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No. 1, Jan-Mar 1982

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U.S., PRC, JAPAN TO BLAME FOR TENSION IN ASIA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 82 pp 3-10

[Article: "The Real Road to Peace and International Security"]

[Text] The Soviet people are working enthusiastically in order to implement the impressive plans of economic and social development drawn up by the 26th CPSU Congress—a milestone in the history of the CPSU, the Soviet state and international relations. The CPSU has always striven to secure external conditions for the construction of socialism and communism in the USSR. The CC CPSU headed by Leonid Brezhnev, its General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has been working indefatigably to normalise the international situation, to banish the possibility of war from international life, to create conditions for the further economic and social progress of the USSR and other socialist countries, and to consolidate the positions of the world democratic and progressive forces.

Experience has shown that socialism is the main force capable of protecting humanity from nuclear war. The foreign policy of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community has been designed to help attain this vital goal. Problems of war and peace have become central to the survival of civilisation.

The West German *Stern* magazine wrote recently that every minute one million dollars is being spent on arms and defence in the world. There are about 50,000 nuclear warheads in the nuclear powers' arsenals, according to *Stern*, and 34,000 of them belong to the United States. It must be added that a Titan missile's nuclear warhead has 740 times the destructive power of the atom bomb that razed Hiroshima to the ground.

It has always been a basic premise of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that the attainment of the ideals of socialism is unthinkable without the struggle for peace on earth. Cooperation between all countries and peoples in the name of social progress and for their future is an essential part of the goals of socialism. The formula of peace underlying Soviet foreign policy centres around the ardent desire to prevent war and create favourable conditions for the allround development of the peoples.

Today, when the imperialists continue to fan up tensions in the world, this formula of peace has acquired singular importance—it has become an alarm-awakening people to the new danger. "Today the state of world affairs requires new, additional efforts to remove the threat of war, and buttress international security. To safeguard peace—no task is more important now on the international plane for our Party, for our people and, for that matter, for all the peoples of the world", concluded the 26th CPSU Congress.

The 26th CPSU Congress worked out a range of measures designed to uphold peace, check the arms race, and attain a political settlement of conflicts. The world public welcomed the Congress' proposals presently known as the Peace Programme for the Eighties. It is being consistently and effectively implemented.

The visit of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the FRG (November 22-25, 1981) was a major step in the implementation of the Peace Programme for the eighties. The Soviet-West German summit took place at a difficult moment in international life. The imperialists are whipping up the arms race and making dangerous plans to deploy new US nuclear missiles in Western Europe, primarily in the FRG. Under these conditions, the peoples of the world look with hope towards the Soviet Union which pursues a peace policy in close cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries. These aspirations were fully met by the new, far-reaching Soviet initiatives put forward during the visit. They serve but one goal—to reach a mutually acceptable agreement and to rid Europe, our common home, of the danger of conflagration.

The USSR's new proposals are an important programme for phasing out nuclear arsenals in Europe and the world over, a programme comprehensible to all. It is realistic, to the point, and constructive, based on the key principles of equality and equal security. The peoples of the world expect that the West, the United States above all, will consider the new Soviet initiatives objectively and soberly.

* * *

In their foreign policy, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are firmly guided by the ideals of freedom and progress for all humankind, the independence of all nations and peoples, the need to work for a more peaceful world and to reduce armaments. The socialist community has never threatened any country. It is common knowledge that at its very inception, the first socialist country in the world inscribed the lofty principles of peace and friendship on its banner.

To the imperialist policy of fanning up tensions in the world and torpedoing detente, the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community oppose a genuine policy of peace which meets the interests of all peoples. The programme of peace, international cooperation and the banning of war has always been the mainstay of Soviet foreign policy, from the historic Decree on Peace promulgated by Lenin to the foreign policy decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. The Congress confirmed the Soviet proposals on increasing international security and curbing the arms race of the last few years and put forward a series of important ideas and constructive initiatives which are a logical continuation and development of the Peace Programmes proclaimed by the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses.

Soviet foreign policy, based on the principles of peace, justice, the recognition of the right of all peoples to shape their own destinies, and support to the peoples' struggle for independence, is inherently humanitarian; it is in keeping with the interests of the whole of peaceloving humanity. The main goal of Soviet foreign policy is to secure the foreign political interests of the Soviet people and state, but at the same time this policy is designed to meet the interests of practically all people on earth. The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Congress states: "Our struggle to strengthen peace and deepen detente is above all the struggle to secure the requisite external conditions for the Soviet people to carry out their constructive tasks. Thereby we are also solving a problem of a truly global nature. For at present nothing is

more essential and more important for any nation than to preserve peace and ensure the paramount right of every human being—the right to life."

It should be noted that this is due not only to the objective coincidence of interests of the Soviet people and all the peoples of the world, and not only to the profound humanitarianism of Soviet foreign policy. This is also due to the fact that in its foreign political activities, the Soviet Union takes public opinion into account as well as ideas and proposals put forward by the most authoritative forums and public figures.

Nowadays, the most urgent and pressing task is to reduce tensions in the world, to slow down the arms race, and to eliminate the danger of war. On 23 June, 1981, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR launched an appeal "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World" calling on them to do everything to prevent a new world war. In the appeal, the USSR's supreme legislative body solemnly declared that the Soviet Union is neither threatening nor seeking confrontation with any country of the West or East. The USSR has never sought military superiority; it has never initiated, nor will it initiate a new round of the arms race. There is no type of weapon which it is not ready to limit or ban on a mutual basis in concert with other states. The need to keep the peace and to prevent a nuclear catastrophe adds to the importance of the foreign political moves designed to attain these goals, putting them in the forefront of political problems of every people.

Trying to defeat each other in the arms race and hoping for a victory in a nuclear war is dangerous madness, Leonid Brezhnev remarked to a *Pravda* correspondent. He added that only those who have decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war, hoping to come out of it victorious. Whatever the might of the attacker and whatever the chosen mode of attack, he shall not attain his aims: retaliation is inevitable. Such is the principled stand of the Soviet Union. "One may ask: why doesn't the United States support the Soviet proposal on the inadmissibility of the first use of nuclear weapons tabled at the 26th session of the UN General Assembly?", said Leonid Brezhnev later in the interview. Indeed, if there is no first strike, there will be no second or third nuclear strike. As a result, all speculation about the possibility or impossibility of winning a nuclear war will lose substance, and the question of nuclear war as such will be removed from the agenda.

As for the Soviet Union, it favours concrete and effective agreements on curbing the arms race. If the principle of equality and equal security of sides is observed, the Soviet Union will show the maximum good will to reach agreements which would reduce the danger of a nuclear war. The Soviet Union views positively the efforts of any other country, be it small, medium-sized or large, if these efforts are aimed at improving the political climate and reducing the level of military confrontation, stressed Leonid Brezhnev in his interview with an NBC correspondent. We are doing, he added, and are ready to do a lot to this effect.

In contrast to the Soviet Union's principled and consistent foreign policy, US allegations that the USSR has designs to start a nuclear war, albeit a limited one, look ridiculous. The true purpose of these inventions is clear: Washington needs them to justify its own efforts to attain strategic superiority over the USSR.

The propaganda drive to "legitimise" nuclear war, now afoot in the US has recently been joined by President Reagan himself who alleges that the Soviet Union thinks it possible to win a nuclear war. Secretary

of State Haig told the House Armed Forces Committee on 30 July 1981 that with a view to strengthening American security and demonstrating the resolve to pursue a new course in US-Soviet relations, the United States is embarking on a major programme of upgrading its military potential. These words of the head of the US foreign policy department are ample illustration of the Reagan Administration's desire to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union by accelerating the arms race and returning to its global "position of strength" policy.

According to press reports, the United States is going to spend \$1,500 billion on arms in between 1981 and 1985. Although the amount of military spending itself is staggering, the true meaning of the new military budget can be understood only in terms of its underlying objectives. Speaking in Chicago on 5 May 1981, Secretary of Defence Weinberger said that the US must be ready to fight a conventional war which may spread to many parts of the globe, unless America succeeds in containing a local aggression. The Pentagon chief is well aware of which party has been advocating all sorts of "local war" doctrines, who has actually unleashed local wars, and who repeatedly made use of sophisticated weapons of mass destruction. Many parts of Indochina bear the scars of such warfare to this day. Thousands of families in Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos were decimated by American napalm, bombs, shells and poison gas.

The conclusion is that the main thrust of the present US Administration's foreign policy is aimed at stirring up all sorts of tensions in the world and at the militarisation of the country's economy and culture. Washington is using the mass media to glorify the cult of violence and peddle its crazy plans of American predominance in the world. In short, it is indulging in what amounts to nuclear-war propaganda. The British *Financial Times* wrote that Reagan clearly believes that the American people have authorised him to display the country's clout to the rest of the world. One can hardly disagree with the newspaper which aptly observes that Reagan has a rather simplified view of the world. He has no doubts that anyone standing in America's way is a fall guy. He is obsessed with the dream of restoring America to the status of the world's number one superpower, the paper concluded.

* * *

During the 30 years or so which have elapsed since the end of the Second World War Asia has been constantly rocked by wars, large and small, and by armed conflicts. The present-day international situation on this continent which accounts for one third of the world's land area and more than one half of its population, arouses growing concern of the world public. Whatever region of Asia we take—Near, Middle or Far East, Southeast Asia or the Indian Ocean—every one of them is plagued by heightening tensions. The root cause of the aggravation of the situation is the aggressive policy of imperialism, militarism and hegemonism. The United States is continuing its aggressive actions against the progressive Arab and North African states, Libya in particular. The US military presence in the Persian Gulf area has grown considerably.

US imperialism is increasing its military presence in many parts of the globe, including Asia. In the Middle East, the United States is encouraging Israel's aggressive aspirations. Tel Aviv annexed the Syrian

Golan Heights not without the Reagan Administration's blessing. It is making massive arms deliveries to reactionary regimes; it is putting together a pro-American bloc of Arab states. Vast territories thousands of miles from the continental United States have been proclaimed "spheres of vital interests" for America. The rapid deployment force is being beefed up constantly. Existing military bases are being expanded and modernised, and new ones are being built.

Washington's militarist policies assume even more dangerous proportions in light of the alliance between imperialism and Great-Han hegemonism. The latest manifestation of this ominous cooperation was Washington's decision to supply sophisticated weaponry to China. Those who are leaving no stones upturned to give modern weapons to the Chinese hegemonists probably think that they will be able to influence Peking's policies and to channel its expansionist drive northwards. This is a dangerous delusion. Of course, the alliance is basically an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist one. But another danger inherent in aiding China's militarisation is that American weapons in the Peking's leaders' hands will most likely be turned against small neighbouring countries, some of which are America's allies. By arming China, the imperialists are encouraging it to act up to its territorial claims to the countries of South and Southeast Asia.

Peking's leaders have given a "high assessment" of Washington's latest moves to whip up the arms race and involve its allies in a new round of arms buildup. The world public opinion is justifiably alarmed by these developments. The *Wall Street Journal* wrote that the decision to sell arms to China goes far beyond the framework of US-Chinese relations. The London *Times* noted that Washington's agreement to strengthen China militarily and technologically combined with the strongly-worded verbal attacks on Kampuchea made by US envoys in Peking, has made the ASEAN countries' leaders wonder whether Secretary of State Haig's short-term anti-Soviet measures might not result in long-term headaches for them.

In an editorial entitled "The Dangerous Nature of Sino-American Military Cooperation" *Mainichi* stressed that a "militarily strong China represents a threat to all Asian countries in its vicinity. The countries of the continent which are the main targets of the Great-Han chauvinism practised by the present Chinese leadership realise that building up China's military potential means putting weapons into the hands of expansionists." Japan's Foreign Ministry expressed concern over US arms deliveries to China. The pressure Washington has placed on Japan to step up its militarisation is increasingly supported by Peking. There is reason to expect that the participants in the US-Chinese collusion will spare no efforts to force Japan to embark on the road of militarisation.

Peking's leaders have been known to make statements to the effect that "international peace and security can be defended" and that the struggle for disarmament "is now more genuinely pressing than at any time in the past". In his statement before the Committee on Disarmament on 5 February 1980, the head of the Chinese delegation even went so far as to say that "China has decided to participate in the work of the Committee beginning from this year, and we are ready actively to join you in your work and to contribute to the attainment of progress toward genuine disarmament and to the cause of peace". However, this statement has not been followed by any serious and constructive proposals on the part of the Chinese delegation. More than that, during the discussion of items on the agenda or of procedural matters, the Chinese

representatives constantly make hostile sallies against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community which resolutely demand an end to the arms race. Since this is the way the Chinese delegation is attempting to contribute to the work of the Disarmament Committee, we must note that the Committee is not a debating society but an instrument of serious negotiations on the most pressing issue facing humanity—that of arms reduction. It is now common knowledge that disarmament Peking style "means primarily that two states must disarm—the USSR and the USA—with the rest of the countries, including China, being free to act as they see fit". Peking's approach to arms reduction was also manifest in the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament program.

China's stand on the limitation of strategic arms is equally inconsistent and does not conform to the interests of the international community. What the Chinese leadership is primarily interested in is increasing the country's nuclear potential, not disarmament. The Indian *Patriot* wrote that China's testing of a new intercontinental ballistic missile has led to a new spurt in the arms race. China's nuclear build-up is no surprise, the paper went on, since Peking's tendency to solve international disputes by force is common knowledge. China's plans pose a most serious threat to the stability and security of the Asian countries, the paper added.

No wonder that Peking's leaders have hailed the Western decision to produce and deploy new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe as "an important step designed to counter the Soviet Union's nuclear superiority", and as "an important step of the NATO countries to strengthen their defences in the face of the Soviet military threat". Peking's leaders still consider that a new world war is inevitable and hope that it will allow them to attain their hegemonic aims.

The Chinese leadership has persistently pushed Japan toward a confrontation with the Soviet Union. It wants Japan to become a military power which, side by side with other imperialist states, would form a common front against the Soviet Union. The Chinese press pays a great deal of attention to Soviet-Japanese relations, invariably supporting in provocative terms Japan's groundless claims to the so-called "northern territories". Peking brandishes the false theory of "the threat from the North" to intimidate the Japanese and divert their attention from the real threat—the US military bases on Japanese soil and in South Korea.

Counting on war, the Peking leaders actively back the imperialist quarters in their policy of pushing on with the arms race, consolidating military and political alliances, and heightening international tensions. Peking is egging the West and Japan on to build up their military power and supports US inhuman plans for neutron bomb production. In effect, the Chinese leadership has opted for confrontation with all peaceloving forces, all those who oppose the arms race and preparation for war.

China's policy of preparation for war is a waste of manpower and material resources and is detrimental to the interests of the Chinese people. The firebrand policies of the Chinese leadership on the international arena, its sallies against detente and disarmament, and its military and political alliance with die-hard reactionaries, are closely linked with its anti-popular domestic course towards militarisation of the country's economy. In defiance of the world public and the vast majority of the countries of the world, Peking continues its nuclear tests in the atmosphere and goes on with building up its missile forces.

Having raised preparation for war to the level of state policy, Peking is feverishly building up its military potential. Having declared the Soviet Union "number one enemy", the Chinese leadership makes a point of emphasising that China's strategic interests are identical with those of the USA and Japan. This identity is based on blatant anti-Sovietism and enmity toward the socialist community as a means to this end.

The imperialist policy of destabilising the world situation, escalating the arms race, and Peking's adventurist course pose a real and serious threat to the independence and sovereignty of states as well as to peace and security in Asia. The situation has been further aggravated by the US Administration's decision to supply China with US-made offensive weapons and sophisticated military equipment.

In developing their military and political alliance, US imperialists, Japanese militarists and Chinese hegemonists have launched a noisy propaganda campaign about the alleged "Soviet military threat"; they are sowing seeds of discord and distrust among the Asian countries, trying to provoke conflicts between them. But it is an established fact that it is the United States that is expanding its network of military bases in the region, including those with nuclear arsenals. It is the United States that is encouraging certain military regimes to produce their own nuclear weapons.

Beginning a new round of the arms race, the imperialist quarters and the Chinese rulers are embarking on a course that leads nowhere. This self-defeating step is the result of a short-sighted view of history, which provides ample proof that the socialist community cannot be intimidated into submission to imperialist diktat by threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Shutting their eyes to the lessons of the past and the failure of their expansionist plans and designs, the war hawks in the imperialist countries demonstrate that they ignore the lessons of history. The history of the postwar years shows that the imperialist quarters cannot hope to profit politically or militarily from the arms race. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community pursue a consistent policy of peace and security as a counterbalance to the imperialist doctrine of continuing the arms race and military hysteria.

The Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy finds a ready response in the hearts and minds of millions in Asia. The Soviet initiative to hold an international conference which would seek a comprehensive settlement to the Middle East problem on a just and realistic basis is in full accord with the aspirations of the peoples, who demand an end to the growth of tension in the world and to the imperialist military and political conspiracy spearheaded against the countries of that area. Of equal importance is the Soviet proposal to hold negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East with all interested countries.

The consistent peace policy of the socialist countries and their active measures in pursuance of this goal represent an obstacle in the way of imperialism, militarism, and hegemonism's macabre plans. A key element in this peace policy is the agreements on friendship and cooperation between the socialist countries and between them and other peaceloving countries.

An important factor in the preservation and consolidation of peace in Asia and the world over is the friendly relations between the USSR and India.

The present-day international situation calls for maximal activisation of all democratic and peaceloving forces to thwart the aggressive policies of imperialism and hegemonism. The Soviet Union and other fra-

ternal socialist countries are cooperating with these progressive forces in the noble cause of defending peace.

The Mongolian People's Republic has put forward a proposal to work out and sign a convention on non-aggression and non-use of force in relations among the countries of Asia and the Pacific. It has also been proposed that the matter be discussed at a conference of the countries in the region with the possible participation of the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Y. Tsedenbal's messages to the heads of state and government of 50 countries and the UN Secretary-General with an exposition of the motives for the Mongolian initiative and considerations on possible ways of implementation have met with considerable interest. The peaceloving public also welcomed Leonid Brezhnev's reply to the message in which the Soviet leader praised the Mongolian proposals and expressed the readiness of the Soviet Government to cooperate in their implementation.

It is natural that this initiative runs in the mainstream of other proposals put forward on a national, regional and international basis with a view to assuring security in Asia. An example of this process are the proposals of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and cooperation, as well as the Soviet proposals on the normalisation of the situation in the Persian Gulf, on confidence-building measures in the Far East, etc. The common underlying feature of all these proposals is a genuine desire to legitimise the principle of the renunciation of the use of force in international relations.

The situation in Asia can and must be normalised. What is needed is good will and the readiness of states to settle international issues in the interest of peace and progress. The unity and solidarity of all peaceloving peoples and countries of Asia are needed, for only this can put an insurmountable obstacle in the way of imperialism and hegemonism's aggressive schemes and adventures. The struggle for security in Asia is one of the decisive directions of the broader struggle for the preservation of peace, the deepening of detente, putting an end to the wasteful arms race, and progressing on to genuine disarmament.

"The Soviet Communists are proud," stressed Leonid Brezhnev, "that they assumed a difficult but noble mission to be in the front ranks of those who struggle to ward off from the peoples dangers inherent in the continuation of the arms race. Our party is calling on all peoples and countries to join their efforts to put an end to this pernicious process."

The new peace initiatives put forward by the 26th CPSU Congress are in keeping with the vital interests of the peoples of the planet. They draw their strength from the epoch-making gains of the builders of a new world, the fighters for national and social liberation. The peaceloving states have sufficient strength and influence to overcome the dangerous escalation of tensions and to stabilise the international situation.

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SUN YAT-SEN'S TIES TO USSR CHRONICLED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 82 pp 11-20

[Article by Academician S. Tikhvinskij: "Great October and the Revolutionary Movement in China"]

[Text]

Chinese revolutionary democrat Sun Yatsen is the most prominent figure in the history of the national liberation struggle of the Chinese people in the first quarter of the 20th century—the dawn of "Asia's awakening". The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia played a crucial role in the political and ideological formation of Sun Yatsen after the defeat of the Xinhai revolution and in his subsequent revolutionary activities. Having put an end to capitalist exploitation on one sixth of the globe, the October Revolution exerted a tremendous influence on the national liberation struggle of the Chinese people and the world revolutionary movement.

Sun Yatsen had long been sympathetic to the struggle of Russia's peoples against autocracy. In 1896-1897, while staying in Britain, he was in contact with Russian political emigres—the narodniki. When in emigration in Japan in 1905-1907, he learned about the revolutionary events in Russia from Japanese socialists and their press. He was also personally in touch with N. Sudzilovsky, G. Gershuni and other Russian revolutionaries of a socialist-revolutionary and narodnik persuasion. There is evidence that in 1905 in Paris, en route to Japan, Sun Yatsen met member of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) G. Chicherin and had a long conversation with him about revolution.¹

The events of the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907 made a profound impression on Sun Yatsen. Graphic proof of this can be found in the articles which he personally edited for *Min bao*. It should be noted, however, that neither the *Min bao* authors nor its editor had a clear conception of the nature of class struggles in Russia: Russia's revolutionaries were indiscriminately referred to as "nihilists". The Chinese and Japanese press of the time applied the term mainly to the Socialist Revolutionaries whose ideology was similar to Sun Yatsen's in ways. He was not acquainted with the theory of scientific socialism, and was not aware of the creative revolutionary role of the workers' and peasants' masses and the role of a Marxist party as a vanguard of the working class. Although Sun Yatsen and his associates did proclaim the slogan of "the equalisation of land ownership rights", they had no significant ties with the working people in urban or rural areas; moreover, they were afraid of spontaneous mass action. Sun Yatsen's three popular

¹ See L. S. Kyuzadjan, "On the Impact of the Russian 1905-1907 Revolution on China's Revolutionary Democrats", *Vestnik istorii mirovoi kultury*, No. 6, 1959, p. 38; T. S. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution*, London, 1928, p. 123.

principles: "to drive out the Manchus and resurrect China; to establish a republic; and to equalise landownership rights", which formed the basis of the Joint Alliance platform, reflected the views of a bourgeois revolutionary democrat. Sun Yatsen also nourished naive illusions about the positive role which the imperialist powers were, in his view, to play in both the Chinese revolution and the subsequent economic rehabilitation of the country. The Xinhai revolution was to dash the futile hopes that the imperialist forces would remain neutral during the struggle of the emerging social forces against the feudal order embodied by Yuan Shikai. However, more than ten years were to pass before this became absolutely clear to Sun Yatsen.

During the events of 1911-1912, the Hubei revolutionaries and Sun Yatsen's Nanking provisional revolutionary government futilely requested economic assistance from the imperialist powers. Only the Bolshevik party in Russia and its leader Lenin rejoiced over the revolutionary uprising of the Chinese people and praised the activities of the Chinese revolutionaries led by Sun Yatsen. Proof of this can be found in the materials of the Bolshevik press of the time as well as in the proceedings of the 1912 Prague Conference of the RSDLP (B) which passed a special resolution expressing support for the Chinese revolutionaries and condemning the imperialist policy of tsarism and the liberal bourgeoisie which tried to take advantage of the civil war in China to annex parts of its territory.

Progressive public opinion in Russia was highly sympathetic towards Sun Yatsen's efforts to establish a democratic republic. Maxim Gorky wrote to Sun Yatsen on 28 October 1912: "I, a Russian, struggle for the triumph of the ideas you are struggling for; wherever these ideas prove victorious, I, like you, shall rejoice in their victory... We, Russians, strive for the ideals you have already attained; we are brothers in spirit, we are comrades in intent; the Russian government, in contrast, and its slaves want the Russian people to adopt a position hostile to the people of China."²

While strongly critical of the tsarist government's aggressive acts against China, Sun Yatsen was highly sympathetic towards the Russian people who were languishing under the yoke of autocracy.³ Speaking in Peking on 1 September 1912, he said that "not only are the Russian people deprived of all political rights, they are subjected to all sorts of suppression by the government".⁴

When the revolutionary movement in China was crushed by Yuan Shikai, a creature of feudal-comprador reaction, Sun Yatsen was forced to flee to Japan. Still he could not grasp the principal cause of his past setbacks—the great distance separating bourgeois revolutionaries from the masses. His new Chinese Revolutionary Party—Zhongguo gemingdang—had no mass base in the country. In 1913-1916, he earnestly hoped for an alliance with an imperialist country, most likely Japan, against Yuan Shikai. While working on his **Programme for the Building of a Country** in 1918, Sun Yatsen strongly hoped for the voluntary participation of the governments of major capitalist states in the economic rehabilitation of China with a view to turning it into a powerful nation. International conferences held after World War I showed the degree of Sun Yatsen's shortsightedness in counting on "foreign capitalism's help in creating socialism in China" and "speeding up the development

² *Izvestia*, June 18, 1937.

³ *Sovremennik*, October 1912, pp. 377-380.

⁴ *Zhongguo gongbao*, Sept. 2, 1912.

of future world civilisation". They also spelled the end of his hopes for a peaceful settlement of postwar differences among the imperialist powers through the creation of an international trust to facilitate the development of China's natural resources and bring about the country's industrialisation. Britain, France, the United States and Japan did not want a powerful China. The Versailles and Washington conferences only triggered a new round of infighting among the imperialist powers for domination over China.

The failure of foreign assistance to materialise was accompanied by constant setbacks in Sun Yatsen's attempts to pit China's warlords against one another and to defeat the Peking government.

Real assistance to China could come only from a socialist state which made it its goal "to render these nations ...backward and oppressed ... 'disinterested cultural assistance'... In other words, we will help them pass to the use of machinery, to the lightening of labour, to democracy, to socialism",⁵ as Lenin wrote in 1916.

The influence of the Great October's ideas and the practical example of conducting a successful revolution was one of the factors which led Sun Yatsen to radically revise his views on the national liberation struggle in China.

Little news of the Russian revolution reached China; the young Soviet republic, fighting to break the stranglehold of intervention, was in an extremely difficult position. Sun Yatsen had no way of receiving current information on the Decree on Peace or the special appeal of the Council of People's Commissars to All the Toiling Moslems of Russia and the East, reaffirming the Soviet government's renunciation of all inequitable treaties signed by the tsarist and Kerensky governments with a view to enslaving the peoples of the Orient.⁶ However, by 1918, Sun Yatsen had already begun to understand that "the Chinese revolution will never succeed unless it learns from Russia..."⁷ Acting on this conclusion, he decided to send his comrades to study the Russian experience; for this purpose, he instructed them to learn Russian.⁸

Sun Yatsen's first contacts with Soviet Russia date back to 1918. In the spring or summer of that year, he sent a message to V. I. Lenin on behalf of the South China Parliament congratulating him on the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Although the original text of the message has been lost, it mentioned, according to some Chinese sources, the possibility of a union between the revolutionary parties of Russia and China for joint struggle.⁹ The Council of People's Commissars authorised G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, to reply to the message. G. Chicherin addressed Sun Yatsen as a person who "since 1911, under particularly difficult conditions, has continued to lead the working people of China against the oppressors—the North Chinese and foreign bourgeoisie and imperialist governments".¹⁰ Chicherin said in part: "In your message to the workers' and peasants' government of Russia some time ago, Respected Teacher, you pointed out that the Russian and the Chinese revolutions pursue identical goals, namely the liberation of workers and the establishment of a durable peace based on the recognition of common inter-

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 67.

⁶ See *Documents of the USSR Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, pp. 11-14, 34-35.

⁷ He Xiangning, "My Recollections" in *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 6, 1961.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ Ping Ming, *History of Sino-Soviet Friendship*, Moscow, 1959, p. 68.

¹⁰ *Documents of the USSR Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1, p. 415.

ests of the two great proletariats—Russian and Chinese. This great goal, which we understand as the establishment of universal peace through a universal brotherhood of the toiling classes of the two nations, has been the basis of all the activity of the workers' and peasants' government since the moment when power passed from the hands of the bourgeois government into the hands of the people.”¹¹ This message, while bearing witness to Chicherin's sympathy for the Chinese people, shows that Moscow did not have a sufficiently clear picture of the alignment of class forces in China at the time and of the socio-political programme of Sun Yatsen, who was only beginning to realise the need to broaden the party's social base among the working people and to take a more consistent anti-imperialist and, to a certain extent, anti-capitalist course.¹²

Sun Yatsen's world outlook was profoundly affected by the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist “May 4 Movement” which sprang up in China under the influence of the Great October Revolution. The Paris Conference resolution of the Shandong dispute in favour of Japan sparked student unrest in Peking. When the disturbances spread to other cities, they were supported by the bourgeoisie and, more importantly, by the working class. For the first time in history, China's proletariat stepped into the arena of conscious political struggle, and from then on it began its transformation into the main strike force of the revolution.

The upsurge in the nationwide struggle showed Sun Yatsen the need to restructure the revolutionary party with a view to legalising it and involving a more representative cross-section of republican elements in it. A new party, the Guomindang (National Party) was set up on 10 October 1919. However, its main political slogan of those years—defence of the constitution and a resumption of the work of Parliament (Parliament had been dissolved twice, in 1913 and 1917) was not equivalent to the revolutionary tasks of the moment and had few followers.

When Sun Yatsen was elected president of the republic at the April 7, 1921 session of parliament in Guangzhou, he failed to obtain recognition of either Peking or the imperialist powers. His attempts to make use of troops of the southern warlords ended in failure. After the mutiny of General Chen Jiongming, which succeeded largely due to the assistance of foreign consuls in Guangzhou, Sun Yatsen had to flee to Shanghai, where he took up residence in the French concession.

The Soviet government provided substantial proof of its friendly attitude towards the Chinese people: on 2 December 1918, a decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee remitted all China's debts to Russia.¹³ A special message of the RSFSR to the governments of South and North China, dated 25 July 1919, set forth the main principles of Soviet foreign policy, solemnly proclaiming the renunciation of all rights and privileges enjoyed by tsarist Russia in China and declaring the old unequal treaties null and void.¹⁴

In the concluding part of the Message of the RSFSR's government to the Chinese people and the governments of South and North China, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L. Karakhan wrote: “If the Chinese people, like the Russian people, want to free themselves and escape the lot prepared for them by the Allies at Versailles with a view

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² See G. V. Yefimov, *Sun Yatsen. In Search for a Road. 1914-1922*, Moscow, 1981, p. 99.

¹³ See *Documents of the USSR Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1, p. 593.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 221-223.

to turning China into a second Korea or a second India, let them understand that their only allies and brothers in the struggle for freedom are the Russian workers and peasants and their Red Army.”¹⁵

Sun Yatsen availed himself of every opportunity to obtain objective information about Russia and its revolutionary experience. Towards the close of 1920, he met with Comintern representative G. Voitinsky who had arrived at Shanghai from Moscow,¹⁶ and in 1922, in Guangzhou, he had a talk with S. Dalin, a representative of Soviet youth who was also a Comintern official. A Russian Telegraph Agency branch and a Russian language school opened in Guangzhou. Sun Yatsen continued his correspondence with G. Chicherin, discussing the setting up of Soviet-Chinese trade relations.¹⁷ In 1921-1922, there was a lively exchange of letters between Sun Yatsen and Russian diplomats in China, followed by personal contacts which enabled Sun Yatsen to understand properly the RSFSR's foreign and domestic policies.

In a letter to G. Chicherin dated 28 August 1921, Sun Yatsen informed his correspondent of the political developments in China in the past ten years and added: “...I would like to meet you and other friends in Moscow. I am exceedingly interested in your cause, particularly the organisation of your Soviets, your Army and education. I would like to know everything you and others can tell me about these things, particularly about education. As Moscow has done, I would like to lay the foundations of the Chinese republic deep in the minds of the younger generation—the toiling people of tomorrow.

“Best wishes to you, to my friend Lenin and to all those who have done so much for the cause of freedom. Sincerely yours, Sun Yatsen.”¹⁸

Lenin took a lively interest in the evolution of the national liberation movement in China; he specifically asked Chicherin to show him Sun Yatsen's letter. Chicherin wrote back to the leader of the Chinese revolution: “Comrade Lenin also read your letter with interest and is following your activities with great sympathy.” In the same letter Chicherin went on to say: “I emphasise that our government and people are most sincere friends of the Chinese people; they ardently want China to become a unified, progressive state, led by a popular government and completely free of external political and economic pressure... Irrespective of the subsequent development of our political positions in and outside Europe, our government will never deviate from the path of most loyal, cordial and sincere friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people, whose welfare and free democratic development are our most sincere wish.”¹⁹

Sun Yatsen also corresponded with A. Ioffe, Soviet diplomatic representative in Peking. Without a clear idea of the essence of Soviet socialist foreign policy and the ways in which it differed from that of other powers, at first Sun Yatsen took a negative view of the Soviet government's efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Peking. Chicherin and Ioffe patiently explained the position of the RSFSR; they showed that the earliest possible normalisation of bilateral relations would be in accord with the interests of the masses in China and Russia. The

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

¹⁶ G. N. Voitinsky, “My Meetings with Sun Yatsen”, *Pravda*, March 15, 1925.

¹⁷ *Documents of the USSR Foreign Policy*, Vol. 2, p. 730.

¹⁸ “Soviet-Chinese Relations. 1917-1957”, *A Collection of Documents*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 58-59.

¹⁹ *Documents of the USSR Foreign Policy*, Vol. 5, pp. 83-84.

final communique of the important talks between Sun Yatsen and Ioffe in Shanghai in January 1923 noted that the two sides "discovered a complete identity of views on Sino-Russian relations". The Soviet representative stressed that "China's most pressing and important task is national unification and the attainment of full national independence".²⁰

In a cable to L. Karakhan, who had been appointed USSR's plenipotentiary representative to China, Sun Yatsen wrote on 16 September 1923: "I have been deeply moved by your generous assessment of my unfailing friendship with New Russia: I assert that no criticism of the ideology which you uphold can and will prevent me from agreeing with you that the genuine interests of our countries require the elaboration of a common policy which will put us on an equal footing with other powers and will liberate us from the political and economic slavery imposed by the international system which relies on force and uses methods of economic imperialism."²¹

The setting up of the Union of Chinese Workers in Russia further strengthened Sun Yatsen's ties with the Soviet Republic. The Union's 3rd Congress elected Sun Yatsen its honorary chairman along with Lenin.²²

The influence of the socialist revolution in Russia on Sun Yatsen must be viewed in light of the upsurge of the Chinese working people's anti-imperialist struggle. One of the first practical effects of this influence was Sun Yatsen's favourable attitude to the first Chinese communists and his gradual rapprochement with the Communist Party established there in 1921.

Another indication of the profound impact of the October Revolution upon Sun Yatsen can be found in the Guomindang's new programme—The Manifesto of Party Principles—published on 1 January 1923 which offered a new interpretation of the three popular principles. The principle of nationalism, although still containing the Great-Han demand for the unification of all of China's peoples into a single Chinese nation, was largely formulated as a means of struggle against the imperialist powers' dominance in China, for China's equality among the peoples of the world, and for the equality of the different peoples living in China. The principles of people's power and people's welfare were concretised as demands for democratic freedoms, universal suffrage, the equalisation of landownership rights, and the nationalisation of railways, natural resources, power plants, etc.

The Manifesto criticised the evils of the Western socio-economic and parliamentary systems. A new, progressive element in Sun Yatsen's ideology was the provision on workers' participation in the management of industrial enterprises. The Guomindang's Manifesto also demanded equal rights for men and women. At the same time, Sun Yatsen still failed to grasp the importance of the resolution of the agrarian problem; he negated class struggle in rural areas and the need to confiscate land from large landowners.

Heading the new South China government in February 1923, Sun Yatsen launched a plan for the peaceful unification of the country. In implementing the Guomindang programme, he paid great attention to the workers' movement, supporting strikes in North China and ensuring democratic freedoms for the population. The vicious attacks and accusations by the Northern warlords who referred to him as "a Comin-

²⁰ *Soviet-Chinese Relations. 1917-1957*, p. 65.

²¹ Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1964. p. 567 (in Russian).

²² *Documents of the USSR Foreign Policy*.

tern agent" and "Moscow's pawn" did not weaken Sun Yatsen's resolve to strengthen relations with Soviet Russia and to consolidate the union with the working masses of all China.

A huge wave of liberation struggles swept across the country in the first half of 1923, largely as a result of the February railway strike which was brutally crushed by the imperialists and warlords and of the anti-Japanese sentiment sparked in March by Tokyo's refusal to return Lushun and Dalian to China after their "leases" expired. Under these conditions, the Communist Party of China began to move from a policy of support for the Guomindang pursued since the 2nd Congress to one of alliance with it and the creation of a united anti-imperialist front. A decision to this effect was passed at the 3rd CPC Congress in Guangzhou in June 1923.

Sun Yatsen discussed this matter with Comintern representative G. Maring in December 1921. It also figured prominently in Lenin's talk with the Chinese delegates to the Congress of Far Eastern Peoples which took place in Moscow in January 1922.²³ Sun Yatsen welcomed Chinese communists into his party and relied on their support in implementing his plans to reorganise the Guomindang into an effective revolutionary party.

Sun Yatsen was open-minded about communist criticism of the Guomindang's inconsistent policies, particularly with respect to foreign powers and he adjusted his domestic and foreign policy accordingly. Concerned about the need to train reliable military personnel, he sent a military group of the Guomindang to Moscow to study the Red Army's experience.

A prominent figure in the Russian and international revolutionary movement, M. Borodin, arrived in Guangzhou in October 1923 at Sun Yatsen's request to become his adviser on the reorganisation of the Guomindang. Sun Yatsen also invited a group of Soviet military advisers, which at various times included such outstanding commanders as V. Blukher, P. Pavlov and A. Cherepanov.

A better knowledge of the experience of the Russian revolution convinced Sun Yatsen that only a disciplined and monolithic party could successfully lead the masses in making necessary revolutionary transformations, so he earnestly applied himself to the task of getting the Guomindang on a sound organisational footing.

Local and district party committees were set up along with Guomindang executive bureaus in big cities. When communists joined the Guomindang, its prestige among the masses was heightened. The time came for Sun Yatsen to openly call for the Guomindang to learn from Soviet Russia and adopt the experience of the Russian revolution. He said: "Why was the Russian revolution victorious, while ours was not? In Russia the revolutionaries themselves fought. They built up their might. We must learn from Russia, learn how to struggle, how to organise, how to build discipline..."²⁴ Speaking at meetings of Guomindang activists which took place in Guangzhou on 25 November and 1 December 1923, Sun Yatsen said that "Russia and China are great countries and they must have one future".²⁵ On the same occasion he put forward three new political guidelines: alliance with the USSR, cooperation with the Communist Party of China, and the support for the peas-

²³ See G. V. Yefimov, *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

²⁴ Sun Yatsen, *Complete works*, Vol. II, part 3, p. 40 (in Chinese).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

ants and workers. He remained loyal to these principles to the end of his life.

However, Sun Yatsen's call for friendship with the USSR did not mean that he espoused communist ideology. Although he did move considerably to the left, ideologically speaking, he was still a revolutionary democrat and a long way from holding a Marxist view of the nature of Chinese society, its political system and the role of imperialism. Sun Yatsen's view of the society of the future differed from that of scientific socialism; it amounted to somewhat naive plans for creating a "people's welfare" state. His world view was pervaded with the idealisation of the past, with elements of Confucianism and Great-Han nationalistic tendencies.

Nevertheless, Soviet Russia's alliance with the government of South China played a significant role in subsequent developments in the whole of China. In writings about Soviet-Chinese relations of the period, some Western historians assert that they differed little from Sun Yatsen's contacts with the capitalist states. Some even go so far as to say that the RSFSR pursued the same imperialist goals as tsarist Russia in China, and Sun Yatsen saw cooperation with Moscow as no more than a means of obtaining military assistance. Soviet historiography provides a convincing criticism of such views, arguing that Western historians ignored the influence on Sun Yatsen of such factors as Soviet Russia's renunciation of unequal treaties and its generous aid to the national liberation movements in the East. They also disregarded the impact on him of the 4 May 1919 Movement and the upsurge of the popular anti-imperialist struggle in China. One should also bear in mind the anti-capitalist factor in Sun Yatsen's ideology. The only aim the Soviet Union sought in maintaining contacts with Sun Yatsen was that of seeing China shake off the yoke of imperialism and turn into a strong, independent, peaceloving, democratic state which could become a major factor in the quest for peace and prosperity in the Far East. The alliance of China's democratic forces with the Soviet Union which was formed during Sun Yatsen's lifetime was a phenomenon determined by history.

Not only did the alliance with Soviet Russia mean a radical turn in Sun Yatsen's foreign policy; it also exerted a profound influence on his domestic policy. On Lenin and the Comintern's recommendation, he took part in the formation of a united anti-imperialist front.²⁶ The process was a difficult one characterised by mutual distrust of all parties concerned. For example, many Chinese communists were sceptical about a union with the Guomindang, and the Communist Party's Guangdong organisation was openly hostile to Sun Yatsen. These sectarian, leftist trends in the CPC were gradually overcome, and a radical change in the CPC's attitude towards the united front came about after the Guomindang's 1st Congress.

Late in 1923, Sun Yatsen's political platform took on a clearly anti-imperialist cast, and his sphere of activity extended far beyond South China, reaching a peak in 1924-1925. "Striving for progress during the latter period of his life helped Sun Yatsen appreciate the lessons of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia and realise that the Communist Party of China and its working class were the most dynamic forces in the country," wrote Song Qingling, Sun Yatsen's wife and associate.

²⁶ V. I. Lenin predicted the inevitability of the Chinese Communists' cooperation with Sun Yatsen back in 1912.—See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 168.

"As soon as he saw the truth, he acted without delay. He reviewed and revised his old policy and principles".²⁷

Sun Yatsen took a series of steps to turn the Guomindang into an ideologically strong, well-trained political party with deep roots among the populace. In his speeches, he popularised the October Revolution and the struggle of Russian Communists, calling on the Guomindang members to study it.

The programme of the Guomindang's 1st Congress which opened in Guangzhou on 20 January 1924 proved to be the most important attainment of revolutionary democracy in China. It was the most complete and consistent expression of Sun Yatsen's revolutionary-democratic views which crystallised after nearly forty years of revolutionary work, and this formulation was assisted by his knowledge of the October Revolution. The party manifesto contained a new interpretation of the three popular principles. The principle of nationalism was given a clearly anti-imperialist slant, including an unambiguous recognition of the right to self-determination of all nations. The principle of democracy stated that power must be in the hands of the people, not of a chosen few. The principle of people's welfare charted China's economic development along the road of state capitalism involving the imposition of control on the capital, the allocation of plots of land to landless peasants, labour legislation, nationalisation of the banks, etc.

The congress proclaimed a policy of doing away with unequal treaties with foreign powers and signing new agreements on the basis of equality and the sovereignty of the contracting parties. This became the central demand of the Guomindang's foreign policy, which thus attained a consistently anti-imperialist character. From the experience of the October Revolution, Sun Yatsen realised that China's liberation could only be won in the struggle against the domination of the imperialist states which supported China's warlords. The masses and the Communist Party were to be the Guomindang's allies in the struggle. In spite of strong opposition from the right, the congress reaffirmed that communists may be Guomindang members.

When the news of Lenin's death reached Sun Yatsen, he proposed to suspend the congress' proceedings for three days in homage to Lenin's memory. In his oration in tribute to Lenin, Sun Yatsen deplored the loss of the great man and expressed his determination to follow a path of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. "I want to follow your path, and although my enemies are against this, my people will acclaim me for this. You have died; the heavens have not extended your life, but you will live for centuries in the memory of oppressed peoples..."²⁸

The Guomindang's 1st Congress gave a new direction to the party's policy. It provided an organisational framework for the united front of the country's progressive forces, giving a new powerful impetus to the national liberation struggle of the Chinese people.

After the congress, Sun Yatsen openly called for support of liberation struggles in other countries. Whereas his previous statements on the matter bore the imprint of the ideas of "race solidarity" and "Pan-Asianism", his new appeal meant that he had broken with past misconceptions, largely under the influence of the Great October Revolution and the USSR's foreign policy. It meant that he had reached the understanding

²⁷ Song Qingling, "Sun Yatsen: Great Revolutionary, Son of the Chinese People", *People's China*, No. 22, 1956, p. 8.

²⁸ *Soviet-Chinese Relations. 1917-1957*, p. 79. See also *Izvestia*, 27 March 1924.

that the national liberation struggle of all peoples oppressed by imperialism is part and parcel of the world revolutionary process, that this struggle can succeed only if it cooperates closely with the struggle of the world proletariat.

In his lectures "On the Three Popular Principles", Sun Yatsen emphasised the need for an unbreakable alliance with Russia, pointing out that the October Revolution was the example to be followed by the Chinese people in their struggle for national liberation.²⁹ He welcomed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and China on 31 May 1924—a step which not only strengthened bilateral relations but also delivered a blow to the system of unequal treaties.

Sun Yatsen's struggle for national independence and his policy of friendship with the Soviet Union were anathema to the imperialists, who did not stop short of using force against the revolutionary government. Britain, for one, tried to stage a counterrevolutionary coup in Guangzhou, and, when that failed, decided to overthrow the Guomindang government by direct armed intervention. Only the massive support of the Chinese people for Sun Yatsen's policy forced Britain to abandon its plans. The "Hands off China!" movement launched in the USSR was also instrumental in foiling the imperialist plans. This is but one example of armed interference in the affairs of the South China government on the part of the imperialist powers.

In his political testament, Sun Yatsen reasserted his belief in the Soviet Union as China's only reliable and selfless friend. He voiced the hope that the day would come when the free and independent Chinese people would march towards a happier future for all humankind side by side with the Soviet Union. Subsequent decades have demonstrated that this hope is attainable, and although, through no fault of the Soviet Union, Sino-Soviet relations today are far from goodneighbourly, the Soviet people are confident: Sun Yatsen's testament will one day be fulfilled.

²⁹ Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 856 (in Chinese).

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SIBERIA AND THE SOVIET FAR EAST IN SOVIET-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 82 pp 21-32

[Article by V. Aleksandrov]

[Text]

The expansion of trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation with foreign countries features prominently in the economic policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. The 26th CPSU Congress made "rational use of the advantages of the international division of labour and the possibilities of external economic ties for raising the efficiency of social production"¹ a priority task. Through extensive, varied, mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technological cooperation with other nations, the USSR meets part of its requirements in equipment, new technology and raw materials, as well as a part of the demand for consumer goods. At the 26th CPSU Congress, Leonid Brezhnev said, "Life requires fruitful cooperation of all countries for solving the peaceful, constructive tasks facing every nation and all humanity."²

The USSR's eastern regions, Siberia and the Far East, play an important role in the international division of labour. The policy of developing the natural resources of these two regions in the interests of the national economy was launched by Lenin a few years after the victory of the October Revolution. The founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state emphasised the importance of Siberia's resources not only for the Soviet Union but also for those members of the international community which had trade agreements with the USSR, considering mutual interests. He pointed out that the possibility of "improving the world's technology" existed if the capitalist countries would enter into proper relations with us.³

Lenin's words have lost none of their significance today when the Soviet Union has reached the stage of advanced socialism. Economic cooperation with other states allows us to economise labour, material resources and time; it also accelerates technological progress. The attainment of these objectives is a priority for the country's planning agencies, export industries, and organisations responsible for the effective introduction of new foreign technology, materials and know-how.

* * *

As the productive forces of the eastern regions began to grow at an accelerated pace, particularly in the '70s, so did the region's share in the country's foreign economic ties. Particularly important in this respect was Siberia's newly acquired status as the country's main source of fuel and energy, as a result of the tapping of huge oil and gas

¹ The 26th CPSU Congress. *Documents and Resolutions*, Moscow, 1981, p. 234.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 483.

deposits, unique in volume and concentration, that had been discovered first in the West Siberian Lowlands and then in the adjoining sub-Arctic regions.

In 1970 Siberia accounted for 28 million tons of oil and gas condensate out of the 353 million extracted in the country as a whole. By 1980 Siberia's share had increased to 313 million tons of the total 603 million. The share of the eastern regions in the overall extraction of oil and gas condensate will continue to grow at a high rate throughout the eleventh five-year-plan period. In 1985, of a total of 620-645 million tons, Siberia is expected to account for 385-395 million, or about 60 per cent.

Gas extraction has also been growing rapidly in the East. In 1980 West Siberian fields accounted for 37 per cent of the country's total gas extraction of 163 billion cubic metres. In 1985, of the country's total gas extraction of 600-640 billion cubic metres, Siberia will account for 330-370 billion, or about 55 per cent.

The discovery of oil and gas deposits in Siberia and the constantly growing rate of extraction have raised the share of Siberian oil and gas in Soviet foreign trade deals. The amount of fuel and electricity in overall Soviet exports is as follows: 15.6 per cent in 1970, 31.4 per cent in 1975, 42.2 per cent in 1979 and 46.9 per cent in 1980.⁴

This includes a certain amount of coal exported from Siberia, primarily from the Kuznetsk Basin. However, the bulk of such exports is constituted by hydrocarbons. In 1979 oil, oil products, and natural gas accounted for 39.1 per cent of all Soviet exports. The value of these export items, primarily supplied by Siberia, exceeded 14.5 billion rubles.⁵

The large share of hydrocarbon fuel in Soviet exports is not something anomalous in international trade; it is rather a reflection of a growing trend in the world markets. In 1980 oil exports accounted for about 25 per cent of world trade as opposed to 11 per cent in 1973. In addition, the physical volume of exported oil was 10 per cent lower than in the preceding year, since some of the importing countries were using up their existing stocks. As the Soviet Union is one of the world's exporters of oil and gas, the share of these raw materials in its exports is naturally higher than the world average.

It should be noted that at one time, the mass media of some capitalist countries and even their official agencies tried to reduce the forecasts for the future growth of Soviet oil and gas industry. But such actions are easily seen through: they were designed to cast doubt on the reliability of the Soviet Union as a trade partner.

The rapid growth of Soviet extracting industries has proven these allegations false, and the general tenor of Western official pronouncements on the matter has changed. Officials who want their statements to sound more grounded, speak differently now. Senator William Proxmire, for one, said in September 1981 that the Soviet Union's oil reserves will not soon be depleted, contrary to previous estimates of the US intelligence agencies, and that the energy sector will not slow down the development of the Soviet economy.

The share of deliveries originating from Soviet Siberia and the Far East in the USSR trade with the capitalist countries, in particular with Japan, has been growing steadily. These deliveries, as well as imports

⁴ See *USSR National Economy in 1980. A Statistical Yearbook*, Moscow, 1981, p. 540.

⁵ See *USSR Foreign Trade in 1979. A Statistical Yearbook*, Moscow, 1980, pp. 19, 25.

from Japan earmarked for the eastern regions, are fully in line with the principle of mutual interest.

What makes the Soviet market particularly attractive to Japanese firms is its rich export and import opportunities, enormous potential, low transportation costs and the reliability of the Soviet Union as a trade partner. The Japanese press stresses that for Japan, the development of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union is an important means of countering the attempts of certain overseas monopolies to corner the Japanese market.

In 1979, of total Soviet exports of 944 million rubles, exports from Siberia and the Far East of a few commodities alone (fuel, timber and cut timber, furs, fish and sea products, and medicinal herbs) constituted 608 million rubles. This means that exports from Siberia and the Far East accounted for about 60 per cent of all Soviet exports to Japan. Since Japan exported 1,653.5 million rubles' worth of goods to the USSR in 1979, the above-said Siberian and Far Eastern exports covered about 40 per cent of all imports from Japan. In terms of total Soviet export to capitalist countries, these items accounted for 5 per cent and were used to pay for 4 per cent of total Soviet imports from the capitalist world.⁶

Since the Soviet national economy is a single complex mechanism, foreign currency earnings from export are allocated to priority areas strictly in accordance with national plans. This means that there is no direct link between the production of export goods in one area and the delivery of foreign-made items to that region. At the same time, economic interest frequently dictates and need to spend some foreign currency earnings for the promotion of export-oriented industries. This is the case in many parts of Siberia and the Far East, where foreign machinery, equipment and materials are widely used to develop industries producing goods for both domestic consumption and for export.

Japan is one of the Soviet Union's largest trading partners in this case. Deliveries from Japan are largely used to increase the output of those items which figure prominently in Soviet exports to Japan, including both traditional and new industries in the extracting and processing sectors.

Deliveries of imported machinery, equipment and materials for industry and transport are effected both under separate foreign trade transactions and as a part of broader trade agreements. They are paid for with earnings both from ordinary commodity exchange deals, and as a result of compensation agreements.

Compensation agreements are of particular importance for the economic development of Siberia and the Far East. Used for deliveries of complete sophisticated plant, they have the added attraction of a special repayment arrangement: goods delivered by Soviet enterprises in repayment for the plant constitute only a fraction of the total output, usually about 20-30 per cent. The remaining, larger part of output goes for domestic consumption or other uses unrelated to the compensation agreement in question. Enterprises in Siberia and the Far East make wide use of imported plant, which figure prominently among the 60 big industrial projects to be built on a compensation basis in the tenth five-year-plan period.

For example, a number of large timber enterprises are to be extended, modernised and rehabilitated under the so-called Timber Agree-

⁶ *Itid.*, pp. 8, 240, 241.

ments between the USSR and Japan. This agreement provides for the introduction of new technology at the Mataiski logging unit of the Khorsk timber enterprise, the Podgorsk logging unit of the Nikolayev timber enterprise in the Maritime Territory, and at the Djalindin logging unit of the Taldan timber enterprise in the Amur Region. Equipment bought under compensation agreements has helped raise productivity at various operations and increase output.⁷

Compensation agreements normally cover periods of five years. This is approximately the time required to build a timber project on a compensation basis. Since payment for the equipment purchased begins before the completion of the project, it takes the form of timber deliveries from existing enterprises. Consequently, enterprises rehabilitated by the installation of equipment bought on a compensation basis can operate for the rest of their depreciation period, entirely for the benefit of the national economy in a manner unrelated to the compensation agreement in question.

In this manner, the Soviet Union meets its trade partners half way: they are repaid before the completion of the projects. An additional advantage offered by the Soviet Union as a trading partner is that it can manoeuvre its resources on a scale private capitalist enterprises cannot imagine. This is something highly valued by our trade partners. The sides are mutually interested in extending cooperation agreements, because our foreign partners can rely on growing deliveries of products turned out with the aid of their plant and technology, and the Soviet side can step up its industrial modernisation efforts.

Foreign, including Japanese, machinery and equipment are used at the South Yakutia coal fields, and in other places for stripping, for road and housing construction. These deliveries have played a positive role in the development of the rich coking coal deposit at Neryungri which is presently served by a branch line of the Baikal-Amur Railway. The concentration plant presently under construction at Neryungri will improve the quality of the coal.

All in all, 104 million tons of coking coal has to be delivered to Japan under a compensation agreement. During the first few years of the compensation agreement, repayment will be made by coal from the existing mines of the Kuznetsk Basin. The upper layer of rock removed at the Neryungri open-cast mine consists of oxidised coal which is used as fuel by the Soviet Far East.

Between 1983 and the turn of the century, when the Neryungri mine will begin the extraction of grade K coal, part of the output will be shipped to Japan in repayment for equipment: five million tons of the 13 produced are to be delivered annually. The remaining, larger part of the high quality coal will go to Soviet consumers after concentration. The availability of high-grade coking coal will permit the creation of a new metallurgical base in the Far East—something which has been needed for a long time. The possibility of transporting enriched coal from Neryungri via BAR brings closer the fulfilment of plans to produce ferrous metals from ores of the Aldan iron ore deposit. This, in turn, will help cut metal shipments from the European part of the country.

A comparison of the costs for the construction of BAR, the town of Neryungri, and the mining project, with foreign credits and the cost of foreign equipment shows that the foreign receipts account for only a small part of the total investment, their role in the ambitious South

⁷ See *Vneshnaya torgovlya*, No. 7, 1980, pp. 18-20.

Yakutia development project is marginal. Similar to the distribution of South Yakutia coal, extracted by machinery bought on a compensation basis, a procedure could be used in the case of Sakhalin oil and gas—presently the target of prospecting on the island's continental shelf under a Soviet-Japanese General Agreement.

The prospecting costs covered by Japanese companies will be repaid many times over, for, if successful they will be assured of stable deliveries of much needed oil and gas at reduced prices. Japanese businessmen highly approve of the terms of the agreement.

This form of cooperation is also fully in keeping with Soviet interests: prospecting in the waters off Sakhalin is done with the help of sophisticated Japanese equipment particularly suited for the great depths and difficult sea conditions involved. For example, Mitsui supplied an off-shore drilling rig capable of sinking 8,000 m deep wells into the continental shelf.

In an assessment of cooperation with Japan in prospecting for oil and gas and the development of deposits, it should be borne in mind that this cooperation involves only a small part of the prospecting industries. The brunt of the prospecting and development effort is borne by Soviet organisations using Soviet-made equipment. US Senator William Proxmire, whom I have already quoted in this article, noted that according to his data, the Soviet Union produces up to 95 per cent of its oil industry equipment. Many analysts believe that this cuts ground from under the feet of those US politicians who hope that trade restrictions can slow down Soviet economic development. No one, not even the US Administration, has the leverage to slow down the rapid progress of the Soviet economy.

Prospecting for oil and gas on the continental shelf off Sakhalin Island as well as prospecting for gas in Yakutia, in which Japanese firms participate should boost deliveries of this valuable raw material to Japan. At the same time, production from the new fields can stimulate the development of other industries. This means that both sides stand to gain. "The energy problem," noted A. Anzai, President of the Board of the Tokyo Gasu Company, "is one of our most serious national problems, and we are pinning high hopes on the realisation of the Yakutian gas project."

* * *

The development of transportation and granting of transportation services to Japan is another sphere of economic cooperation between the USSR and Japan.

The port of Vostochny near the town of Nakhodka is one of the largest projects where transport facilities are jointly built. The first section of this deep-water port was commissioned in 1979. It includes specialised facilities for the processing of round timber with a capacity of 360,000 tons a year, facilities for loading vessels with chips, a container terminal with a capacity of 700,000 containers meeting international standards, and a coal facility with a capacity of 5 million tons of coal a year. The planned further expansion of the port facilities will make it possible to handle 40 million tons of cargo per annum. As a result, Vostochny will become the USSR's largest sea port.

The facilities in the port of Vostochny have created favourable conditions for large-scale international shipping operations. For example, Vostochny's container terminal was largely instrumental in adopting, at the international transportation market, of the new cross-country railroad connecting the Pacific Ocean with the Baltic Sea. Due to the intro-

duction of many-tons-capacity containers, loading operations now take only one-tenth of the time they used to, and haulage of goods across Siberia has cut the distance for certain items from 20,000-27,000 kilometers to 13,000 kilometres, cutting transportation costs by one-fifth or more. As a result, the Transsiberian main line is now the preferred route for the transportation of a large percentage of goods between Western Europe and the countries of the Pacific.

This new railway is used extensively by many Japanese firms. Many Japanese goods have been able to penetrate the European market due to this reliable possibility of covering the distance between the Pacific and the Baltic without additional transshipment. Thus Siberia has proven to be Japan's road to Europe.

Soon the Baikal-Amur Railway will be playing an important role in these transportation operations. Transportation services are mutually beneficial and absolutely essential for commercial exchange: they account for 10 per cent of international settlements. The reduction of transportation costs in cargo shipment from Japan to Europe via the Soviet Union is another example of both sides standing to gain from economic cooperation.

The experience of the international container terminal operation in the port of Vostochny has been used gainfully in other transshipment points. For example, it was used in the establishment of a ferry line for containers between the ports of Magadan and Vanino—a domestic line. Since 1981, movement of cargo in containers has become a regular practice there. This has enabled considerable savings of material resources and labour.

Construction equipment made in Japan is extensively used in the building of the Baikal-Amur Railway. First, deliveries of Japanese equipment were made during the construction of the so-called smaller BAR, that is, its branch line which connects BAR and the Transsiberian main line with the Ugolnaya Station, the terminal for the loading of coal from the Neryungri deposit in South Yakutia. Certain types of Japanese machinery and equipment have proved their worth at this construction site. This promoted purchases of equipment for other sections of the main line. Equipment supplied by Nissho-Iwai is used in the construction of a number of tunnels. For example, tunnelling equipment supplied by Furukawa is used to build the North Muisk tunnel (15 km), the largest on BAR and in the Soviet Union. Komatsu bulldozers and Kato cranes have become a familiar sight at construction sites along the whole of the main line.⁸

The good working relationships between the Japanese firms and Soviet operators of Japanese machinery make it possible to improve the equipment. For example, Soviet specialists using a Kato drilling machine have made valuable suggestions on the design of the rig to the management of the firm. Japanese engineers then made improvements in the rig, and now it better meets the interests of both sides.⁹

Equipment and machinery imported by the Soviet Union are making it possible to cut labour involved and accelerate completion of this new transportation artery in the country's east.

Japanese machines are also used in another transportation field in the construction of Siberian oil and gas pipelines. For example, Koyo has supplied a large lot of industrial oil equipment including valves, gate valves and clack valves for main oil and gas pipelines. A big consign-

⁸ See BAR, 16 April 1980, 26 December 1980, 2 April, 1981.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 24 December, 1980.

ment of large-diameter pipes has been purchased from Sumitomo Metal Industries, Nippon Steel, Nippon Kokan and Kawasaki Steel for the construction of the gas pipeline connecting the West Siberian and European parts of the USSR. Komatsu pipe-layers and other Japanese equipment have been used in laying the pipeline in the northern parts of the Tyumen region.¹⁰

We import pipes, machinery and equipment from Japan for a number of reasons. The main one is that oil and gas extraction and transportation from Siberia are growing at a faster rate than other industries. These projects call for a great deal of rolled metal, particularly large-diameter 1,220 and 1,420 mm pipes, 1,500 kilometres of main gas pipelines are to be commissioned annually during the current five-year-plan period alone. The use of imported equipment results in a considerable economy of time, though, naturally, Soviet machinery and equipment are used on a much broader basis than imported equipment.

As a rule, imported machinery and equipment, including that made in Japan, at construction sites and enterprises in Siberia and the Far East are used in conjunction with Soviet machinery and equipment. Thus, we can easily determine the advantages of various types of equipment, testing it in difficult weather conditions and working out the most suitable technology.

For example, a number of enterprises in East Siberia involved in exporting timber to foreign countries, including Japan, carried out a comparison of operational performance and economic efficiency of tree-harvesting machines with felling devices and timber clips. The comparison was primarily based on equipment supplied by the chief timber producing nations. As a result of the comparison, more efficient methods of fully mechanised felling and log-skidding operations have been designed. Ways of improving Soviet equipment have been found, and helpful suggestions for a more reliable foreign-made machinery were offered to the suppliers. This experiment was useful for both Soviet enterprises and our trade partners.¹¹

Another important feature of the use of imported, Japanese among other, equipment in Siberia and the Far East is the possibility of comparing various techniques and of accelerating the introduction of scientific and technological advances. This does not mean that imported equipment is superior to Soviet-made systems. Frequently the opposite is true. However, every country and every large firm has valuable experience to offer. They also have technology which is not readily accessible to other countries.

Soviet foreign trade organisations, their experts and other representatives purchase the most up-to-date equipment which is capable of providing a maximal economy of labour. This aspect is particularly important in Siberia, especially in its northern parts, for here labour unit costs are higher than in other zones of the country. The cost of settling and upkeep of one labourer in Siberia is 2.5 times higher on average than in the populated temperate zone. These costs are especially high in hitherto uninhabited areas where it costs between 17,000 and 20,000 rubles to settle one labourer, while in certain sub-Arctic areas the cost is 60,000 rubles.¹²

Machinery and equipment which is to be used in Siberia and the Far

¹⁰ See *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 34, 1980; *Vneshnaya torgovlya*, No. 1, 1981.

¹¹ See *Lesnaya promyshlennost*, No. 1, 1980.

¹² See *Izvestiya Sibirskogo otdeleniya Akademii Nauk SSSR*, Social Science Series, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1981, pp. 44, 61; *Gazovaya promyshlennost*, No. 2, 1981, p. 43.

East, including that purchased abroad, must have high capacity, greater endurance and be capable of operating in adverse weather conditions. Not all foreign-made equipment meets these requirements. Frequently, Soviet organisations must introduce minor modifications, and even more important, overhaul it to extend its lifetime.

Because Soviet organisations put particularly high demands on equipment purchased in Japan and abroad, special personnel training is necessary to secure its proper maintenance and effective use. Naturally, this has created certain organisational problems, but at the same time, this experience has been useful from the point of view of upgrading the qualifications of our specialists. Now Siberia and the Far East have an entire system for training and retraining specialists who are to operate foreign-made machines and equipment. By way of illustration we can mention the use of Komatsu bulldozers in the Bamstroymekhanizatsiya Trust, one of the biggest enterprises involved in the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railway. The trust has set up a training centre for skilled workers who have already mastered similar Soviet machinery. The centre uses all manner of visual aides including mock-ups, films and slides.¹³

The overall training of machine and bulldozer operators, assembly-men and workers of other specialities makes it possible to use costly equipment effectively, to ensure proper maintenance and to make recommendations on possible improvements, as well as on the improvement of Soviet-made equipment. Experience and specialised skills acquired in the operation of foreign-made equipment improve the workers' skills, and help raise productivity in using the new powerful and highly productive Soviet-made machinery and equipment.

In addition to economic cooperation, diverse deliveries of equipment to the eastern regions of the USSR, an important role is played by scientific and technological cooperation with Japan. The research centres of Siberia and the Far East are actively participating in these efforts.

Some of Japan's scientific and technological advances are being used in the Soviet Union. For example, the rapid development of pipeline transportation in the USSR made it necessary to use many technological innovations patented abroad. Soviet specialists have made careful studies of the findings of Japanese scientists working on increasing the strength of pipes for the gas and oil industries, the resistance of metal, and improving the quality of welding seams under low-temperature conditions. The so-called SEKT-system developed in Japan was used for the improvement of electric heating devices for the pipelines in the Siberian North.¹⁴

For their part, Japanese firms make use of the achievements of the Soviet Union. They buy Soviet licences for machines and technology. For example, Japanese firms bought several licences for a hydraulic method of coal extraction developed in Siberia's Kuznetsk basin, as well as for certain processes of steel production in blast furnaces and coke production developed in Siberia. Many Japanese scientists are interested in co-operating with the research centres of the Siberian branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

* * *

In addition to deliveries of machinery, equipment and raw materials, trade and economic relations between the USSR and Japan involve

¹³ See *BAR*, 25 March 1981, 8 April 1981.

¹⁴ See *Gazovaya promyshlennost*, Nos. 1 and 4, 1981.

deliveries of consumer goods, which is a usual feature for the world trade. Items made by Siberian jewellers, famous Siberian furs, and medicinal herbs from the Soviet Far East are to be encountered in many countries of the world, including Japan. Japan, for its part, supplies a range of consumer goods to the USSR. For example, within the framework of agreements on timber, coal and gas prospecting, a part of the credits was used to repay deliveries of such consumer goods as textiles, footwear designed for local conditions, china, radio and electronic home appliances, etc. The importance of these mutual deliveries can hardly be overestimated. Cash received from sales of consumer goods is used to finance construction on a compensation basis: it is also used to pay foreign specialists. This, in turn, facilitates the development of scarcely populated areas.

Imports of consumer goods from Japan primarily include items which are either not produced in the eastern part of the USSR or are produced in insufficient quantities. It should be remembered that production capacities in Siberia and the Far East were not designed to promptly meet consumer demand which has grown rapidly as a result of the influx of highly paid specialists. Deliveries of Soviet-made consumer goods from the Western part of the country are not always timely enough to provide the solution. More than that, estimates show that it is more profitable for the Soviet Union to buy certain consumer goods for the Far Eastern population abroad than to ship similar items from the European part of the USSR.

The availability of imported consumer goods at the new construction sites improves the living conditions of the population and helps reduce personnel turnover. The better range and high quality of consumer goods assures a proper balance between growing wages and expenditures of the population, thus making for sounder budgeting by local administrations.

Coastal trade—a specific type of trade which is characteristic of Soviet-Japanese relations—is prospering. This type of commercial exchange between the USSR and Japan started in the 1960s with commodity deliveries by small and medium-size Japanese firms in repayment for exports from the Soviet Far East. In 1964, a Soviet foreign trade office was set up to deal with coastal trade, transformed in 1979 into an all-Union cost-accounting foreign trade amalgamation Dalintorg with its headquarters in Nakhodka.

The turnover of coastal trade was over 70 million rubles in 1980, or one-fortieth of the total volume of Soviet-Japanese trade. However, the role of coastal trade is particularly significant in that it meets consumer demands. A part of the funds received from coastal trade is channelled to meet the needs of those local industries which produce for export. This creates conditions for the output growth and improvement of quality of goods exported as a part of coastal trade.

The Japanese side is also greatly interested in coastal trade. What makes it so attractive to such a large number of Japanese firms despite its small volume?

Coastal trade provides opportunities primarily for small enterprises which suffer the most from competition from the big firms. It is no exaggeration that many small businesses and cooperatives would be crushed by monopolies without the stable market for goods provided by coastal trade, and this would mean unemployment and loss of subsistence for many working people.

Coastal trade also provides a source of raw materials for many small firms which cannot go to the world market to buy large consignments of commodities.

The active stand of the Japanese participants in coastal trade who have a stake in normalising relations between the two countries is highly indicative. For example, the Japanese Association for the Promotion of Coastal Trade and Fisheries sponsored a conference in Aomori in August 1981, attended by businessmen and municipal workers from more than 40 Japanese coastal towns. In resolutions sent to the Japanese government, conference participants stressed the importance of developing friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, further extension of coastal trade, and allround links between the two countries. They came out in favour of active participation of Japan's Western regions in Soviet-Japanese cooperation, particularly in the development of Siberian resources.

Diversified links with many small firms, trading cooperatives and associations along with prompt processing of transactions and quick delivery of goods enable the Soviet side to meet the demand for many items which are in short supply in the Eastern part of the country. An important feature of the coastal trade is the fact that goods imported from Japan are marketed through the local distribution system, in accordance with the volume of goods sold by the regions, territories and autonomous republics, with the part they play in these trade operations. This helps better to mobilise the export potential of enterprises of Siberia and the Far East enabling them to sell items produced by local artisans and craftsmen, as well as those produced in small lots by local industries.

The volume of coastal trade has been growing steadily, as has the number of participating territories, regions and autonomous republics of the Russian Federation. Practically speaking, all areas of the Far East and Eastern Siberia take part in this type of commodity exchange.

The extension of trade and economic links of Siberia and the Far East with Japan have required the streamlining of organisations—not only those involved in commercial operations—but also those in advertising and other functions. For example, the Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Irkutsk branches of the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry are actively involved in the organisation of exhibitions of Soviet products in Japan and Japanese products in the Soviet Union.

Commodities marketed through coastal trade are often displayed at exhibitions and fairs organised in Japan and in the Soviet Far East. This adds to the prestige of the participating enterprises and is also an important factor promoting better quality and a broader range of articles and better supplying of the population with consumer goods.

* * *

The acceleration of scientific and technological progress, along with the development of the industrial base and infrastructure in Siberia and the Far East, create good opportunities for greater involvement of these regions in our foreign trade, particularly in trade with neighbouring Japan.

In addition to the traditional range of commodities exchanged and forms of cooperation, there is good potential for diversifying into new types of trade cooperation. There are plans for more sophisticated wood-processing which provides for a growing share of compact and expensive

wood products such as cut timber, plywood, splintboards, and cellulose pulp, in addition to the export of round timber from Siberia and the Far East. Both the USSR and Japan stand to benefit from this new form of cooperation which will promote better use of the productive forces of Siberia and the Soviet Far East.

Experts feel that it is highly practical to set up not only giant wood-processing enterprises but also a series of smaller facilities which could be located in easily accessible places with smaller forest resources of their own. This will make it possible to set up a diversified production network which will help more efficiently use the wood resources.

Chemistry and petrochemistry is another promising sphere of cooperation. The establishment of chemical enterprises oriented toward exports to Japan would cut transportation costs many times, since the shipment of petrochemicals costs only a fraction of the transportation of crude products. Both countries would benefit from such an arrangement.

The world market situation makes the liquefaction of Siberian and Far Eastern coal increasingly attractive. Coal deposits in the Siberian coal fields run into 13-digit figures. The shallowness of some of these deposits and their proximity to the existing railroad network make their large-scale mining highly convenient and cheap. For example, the Kansk-Achinsk open-cast mines produce the cheapest coal in the country—up to one billion tons a year potentially. This may be used as raw material for the production of liquid fuel which is in great demand in the world markets.

The USSR plan for economic and social development in the eleventh five-year-plan period calls for the establishment of the first coal liquefaction plants in the Kansk-Achinsk basin. In view of the great potential of the area and the USSR's powerful scientific base in power development, we can expect foreign firms to show an interest in joint development of this process.

Growing metal consumption in the eastern parts of the USSR makes the need for a new metallurgical base increasingly pressing. The construction of BAR will solve the transportation problem in areas of principal deposits of coking coal and iron ore.

The day is near when copper, asbestos and other raw-material deposits situated along the BAR route will be mined extensively. Throughout the length of the main line, which passes through untouched taiga, there are many rich deposits which are of prime industrial importance. The choice of the route for the railroad was largely dictated by their existence.

It has long been known that the main obstacle in the way of tapping Siberia's wealth is the great distances involved. The completion of the Baikal-Amur Railway will help solve this problem, creating a railhead for the development of enormous mineral wealth in the area adjacent to the main line covering a surface of approximately a million square kilometres.

The completion of BAR will mean that the main thrust of the cooperation effort with foreign firms will be in the sphere of industrial production, which promises the greatest returns for both sides. This cooperation is particularly attractive in the case of Siberia and the Far East, not only from the viewpoint of regular siting industries but also for many other reasons. The fact is that the through traffic on BAR will begin at the end of the eleventh five-year-plan period. Although some construction work will continue, the line will be largely operational.

This poses the urgent task of continuing use of the existing teams of construction workers. The resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress contain

a special provision for this: the BAR branch line is to be extended northwards from the Ugolnaya Station up to Yakutsk. This means another 800 km of laying track across rugged terrain.

Many thousands of construction workers will be relocated to new construction sites. But great numbers of people will also remain in areas along the BAR route. It is not going to be an easy task to provide employment for these highly skilled specialists. But then, the sooner they are provided with jobs suitable for their skills, knowledge and experience, the greater the economic benefit will be. This is another possible sphere of effective international cooperation with the participation of foreign partners.

In extending economic cooperation with other countries, particularly in the development of Siberia and the Far East, the Soviet Union is motivated by the desire to develop mutually beneficial cooperation. It is natural that the construction envisioned and economic growth expected as a result will be implemented irrespective of the participation of foreign countries. As Leonid Brezhnev noted in his interview to *Asahi* it would be wrong to say that "the Soviet Union will not be able to develop the rich resources of Siberia and the Far East on its own. It is perfectly evident, and this is borne out by the entire history of our state, that we have every possibility of coping with this task".

* * *

The realisation of Siberian and Far Eastern projects opens up broad vistas for the further development of mutually beneficial cooperation between the USSR and foreign countries. In addition to the resolution of a number of tasks of a national scale for the Soviet Union, this cooperation also involves the attainment of some regional objectives. As before, the development of eastern regions will be determined by domestic requirements and the possibilities of the country. At the same time mutually beneficial partnership is called upon to contribute to the accelerated tapping of Siberia's resources to make them part of Siberian economy, and to bring closer the realisation of Lenin's idea about establishing "links with world trade through the Pacific Ocean".¹⁵

The involvement of foreign firms in Siberian and Far Eastern projects will also help solve an important foreign-policy task: the building up of confidence and goodneighbourliness between participating countries. All these projects pursue purely creative goals and do not encroach upon anyone's interests.

The Soviet Union takes a positive view of the extension of businesslike cooperation with all countries, including Japan. It is not putting up any fences against its neighbours. On the contrary, it is opening its doors wide before them and invites them to carry out challenging projects jointly with a view to raising the standard of living, creating jobs, and creating a climate of trust and cooperation in the Pacific.

¹⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 465.

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PRC NATIONAL CONGRESS FAILS TO DEAL WITH SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 82 pp 33-43

[Article by V. Matyayev and V. Fetov: "Fourth Session of PRC National People's Congress"]

[Text]

The Fifth National People's Congress met for its fourth session in Peking from November 30 to December 13, 1981, and discussed the present economic situation in China and further course of socialist construction (report by Premier of the State Council Zhao Ziyang); fulfilment of the state budget for 1980 and of the rough draft of the financial plan for 1981 (report by Finance Minister Wang Bingqian); the work done by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the draft civil legal procedure code, and bills on economic contracts and income tax from foreign concerns (report by Standing Committee Vice-Chairman Yang Shangkun); postponement of the revision of the 1978 Constitution (report by Standing Committee Vice-Chairman Peng Zhen); the work done by the Supreme People's Court (report by Jiang Hua, President of the Supreme People's Court); the work done by the Supreme People's Procurator's Office (report by Huang Huoqing, Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procurator's Office), and State Council proposals concerning a nationwide afforestation campaign (report by Minister of Forestry Yong Wentao).¹

The session approved the reports discussed. A special resolution sanctioned the postponement of the revision of the amended draft Constitution. The deputies passed a law on economic contracts and a law on income tax from foreign concerns, and approved the report of the Bills Committee. The session also approved in principle the draft civil legal procedure code, authorised the Standing Committee to study the approved draft, introduce the amendments and publish it for trial realisation.

As provided for by the Constitution, National People's Congress sessions are convened once a year (it has been so the last few years). The previous one took place in September 1980. The 1981 session was attended by 3,154 of the 3,453 deputies elected by means of "democratic consultations". No reasons were published for the absence of the other 299 deputies.

The last session was noteworthy because on its eve the Chinese leaders and mass media stressed that it would be devoted chiefly to the discussion of economic policy questions and be a major landmark in the elaboration of economic policy. It was hinted time and again that the session would discuss not only the sixth five-year economic development plan, but also a long-term plan concretising the policy of "four modernisations". This heightened interest in the coming session all the more because the last three plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China did not discuss economic and planning questions, although economic policy in that period experienced no few fluctua-

¹ The discussion of this question by China's supreme legislative body was prompted by the sharp deterioration of the ecological situation, which became one of the reasons of serious natural calamities in recent years and of which the alarmed Chinese press is writing so much.

tions and changes. Serious changes had also taken place since the previous Congress session in the Party and Government leadership, changes affecting primarily the sphere of economic organisation and management. Hua Guofeng, for instance, ceased to be Premier in September 1980 and in June 1981 he also had to relinquish the post of CPC Central Committee Chairman. Zhao Ziyang became Premier and then CPC Deputy Central Committee Chairman, while Hu Yaobang was elected CPC Central Committee Chairman. Both are regarded as close associates of Deng Xiaoping. These changes further weakened the positions of those who had risen during the "cultural revolution".

Immediately after the session, it was officially labelled a major landmark in determining ways and practical methods of developing the Chinese economy. *Renmin ribao* affirmed editorially on December 15, 1981, that the session had adopted a course which "correctly generalises the experience of economic construction over 32 years and particularly in the last three years" and is a "concrete manifestation of the Party's policy of readjusting, restructuring, consolidating and improving followed since the Third Plenary Meeting of the 11th CPC Central Committee". This policy is palmed off as a "product of adaptation of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thought to the new situation, the new practice of economic construction" in China. What is more, its "correctness" allegedly "has already been confirmed in the process of economic construction in these past few years". The policy approved by the session, the newspaper affirmed, "is the programme of economic work in our country for a relatively lengthy period to come".

Actually, the session did not work out any policy that could serve as a reliable guideline in economic development. Incidentally, all the previous Congress sessions since 1978 were hailed with similar enthusiasm, though the directives and guidelines they set down had to be either amended or dropped.

First of all, no policy of economic "readjustment", which is allegedly "concretised" by the session documents, notably Zhao Ziyang's report, can serve as a basis for any programme. Such a course can be interpreted as a consistent and clear-cut line of economic policy, moreover stemming from the guidelines of the Third Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, only if one stretches a point and permits open distortions.

The platform of the Third Plenary Meeting by no means envisaged a switch to any economic "readjustment". On the contrary, it is expressive of the leadership's idea of the possibility of another "leap" and intensification of the rate of growth of production. The plenary meeting communique urged to "speed up socialist modernisation" and "promote stormy development in all the branches and sectors of our socialist economy". It said: "There is no doubt whatsoever that our country's economic development will again be fast and steady". The task set was to turn China into "a modern socialist power by the end of this century".

The Chinese leadership was forced to turn to "readjustment" in April-June 1979 by profound disproportions and other crisis phenomena in the economy, the consequences of Maoist policy. But of course it cannot in any way be characterised as "a product of adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the new situation". The policy of economic "readjustment" was essentially the same sort of manifestation of voluntarism as the whole of the preceding "leftist" policy, though it is of an entirely different character. The process of "readjustment" was to extend over three years and end in 1981. This policy was depicted as "the first battle for four

modernisations and the conversion of the country into a mighty modern power by the end of the century". With its realisation it was planned to shunt the Chinese economy onto "the rails of steady, proportional development at a fast rate". "Readjustment" was regarded merely as a brief stop before a new "dash".

Such an approach proved to be unrealistic. The problems which had necessitated the policy of "readjustment" remained and, what is more, there appeared in the process of its implementation new interbranch discrepancies and disproportions, the chronic budget deficit, inflation and growth of prices prevailed, Peking partially lost control over economic processes, and unemployment was as massive as ever. The rates of growth of the aggregate output in industry and agriculture fell to a critically low level, and the fuel and energy problem became extremely grave. Criticism of voluntarism and subjectivism and declarations about the need to put an end to devotion to "leftism" did not lead to the elaboration of a scientifically substantiated conception of economic development. The country continues to exist without long-term plans. Nor has it succeeded in drawing up reliable annual economic development plans and adopting them in good time. The Chinese leadership is hushing up the fact that the time allotted initially for "readjustment" has run out and that all that has been achieved in this time is a better understanding of the sweep of the problem and the empiric determination of the content of the adopted policy. Besides sharply reducing plan targets, the working meeting of the CPC Central Committee in December 1980 was compelled to chart a course of "further readjustment". The latest Congress Session admitted that the "content of economic readjustment has proved to be far broader than supposed" and agreed with the State Council that it was necessary to prolong it for another five years "and perhaps even more". But there is no clarity on this issue in Peking and it is not known what concrete results "readjustment" may yield. Zhao Ziyang said ambiguously at the Congress session that the government hoped this policy would convert the 1990s into "a period of new economic prosperity".

The session of the National People's Congress showed that the Chinese leaders were not ready to solve a whole number of socio-economic problems. The deliberations at the session vividly reflected the present difficulties, the complicated situation due to objective and subjective causes—insurmountable economic and financial crisis, differences among the leaders over the main questions of the country's development, the continuing struggle among the different factions for power, for the leadership in the CPC and for dominant influence on the government machine, growing ideological discord and vacillation in the Party and in society, the population's increasing lack of confidence in the leaders' ability to bring the country onto the path of stable and consistent progress. It has again become obvious that the Chinese leadership has no clear-cut and integral programme of action for the solution of social and economic problems.

This is evidenced by the deletion from the session agenda of the question of long-term planning. Zhao Ziyang's report merely said it was intended to treble the volume of gross industrial and agricultural production by the end of the century. It must be said that this practically unrealistic aim is ostensive and unsubstantiated.

The session also did not discuss any special documents relating to

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the sixth five-year economic development plan for 1981-1985.² The plan was discussed in general terms only in the final part of the Premier's report. It affirmed that the rough outlines and basic figures of the sixth five-year plan were ready back in 1980, but the compilation of the plan has not yet been completed. As may be seen, there is practically no plan even now, after the end of the first year of the plan. It ought to be said in this connection that Chinese planning has long not gone beyond the stage of advancing arbitrary and uncoordinated indices, and is suffering from the chronic disease of unbalanced and unsubstantiated plans. Moreover, the main objective of the sixth five-year plan, according to Zhao Ziyang, is radically to improve the financial and economic situation in the country, i.e., it is not directed at developing the economy as such, at promoting the growth of the productive forces. It is intended to fulfil the task set by bringing the rates of growth of the national income "closer" to the rates of growth of gross industrial and agricultural production (actually by considerably slowing down the rates of growth of social production), and also by "rationally reducing" the share of accumulation in distributing the national income and "correspondingly increasing" the share of consumption. The main efforts in the period ending in 1985, the Premier said, would be concentrated on regulating the structure of the economy, putting the existing enterprises in order, and technically reconstructing the leading enterprises. In other words, it will be the continuation of the policy pursued hitherto on the basis of highly rough, ephemeral and unstable annual plans.

The session's approach to questions of long-term development showed once again that the positive experience of long-term planning accumulated in the first ten years of its existence with the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has been lost in China.

The session was only able to discuss economic tasks for 1982. But the drafts of the plan and the budget for this year were not presented and the deputies were given only the text of the "Basic Provisions". No integral plan was in fact adopted. It is characteristic that at the end of 1981 the Congress discussed the fulfilment of the budget targets for this year.

As is known, the Third Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee in December 1978 decided to concentrate efforts on economic work, and the Fifth Plenary Meeting in February 1980, concretising this task, went on record with the statement that the prime task was to draw up a long-term economic development plan. One can easily observe that no noticeable progress has been achieved in the fulfilment of this task. In this respect the latest Congress session looked inferior even to the one before it, when Hua Guofeng, then Premier, laid down the "guidelines" for the compilation of a long-term plan. At the 1981 session the deputies were not even told how and to what extent the "guidelines" were being translated into reality.

In his report to the session, Zhao Ziyang made an attempt to depict the current economic situation, formulate guidelines for "further economic construction" and outline the prospects. He tried to create the impression that the economic situation was generally good and instil confidence in its future development. The situation, he said, was "much better than expected and China's economy is already entering the channel of stable development". Addressing the National People's Congress for the first

² The Congress session empowered the State Council to "complete" the draft of the sixth five-year plan and submit it to the Congress for its consideration, but did not set the date.

time as Premier, Zhao Ziyang clearly tried to claim credit for the decrease in the financial deficit, the expected relatively good grain crop (he said it would be at the 1979 level), high rates of growth of production in light and textile industries, reduction of the volume of investment (from 53.9 billion yuan in 1980 to 38 billion in 1981), and increase in the share of the consumption fund in the national income (from 63.5 per cent in 1978 to 70 per cent in 1981).

But Zhao Ziyang deliberately spoke only of the results of 1981 alone, analysing them outside the framework of three-year "readjustment". Among other things, he did not mention that the original plan targets for 1981 were revised (as directed by the working meeting of the CPC Central Committee in December 1980) in the spring of that year and were substantially lowered. Appropriations for capital construction, for instance, were cut from 53.9 billion yuan to 30 billion (later they were increased by 8 billion).

Speaking rather reluctantly of the shortcomings of and the difficulties created by the policy followed by the Government, the Premier was nevertheless forced to admit that it was constantly necessary to take "emergency measures" in 1981 and that the "crisis situation in the economy", which had been spoken of back at the beginning of 1981, had not been eliminated. He noted that though the budget was somewhat better balanced than those of the two preceding years, the state of its balance was "not stable". The Premier admitted that "it will take quite a long time and persevering effort" really to balance the budget. He also pointed to the "low effectiveness of economic construction", but tried to justify it by "objective reasons" in which, repeating the shopworn anti-Soviet fables, he included the "lengthy blockade of China" not only by imperialism, but also by "social-imperialism", meaning the USSR.

According to Zhao Ziyang's report, the volume of gross industrial and agricultural production increased by only 3 per cent in 1981 (in January of this year the Chinese State Statistical Board gave it as 4 per cent) instead of the 5.5 per cent planned. Light industry, in which the increase in output was 13.6 per cent (18.4 per cent in 1980), continued to develop at a faster rate. But this increase entailed a sharp decline in heavy industry output. Its volume is 5 per cent below the 1980 level (in 1980 there was a 1.6 per cent increase).

The priority development of light industry is being actually effected by the temporary closure of plants and curtailment of production in heavy industry, which is not receiving raw materials, fuel and electrical energy in adequate amounts during the "readjustment" process. Such a situation leads to a general deceleration of growth of social production, to the stagnation of the productive forces, to the impairment of the basis of development of light industry itself and eventually to the appearance of a new economic disproportion, which is the product of the policy of "readjustment". Such a tendency has an adverse effect on the social and material state of the working class, keeps unemployment going, etc. It has given rise to anxiety in the Chinese leadership in which, according to the Western press, disputes have grown sharper between the advocates of the priority development of light industry and those who deem it necessary to devote attention to both light and heavy industries or even call for the priority development of the latter. It is noteworthy that on November 30, the day the session opened, *Renmin ribao* published an article entitled "How to Liven up Heavy Industry in the Period of Readjustment", in which it criticised those who "erroneously hold that heavy industry is not important and regard it as a 'burden'". There are signs

of understanding that further neglect of heavy industry may bring the whole of the economy into an impasse.

The state budget for 1981 had a deficit of about 2.72 billion yuan (17 billion in 1979 and 12.75 billion in 1980). Budget items and overall figures were repeatedly revised during the year. The decrease in the deficit was not due to increased revenue. It was the result of the reduction of government spending and the application of such emergency measures as the issue of state bonds to the sum of 4.87 billion, Peking's "borrowing" of 7 billion yuan from local budgets, additional issue of banknotes, consideration of foreign credits as revenue, etc. Peking's financial measures did not check the rise of prices (2 per cent, in 1980—6 per cent) and inflation (it was also stimulated by the issue of currency), which came to 6 per cent in 1981. The draft budget for 1982 envisages a deficit of 3 billion yuan (revenue—110 billion, expenditure—113 billion). It is noteworthy that the Congress deputies were not taken in by Zhao Ziyang's assertion that the prices had in general been stabilised and urged the Government to take more effective measures to "put an end to the steady rise of prices", particularly those of foodstuffs.

In the first half of 1981, according to data published earlier, the output of lathes dropped by 20.9 per cent, automobiles by 22.3 per cent, tractors by 44.2 per cent, mine equipment by 33 per cent, steel by 5.7 per cent, rolled metal by 5.1 per cent, coal by 2.4 per cent, and oil by 5.3 per cent. To keep up economic activity, the leadership was forced hastily to revise the voluntaristic decision to cut spending and appropriate another 8 billion yuan which went largely for resumption of construction. Of this sum, 3.5 billion yuan was channeled into housing construction and the rest went to increase production capacities in light industry, build additional oil and transport facilities, and to resume the construction of moth-balled enterprises requiring imported machinery.

Indicative of China's financial and economic difficulties is the announcement of the cuts it was forced to make in military spending, specifically in appropriations for the maintenance of auxiliary services and personnel. At the same time, military spending included in secret budget items, primarily for the development and production of nuclear missiles, is not decreasing. This is evidenced by the tests of a new ballistic missile and such events on the occasion of the 32nd anniversary of the People's Republic of China as the launching of three earth satellites with the help of one booster and the country's biggest-ever military exercise in North China.

Larger sums were appropriated for culture and education (8.1 per cent), public health (7.2 per cent) and science (21.3 per cent). The Chinese leadership can no longer neglect them, for that already had pernicious effect in the past.

The volume of China's foreign trade in 1981 topped 56 billion yuan (51.7 billion in 1980). The growth was due chiefly to the expansion of economic ties with industrialised capitalist countries, primarily Japan and the United States, attended by the further decrease in the volume of trade with socialist countries. The deficit in the trade with the industrialised capitalist countries is made good by foreign currency receipts from Hong-kong and profits from trade with developing countries.

Having proclaimed 1981 the first year of the sixth five-year plan, Premier Zhao Ziyang devoted attention to measures designed to improve organisational and economic work.

It is symptomatic that his report did not amplify upon and analyse questions relating to the economic reform now under way. Speaking of

agrarian policy, he singled out the question of "securing production teams' right to self-management" and "establishing and improving the system of economic responsibility", which in practice means encouragement in one or another degree and form of rich private farms. As for industry, it noted the "extension of the rights of enterprises to self-management, introduction of the system of economic responsibility, realisation of the principle of distribution according to the work done, and determination of the auxiliary role of market regulation with the state plan playing the guiding role". Having put the cart before the horse in the sphere of reforms in 1980 and suffered discomfiture, the Chinese leaders now adhere to the thesis that reforms should be subordinated to the tasks of "readjustment" and try to define more clearly the sphere and scale of reforms, whose final elaboration is postponed until a later date. The need is stressed to strengthen centralised economic management and to adhere to the socialist path of development "according with the conditions obtaining in China".

Zhao Ziyang also laid down "ten guidelines" designed to "raise the economic effect and pave a new way for economic construction". These guidelines actually do not contain anything new, generalise theses that were voiced earlier, and show that the Chinese leadership is marking time around the same old problems. They include the need to accelerate the development of agriculture; attach more importance to the production of consumer goods and continue with readjustment in what concerns the orientation of heavy industry; make better use of the factor of utilisation of energy resources and develop the power industry and transport; carry out technical reconstruction; effect "general consolidation" and reorganisation of the existing enterprises; "learn to create, accumulate and use monetary resources" and spend money economically on construction; promote ties with abroad, notably to "attract foreign capital and develop diverse forms of international economic and technical cooperation on a mutually beneficial basis"; "actively and carefully" reform the economic system; raise the people's educational level, and "organise production, construction and people's life on the basis of a single plan".

Such recommendations concerning economic work point above all to the fact that it is a question of restoring elementary order and eliminating the causes making it necessary to "readjust" the disproportions that have taken shape. The guidelines allow themselves to be differently interpreted, especially in the light of diverse approaches to how the declared intention to take the path of socialist collectivisation in the countryside tallies with the encouragement of private-ownership tendencies, the appeals to strengthen the role of state planning with the complete "determination of the auxiliary role" of market regulation and orientation upon multistructural economy, etc.

What is more, these guidelines sound declarative in the light of the economic realities. This applies first and foremost to the first guideline which confirms the priority of agriculture. Although the Chinese leaders have been speaking of it for many years, since Mao Zedong's time, they actually do not reinforce their words with any deeds and continue, as in Mao's time, to evade investment in agriculture.³ Thus, having called agricultural development "the key factor in ensuring the allround growth

³ For instance, appropriations for agriculture in 1980 did not really come to the 16.8 billion yuan announced, but to only 6.7 billion yuan, for 7.74 billion yuan went to cover the losses of the people's communes and 2.4 billion yuan to increase the loan funds of the agricultural bank. See *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 31, 1980.

of the economy", Zhao Ziyang declared at the session that it would be impossible to invest any large sums in it for "several years". The whole of Peking's rural policy is directed at making the peasants go on solving all their problems "by themselves".

The only new thing in the "ten guidelines" is the bluntly and clearly stated aim to attract foreign capital. Zhao Ziyang definitely tried to enhance China's reputation. He said that "far-sighted politicians and businessmen in all countries know China's vast potential as a market and its great importance for the stable development of the world economy in the future". The Premier demonstratively asserted that China would not import oil in the immediate future.

Zhao Ziyang, as all the other speakers, again sharply criticised "bureaucratic tendency", which he called a "serious obstacle on the path of economic development". A demand was raised at the session to "eradicate bureaucratism" and "eliminate such intolerable phenomena as duplication of organs, inflated staffs, red tape, and very low efficiency". Departments and local governments were ordered to reduce their staffs. But the documents of the session show that the anti-bureaucratic slogans of the Chinese leadership do not tally with the measures which it really takes. Finance Minister Wang Bingqian revealed that administrative expenditure in 1981 added up to 7.24 billion yuan, which was 21 per cent above the planned figure. And the increase in this expenditure was due above all to the need to "strengthen public safety", i. e., to reinforce the regime's repressive and bureaucratic machine.

The main task in 1982, the second year of the sixth five-year plan, was thus formulated in Zhao Ziyang's report: to consolidate "achievements" in the stabilisation of the economy, maintain the generally balanced state budget and credit operations, keep up the generally stable prices of goods, make efforts to raise the economic effect, and achieve a somewhat faster rate of economic development than in 1981. It was said above that the annual plan as such was dealt with very tersely. It provides for a 4 per cent increase in gross industrial and agricultural production and in the national income. This is linked with the hope that the output in agriculture and the light and textile industries next year will be "considerably increased". At the same time the task was set for heavy industry to switch "from curtailment to growth".

What particularly distinguished the session was that nothing concrete was said about people's living standards and that no guidelines were laid down for their improvement. The question of eliminating unemployment, which still affects tens of millions of people of working age, was noticeably muffled up. The fact that over 20 million people have been found jobs in the past three years, as it is claimed, does not make the problem less acute. For the ranks of people of working age in China are annually swelled by more than 23 million. The Chinese press is admitting increasingly often that it will be impossible to eliminate unemployment at least in the period of "readjustment".

Although the session practically did not deal with foreign policy questions, it reaffirmed sufficiently clearly the Chinese leadership's former line, whose core is anti-Sovietism and hostility towards socialist countries. Referring obviously to the USSR, Zhao Ziyang's report repeated the fable about the "threat of aggression from hostile external forces". This bogey and anti-Sovietism are being used to intimidate the Chinese people and make them weather difficulties without a murmur, to gloss over the leadership's mistakes and miscalculations. China, the

Premier said, would continue to "oppose hegemonism", the Soviet Union.

The fact that neither the economic plan for 1982 nor the budget was approved by the Congress session allows the Chinese leaders to manipulate with them at will as the situation may require. It is noteworthy that, according to Xinhua Agency reports, Zhao Ziyang's report was approved "by the majority" (not unanimously) of the deputies and that the objectives it set were recognised as "expedient". There is on the session the impress of special caution, of uncertainty how things will really turn out in the sphere of economic development.

Peng Zhen, Deputy Chairman of the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution, submitted in written form its explanations and proposal to prolong its term of office for another year. He referred in them to the "complexity of the questions dealt with" and to a "number of unsolved major problems" linked with the "structural reforms carried out in the country", etc. All this is given as the reason for the delay with the elaboration of the draft of the revised Constitution which, as decided by the Third Session of the National People's Congress in September 1980, the Committee, headed by Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, was to have submitted for a "nation-wide discussion" in the first half of 1981. The Fourth Session of the Congress was to approve this draft, but so far it has not been prepared.

The explanations by Peng Zhen conceal the main reason why the commission's work was fruitless, which is due to the differences within the upper crust in connection with the status of factions and their leaders, caused by the struggle for power. The restoration of the post of the PRC Chairman, the determination of his powers and the nomination for this post became the subject of the fight.

Discussions are also going on about the nature and character of the state in China, Mao Zedong's "thought", the status and place of the people's communes, landownership (in connection with the introduction now of different forms of so-called "responsibility for production" in the countryside), etc.

Among the main things done by the Standing Committee between the two Congress sessions, Yang Shangkun's report singled out the organisation of a special court and a special procurator's office to deal with the "Lin Biao and Jiang Qing groups", the conferment of the title of Honorary Chairman of the PRC upon Song Qingling (Sun Yatsen's widow who died in May 1981), and Ye Jianying's "new" proposal of September 30, 1981, for Taiwan's "peaceful reunification" with China, offering "cooperation" with the Guomindang in the conditions in which Taiwan will enjoy the broadest autonomy. In the period under review, the Standing Committee of the Congress sent delegations to 15 countries and played host to delegations of 11 countries. The expansion of the Chinese Parliament's international ties is motivated notably by the need to "oppose hegemonism".

In pursuance of the policy of strengthening economic legislation, which reflects the objective need to put the economy in order, the session passed a law on economic contracts designed to regulate economic ties and help fulfil the state plan "in the conditions of multistructural economy and multistage economic structure". It regulates economic relations in the sphere of purchases and sales, transportation of goods, electric power supply, property insurance, etc.

The law designed to attract foreign capital is being further deve-

loped.⁴ The session approved the law on income tax from foreign enterprises. A progressive tax rate ranking from 20 to 40 per cent, as well as a local income tax of 10 per cent, both on the taxable amount, have been established for them. On the whole, it is pointed out, the established amount of income tax is lower than in many developing countries. The law precludes double taxation:

This law, the guidelines in Zhao Ziyang's report and other facts show that the Chinese leadership, meeting at the stage of "readjustment" with a shortage of internal resources, is turning more and more to foreign capital as a source of investment in the country's economy and banks on making wide use of its as an instrument for developing the productive forces and livening up economic activity.

It follows from the reports delivered by Huang Huoqing, Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme People's Procurator's Office, and Jiang Hua, President of the Supreme People's Court, that the authorities have failed, despite all their efforts, to effect any major changes in ensuring public order. It is illustrative that from October 1980 to September 1981 the courts of all instances heard about 40,000 major criminal cases (they do not include those of political nature). Anxiety was voiced at the session about the increase of economic crimes, smuggling, bribery, and embezzlement.

Back on January 16, 1980, Deng Xiaoping said there was a need to promulgate a great number of laws in diverse spheres, because in Mao's time work in this field was either ignored or completely neglected. But the framing of laws is meeting with serious difficulties, as was revealed at the session. Of the eight bills submitted at the Third Session of the National People's Congress only three were promulgated by the end of 1981. This may be illustrated by the draft civil legal procedure code, which it was proposed to promulgate only as an experimental one, although it had been in process of elaboration since 1979. In its final form it must be submitted to the next session of the National People's Congress.

* * *

The session showed that there were still no signs of the solution of China's main socio-economic problems and that it was too early to speak of practically realising the so-called policy of "four modernisations". No concrete scientifically substantiated guidelines and figures of this policy have been elaborated, there are only very rough outlines. Economic work is meeting with serious snags, due above all to differences in the leadership. The very policy of "readjustment", which aims at rectifying the errors and eliminating the pernicious consequences of the Maoist course, is voluntaristic, ill-considered and uncoordinated, and this created new complications. It is no accident that more than half of the over 2,000 of the Congress deputies' remarks and proposals concerned various aspects of economic and administrative activities.

The Chinese leadership is not ready or able to give replies to questions raised by life, and empirically realises how far the present situation in the economy and the measures taken hitherto are from really solv-

⁴ It is planned to hold an international conference on the encouragements of foreign investments in China in June 1982. It will be under the joint auspices of the PRC government and the UNIDO.

According to some estimates there are 131 enterprises in China, in which foreign capital participates, with the total sum of foreign investments reaching \$1.5 billion.

ing fundamental economic problems. This being the case, it continues to eulogise Mao Zedong and his "thought", blames the socio-economic difficulties chiefly on a "threat" from without, and plays an anti-Soviet tune in an effort to evade responsibility for its own numerous mistakes.

Work in the economic field so far has not been put on the path of long-term planning, there is even no clear-cut and consistent conception of economic development in the immediate future. The new annual plan is again a statistical skeleton of estimates. So it is difficult to say how realistic are the statements made at the session and the indices discussed. It is not fortuitous that the Chinese leaders did not even try to get the session to approve the 1982 plan. They are apparently not sure how the economic situation will shape out and develop, nor can they foresee what decisions they will take in the course of the raging contest of views. And so Peking prefers to have a plan and a budget incomplete, merely as a general estimate, in order to adapt them to the events.

The Congress deliberations confirmed that the Chinese leadership is continuing to vacillate and search for some "magic means" (for instance, import of equipment or, as is the case now, attraction of foreign capital) allowing quickly to solve the problems that have accumulated and lay a material foundation for the ambitious policy of hegemonism. Following the path of such a search, the Peking leaders set increasing hopes on the policy of "open doors", noticeably extend the sphere of its application, expecting to receive financial, technical and economic aid abroad in the form of easy-term credits and direct investments. Peking is linking the "open doors" policy with anti-Sovietism, intending to get from the imperialists by political means the best possible conditions for economic cooperation.

The task of improving the masses' life is again relegated to the background and preference is given more and more to the old Maoist method of ideologically and politically indoctrinating and oppressing the population.

All in all, the results of the session testify to China's continuing economic and political instability.

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CCP CONTINUES MAOIST ARBITRARINESS, PURGES, FACTIONALISM

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[Article by R. M. Neronov, candidate of historical sciences, and G. A. Stepanova, candidate of historical sciences: "Some Trends in CCP Development"]

[Text] Present-day studies of the situation in China show clearly enough that the Communist Party of China is still in a state of ideological and organisational crisis. The Central Committee's Report delivered by Leonid Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress said: "The experience of the social and economic development of the PRC over the past twenty years is a painful lesson showing what any distortion of the principles and essence of socialism in home and foreign policy leads to."¹

The profound crisis through which China and its Communist Party have been going through in recent years is the result of their departure in theory and practice from Marxism-Leninism, the consequence of China's siding with the imperialist and reactionary forces. Such a policy is totally contrary to the vital interests of the Chinese people. The CPC can get out of the crisis only if it overcomes the Maoist legacy. Life has proved the Maoist interpretation of socialism to be completely invalid, and has shown the total bankruptcy of the attempts to put the "Chinese model" into practice. The present Chinese leadership had to reappraise many important aspects of Maoist theory and practice. But it continues to pursue the hegemonic policy bequeathed by Mao Zedong of accelerating the militarisation of the country, whipping up anti-Sovietism, aggravating international tension and leaguing with imperialism.

The Chinese leaders' refusal to break with Maoist legacy is vividly illustrated by the Resolution on Certain Aspects of CPC History Since the Establishment of the People's Republic of China, which was adopted by the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee in June 1981 and which secured renovated Maoism as the ideological and political foundation for the development of Chinese society.

A big role is assigned, within the framework of the now modified Maoist course, to the Party which the Chinese leaders want to make an obedient tool of for the realisation of their anti-national and hegemonic actions. The consolidation of the CPC within the Maoist regime, which is something the Peking leadership is striving for, may, if the present anti-Soviet and anti-socialist provisions of the Party Rules and the Constitution are preserved, lead to a worse confrontation between China and the Soviet Union and its allies, and to Peking's closer military and political alliance with world imperialism.

The implementation of the Resolution on Certain Aspects of CPC History Since the Establishment of the PRC is fraught with danger for the future of the Chinese party. It is latent not only in the ideological results but also in the possible concrete political results of the mass campaign for the "study" of this document. It would not be out of place to draw attention to the fact that the decisions of the Sixth Plenary Meeting are trying to create the semblance of the Party's Marxist recuperation, rehabilitate Mao Zedong and Maoism, and depict Peking's foreign policy

¹ The 26th CPSU Congress. Documents and Resolutions, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.

as one based on proletarian internationalism and principles of peaceful coexistence. The very adoption of the second decision in CPC history that canonises Maoism as a leading ideology and policy testifies to its complete ideological and political bankruptcy.

The decisions of the Sixth Plenary Meeting are the direct result of the preceding stage in the CPC's development, characterised by the struggle of different trends on China's political arena.

After Mao Zedong's death and the arrest of the "gang of four" certain new traits appeared in the life of the CPC. Its leadership tried to take measures to form a strictly controllable, obedient party machine and to use it within a somewhat reformed political structure to achieve strategic aims of hegemonic and chauvinistic nature. If one takes a look at what has been done in the CPC since 1976, one will see through the lying Chinese propaganda about the "normalisation" of the situation in, and "democratisation" of the Party and the restoration of the "sound style" in it, and through the disquisitions in bourgeois and revisionist publications about the "end of the Mao era", "de-Maoisation", "regeneration", etc.

It is true that CC plenary meetings and Party conferences are being held more frequently. From 1976 to 1981, for instance, there were seven CC plenary meetings and the 11th Emergency Party Congress. This formally positive development, however, was due not so much to a desire to alter the old policy and eliminate the profound disorganisation and crisis left to the Party and the country by Mao Zedong and his followers, as to the need to secure by official Party decisions the results of yet another compromise reached by the Chinese leaders in the process of internal strife. It is no accident that practically every plenary meeting was accompanied by new appointments or by a reshuffle.

But even this is not the most important thing. Though democratic centralism has been proclaimed the Party's organisational principle, as provided for by the CPC Rules, this principle is not being adhered to because the exigencies of inner-Party life have been violated for years and even decades, arbitrariness and lawlessness have become a kind of "tradition", and the leading bodies at all levels do not report to the Party masses as required. An analysis of Chinese Party publications shows that for many years the Party leaders have in fact been above Party discipline. An organisational muddle reigns in the Party, and local organisations are often in a state of chaos. Under the Rules adopted by the 11th CPC Congress and formulated in accordance with the Maoist principles of Party building, they are invested only with executive functions. The significance of the all-China Party congresses is belittled, and the powers, order and procedure of convening congresses are not defined. Still in force is the fallacious Maoist practice of adopting "decisions" on the most important Party questions not at the congresses, but at secret administrative and Party meetings of high-ranking functionaries at which the Peking leaders inform them of the decisions already taken. The coordinated decision is then submitted as a ready document to a congress or a plenary meeting, and is adopted practically without change. But even such a curtailed procedure, called "democratic consultations" is resorted to by far not always, especially when it is not certain whether the decision prepared in the upper echelons will be approved by the majority of those attending the forum.

Party control bodies, liquidated during the "cultural revolution", have been recreated in recent years. As provided for by the CPC Rules, the CC Central Disciplinary Committee headed by Chen Yun, Political Bureau

member and CC CPC Deputy Chairman, and disciplinary committees of the provincial and county Party committees have already been set up. The CPC CC Secretariat has been reestablished, and the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the CC has charged it with looking after current work.

The establishment of control bodies and the Secretariat in the Party machine outwardly means renunciation of the Maoist practice of setting up groups not provided for by the Rules to deal with matters without consulting the CPC Central Committee and even members of the Political Bureau (for instance, the Cultural Revolution Group, headquarters, committees supporting "leftists", etc.). But, we think, it is still too early to speak of the "normalisation" of the CPC's organisational life and structure. The crux of the matter is that the recreation of the control bodies and the Secretariat was not dictated primarily by a desire to return to the "glorious Party traditions", but by the exigencies of the inner-Party struggle of the different factions. The unceasing struggle of the groups in the upper echelon of the CPC leadership pointed to the need of control bodies that would give some guarantee against persecution and repression and at the same time make it possible to curb undesirable tendencies in the provinces. It is important to stress that the need of such control bodies was felt by practically all the factions and echelons of leadership. Moreover, there appeared an urgent necessity of appointing special disciplinary bodies to introduce elementary order in the CPC, where abuses and violations transcended all the conceivable limits (recall if only the notorious case of Wang Shouxin, a female embezzler in Binxian County, Heilongjiang Province, who actually bribed and twisted round her finger all the leading county and provincial functionaries).

The first meeting of the Central Disciplinary Committee was held in January 1979. It was addressed by Chen Yun, Hu Yaobang, Deng Yingchao and its other leaders. Attention was devoted mainly to organisational tasks that required immediate solution. The Committee first set out to draw up a document on certain norms of political life in the Party which was to become a kind of enumeration of the powers of the disciplinary committees of different levels. This document in its final form was approved by the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee in February 1980. The plenary meeting communique called the document "a necessary concrete addition to the Party Rules which is important for the development of active and elimination of negative factors within the Party". The adoption, in the 60th year of the CPC's existence, of such a document, which explains the elementary rights and duties of Party members, cannot but be regarded as a kind of proof of the crisis and the ideological and organisational disorder characteristic of the present state of the CPC.

However, the main objective of the committees' efforts to normalise Party life was the revision of the "mistakes" committed in the periods of Mao Zedong's most massive reprisals (the "struggle against the rightists", the "cultural revolution", etc.), and a purge of the Party. In 1979, the Central Disciplinary Committee alone adopted decisions to rehabilitate more than 2,500 people repressed as advocates of "right-wing deviation" (1957), while the number of people rehabilitated in connection with various "cases" of the "cultural revolution" period ran into tens of thousands. It is known that the number of people repressed during the "cultural revolution" by Mao Zedong's followers added up to about 200 million (including over 10 million communists).²

² *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1981, p. 84 (in Russian).

The question of purge was tackled first by the disciplinary committees in the provinces. People to be purged were as a rule accused of compromising the style of the Party's work, of violating state laws, and were automatically included among the followers of Lin Biao and the "gang of four". The scale of this activity may be gauged by the "experience" of Fujian Province in 1979. The disciplinary committee of the provincial Party committee expelled 1,500 people from the CPC within a few months and meted out Party penalties to about 700 members.³ Thus, the reestablished control bodies are not so much a means to normalise the situation in the CPC, as a weapon for new factional bouts in the different echelons of leadership.

The institution of the CC Secretariat at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee was dictated by similar reasons. Commenting on the cooptation to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the Chinese mass media particularly stressed their "ability to work by themselves, being in their prime", to "follow the line firmly", etc. Chinese propaganda organs affirmed that the establishment of the Secretariat and the reinforcement of the Political Bureau's Standing Committee were "due not only to the necessity of effectuating the four modernisations, but also to the need to ensure the continuity of the Party line, course and policy and the stability of collective leadership for a lengthy period". Nevertheless, as all serious foreign observers noted, the composition of the new Secretariat testified to the appearance in the CPC leadership of a new executive body which maximally limited the sphere of activity and power of former CPC Chairman Hua Guofeng, and to the advancement to the fore of a growing cohort of adherents of the right-pragmatic course, which already then, in 1980, made Hua Guofeng only the nominal head of the CPC and became a prelude to his impending resignation. Consequently, the recreation of the CC Secretariat cannot but be regarded as yet another battle between different groups of Peking leadership, and that naturally is no "improvement" of the inner-Party atmosphere.

Factional struggle is a chronic CPC disease. Although the documents of the last, 11th Congress said factional struggle in the Party was inadmissible and a number of declarative clauses and provisions were introduced into the Rules to "check" it, the efforts to overcome factionalism have so far failed. Measures taken in this direction have not led and cannot lead to any results because the struggle within the Party leadership is stimulated by objective reasons. The struggle in the upper echelons in Peking over the country's socio-economic, ideological and foreign policies periodically gains momentum. Its sharpness and intensity give grounds to assume that the participants are not only the right-wing pragmatic Maoists with their chauvinistic, pro-imperialist platform and not only the "left-wing" Maoists with their attempts to return to "orthodox" Maoism, but also the genuine democratic and patriotic forces opposing them. What makes the inner-Party struggle especially tense is the actual complex situation in China: widespread petty-bourgeois political views, economic growth difficulties aggravated by the population explosion, and the Maoists' economic vacillations.

The struggle in the Party is unfolding at all levels, from the Political Bureau and the Central Committee to local organisations and local Party apparatus. People who had suffered defeat in the inner-Party struggle were removed from the Political Bureau and the Central Committee and

³ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 10, 1979.

members of the factions that had won at the given stage were coopted at practically all the plenary meetings of the Central Committee in 1976-1981 and at the 11th CPC Congress. The inner-Party struggle was especially sharp in the middle and at the end of 1978, before the Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee. In this period several groups of pragmatical Maoists (including Deng Xiaoping's group) launched a struggle against the "left-wing" Maoists headed by Hua Guofeng (backed by Ye Jianying's group). In view of the obvious failure of the "11th Congress line", the fight was over the concrete questions of the future socio-economic course that would allow to make China a "mighty state" within a brief span of time, over the attitude to Maoist legacy, home policy methods, etc. At this stage victory went to right-wing pragmatical Maoists who insisted on the proclamation of a modified Maoist course—the so-called "Third Plenary Meeting course".

That a sharp internal struggle was raging was admitted time and again by Chinese leaders in their speeches before cadre workers, for instance, by Deng Xiaoping at a conference in Peking on January 16, 1980. The *Hongqi* journal (No. 10, 1979) said that factionalism had affected all the leading CPC bodies and that there were "secret groups" in the Party organisations.

One of the consequences of bitter factional struggle are the continuous "purges" among the leading functionaries of the CPC and the administrative bodies. After Mao Zedong's death his closest associates were removed from the Political Bureau and the State Council. The arrest of the "gang of four" was followed by the removal, all over the country, of their followers from the posts they held—thousands of provincial and county leaders and People's Liberation Army political workers and officers all the way down to divisional and corps commanders. Over 40 per cent of the Central Committee were not reelected at the 11th CPC Congress in 1977, and after it purges were carried out throughout the Party, from the Central Committee down to local organisations. Practically all the leaders of the provincial Party committees and governments were replaced in 1977-1981.

A new round of reshuffles and "purges" began after the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the 11th Central Committee in February 1980. They continue to this day following the Sixth Plenary Meeting, while the stage of "practical conclusions" will probably end only after the announcement at the 12th Congress of the reshuffles in the leadership.

The incessant struggle in Peking's upper echelons engenders discord and scepticism in the local Party organisations. There are hundreds of instances noted in 1978-1981 of the rank-and-file members being disoriented, of their not understanding the situation and, what is most important, their not understanding the changes taking place, and fearing the need of new political directives and policy initiated by the Third Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee at the end of 1978. The point is that for years all the active Party members and leaders of local organisations were educated in the "left" Maoist spirit of renouncing material incentives, disdaining them, relying on ultra-revolutionary slogans, keeping up the "revolution", fighting the "enemies" and the people of the "four black categories", etc. Another course was followed after December 1978: alliance with the well-to-do village strata, encouragement of good work with bonuses, advancement of slogans like "To grow rich is good", admission of members of the bourgeoisie and intellectuals to Party membership, etc. Members of local Party organisations view such a change in the home policy followed immediately after Mao and during the three years

of Hua Guofeng's rule with caution and fear lest the wind of reform reverse its direction and the supporters of the "left" Maoist wing return to power. Local cadres prefer a passive stance and do not want to adopt independent decisions. Hence the frequent complaints in the Chinese press that the "Third Plenary Meeting course" is meeting with obstructions and that there are relapses to "leftism" which allegedly hamper the realisation of the "four modernisations".

Local Party organisations began to hold conferences in 1980 in preparation for the 12th Congress. They revealed a desire to alter the composition of the "leading groups" in order to modernise the country's economy more successfully. The Party press stressed that the main task of the Party conferences was to establish a kind of Party committees that "can bring about modernisation". City, county, aimak and autonomous area Party conferences elected new Party committees and delegates to provincial conferences. The new Party committees, newspapers emphasised, have fewer members, but their educational and professional level is higher and the average age—lower. The average age of the executive members of new Party committees in a number of counties of Qinghai Province is 41-43 years. In Shandong Province people nominated for membership of the leading groups of Party organisations were specially trained middle-aged cadres. About 100,000 leading cadres went through "refresher courses" in Party schools, higher educational institutions and secondary special educational establishments.

The renewal of the leadership at various levels is a major element of preparation for the coming Congress. The Peking leaders hope at this stage to draw into the leading groups the CPC members who, first, accept their political, economic and social course and, second, are capable of effectively implementing it. For the rehabilitated CPC leaders this is the main condition for reinstatement. The process will apparently involve hundreds of thousands of Party workers for the problem affects practically all the sections of the Party apparatus—from Party leaders in the communes and big enterprises to Party committee leaders of provincial and higher level. It is because of the scope of this process, that in the period since the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the 11th Central Committee and the announcement on the convocation of the 12th Emergency Congress, Party conferences have not yet been held in all the counties, cities and autonomous areas, and in half of the provinces.

The question of the CPC's composition is still of prime importance on the eve of the 12th Congress. Judging by the Chinese leaders' statements, the Party has 39 million members and about half of them do not meet present-day requirements. It is they and a number of old communists, who also have "ceased to meet" these requirements, who must become, on the eve of the Congress, the main objects of the measures to put the Party ranks "in good order". It is with a view to "improving" the composition that particular attention is paid to the question of admitting intellectuals into the Party. Although the social composition of the Party is still not being revealed, petty-bourgeois influence, many reports say, continues to prevail.⁴

A "working meeting" of the CPC Central Committee took place at the end of 1980. It was attended by more than 1,000 people, including members of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat, vice-premiers and members of the State Council dealing with economic questions, provincial Party leaders and leaders of CPC committees in big cities. The meeting

⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 9, 1980.

was chaired by CC General Secretary Hu Yaobang and was devoted mainly to economic questions. Reports were made by CPC Deputy Chairman Chen Yun, CPC Deputy Chairman and Premier Zhao Ziyang, and CPC Deputy Chairman Deng Xiaoping. In addition to the resolution on "economic regulation", the meeting adopted an important resolution on the question of cadres. Among other things, it discussed the question of removing Hua Guofeng from the post of CPC Chairman. Foreign correspondents reported that Hua Guofeng indulged in self-criticism at that meeting and was criticised by the participants for opposing the reinstatement of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, allowing reprisals on the pretext of combating counterrevolution, building his own personality cult, introducing the changes he wanted into the fifth volume of Mao Zedong's selected works, and for economic failures.⁵ In an important "prescriptive" speech at that meeting Deng Xiaoping pointed to the mistakes in economic policy since 1976, warned against "overhasty modernisation", urged to strengthen the Party leadership in the present difficult situation", and stressed the need to "return to the Yanan spirit and remedy the situation in the Party".

The decision to convene the 12th CPC Congress was adopted, as said above, at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the 11th Central Committee in February 1980, i. e., two and a half years after the preceding congress. According to the CPC Rules, congresses are convened once every five years. The 12th Congress is thus to be held ahead of schedule. The 10th in 1973 and the 11th in 1977 were also emergency congresses.

Why are CPC congresses convened ahead of schedule? From the point of view prevailing in socialist countries, the last CPC congresses, starting with the 9th in 1969, are not forums at which the communists discuss, in a calm and businesslike atmosphere, the main aspects of development of the Party and the country in general, sum up the results of the work done in the preceding period, lay down a new programme of action, etc. The abovementioned congresses in China marked the end of another round of inner-political struggle. The 12th Congress will not be an exception. Its convocation is dictated by the need to secure the new reshuffle in the Party leadership, confirm purges and promotions, introduce amendments to the Party Rules, and sanction the already effected deviation from the line of the preceding congress.

Considerable changes will probably be made in the Party Rules at the 12th Congress. It is noteworthy that substantial amendments are made in them practically every four years. This is in itself indicative of the organisational instability and confusion in the Party. In his abovementioned speech in January 1980, Deng Xiaoping said the Rules adopted at the 9th and 10th CPC congresses "were not Party Rules in the full sense". The press said these Rules "contained many mistakes" because of interference by Lin Biao, the "gang of four" and the "Adviser" (Kang Sheng, who was adviser to the CC Cultural Revolution Group).⁶ No less criticism was levelled at the Rules adopted at the 11th CPC Congress. Although "some of the mistakes have been rectified", *Renmin ribao* wrote, the Rules are "incomplete and require considerable amendments, particularly now that we are meeting, in the sphere of Party organisation, with a great many new circumstances and new problems".⁷

The draft of the new Rules was discussed and approved by the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee. The resolutions of the Fifth

⁵ See *Tokyo shimbun*, Jan. 9 and 15, 1981.

⁶ *Zheming*, March 6, 1980; *Renmin ribao*, March 17, 1980.

⁷ *Renmin ribao*, March 17, 1980.

and particularly of the Sixth Plenary Meeting showed that a number of paragraphs of the new Rules would in effect touch up the "left" Maoist guidelines, impart a different meaning to them or even negate them. The positive assessments of the "cultural revolution" will probably be cancelled out, changes will be introduced in the paragraphs on the appointment of the leading cardes, and the paragraph on "Mao's thought" will be differently formulated. On the whole, the documents of the coming 12th CPC Congress will reappraise a number of basic theses of the preceding, 11th Congress, and reassess the "cultural revolution", Liu Shaoqi's personality and certain Maoist tenets (for instance, on the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the approach to the former "models" of Chinese society, Dazhai and Daqing, etc.).

It should be noted that for some time now the Peking leadership has been turning more and more to the documents of the 8th CPC Congress. Starting with 1979, a number of publications said that the home policy course laid down at the 8th Congress "was correct" and that the Rules it adopted "were perfect". For the first time official documents, for instance the communique of the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, positively assessed the resolutions of the 8th Congress. This was also done by the communique of the Fifth Plenary Meeting.⁸ In his speech in January 1980, Deng Xiaoping claimed that the "good name and traditions of the 8th CPC Congress" had been restored.⁹ In May 1980, the documents of the 8th Congress (its first session in 1956) were republished without any comment.

The recourse to the documents and resolutions of the 8th CPC Congress is, nevertheless, inconsistent and contradictory: while the appeal to make use of such of its provisions as the principle of democratic centralism, adherence to the methods of collective leadership, struggle against the personality cult, etc., may be regarded as a positive, though unsubstantiated phenomenon, the separation and rejection of the most important part of the resolutions saying the Party must guide itself by Marxism-Leninism (and not by the "thought of Mao Zedong", as required by the present CPC Rules), and abide by the principles of proletarian internationalism and friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries show that the CPC leadership sticks to reactionary nationalistic Maoism. Actually, the present Party leaders are seeking to use the name and slogans of the 8th Congress, and not its resolutions, to further their aims. They are trying to strengthen the shaken prestige of the Party among the people and give the Party's Maoist principles a pseudo-Marxist façade with the help of the authority of the 8th Congress and its resolutions, and certain theses contained in its other documents.

A huge number of victims of the "cultural revolution" have so far been rehabilitated in China, with the result that a great many Party cadres, defamed and repressed in Mao's time, have again been drawn into Party and Government activity at all levels from the lowest to the Political Bureau. As Deng Xiaoping said in one of his speeches, over 2.9 million people have been rehabilitated, including practically all the Party leaders (many posthumously)—members of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, and regional and provincial Party leaders.

The rehabilitation campaign was crowned, it may be said, by the resolution of the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee on the

⁸ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 29, 1980 and March 1, 1980.

⁹ *Zheming*, March 6, 1980.

complete vindication of Liu Shaoqi. This resolution is extremely important because it entailed the reassessment of a whole number of questions which may be reflected in the documents of the coming 12th CPC Congress. The communique of the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee on Liu Shaoqi's rehabilitation said "this question does not concern him alone". In this connection, the Peking leadership was indeed compelled to abrogate a number of resolutions or distort historical facts. The documents of the 11th CPC Congress, for instance, characterised Liu Shaoqi as a "swindler" and "capitalist roader like Lin Biao and the Gang of Four", and spoke of "Liu Shaoqi's bourgeois headquarters".¹⁰ Judging by the Fifth Plenary Meeting communique, subsequent press articles and reports on the Liu Shaoqi memorial meeting in May 1980, his rehabilitation is palmed off in China as the restoration of "the true meaning of Mao Zedong's thought", while the theses and principles elaborated by Liu Shaoqi in the sphere of Party building and the working-class movement are qualified as "the component part of the system of Mao Zedong's thought".¹¹ As may be seen, it is another attempt by the Chinese leaders to falsify recent history, vindicate in every possible way Mao Zedong, the man chiefly to blame for the "cultural revolution", and declare rectification of the shortcomings and mistakes committed through his fault for realisation of his behests.

The position of Hua Guofeng, who became CPC Chairman after Mao's death, has changed considerably since the 11th Party Congress. The praise sung him at the Congress, at which he was called a "worthy disciple and heir" of Mao Zedong, the "wise leader of the Party and the people", the "wise Army commander", etc., was followed, at first by veiled, and then open criticism in connection with the trial of the so-called "counterrevolutionary groups of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing". Hua Guofeng's power and authority as Chairman of the Party were substantially limited during the reorganisation of the Party apparatus, of which we spoke above. At the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in September 1980 he was compelled to relinquish the post of Premier, which he had held concurrently. This also badly weakened his position. Lastly, after the criticism he was subjected to at the CC "working meeting" at the end of 1980 and his lengthy absence at official meetings and receptions, the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee held in June 1981, decided on the future of the man Mao Zedong himself had allegedly chosen as his successor. Hua Guofeng lost his post as CPC Chairman and became one of the least important Party Deputy Chairmen. He was thus at the head of the CPC for less than five years.

The preservation of the Maoist "tradition" of bypassing national CPC congresses in solving highly important Party problems was confirmed by the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee held instead of the announced 12th Party Congress at the end of June 1981. As an analysis of the tendencies within the Party shows, the reason for the protracted preparation of the Plenary Meeting and the impossibility of convening the promised Party congress was the struggle among the Peking leaders over the assessment of some basic moments in CPC history, the role of Mao Zedong and his "thought", and the elaboration of the political and economic course of the country's development. The "study" of the documents of the Central Committee's "working meeting", which took

¹⁰ See *The 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)*, Peking, 1977, pp. 40, 43, 56, 87 (in Chinese).

¹¹ *Renmin ribao*, March 1, 1980, May 16 and 18, 1980.

place in December 1980, was completed only by the spring of 1981. Since that meeting, conferences of cadres of all provinces, important branches of the economy, ministries and the armed forces were held amid sharp struggle, and the resolutions and documents of the "working meeting" were "studied" at some of them. After that the Peking press published important articles outlining the further socio-economic course of China's development and giving a new assessment of the role played by Mao Zedong and his "thought" in CPC history.¹²

Like the preceding Party plenary meetings, the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee marked the end of another round of inner-Party struggle and the adoption of a compromise decision. Among the basic moments in the work and resolutions of the Sixth Plenary Meeting one should list the following:

the Plenary Meeting confirmed that modified Maoism with its concomitants—great-power hegemonism, chauvinism and anti-Sovietism—would be the immutable ideological and theoretical basis of the CPC and society in general "for a long time to come";

the documents of the Sixth Plenary Meeting showed that the present Peking leadership was still speculating on Marxist-Leninist terminology, trying to create the semblance of the CPC adhering to Marxist-Leninist positions and continuing to be the vanguard of the Chinese working class;

the Resolution on Certain Aspects of CPC History Since the Establishment of the People's Republic of China, though forced to admit that Mao Zedong had committed "serious mistakes", nevertheless showed that the present Peking leadership was not in a position to overcome Mao's pernicious legacy and draw conclusions from the mistakes of the past;

the personnel changes made by the Sixth Plenary Meeting, as a result of which Hua Guofeng was superseded by Hu Yaobang, but remained in the Party leadership as Deputy Chairman, confirmed most vividly the compromise nature of the agreement between the rival groups in the CPC upper echelons.

The Sixth Plenary Meeting and its resolutions graphically testify to the crisis in the Party and society in general, and to the fact that the Party is confronted by a multitude of unsolved problems and that it is impossible to solve them without discarding the pernicious Maoist legacy. The half-way, compromise resolutions adopted by the Plenary Meeting (notably on the "thought of Mao Zedong", his "deserves" and "mistakes", the "cultural revolution", etc.) confirmed the impotence of the present Peking leadership and its inability to solve these problems. All these facts allow to say that the compromise reached will not be long-lived and that the struggle in the leadership will become sharper in the near future. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that the Plenary Meeting adopted no decision on the precise date for the 12th CPC Congress.

The present CPC leadership announced that the study of the documents of the Plenary Meeting "is one of the Party's main tasks in the coming half-year". In an editorial entitled "Seriously to Study the Resolution, to Unite and to Look Ahead", *Renmin ribao* asserted that Mao Zedong and his "thought" were inseparable from the whole of CPC history and "inseparable from the future of the Chinese revolution".¹³ The appeals to study the documents of the Sixth Plenary Meeting, addressed, in the first place, to the leading cadres in counties and up, reveal that the

¹² *Renmin ribao*, April 9 and 11, 1981; *Guangming ribao*, April 20, 1981.

¹³ *Renmin ribao*, July 6, 1981.

campaign for "reeducation" began in the upper echelons and that before a "single understanding" is promoted among the local cadres it is necessary to "unify the views" of top-ranking leaders. At the same time, reports in the Peking and provincial press and over the radio show that the process of "reeducation" is gradually extending to rank-and-file Party members and the Chinese society as a whole.

To direct the new campaign of propaganda of corrected "thought of Mao Zedong" into a channel suiting the Peking leadership, *Renmin ribao* published in July 1981, eight prescriptive articles under the heading of "To Study Certain Aspects of CPC History After the Establishment of the People's Republic of China" which contained a detailed official assessment of the stages of the CPC's development with appropriate explanations of events. These articles were obviously prepared, not by the editors of the newspaper, but by the CPC Central Committee or the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The themes to be studied coincide, on the whole, with the sections of the Resolution and are listed chronologically.¹⁴ Attention is devoted mainly to Mao Zedong's "deserves" and the achievements of the PRC after 1949. Major events are commented upon thoroughly and in a new way, the assessment conforming to the aims of the new CPC leadership. Besides this, "Theses for the Study of the Resolution" was published in *Guangming ribao*.

"Complete recognition of Comrade Mao Zedong's place in history and that of his thought in the Chinese revolution" is officially stated as the prime objective in "studying" the Resolution. Chinese propaganda is advised to stress that "Comrade Mao Zedong's deserves before the Chinese revolution are far greater than his mistakes" and to show that the "deserves hold first place and mistakes—second".¹⁵ According to the Peking leaders' plans, the study of the Resolution is to promote "unity of understanding", i. e., unity of views which, as we see, is lacking in the CPC not only in the sphere of Party's history, but also in its present-day policy. Being aware of the danger of "reappraising values" in what concerns vital problems of CPC history, a thing that may lead to puzzling questions and disputes in local organisations, the present Peking leadership recommends cadres "to avoid dwelling on small historical events in every possible way and not to allow mass polemics on the subject of concrete truth and untruth in history".¹⁶ It is feared that the measure itself may lead to an all-out criticism of the "thought of Mao Zedong" and CPC policy. There are grounds to believe that the campaign of "reeducation" is being conducted in line with the directives of Zhongia No. 22, a CPC Central Committee secret document sent to provincial and county Party committees through Party channels at the beginning of July 1981. Carrying out these directives, provincial Party committees regularly hold "conferences of cadres of three levels", meetings of the standing committees of Party committees, plenary meetings of Party committees at which plans for and the "study" of the Resolution are discussed. With the same aim in view, county Party organisations have arranged numerous "courses for the study of the Resolution", "study courses for leading functionaries", "courses for the propaganda of the essence of the Resolution", etc.

Despite all the attempts made by the Chinese leadership to secure a uniform attitude to the Resolution of the Plenary Meeting, the aim

¹⁴ *Renmin ribao*, July 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 21, 24, 28, 1981.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, July 6, 1981 (the quotes are from Deng Xiaoping's speech).

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

remains hard to achieve. Judging by reports in the Peking and provincial press, questions linked chiefly with the Chinese leaders' present policy constantly arise in the process of the "study" of the Resolution. If one discarded statements eulogising Mao Zedong as a "Marxist-Leninist" and a "great proletarian revolutionary" and his thought as the "quintessence of the collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China" and other cliches taken from the Resolution, one could discern tendencies testifying to continuing differences and struggle between CPC groups.

As for inner-Party struggle, this is evidenced by the open criticism of Hua Guofeng after the Plenary Meeting. Although that meeting seemingly did its job and removed the "leader" from the highest post in the CPC, criticism of Hua Guofeng continues. It is perfectly clear that the continuing attacks on Hua Guofeng may also be directed against the people who had backed him all these years, primarily Ye Jianying and his followers.

Information available points to different views inside the CPC and in China in general about the assessment of the "thought of Mao Zedong" in the Resolution. Though it pointed at the main mistakes in Mao's practical activity, the Plenary Meeting did not draw a clear-cut line between what is rational and what is erroneous in Mao Zedong's thought. It is very likely that this may lead to still greater ideological confusion in various spheres of the CPC.

* * *

An objective analysis of the situation in the CPC shows that the deep ideological and organisational crisis that has hit the Communist Party of China cannot be eliminated by the methods now proposed in Peking. However much the CPC propaganda machine may talk about the need to achieve ideological unity on the basis of the main conclusions of the Resolution on Certain Aspects of CPC History Since the Establishment of the People's Republic of China, there can be no unity. In the present situation, when the right-wing nationalistic forces led by Deng Xiaoping predominate, and after years of savage anti-Soviet propaganda and amid consequences of the terror of the "cultural revolution", the ideals of socialism are being seriously discredited and the Chinese people's socialist gains increasingly impaired. Thus, the objective interests of the Chinese people come more and more into conflict with the militaristic and hegemonic aims of Maoism, and this tells directly on the CPC too, destabilising and destroying its organism.

A major obstacle on the Maoists' way to their aims is erected by the victories of the socialist countries and the peaceloving forces in the struggle against imperialism and for confidence between and peaceful coexistence of all countries. Ultimately, it is this and a number of other factors that predetermine Maoism's historical doom as an ideological and political system, although at present the Maoist policy and ideology predetermine and stimulate in many ways (though not fully and not for ever) the negative processes and tendencies in the present-day CPC.

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PRC RURAL UNEMPLOYMENT, AGRICULTURAL STAGNATION SURVEYED

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[Article by I. N. Korkunov, candidate of economic sciences: "Socioeconomic Problems of the Chinese Countryside"]

[Text]

The agrarian problem is one of the major economic problems facing China today. Overcoming economic and social backwardness in the country, providing for the overwhelming majority of the population and maintaining their standard of living depends to a large extent on the solution of this problem. To a large measure, the growth rate and structure of the entire economy are determined by the condition of agriculture. This sector of the Chinese economy is the major supplier of raw materials for light industry (over 60 per cent) and a considerable source of the national income, budgetary revenue (40 per cent) and export earnings (40 per cent) and its output constitutes the bulk of the commodities sold on the domestic market (80 per cent).¹

At the same time, political and economic stability in the country depends on the situation in the Chinese countryside where over 80 per cent of the total population lives. The present condition of the Chinese countryside reflects the aggravation of the main contradiction of Chinese society, that between the anti-socialist character of the Peking leaders' policy and the needs of production growth and vital interests of the population. The economic backwardness of Chinese agriculture is explained by the totality of relations of production and exchange and by the position of agriculture within the economy as a whole.

The way the agrarian problem, which has lately grown more acute, is tackled, will largely determine the entire course of China's further development and the nature of its socio-economic system. Progress in the agrarian sector, which employs the greatest number of people and accounts for the largest portion of social reproduction, depends primarily on changes in governmental policy pertaining to the crucial problems of the economic basis, the system of national economic priorities, and prospects for the development of Chinese society.

The period following the death of Mao Zedong has found the country heavily burdened by the legacy of Maoism which had negative effects on the economy as a whole, and on agriculture in particular. Agricultural production is barely keeping pace with population growth: food rationing continues, and the problem of supplying agricultural raw materials to industry has exacerbated. Discontent is growing among the farmers and workers, in the CPC, and in the army.

Although agriculture has been officially proclaimed "the backbone of the economy" and its advance the primary task of the "regulation" period (1979-1985), an analysis of the agrarian policy of the post-Mao leadership shows that this proclamation is actually an empty slogan: China's present-day leaders have not made their primary objective raising the standard of living of the population on the basis of the com-

¹ See *Nongye jingji wenti*, 1981, No. 1, p. 35; No. 11, p. 2; *Renmin ribao*, June 13 and Sept. 7, 1977, Oct. 6, 1978.

prehensive and diversified development of agricultural production. This is borne out by the lack of effective aid to the countryside by the state, by the cessation of the "modernisation" which was planned earlier, cut-backs in state appropriations, and the preservation of price scissors. In fact, agriculture is not a priority economic sector receiving funds before any other branch but an "economic donor" producing resources for the militarisation of the country through a system of prices and taxes.

The 1957-1977 period saw no rise in labour productivity in agriculture. In fact, it had even dropped. In 1957 the country produced 270 kg of grain per head of the population, whereas 20 years later, in 1977, the figure was 267. Between 1957 and 1970, according to Chinese statistics, per capita cotton production decreased from 2.6 to 2.3 kg and the output of water-based enterprises from 4.9 to 4.5 kg.² This tendency is explained by the fact that the workforce in the countryside is growing faster than fixed assets are increasing, and technological modernisation lags far behind. In the USSR, the workforce employed in agriculture has decreased from 49.5 million to 27 million during the Soviet period while annual agricultural output has grown by 230 per cent.³ In China the workforce in the countryside is growing steadily while the cultivated area per rural inhabitant has shrunk by 40 per cent during the past 25 years from 0.17 to 0.1 hectare—25 per cent of the world average.

The unresolved employment problem and the "excess" of labour in the countryside, exceeding one-third of its total strength, undercuts social labour productivity and constitutes a major factor of social instability in the country.⁴ There are many "superfluous" peasants in the densely populated eastern provinces of the country, where they often have to queue for jobs. Fuller employment is often formal because the cost-and-benefit characteristic of production is ignored. Lately the introduction of the system of "production responsibility" has further aggravated the problem of "surplus" labour.

According to the Chinese data, the labour force in the countryside in 1977 grew by 47 per cent over 1957, whereas grain production increased during that period by a mere 45 per cent, cotton by 25 per cent, and oil-bearing crops by 10 per cent.⁵ The continuous intensification of farm work with no increase in remuneration remains the principal factor of the development of agricultural production of China. Moreover, according to Chinese statistics, the value of one work day in 1977 was 33 per cent lower than it was in 1957.⁶

It has been officially recognized that Chinese agriculture has remained at virtually the same level of labour productivity and per capita

² *Zhongguo jingji nianjian* (Yearbook of the Chinese Economy, 1981), Peking, 1981, p. 12.

Grain production in per capita terms in China was higher in the late 19th and the early 20th century than it is at present. In 1885, for instance, it was 326 kg, in 1905, 304 kg and in 1915, 301 kg. See O. Nepomnin, *The Socio-Economic History of China (1894-1914)*, Moscow, 1980, p. 295 (in Russian).

³ See *Agrarian Problems in the Development of Socialism*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1980, p. 6.

⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 1, 1981. The figures for "surplus" labour in China are higher than in many other Asian countries. For instance, in South and Southeast Asian countries the share of underemployed in the total of the gainfully employed population is 20 per cent, including 12 per cent in the Philippines and 20 per cent in Sri Lanka. See *Foreign Orient and Our Time. Major Problems and Tendencies of Development of the Countries of the Foreign Orient*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1980, p. 49 (in Russian).

⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 15, 1979.

⁶ See *Nongye jingji wenti*, 1980, No. 1, p. 35.

grain production for the past two millennia.⁷ As a consequence, China's backwardness in yield capacity and labour productivity is increasing as compared with other countries, with the figures for China among the lowest in the world. According to FAO statistics, China produces only 15 per cent of the world's grain output, although it accounts for 28 per cent of the world's rural population. A Chinese farmer produces dozens of times less grain than a farmer in the industrialised countries. In 1979, a Chinese farmer grew on average 1,040 kg of grain, whereas the figure for the United States was 95,332 kg and for France 20,155 kg.⁸ Live labour input per hectare of wheat in China amounts to 150-180 man-days per year, whereas the figure for the United States is less than one man-day, with a yield 50 per cent higher than in China. Labour input per hectare of rice in China is 300 man-days, whereas in Japan it is 146 man-days, with rice yields almost the double of those in China.⁹

Agriculture is falling further behind industry, a fact which is closely related to the deep-seated discrepancies of social reproduction. This constitutes one of the basic causes of disproportions between the branches of the economy and of the overall economic crisis. Differences in the structural patterns of labour and technology-labour ratio between more up-to-date industrial production and traditional agricultural production are the main reason for the discrepancies between labour productivity levels in those economic sectors. While in industry, the per worker output in 1980 amounted to 9,000 yuan, in agriculture (including subsidiary crafts) it was a mere 450 yuan, or one-twentieth of that in industry. Vast discrepancies between town and countryside persevere, making themselves felt particularly in the living and working conditions of the urban and rural populations. According to the Chinese press, the "three main differences" keep growing in the country, namely, those between the countryside and the city, between agriculture and industry and between manual and mental work.¹⁰ According to a report of the Central Statistical Board of the PRC in 1980, the average income of a commune member from the socialised economy was a mere 85.9 yuan.¹¹

Due to low labour productivity, one people's commune is capable of contributing an average of a mere seven per cent of its gross income to expanded reproduction. Accumulation constitutes a mere eight yuan per worker, and 4.16 yuan per mu (1/15 hectare) of ploughland.¹² That is why 50-60 per cent—and even up to 80 per cent in some provinces—of the fixed assets of the people's communes, worth a total of 85,000 million yuan, consist of primitive agricultural implements. The fixed assets of a large production team are estimated at a mere 10,000 yuan, whereas one 55 hp tractor costs 14,000 yuan.¹³

The Chinese countryside gets no effective state aid nor has it any sound material or technical base: it has to "rely on its own resources". This situation is at odds with the objective needs of the development of society. In 1980 China officially recognized the task of mechanising agriculture "in the main" as unrealistic. Attempts to find the bulk of funds needed for mechanisation (70-90 per cent) directly in the communes and districts involved have turned out to be futile. Other unresolved problems

⁷ *Guangming ribao*, April 10, 1979.

⁸ *Jingji kexue*, 1980, No. 1.

⁹ *Renmin ribao*, May 14, 1978.

¹⁰ *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, 1981, No. 7, p. 12.

¹¹ See *Renmin ribao*, April 6, 1981.

¹² See *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, 1980, No. 3.

¹³ *Nongye jingji wenti*, 1980, No. 1, p. 15.

include the low quality of machinery supplied to the countryside, its inefficient utilisation, and a lack of machine operators. That is why since late 1979, China has concentrated its efforts on selective "pocket" mechanisation in the "major bases of commercial grain production", namely, in major agricultural areas in the northeast and around major cities and industrial centres. China has claimed lately that it is necessary "to slow down the rate of mechanisation and to use cheap live labour in every way possible".¹⁴

Although the Chinese leadership admits the existence of considerable price scissors between agricultural and industrial production, the high prices of industrial products supplied to the countryside have not yet been reduced. The practice of monopoly state purchases of farm produce at low prices, which does not ensure the profitability of agricultural production, continues as well. In 1975, the prices of manufactured products supplied to the countryside were on average 15-20 per cent higher than their production costs; those of farm produce purchased were 25-30 per cent lower than production costs.¹⁵ Purchasing prices for grain were often less than half of production costs in a number of areas with inferior production conditions.¹⁶

The prices of machinery and fertilizers supplied to the countryside in China are far higher than the average prices on the world market. In Japan, for instance, a 20 hp tractor is worth 5.5 tons of rice, whereas in China the 28 hp Dongfanghong tractor is worth 35.5 tons of rice. On the world market, one kilogram of grain is worth two kilograms of fertilizers, whereas in China it is worth less than one kilogram.¹⁷ The cost of diesel fuel in terms of rice is six times higher in China than it is in Japan, particular types of fertilizers are 12-13 times higher, and tractors 3-6 times higher.¹⁸ The drastically unequal exchanges of output between the cities and the countryside create conditions under which the peasantry will be opposed to the working class. This, in turn, will reduce interest in substituting embodied labour for live labour and decrease possibility for expanded reproduction in agriculture.

The insufficient "safety margin" in agriculture and the lack of major reserves making it possible to overcome difficulties and to provide the country with food grain and raw materials constitute the major reasons for economic and political instability and food shortages. The food supply sometimes drops below subsistence level, particularly in provinces hit by natural disasters. (Their area annually amounts to one-sixth of the country's territory.)

The Chinese press admits that over the past twenty-odd years, far from having made progress in the solution of the food problem, the country saw further deterioration in this field. A tough rationing system for basic foods and consumer goods remains in force in the country, and the standard of living continues to decrease. In 1978, per capita grain consumption was down by 3.2 per cent, as compared with 1957, vegetable oil use was 33.3 per cent lower, and cotton fabrics use was down two per cent. Supplies to the rural population have decreased even more. In the same period, according to official statistics, grain consumption in the countryside decreased by 5.6 per cent, vegetable oil consumption by 43.2 per cent and the consumption of cotton fabrics by 5.7 per

¹⁴ *Liaowang*, 1981, No. 5.

¹⁵ *Zhonggong yanzuo*, 1980, June.

¹⁶ *Jingji yanzuo*, 1979, No. 4, p. 3.

¹⁷ *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, 1980, No. 3.

¹⁸ *Jingji yanzuo*, 1978, No. 12.

cent.¹⁹ The Chinese press admits that the per capita consumption of food grain decreased in the period between 1957 and 1978 from 203 to 196 kg. In the same period the per capita consumption of cotton fabrics went down from 8.3 to 7.5 metres.²⁰

A considerable share of the communes—about one out of six—is considered to be in need of state aid. Some of the communes have been getting grain from the state year after year. The Chinese press points out that 1,175,000 production teams numbering 130 million "experience extreme difficulties in collective production and life".²¹ Addressing a meeting at the CPC Central Committee in April 1979, Li Xiannian, Deputy Premier of the PRC State Council, said that over 100 million people were permanently hungry. "People are displeased," Li Xiannian stressed.²²

According to FAO statistics, the calorific value of food for Asian countries should be at least 2,300-2,500 calories per adult per day, whereas in China the average calorific value of food is only 2,200 calories per day.²³ Another negative factor of the reproduction of labour is structural starvation caused by the absolute predominance of vegetable stuffs and lack of proteins, particularly animal protein, which accounts for no more than five per cent of the calories consumed (the figure for the United States is 50 per cent).²⁴ China is at the bottom of the list of the world's countries in production and consumption of animal husbandry products, all the more so since a considerable portion of stock-breeding products are exported (one-seventh of the Chinese exports in terms of value).²⁵ According to official figures of the Central Statistical Board of China, the production of major food crops during recent years has been as follows (million tons):

	1977	1978	1979	1980	Increment in 1980 % of 1979
Basic food crops* including:	283.0	304.8	332.1	318.2	-4.2
rice	125.0	137.0	137.7	139.2	-3.1
wheat	51.0	54.0	62.8	51.2	-13.7
sweet potatoes and potatoes	26.0**	28.3**	28.5	27.9	-2.2
soy beans	8.1**	8.3	7.5	7.9	5.0
Oil-bearing crops	4.6*	5.2	6.4	7.3	11.4
Sugar cane	17.8	21.1	21.5	21.5	0
Sugar beets	2.5	2.7	3.1	5.5	71.0
Cotton (fiber)	2.05	2.17	2.2	2.25	0.2

Note: * The basic food crops include pulses and also sweet potatoes and potatoes converted to grain value (5 to 1).

** Estimated.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1979, No. 12, p. 37.

²⁰ *Guangming ribao*, June 28, 1980.

²¹ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 17, 1980.

²² The draft resolution of the CPC Central Committee on boosting agricultural production pointed out that over 100 million people were going hungry in the countryside.

²³ The calorific value of food is far lower in the calamity-stricken provinces. For instance, in 1980, in the Hubei and Hunan provinces which were hit by natural disaster, it amounted to 1,200-1,400 calories. See *China Business Review*, May-June, 1981.

²⁴ The minimal consumption of proteins per adult in China should be 50 grams per day. See *Jingji yanze*, 1981, No. 7.

²⁵ See *Jingji yanze*, 1979, No. 7, p. 19.

Many foreign sources estimate basic food crop harvests at levels far below the official data of the Central Statistical Board of China. Foreign statisticians point out that Chinese statistics are unreliable and that figures may be inflated by local authorities.

Low marketable surplus of agricultural production remains a serious problem for the Chinese countryside. According to estimates of Chinese statistical bodies, even if the annual grain production figure accepted as a basis for calculation is 325 million tons, the marketable surplus will only amount to 50 millions tons. This is obviously insufficient to supply 160 million of non-agricultural population with food. Over 80 per cent of the grain harvests are used by the peasants themselves, and are laid aside as seed stock, fodder and reserves, which is consequence of low labour productivity and the semi-subsistence character of agriculture, and, therefore, the proportion of marketable grain crops does not exceed 20 per cent.²⁶ According to official statistics, in 1979, before the procurement prices of a number of agricultural products were raised, each peasant produced a mere 70 yuan in output purchased by the state. After the price rise, the figure reached 80 yuan,²⁷ which testifies to the semi-subsistence character of farming, in which a considerable portion of output is used for personal consumption of peasants rather than for reproduction.

In the 1960s China began to import grain regularly, spending vast amounts of hard cash for the purpose. Food had to be supplied to its rapidly growing population, primarily in the cities. In 1979 alone, for instance, the imports of grain, cotton, soy beans, soy oil and sugar amounted to \$ 340 million. Purchases of farm produce amount to roughly 25 per cent of all Chinese imports, which reflects China's inability to produce food in sufficient quantities and to meet the growing domestic demand, generated, in particular, by demographic factors. Grain imports constitute over 25 per cent of the grain rations received by the urban population. Recently it was announced that the country would have to import vast quantities of food for a long time.

The table below shows the amount of farm produce imported by China over the past few years (in thousands of tons).

Year	Grain	Soy beans	Soy oil	Sugar	Raw cotton
1977	6,838	364	166	1,743	350
1978	9,309	109	108	1,366	480
1979	10,512	547	112	1,048	760
1980*	13,000	1,000	110	950	700

Source: *Agricultural Situation*, Washington, 1980, p. 17.

* Estimated.

A considerable share of China's grain imports is supplied by the United States. Under a trade agreement between the two countries for 1981-1985, China can annually import 6 to 9 million tons of grain from the United States, and also additional amounts under special annual

²⁶ According to the data of the Central Statistical Board of China, the country's grain output is distributed as follows: 60 per cent is consumed by the peasantry, 20 per cent is used for seed stock, fodder and various reserves, and 20 per cent goes for taxes and purchases.

²⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, April 9, 1981.

agreements. Apart from food imports, imports of cotton and other technical crops have been steadily growing over the past few years. In 1978, for instance, cotton imports constituted 27 per cent of the gross production of that crop in China.

In the mid-1970s, the negative phenomena in the economy caused by adventuristic policy and serious errors led to an acute crisis, and the need to overcome it is a major problem facing the Chinese leadership today. The condition of agriculture remained essential to the economic growth and the carrying out of economic plans. Worried by the chronic agricultural crisis, the Chinese leaders grew increasingly aware of a close relationship between their problems, the possibility of implementing the "four modernisations", and achieving political and economic stability in the country.

The task of creating a powerful state "with modern agriculture, industry, defence, science and technology" by the end of the century that was formulated by the 11th CPC Congress (August 1977) cannot be accomplished unless agriculture is modernised. So in the past few years, namely at the 3rd and 4th Plenary Meetings of the CPC Central Committee (December 1978 and September 1979) the importance of agriculture to the solution of the problems facing the country was emphasised. As guidelines for economic activities were laid, the need "to improve primarily agriculture and light industry, and to better the market situation",²⁸ was stressed.

A noticeable role in the formulation of agrarian policy was played by the decisions of the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee which approved the Tentative Draft Rules for the Working of Rural People's Communes ("New 60 Provisions"), which were sent to the provinces for discussion by provincial leaders and for experimental application. The amendments made in agricultural policy were formalised in the "Resolution on Certain Aspects of the Acceleration of Agricultural Growth" passed by the 4th Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee. It was pointed out at those Plenary Meetings that agriculture remained an extremely backward sector of the economy, that its labour productivity and growth rates were very low,²⁹ "and that it is necessary to concentrate the main forces on agriculture".³⁰ The Plenary Meetings formulated a course for the diversification of Chinese agriculture.

The Chinese leaders had to admit that the extreme left-wing methods of economic policy that had been fostered in the countryside for more than 20 years were impairing farming and led to gross breaches of the rules of agricultural cooperatives. They began to abandon the course of "learning from Dazhai" in 1978, and it was criticised openly after the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee. It was pointed out that the main aspects of the "Dazhaisation" of the countryside, such as levelling out, disregard for material incentive, organisation of production and subsidiary crafts, and emphasis on labour enthusiasm alone, were impeding the growth of agricultural production.³¹

At the same time the Chinese began to say, although cautiously, that the advance of agriculture had been hampered by the emergence of rural people's communes in 1958, which were created "at a stroke"

²⁸ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 7, 1977.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1979.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1979.

³¹ *Ibid.*, July 12, 1981.

while cooperatives of a higher type had not yet got onto their feet.³² One of the "two major errors" committed in China with regard to the establishment of people's communes was the "communist fad" reflecting the erroneous view that "organising communes meant finding a practical way for the transition to communism"³³ These admissions, however, were for the most part declarative and made no fundamental changes either in agrarian policy or in the state of agriculture.

Since the slogan of the "Dazhaisation" of the countryside has been removed and the people's communes criticised, the Chinese leaders, to all appearances, have not come up with a long-term integrated scientific program for the development of agriculture. There were plans to increase the share of state capital investments in agriculture to 14 per cent of the total in 1979 as compared with 10.7 per cent the year before to break the deadlock.³⁴ However, due to growing economic difficulties and inflation, capital investments in the countryside were not increased to any large extent. Already in 1980, the volume of state investments in agriculture decreased by over 20 per cent as compared with the previous year. Moreover, they were channelled primarily into restricted "commodity bases", whereas most farming areas had to "rely on their own resources". It was officially pointed out that agriculture would not receive additional funds and that the problems of its development would have to be resolved "relying on political guidelines and science".³⁵

Having realised that their plans to modernise agriculture are unrealistic, the Chinese leaders have lately been emphasising organisational and economic measures, such as improvements in the system of administration and management, the organisation and remuneration of labour, material incentives, etc. These measures, however, will not resolve the major problems of the Chinese countryside. They may have a certain effect over a short period, but later big investments will inevitably be required to bolster the material and technical basis of agriculture.

Trying to overcome stagnation in agriculture, the Peking leaders are taking measures to restore the principles of distribution according to labour and introduce material incentives, proving the Maoist tenet that such measures have a "bourgeois" character false. However, the abandonment of levelling out in remuneration is incomplete, controversial, and inconsistent. Differences on this issue between the Chinese leaders, the prolonged sway of Maoism with its Dazhai model and the low cultural level of the farming population, all of which hamper economic activity in the countryside, are slowing down the introduction of the new system of remuneration for work in accordance with its quantity and quality. The Chinese press points out that some peasants in a number of communes have "come out against the abrogation of levelling out and against remuneration in accordance with work quotas".³⁶ Obviously, remuneration according to work is opposed primarily by farming families with a large number of dependents which will be unable to feed themselves if distribution "by the number of mouths" is abandoned.

For this reason, despite official criticism of levelling out in distribution which takes no account of worker's skills or actual contributions, this system, with a ratio of distribution "by mouths and by work" being

³² *Ibid.*, April 9, 1981, and Nov. 6, 1979.

³³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1980.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 12, 1980, and March 8, 1981.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, September 12, 1980.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Oct. 18, 1978.

7 to 3 or 6 to 4, remains prevalent, the more so since the Peking leaders are unable to put the system of remuneration according to work on a sound material basis.

During the past few years, many restrictions on personal subsidiary plots and household crafts have been lifted. Today they are considered to be an essential supplement to the socialised economy, and rural markets, the operation of which was banned during the "cultural revolution", have been reopened.³⁷ Produce from the peasants' subsidiary plots and the surplus output of production teams (after they have met the targets for sales to the state) may be sold on those markets.

Small-team and even individual production—the breaking down of production assignments among individual peasant households, which operate according to the principle "ensure supplies to the state and collective and leave the rest for yourself"³⁸—began to be introduced in the countryside in 1979 to revive agricultural production. Land, draught animals, and farm implements are allotted to production groups. After the cost of implements has been repaid, they become the property of peasant households.³⁹

In 1981, a total of 90 per cent of all the production teams fell under the system of "production responsibility".⁴⁰ The introduction of various types of small-team and individual farming within the formal framework of the collective economy resulted in the actual restructuring and even breakdown of the system of communes and teams: in 1980 temporary and seasonal groups embracing several households and practising payment according to work quotas emerged in more than 50 per cent of the teams; 25 per cent of the teams practised small-group contracts with payment by agreement depending on production growth (a "big contract" for the whole growing season or "attachment of production to groups"); and 30 per cent of the teams attached production to households while dividing land according to mouths or working members.⁴¹

Plots of land were turned over to groups of farmers or individual farming households for permanent tillage on a particularly large scale in the poorer and more backward regions, which account for one-third of the population and one-fourth of the gross grain output. By introducing the "production responsibility" system, the state sought to shed the burden of responsibility for aid to those regions and shift it to the peasants themselves. The encouragement of individual forms of farming weakens the collective form of property, scatters it, particularly in the weaker communes and teams, enhances the tendency to engage in private farming, and leads to the emergence of a mixed economy. Lately China began to admit that "a transition from collective farming to a new system, in which private farming plays the dominant role and which is characterised by certain limitations"⁴² is taking place in a number of rural areas.

Summing up the initial results of the new system, the Chinese press notes its negative aspects: production is isolated within small economic units, which prevents the utilisation of such advantages of collective

³⁷ In 1979 it was allowed in a number of districts to increase the size of personal subsidiary plots to 15 per cent of the ploughland in the use of a production team by bringing under cultivation inconvenient or undercultivated areas.

³⁸ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 1, 1981.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ *Jingji guangli*, 1981, No. 9, p. 12.

⁴¹ See *Renmin ribao*, April 2, 1981; Sept. 5, 1981.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1981.

work as cooperation and division of labour; joint construction projects, the fulfilment of commitments to the state, and the collection of resources for social accumulation funds are complicated; attitudes of private proprietorship are fostered among the peasantry; birth control programs are difficult to maintain.⁴³

The recent period saw a particularly marked revision of social priorities in the policy of the Chinese leadership toward the peasantry and the working class. Emphasis was shifted to the well-to-do, "strong" strata of the peasantry, skilled workers, and bourgeois elements in an attempt to reinforce the social base for implementing the "four modernisations" program. It is stressed that the CPC's current agrarian policy envisions "renunciation of the slogan of reliance on the poor and the lower strata of the middle peasantry to avoid the artificial expansion of class contradictions" because this "breeds passivity among the middle peasants".⁴⁴ "Pour peasants' unions" in the Chinese countryside have been abolished. These modifications in the CPC's policy are explained by the Chinese leaders' belief that the poor people in town and countryside cannot be the motive force of the "four modernisations", according to which "the socialist system and the market economy" are to coexist within the Chinese economy.

The latter-day policy of support for "strong households", the slogan "let part of the peasantry be the first to grow wealthy" and the possibility of "small-scale exploitation" throughout "a whole historical stage" will inevitably aggravate the economic contradictions and social conflicts in the Chinese countryside. They make themselves felt in the growing discrepancies between levels of income, the polarisation of the peasantry, the emergence of well-to-do households as a social group and, as a consequence, the appearance of covert exploitation of different types, such as secret leases, purchases and sales of land, hiring of labour and usury. For instance, plots of land, particularly those suitable for vegetable growing, are leased out at high rates (50 or more yuan per mu) in a number of counties of Shanghai.⁴⁵

It is pointed out ever more often in China that the peasantry and cadre workers believe the plots of land attached to their households to be their private property and sell them, in particular, to urban residents, enterprises and offices. Such sales took place, for instance, in Sichuan.⁴⁶ In the Luoqing district of Zhejiang Province, team leaders sold 4,000 mu of land at 20 yuan per mu.⁴⁷ The attachment of land to households often leads to the misappropriation of public property and fixed assets and the sale of tractors and draft animals. Manually operated tractors are sold by teams to private peasants in the Guangdong Province, for instance. Altogether 350 such tractors were sold and 450 leased out in the Shenzhen district alone.⁴⁸

Householders who have plots of land exploit hired labour ever more frequently. The major three forms of such exploitation in China include the use of hired labour for aid in working the plot allotted, when its size exceeds what can be worked by the peasant household; sometimes plots are worked exclusively by hired hands while members of the household pursue subsidiary crafts, engage in black marketeering, etc.; and

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1981.

⁴⁴ *Zhongguo qingnianbao*, Sept. 4, 1979.

⁴⁵ *Jiefan ribao*, March 24, 1980.

⁴⁶ See *Sichuan ribao*, Aug. 14, 1980.

⁴⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, April 12, 1981.

⁴⁸ See *Nanfan ribao*, March 7, 1981.

lastly, labour is hired under the pretext of assistance in subsidiary crafts, cottage industries, etc.⁴⁹

"When production teams have been converted into self-supporting units, rivalry flares up between them which can easily lead even to the destruction of the productive forces,"⁵⁰ *Honqi*, published by the CPC Central Committee, admits. Competition between peasant groups and households grows over land, water and fertilizers. Many groups and households prefer to grow more profitable crops and sell their output on the free market at higher prices.

An analysis of the Chinese leaders' agrarian policy shows that the measures taken in the country have not effectively resolved the problem of the diversification of agriculture but have rather worsened discrepancies and imbalances in the rural economy and exacerbated social contradictions. The shift of emphasis in agrarian policy to areas that are better developed economically and the provision of more favourable conditions for them has enhanced the regional differentiation of production and income levels and exacerbated social inequality and tension in the countryside. It is in the "wealthier" areas that the more well-to-do teams and economic units are formed; their profits depend not so much on the quantity and quality of their work as on their "competitiveness" connected with non-production conditions, with the polarisation of elements of exploitation in the rural economy increasing as a result.

These differences between and within the regions are also enhanced by new precepts: "Let part of regions and economic units get rich first", "There is no need to be afraid of differences", etc.⁵¹ The polarisation between poor and rich regions and economic units in China is not only recognized as inevitable but also deemed an important "motive force" of accelerated agricultural development.⁵²

The growing tendency toward differentiation and strengthening exploitation in the countryside evoke dissatisfaction among the poorer Chinese peasants. The Chinese press admits that the general opinion is that "the countryside is disorganised and capitalism is flourishing", "the countryside has split into two classes" and "the poor are again getting poorer and the rich richer".⁵³ To blunt this discontent and prevent disturbances among the peasants, the PRC leaders had to resort to some economic measures, in particular, lowering the unbearably high level of taxes and deliveries for poor communes and teams ("let us allow the backward rural areas to have a rest and to muster strength" and "let us make their heavy burden lighter"). The Finance Ministry disclosed that in early 1979, the agricultural tax was lifted for those peasants who, after paying the tax, had less grain for consumption than was fixed by minimal norms. Threshold revenue liable to tax on commercial output was raised from 600 yuan to not less than 3,000 yuan.⁵⁴ According to the Chinese data, these changes will make it possible for the countryside to accumulate an additional 1,000 million yuan a year.

The Chinese have admitted that the principles of centralised and local management, of agricultural planning and relations between the collective units and the state are being violated, which has actually placed the people's communes under state control. In practice, however,

⁴⁹ See *Renmin ribao*, April 4, 1981.

⁵⁰ *Honqi*, 1981, No. 2, p. 12.

⁵¹ See *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 10, 1980.

⁵² See *Ibid.*, June 30, 1979.

⁵³ See *Ibid.*, Nov. 22 and 24, 1981; April 22, 1981.

⁵⁴ See *Ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1979.

nothing follows those pronouncements in the Chinese press about the need to safeguard the independence of collective economic management and the cooperative form of property. Rural managers continue using coercion, and local authorities and cadre workers are inclined to arbitrariness. The latest innovations in the agrarian policy have sharply increased tendencies towards regionalism, spontaneity, and decentralisation and worsened the disproportions and contradictions in the economy.

Major organisational changes carried out in respect of the Chinese government bodies concerned with agriculture show that attempts are being made to raise the level of management in agriculture. In February 1979, resolutions were passed to set up a State Committee for Agriculture and a Ministry of Farm Machine Building and to establish a Ministry of Agriculture and a Ministry of Forestry to replace the former Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. A decision was made to set up a Ministry of Mechanical Engineering for Agriculture and a Ministry of Virgin Land Development. A State Committee for Science and Technology has been set up under the Ministry of Agriculture. The PRC State Council passed a resolution to reopen the Agricultural Bank of China. The Forestry Code of the PRC was approved for experimental endorsement. In 1979, the PRC had 47 agricultural and forestry institutes and 350 secondary agricultural schools.

Changes in the PRC's agrarian policy as a result of attempts to boost agricultural production without giving additional aid to the countryside undermine political and economic stability of society and lead to shifts in the social and economic structure and the economic basis. The totality of social and production relations which characterise the economic basis of a society are dominated by property relations, which are in turn essentially determined by the superstructure. The military-bureaucratic state in China is seeking to adjust its economic basis to suit its aims.

The crisis situation in the rural areas is above all caused by the exacerbation of the main contradiction in society—that between the military-bureaucratic system and the exigencies of the country's economic development. The PRC leaders' course towards alliance with world capitalism, the desire to develop the Chinese countryside along right-wing lines, and attempts to prop up the bankrupt ideas of "barracks communism" with the aid of "market socialism" and "spontaneous regulation of production relations by the peasants themselves" further weaken and split cooperative property and even individual households. Chinese economic development is increasingly oriented toward a mixed "market" economy, a hybrid of essentially incompatible planned socialist economic management and capitalist economic methods, which in the final analysis will further aggravate social and economic contradictions and jeopardise the socialist gains of the Chinese people.

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10TH ANNIVERSARY OF 'PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST' JOURNAL MARKED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 82 pp 68-79

[Article by V. A. Arkhipov: "For the Thorough Scientific Analysis of the Problems of the Far East Region"]

[Text]

With the publication of the present issue, **Far Eastern Affairs**, a quarterly of social science and political analysis, enters the second decade of its existence.

The world situation itself generated the need for us to publish a periodical dealing with the domestic and foreign affairs of the Far Eastern countries. Since the end of World War II, this region has for a long time played a dramatically larger role internationally for a number of objective reasons.

In the postwar period, the states which had withdrawn from the world imperialist system were joined by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which started laying the foundations of socialism after the country's liberation from the Japanese invaders. When the people's democratic revolution triumphed in China in 1949, the world's most populous nation began playing an ever growing role in international affairs. Japan, which overcame the aftermath of its defeat in World War II in a fairly short time, began to be a leader in the capitalist world in level of industrial development and volume of GNP and became virtually a centre of world imperialism. The situation in Indochina, which is adjacent to the Far East, also exercised a certain influence on the growing importance of the Asian-Pacific region in international politics.

All this necessitated a systematic scientific analysis of the various problems of the international situation and domestic policies of the Far Eastern countries. Soviet Oriental scholars, who have long-standing traditions of serious work in these studies, responded to this need, among other things, by launching the quarterly of social science and political analysis, **Far Eastern Affairs**.

Addressing the readers of the first issue published in 1972, the editors of **Far Eastern Affairs** stated that the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences had initiated the publication of this new periodical, the task of which was to discuss the international problems of the Far East and the life of the peoples of the region. These topics called for a profound scientific analysis within the framework of a special periodical.

The periodical intended to publish regularly articles on the experiences and relations of the Far Eastern countries building a new socialist society. To study the specific features of the building of socialism in Far

Eastern countries was one of the periodical's tasks, and to this end, the editors hoped to gain help and cooperation from among government and public figures and scholars from the region as well.

The interests of the Far Eastern nations and the long-term interests of socialism and peace make it imperative that relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China be radically improved.

"In this connection," the editors said in their address, "our periodical deems it one of its major tasks to promote the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations through a systematic reporting of the efforts the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government made to this end, and also of the state of Soviet-Chinese relations in the political, economic and cultural fields. We will cover events in China extensively and analyze the state of China's economy, domestic and foreign policy, ideology and culture. At the same time, the editors believe that the denunciation of and struggle against the Maoists' Great-Han nationalism which has been transformed into social-chauvinism of a militarist nature, and the struggle against right-wing and 'left-wing' opportunism and revisionism are, as before, tasks of paramount importance. As far as possible, the periodical will tackle these tasks, because the unity of the socialist countries and the world communist movement in the interests of joint action against imperialism is only possible on a Marxist-Leninist basis."

The periodical also planned to carry extensive information about the situation in Japan, its foreign policy and relations with the USSR, the PRC, the US and the Far Eastern countries, Japan's economic and social problems, and the state of affairs in its social and political thought and culture.

The editors wanted to see their publication raise and analyze profoundly the more outstanding questions in the life of the Far Eastern states and nations, with the broad participation of Soviet scholars and experts in this field and with the cooperation of their readers, on whose assistance and suggestions the editors hoped to rely in their work.

The past decade has forcefully corroborated the expediency and fruitfulness of publishing a specialised periodical of social science and political analysis dealing with the Far East in our country. **Far Eastern Affairs** has attained a merited status among other Soviet periodicals dealing with world affairs. Now it has a broad readership both within the country and abroad. Owing to the growing number of subscribers, the Russian edition grew from 5,000 copies in 1972 to 19,190 at the end of 1981. The periodical is regularly sent to the country's libraries, research centres and newspaper stalls. The articles it carries are of interest not only to Oriental scholars but also to broad sectors of the Soviet public. Judging by the letters the editors get, the quarterly is read by workers, collective farmers, students, scientists, and workers in cultural fields throughout the country. It is of special value to lecturers and propaganda workers who give lectures on international affairs.

Beginning in 1973, the periodical was published in English and Japanese, and beginning in the second half of 1979, in Spanish. These editions are distributed abroad—in the socialist countries and in many of the capitalist and developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. People in the US, West Germany, Britain, France, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Japan, Sweden and other countries subscribe to and read it. Major universities and libraries the world over are also among its subscribers.

The periodical is welcomed by the public of the socialist community

and by the progressive people in other countries. Major centres of Sinology and Oriental studies in Western countries and Japan evince ever growing interest in our articles, while Maoist publications often enter into polemics with what is printed in the journal. Some of the articles are reprinted in full or in abridged versions abroad. In late 1977, the USSR Copyright Agency concluded an agreement with American companies on the translation and distribution in the United States of an English-language edition supplementary to the one published in the Soviet Union.

Over the ten years of its existence, the editorial office has attracted a large group of experienced contributors, mostly researchers from the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences. At the same time, scholars from other centres of Oriental studies in Moscow, Leningrad and other cities of the country also actively contribute to this publication, although not on such a large scale.

In the past decade, the periodical has carried important political and theoretical articles written by such prominent figures as M. S. Solomentsev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation; I. T. Novikov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; Yu. Tsedenbal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party; T. U. Usualiyev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kirghiz Communist Party; V. A. Sudets, Marshal of the Air Force; The First Secretaries of the CPSU Area and Region Committees of the Far East V. P. Lomakin, A. K. Chyornyy and others, Army General V. F. Tolubko, Members and Corresponding Members of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. P. Okladnikov, E. M. Zhukov, S. L. Tikhvinsky and M. I. Sladkovsky, Doctors of Sciences M. S. Kapitsa, O. B. Rakhmanin, R. A. Ulyanovsky, I. I. Kovalenko and many other noted Soviet politicians and scholars.

The quarterly also regularly publishes articles by scholars from the socialist countries.

To give a current analysis of the problems pending in modern China, the periodical regularly carries documents from the round-table discussions held at the editorial office. These round-table meetings focus on problems of China's domestic situation and foreign policy which are especially acute in a given period and, as a rule, enlist eminent Oriental scholars, above all, Sinologists and analysts of international relations. Readers have responded favourably to this form of presentation.

Over the ten years of its existence, the periodical has clearly determined the basic lines of its activity in keeping with the problems of the international situation and internal policies of the Far Eastern countries.

Propaganda and analysis of the Leninist foreign policy pursued by the USSR in the Far East. The 26th CPSU Congress forcefully demonstrated the coherent aims of Soviet domestic and foreign policy and its class nature. It also showed that this policy serves the lofty ideals of peace, social progress, the interests of the working people at large, and rests on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Today's peaceloving Soviet foreign policy, based on the Peace Programmes adopted by the 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses, which have opened new prospects for international politics, is in perfect harmony with the problems of our country's economic and cultural development and with the interests of promoting peace, detente, and goodneighbourly and mutually advantageous relations among all countries. Together with other socialist countries, the USSR is working

to stop the growing arms race, which jeopardises peace, and to reach agreements on problems of disarmament.

The Party Congresses held here in the past decade paid a great deal of attention to the problems of the situation in Asia and to relations between the Soviet Union and the Asian countries. It is only natural that a number of foreign policy initiatives made by the CPSU Congresses immediately concerned the situation in Asia, including the Far East.

The resolutions of the 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses are the basic guidelines which are directly or indirectly reflected in all the articles published by the periodical and which determine their general content and ideological and political message. A large number of the editorials and articles featured in the past decade have centred directly on the results of the past three CPSU Congresses. They made a detailed analysis of the resolutions passed by the highest forums of the Leninist party, commented on them, and made use of facts in discussing their importance with respect to the international situation in the Far East.

The first issue of the periodical published in 1972 carried an editorial, "The Resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress and Problems of the Unity Between the Socialist Countries and of Promoting Peace in the Far East", which launched the publication of articles on different aspects of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East. Dozens of articles dealing with these problems have been published by the quarterly since then and, in planning them, the editors were always guided by the desire to encompass as fully as possible the most crucial and pressing problems within the scope of their work. Among them were problems of promoting cooperation between the socialist countries in light of the resolutions of the Party Congresses, Soviet efforts to ensure peace and security in the Far East, the importance of the Great October Socialist Revolution for the development of the revolutionary process in Asian and African countries, the need for disarmament and bans of nuclear weapons to guarantee universal peace and security, the role world socialism plays as the main revolutionary force of modern times, the Soviet Union's work toward peace and detente, the importance of the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress for strengthening peace and security in Asia and the programme of peaceful and constructive development of our country adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress.

The quarterly also attached great importance to highlighting the social, economic and cultural development of the Soviet territories and regions in the Far East, and the programme documents and resolutions of the Party and government bodies on these problems. The plan for the country's social and economic development gives priority to the development of the Far East as compared with other regions in the Soviet Union. Many articles published in the periodical over the past decade described in detail how these plans are being implemented. They dealt with the social, economic and cultural development of the Maritime and Khabarovsk Territories, Yakutiya and Sakhalin, the development of the mineral resources of Siberia and the Far East, the prospects for the industrial development of these regions in the Tenth and Eleventh Five-Year-Plan periods, the building of the Baikal-Amur Railroad, and the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress on the economic development of the region.

These articles describe the accomplishments of Soviet working people in the Far Eastern territories and regions of our country in developing mineral resources, industry, power engineering, farming, and culture and their efforts to expand and strengthen goodneighbourly and mutually ad-

vantageous relations with the countries contiguous with the Soviet Far East.

On the situation in the Far Eastern socialist countries. Our country maintains friendly relations with the Mongolian People's Republic and has a programme of comprehensive cooperation with this state. It is only natural, therefore, that the quarterly paid much attention to various aspects of the life of the friendly Mongolian people and to the Republic's social and economic development. The experience of the Mongolian people who are building socialism in their country, bypassing the capitalist stage of development, is of special interest from the point of view of its contribution to the Marxist scientific theory of building socialism and serves as confirmation of Lenin's well-known thesis on the possibility of such development, provided it is supported by the proletariat of other, more developed countries. This experience is of huge practical importance for many developing countries which cast away the yoke of colonialism in the not so distant past and embarked upon the road of socialist development.

In describing Mongolian people's life, the periodical sought to make an exhaustive analysis of their experience and to appraise its various aspects through the prism of theory. A major contribution to the analysis of this problem was, beyond any doubt, made in an extensive article "Towards the Socialist Social System, Bypassing Capitalism", written specially for our periodical by Yu. Tsedenbal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and Chairman of the Presidium of the Great People's Hural, who gave an in-depth Marxist survey of the historical road traversed by the Mongolian People's Republic.

Quite a few articles have dealt with the foreign policy of Mongolia, its participation in implementing the comprehensive programme of economic integration of the CMEA member countries, and problems of scientific and cultural life in Mongolia.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is also one of the Far Eastern socialist countries. The republic is building socialism under the complicated circumstances of Korea's being divided into two parts. The domination of South Korea by US imperialism, whose arms in effect prop up the South Korean puppet dictator regime, aggravates the situation on the Korean Peninsula and deliberately obstructs the realisation of the aspirations of all Koreans to unite their country. Under these complicated circumstances, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has scored impressive successes in developing its own statehood, laying the foundations of socialism, advancing the national economy and culture, and raising the people's well-being.

All these problems have been highlighted in the many articles published in **Far Eastern Affairs** in the past decade. They dealt with the problems of strengthening peace on the Korean Peninsula, Soviet-Korean cooperation, the results of and prospects for building socialism in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the history of the liberation struggle of the Korean people, various aspects of social, scientific and cultural life in the republic, and its role on the international scene.

The periodical also published articles exposing the policy pursued by the imperialist states, above all by US imperialism, which aims at perpetuating the division of Korea, and preserving and strengthening the puppet dictator regime in the southern part of the peninsula. Some articles described the domestic situation in South Korea, the state of its economy, its growing dependence on US and Japanese capital, the anti-

democratic nature of the Seoul dictators' policy, and its subordination to the militarist aims of US and Japanese imperialism in the Far East.

On August 24, 1973, the newspaper **Pravda** carried an article which dealt with **Far Eastern Affairs** and stated that the publication of this new periodical "was determined by the need for an in-depth analysis and discussion of many complicated, often poorly studied theoretical, political, social, economic, historical, legal and other problems associated with this region in one way or another". It is only natural that problems connected with China, its position on the international scene, the state of affairs in that country, and Soviet-Chinese relations feature prominently among the subjects dealt with in these articles. Needless to say, the forty issues of the periodical have contained a multitude of articles and other documents on these problems, with the main emphasis having been placed on outlining, popularising and explaining **Soviet foreign policy toward China**.

Soviet Sinology has long-standing and stable traditions, and interest in what is going on in China and its relations with the Soviet Union has always been great in our country, not only among foreign policy experts and Sinologists but also among the Soviet public at large.

The documents of the 24th, 25th, and 26th CPSU Congresses contain the fundamental principles for a comprehensive analysis of the present-day situation in the PRC and Peking's policy. The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Congress formulated the important conclusion that "the experience of the social and economic development of the PRC over the past twenty years is a painful lesson showing what any distortion of the principles and essence of socialism in home and foreign policy leads to".¹

The CPSU's policy with respect to China combines a rebuff to Peking's incendiary line, defence of the interests of the Soviet state, the socialist community and the world communist movement, opposition to the Maoist ideology and policy hostile to Marxism-Leninism, and a readiness to normalise Soviet-Chinese relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Leonid Brezhnev stated at the 26th CPSU Congress that "our proposals for normalising relations with China remain open, and our feelings of friendship and respect for the Chinese people have not changed".

The article "The 26th CPSU Congress and Some Problems of Studying the History of China" (No.4, 1981) stated that the Soviet Communists and the Soviet people have invariably sympathised with the heroic struggle of the Chinese revolutionaries and China's true Communists. This is true for the period when the national liberation movement was mounting in China and for the early years of the PRC, when the Republic was marching hand-in-hand with the Soviet Union and other fraternal nations.

The Soviet people, who feel a great deal of warmth toward the Chinese people were watching with anxiety and pain the great tragedy experienced by the CPC and Chinese society as a result of the criminal activity of Mao Zedong and his accomplices from the late 1950s to the 1970s.

We feel the same sympathy for the Chinese people and the honest Chinese Communists now, when the post-Mao leadership is still unwilling to shed the Maoist legacy resolutely and is following a dangerous

¹ *The 26th CPSU Congress. Documents and Resolutions*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.

course of collusion with imperialism and reaction on an anti-socialist and anti-Soviet platform.

In the past decade, **Far Eastern Affairs** has adhered to a consistent position of principle in discussing Chinese problems. The provisions upon which our articles were based were worked out in keeping with the resolutions of the CPSU Congresses and other Party documents and reflected the fundamental principles of the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet state.

The exposure of the subversive and divisive activity of Maoism in the world communist and revolutionary movement. In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, Mao Zedong usurped the rights of plenipotentiary and one-man leadership of the CPC and proclaimed a "special course", the implementation of which isolated China from the socialist countries and subordinated the country to the adventurist, great-power goals of the Maoist leadership. Inspired by their hegemonic ambitions, the Maoist leaders, headed by the "great helmsman", launched an anti-Soviet campaign in a bid to denigrate the CPSU and to undermine its prestige in the world communist and revolutionary movement, groundlessly claiming that "the centre of world revolution" has been in China, distorting the role of the international working class in the world revolutionary process and contrasting it and the socialist system to the national liberation movement. These intrigues on the part of the Maoists, who were seeking to win the communist and workers' parties over to their side, in the newly independent countries above all, and to subordinate their activities to unscientific Maoist concepts, played into the hands of the reactionary forces of world imperialism, and were in fact aimed at splitting the world revolutionary movement and weakening it in this way. "The CPC leaders," the February 1964 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU stated, "oppose the communist movement on all the major problems of its strategy and tactics."

As the resolutions of our Party stressed the need to counteract Peking's subversive activity in the world revolutionary and communist movement, **Far Eastern Affairs** responded by systematically publishing articles which denounced the Maoists' divisive activities in the field of theory, ideology, and practical politics. These articles disclosed Peking's struggle against the socialist community and its activities as the "fifth column" of imperialism in the world communist and revolutionary movement, criticised the Maoist unscientific theoretical concepts of the modern revolutionary process, and the Maoists' efforts to form a joint platform with anti-communism and imperialist ideology. The quarterly discussed the effectiveness of the communist and workers' parties' struggle against Maoism, exposed the subversive activity of Maoism in the world trade union and youth movements, and so on.

Criticism of Peking's adventurist great-power course on the international scene. By the mid-1960s, Mao Zedong and his clique had carried out a counterrevolutionary coup in the country, routed the Communist Party of China as a result of the "cultural revolution", and at the same time made a U-turn in China's foreign policy. They severed friendly ties of alliance with the socialist countries and began overtly and blatantly confronting them on the international scene, teaming up with the reactionary imperialist forces on a common platform of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism. After Mao's death, the new leadership in Peking has been strengthening its line of alliance with imperialism.

The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress emphasised that, while at present changes are under way in

China's internal policy, "unfortunately, there are no grounds yet to speak of any changes for the better in Peking's foreign policy. As before, it is aimed at aggravating the international situation, and is aligned with the policy of the imperialist powers."²

In the past years, every issue of the periodical has carried articles that contained profound analysis of the zigzags in foreign policy pursued by the Maoist leaders.

The editors believed their major task was to give a scientific analysis of the gap between the Maoists' rhetoric and practical activities on the international scene, to expose their widely exploited demagoguery and abuse of Marxist slogans, and to reveal the actual aims and meaning of the Maoist foreign policy.

The Maoists largely cloak their activities on the international scene by claiming their adherence to the lofty ideals of peace and friendship among nations and by demagogically using many slogans of the world progressive forces to their own ends.

The Peking leaders' reactionary, hegemonic course on the international scene has been criticised here on a wide range of foreign policy problems. The contributions in this field gave a general assessment of China's foreign policy at all the major stages of the 1960s and 1970s, they pointed out the historical roots of this policy and exposed Peking's foreign policy machinations in different regions of the world, its militarist aspirations and overt calls to war, attempts to cash in on setting the two great powers at loggerheads, the anti-social aims of Peking's foreign policy and its hostility to the interests of the people, including the Chinese people. A number of articles dealt with Peking's policy toward the developing Asian, African and Latin American countries, its support of reactionary regimes like that of Pinochet in Chile, China's actions in the United Nations and other international organisations, its various diplomatic manoeuvres, unlawful claims to the territories of neighbouring countries and, finally, direct aggressions against India and Vietnam. The periodical consistently and systematically denounces the main trend in Peking's foreign policy—to form, expand and consolidate China's military and political alliance with the imperialist countries and to use this alliance against the socialist countries.

The exposure of the Maoists' anti-democratic reactionary domestic policy. In the late 1950s, Maoism rejected the scientifically substantiated Marxist course of building socialism and the practical experience gained in this field by the USSR and other socialist countries and launched a number of "experiments" in social and economic policy and practice inside China. The complicated circumstances inside the country, with its extremely poorly developed productive forces, the sway of semi-feudal production relations and traditions, and the backwardness and illiteracy of the masses make the problem of laying the foundations of socialism highly complicated, even if scientifically correct, verified theory is strictly adhered to. The voluntarist and theoretically unsubstantiated "experiments" Mao Zedong and his grouping made in the social and economic policy reached climax in the so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution" and led China to the verge of social and economic disaster, the consequences of which the country has yet to overcome even today. The 26th CPSU Congress stated that "the present Chinese leaders them-

² *The 26th CPSU Congress. Documents and Resolutions*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.

ves describe what happened in the period of the so-called cultural revolution in their country as 'a most cruel feudal-fascist dictatorship'."

Far Eastern Affairs has systematically exposed the fallacy of the Maoist leaders' domestic social and economic policies which run counter to the interests of the working people of the country and aim at militarising its economy for the sake of the great-power and chauvinist aspirations of the Peking rulers. The periodical subjected all aspects of Maoist domestic policy to scrupulous scientific analysis to show that it is simply incongruent with the fundamental scientific theory of building socialism and that it is of a voluntarist and subjectivist nature. It criticised the Maoist leadership's policy with respect to China's working class, peasants and intelligentsia, the adventurist course of "communising" the country and of "the continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", and the setting up of an atmosphere of permanent terror toward everyone opposing the Maoist line. The Resolutions of the 9th, 10th and 11th CPC Congresses, the Plenary Meetings of the CPC Central Committee and the Sessions of the National People's Congress were analyzed in detail and assessed in the periodical. The economic situation in the PRC has also been surveyed systematically.

Criticism of the ideological foundations of Maoism. Maoism is an ideological and political doctrine profoundly antagonistic to the scientific theory of building a communist society as formulated by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. Regular contributions to the "Ideology" section of our periodical have demonstrated the scientific fallacies of the philosophical, political economy and historical concepts of Mao Zedong and his associates, who demagogically exploited Marxism-Leninism to conceal the anti-Marxist essence of their views. The periodical analyzed the continuity between the chauvinist concepts of Maoism and China's historical Great-Han concepts, their essence, origin and evolution. The theoretical and ideological substantiation of various ideological campaigns of the "criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius" type regularly carried out in Maoist China has been analyzed systematically from a scientific position and evaluated.

Problems of China's history and the Chinese revolution. The "History" section of **Far Eastern Affairs** has regularly carried articles dealing with different periods of China's history and individual historical events and personalities. In selecting this material, the editors were guided above all by its topicality and by whether it ensured a better understanding of the tendencies and phenomena in the present-day life of Chinese society. Among other tactics of their pseudo-scientific methodology, the Maoists are known to have made wide use of a deliberately distorted interpretation of different facts of Chinese history and historical events in general to "substantiate" their subjective political concepts and practical policy. Chinese theoreticians replaced Marxist historiographic principles with unjustified historical parallels, tendentious historical analogies, and often with flagrant falsification of the very process of historical development. A similar method is their intentional distortion of historical facts to justify Peking's unlawful territorial claims and to corroborate the "legitimacy" of its hegemonic and Great-Han ambitions. The "History" section seeks to expose this "scientific and historical research" and the falsifications of the Maoist propaganda machine and to restore the truth about the historical process and the role certain events and people had to play in it.

Much attention has been allotted to problems of the Chinese people's historical and cultural heritage, which is being trampled upon by the

Maoists, to the rich traditions of the revolutionary movement in that country, and to the struggle led by the best sons of China against the sway of colonialism, feudalism and comprador capital, and for a better future and socialism for China.

Soviet-Chinese relations. Not unnaturally, this topic has been given special attention. Soviet-Chinese relations are an essential factor of international life in general and their state is, undoubtedly, of great importance for the two sides. The Soviet Union has always sought to build Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of goodneighbourliness and mutually advantageous contacts in all fields.

It is common knowledge that Soviet people rendered extensive material aid and political support to the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, beginning in the early days after the Great October Socialist Revolution. Now, too, despite the paroxysms of extreme anti-Sovietism in Peking's policy, the Soviet people feel profound sympathy toward the Chinese people who are going through hard times. The USSR wants normal relations with China, and the only obstacle to this is the continuing anti-Soviet and anti-socialist line of the Maoist leadership. The stance of this periodical, therefore, has always been to criticise anti-Sovietism, to expose the slanderous allegations of the Maoists about the essence of Soviet-Chinese relations, and to promote their normalisation as far as possible.

This periodical has described in detail the state of Soviet-Chinese relations in all their aspects in the past years, exposed the concoctions of Maoists about Soviet policy towards China, the Maoists' unlawful claims to parts of Soviet territory and their attempts to give a "scientific and historical justification" of these claims in Peking, and restored the truth about the history of Russian-Chinese relations prior to October 1917 and Soviet-Chinese relations in different periods. All the facts made public in this context were scientifically substantiated and based on the historical documents and other authentic sources available to our contributors. The periodical has contrasted this material to the unfounded claims of Peking's propaganda.

Japan's foreign policy and internal situation. The analysis of various aspects of Japan's present-day international position and domestic life has been one of the major elements in the activity of our periodical. Articles published over the past decade have enabled the reader to follow the most significant trends and events in the main fields of life in that country. Our contributors have analyzed the main aspects of Japan's policy on the international scene thoroughly, especially its participation in the military alliance with US imperialism based on the so-called "security treaty", the growing tendency among the ruling elite of the country toward further militarisation, problems of the economic situation in Japan, its considerable accomplishments in developing applied sciences and techniques, and the disorders and crises in the economy which have come about as an inevitable consequence of the evolution of capitalist production and the capitalist way of life. Special attention was paid to the position of the Japanese working class, the history of the workers' and revolutionary movement in Japan and its present state, the Japanese working people's struggle against the militarisation of the country, against the US-Japanese "security treaty", and for better living conditions and a lesser burden of capitalist exploitation. Many articles centred on the activities of the country's political parties—the Communist Party of Japan, the Socialist Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Komeito and others. The cultural life of Japanese society, li-

terature, the arts, and religious trends that have an important play in Japan have also come under discussion.

The editors have always kept a close eye on Soviet-Japanese relations, tendencies in their development, and circumstances preventing their further expansion and consolidation on the basis of goodneighbourliness and mutual benefit, and also problems of Soviet-Japanese trade, economic and cultural cooperation. Some articles dealt with the problem of territorial claims that certain elements in Japan have made on the Soviet Union. Their authors made use of extensive material on the history of the development of Russia's Far Eastern territories in the 17th-19th centuries and also of modern documents related to the problem to prove that these territorial claims are groundless and unlawful and are aimed at aggravating Soviet-Japanese relations.

* * *

This brief survey of the topics covered by the periodical is naturally unable to deal with all aspects of its activity. In addition to those already mentioned, there have been articles dealing with the most essential problems of the international position and domestic policies of the countries contiguous to the Far Eastern region, including Vietnam, Kampuchea, Laos, India and Indonesia. During the US war of aggression against the Vietnamese people, the periodical systematically published articles exposing the policy and inhuman activities of US imperialism and its accomplices in Vietnam. After the US adventure in Vietnam suffered an inglorious defeat and the Vietnamese people emerged victorious, the periodical published many articles on the laying of the foundations of socialism in that country.

The periodical included regular headlines: Scientific Events, Culture, Distinguished Revolutionaries, Comments, What They Themselves Say, Essays, and Book Reviews.

Quite a few articles have been published in connection with important events in the life of our country, among them the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the 250th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Recent issues of the quarterly have made a detailed survey of the research carried out by the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in connection with its 15th anniversary. Many articles dealt with different problems of the history of prerevolutionary Russian and Soviet Oriental and Chinese studies and their foremost representatives.

The 26th CPSU Congress pointed to the changes under way in China and stated that only time would tell what they actually meant. As do Soviet Sinologists in general, the staff of **Far Eastern Affairs** believes it to be their major task to make an indepth and purposeful analysis of the processes going on in China and tendencies in the evolution of the situation in this country in forthcoming years along with evaluating and interpreting them from Marxist positions.

The quarterly will continue to expose Peking's domestic and foreign policies, to show the grave consequences of distorting the principles of socialism, to reveal the anti-Marxist and anti-popular essence of the Maoist ideological legacy which is jeopardising the socialist gains of the Chinese working people, and to subject changes in China's domestic policy to a clear-cut class analysis. As before, the editors believe it important

to expose the essence of Maoist anti-Sovietism, to show that the Maoists have betrayed the ideals of communism and the ideals of the Chinese revolution and to denounce the Chinese leaders' course, which is widening the gap between the interests of the Chinese people and the ideology and political practice of Maoism.

Mention should be made of certain difficulties, shortcomings and miscalculations in the work of the editorial board in the past years. The editors are making efforts to improve the quality of each new issue, aware that reality constantly poses new, more complicated problems and makes more stringent demands.

In the ten years of its existence, the quarterly has amassed considerable experience and carried out significant research. We offer this short survey in the hope that our work will be more profound and fruitful thanks to the cooperation of the scientific community at large in the years to come.

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SPLIT BETWEEN 'LEFTIST-ORTHODOX,' 'RIGHTIST-PRAGMATIC' GROUPS IN MAOISM VIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 82 pp 80-91

[Article by V. F. Feoktistov, candidate of philosophical sciences: "The Present-Day Modification of Maoism"]

[Text] The latter half of 1981 was an important period marked by efforts to bring ideology in line with the new stage in the Peking leaders' policy. The essence of this stage, which started simultaneously with Peking's armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in February 1979, was manifest in the open formation of a strategic alliance between China and the leading capitalist states, the USA above all, as well as in the parallel, and at times, joint actions of the PRC and the imperialist powers against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.¹ This "evolution" in Peking's policy posing danger to peace and socialism, in particular to socialism in China, has left its imprint on the official ideological doctrine of the Chinese leaders. This doctrine, designed to justify any new political zigzag, has been streamlined, this time too, to correspond to the new elements of the political course.

By and large, Maoism is characterised by a search for theoretical and ideological "arguments" in favour of rapprochement with the imperialist West. In recent years, however, especially after Deng Xiaoping made his comeback, this quest has proven particularly intensive.

This new stage in the evolution of Peking's ideological and theoretical platform has found its expression in the third modification of Maoism since 1977.² The new model of Maoism was recorded in the special decision by the 6th Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC late in June 1981. It had been worked out amid a new upsurge of fierce struggle between various factions of the Chinese leadership, caused by a row over interpretation and evaluation of the "thought of Mao Zedong". This struggle has been in progress for five years now, and if we want to see its mainsprings and to get at the heart of the new version of Maoism being offered to the Chinese and the world public, we must review its main stages.

The bankruptcy of ultra-revolutionary "line of Mao" of the 1960s and first half of the 1970s forced Mao Zedong's successors to look for other ways to implement the selfsame Maoist strategic designs. While adhering to Great-Han chauvinism, hegemonism, militarism, and anti-Sovietism which are the essence of the theory and practice of Maoism, the new Chinese leaders have taken different views on how to translate their hegemonic plans into reality. Thus, two main groupings have emerged:

¹ For more details see O. Borisov, "The 26th CPSU Congress and Some Problems of Studying the History of China", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1981, No. 4.

² Concerning the first two modifications of Maoism after the death of Mao Zedong see V. Feoktistov, G. Yashchenko "Ideological Struggle in China Today", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1980, No. 2.

"leftist"—orthodox led by Hua Guofeng and rightist-nationalist, "purely" pragmatic led by Deng Xiaoping.

Hua Guofeng's group sought to carry on with the "line of Mao" based on the leftist "theory of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" which steered the PRC towards a society of "barracks communism". At the same time, this group favoured a certain rectification of the "line of Mao" and the elimination of some voluntaristic extremities.

However, the policy pursued by Hua Guofeng and his entourage was still based on the methods of the "cultural revolution" in politics and the methods of Daqing and Dazhai in economic management. This line, reiterated by the 11th CPC Congress (1977), was adopted as the "main Party line" for the period of the "four modernisations" and then was proclaimed the "general task for the new historical period" at the first session of the Fifth National People's Congress (1978).

Unlike the "line" of the Hua Guofeng group, essentially based on extra-economic coercion, Deng Xiaoping's platform rested on economic pragmatism and more flexible methods of political control providing for the restoration and active use of the governmental and public institutions destroyed during the "cultural revolution".

In the spring of 1978, the differences between the two groups developed into an open ideological struggle, with Deng Xiaoping's group embarking on the "modernisation" of Maoism in a bid to adapt it to the tasks of their rightist-pragmatic policy—in other words, on the elaboration of a new "model" of Maoism. The campaign for the "emancipation of consciousness" was started in China, which aimed at ridding Maoism of leftist-revolutionary doctrines and reducing it to three pragmatically interpreted principles: "businesslike realistic approach", "proceed in all matters from the obtaining situation" and "combine theory with practice". These were described as the "most fundamental principles of Marxism".

The Third Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC, held in December 1978, was an important milestone in the struggle for the elaboration of a new "model" of Maoism. The significance of that Plenary Meeting for the formation of the ideological and political line of the CPC has been consistently emphasised by official propaganda. This is no accident since it was precisely the Third Plenary Meeting at which the Deng Xiaoping group was victorious that traced the main direction along which the further modification of Maoism was to develop, as well as the process of adapting it to the strategic aims of the present Chinese leadership, and its alliance with the world imperialism.

Under pressure from Deng Xiaoping's group, the Third Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC discarded the orientation on artificial aggravation of the "class struggle" in conformity with Mao's theory of the "continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" and decided to end the "class struggle" and work for the "four modernisations". By the beginning of 1981, the thesis of Mao Zedong on the exacerbation of the class struggle under socialism was disavowed, and the "cultural revolution" was declared a period of "great calamities". The leftist-revolutionary "thought of Mao Zedong" was openly qualified as "erroneous" and "running counter to the initial thought of Mao Zedong". This was a reference to the "exceptionally correct principles formulated by Mao Zedong prior to the late 1950s and the early 1960s". Actually, these "principles" were linked with the rightist-revisionist concept of "new democracy" worked out by Mao Zedong in the 1940s. The principles of

the dictatorship of "all patriotic classes", including national bourgeoisie, the encouragement of the private capitalist sector of economy so China's economy could be reinforced internally, which were included in that concept, served as the groundwork for the rightist-pragmatic policy of Deng Xiaoping and his group which began the restoration of private capitalist and petty commodity patterns in the economy and the invigoration of political activities of the bourgeoisie (1979-1980).

This stance of the Deng Xiaoping group led to a serious opposition from the Hua Guofeng group which, contrary to the catchword of "emancipation of consciousness", in the spring of 1979, advanced "four basic principles": "firmly to adhere to the socialist road, dictatorship of the proletariat, recognition of the leading role of the CPC, and Marxism-Leninism—the thought of Mao Zedong". Late in 1979, the appeal "firmly to adhere to the socialist road" became central in the ideological line of Hua Guofeng and his supporters who claimed that Marxism deals only with the most general laws of the development of human society and is therefore "insufficient" to determine China's concrete "socialist road". Hence, the theorists belonging to the Hua Guofeng's group concluded that there was a need to search for a "socialist road suitable for the conditions prevailing in China", on the ground of the "concrete practice" of the PRC, based on its "own [i. e., non-Marxist.—V. F.] theory of socialism" proceeding exclusively from the "Chinese experience". Thus, the very possibility of elaborating a common theory of socialism with common features was refuted. This deprived socialist society of the fundamental characteristic which makes socialism a law-governed stage of social development. In other words, the concept of "socialism" is rendered meaningless. The provisions of some "important documents of the CPC" and Mao's works "The Ten Major Relationships" and "Concerning the Correct Resolution of Contradictions Among the People" were used as the ideological basis of this "theory".

Soon Deng Xiaoping and his associates, however, also adhered to the idea of looking for a "suitable socialist road", and in 1980 they came up with the concept of "market socialism". The crucial thesis of this "concept" was the "multi-structural nature of socialist economy". Thus an attempt was made to justify the policy of restoring the private sector in the PRC's economy. Simultaneously, the tendency toward "liberalisation" in the spirit of ideological and political pluralism directed by that group began to develop.

When opposition to Deng's line, promoted largely by the contradictoriness of the ideological principles of the top echelon of power, began to grow, the Deng Xiaoping group was compelled to agree to a compromise, unifying the official ideological principles (4th Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC, September 1979) founded on the recognition of the "four basic principles". As a result, the rightist-pragmatic "emancipation of consciousness" and the doctrine of "realistic approach" were fused with the "four basic principles". The Plenary Meeting synthesised the platform of Deng and the platform of Hua in a bid to "restore the genuine image of the thought of Mao Zedong".

Since 1980, the idea of orthodox Maoism has again become prevalent. Propaganda on the importance of mass ideological and political work and a clear-cut ideological line appeared. By the end of 1980, the propaganda of "communist morality" spearheaded against the reviving principles of personal material well-being was placed at the centre of this work. The brainwashing of the population was again regarded as the chief means of achieving the moral and political unity of Chinese society

in the name of implementing the "four modernisations". Objectively, this meant the recognition of the futility of attempts to ensure such unity by economic methods. The crisis of the rightist-pragmatic platform of Deng Xiaoping became evident, and a new modification of Maoism had to be formed.

Early in 1981 the campaign to implant "communist morality" was crowned by the thesis on the creation in China of a "high spiritual civilisation of socialism" as one of the immediate and basic tasks in the policy of the CPC. The Maoist postulate on the allegedly boundless ability of the masses to build a new society irrespective of the objective material conditions and factors of these activities was viewed as the substantiation of this catchword. Gradually the propagation of that concept was reduced to the selfsame nationalist and vanguard slogans.

The new turn in the ideological line pursued by the leadership coincided with propaganda to enhance the role of the army in the PRC's political life. The Chinese leaders called on the PLA to "take upon itself the historic mission of the advanced contingent to translate the line, course and political directives of the party into reality".³ The movement for learning from Lei Feng—"a model man of the epoch of Mao Zedong", created by Maoist propaganda back in the early 1960s—was resumed.⁴ The campaign for the "struggle for high spiritual civilisation" was accompanied by a partial revision of the ideological and political platform of the rightist-pragmatic group. The press carried articles criticising the thesis on "limitless democracy" which denied political guidance of society by the Communist Party and the economic substantiation of Deng's concept of "market socialism". Defence of Maoism was intensified, and the "thought of Mao Zedong" was proclaimed the "most valuable legacy which he left us".⁵ Propagandists began to use the "thought of Mao Zedong" once more on a large scale as the theoretical substantiation of Peking's ideological and political line.

The selfsame actual renunciation of Marxism-Leninism as a theory for the building of socialism remained a characteristic feature in criticising the rightist-pragmatic platform. The criticism was levelled from a Maoist viewpoint in defence of the model of the specific "socialist road" which "suits the conditions obtaining in China", contrary to the theory and practice of scientific communism, and not only to the ideas of the "pragmaticists".

Thus, after the Third Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC, the modification of Maoism proceeded in the struggle between the two main trends: "orthodox", essentially leftist, and rightist-nationalist, or rightist-pragmatic. The battle was accompanied by compromises, although the right-wing "line" of Deng Xiaoping predominated. The materials of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC, at which another ideological compromise between the competing groups was achieved and the modification of Maoism continued, is also evidence of this.

The Plenary Meeting adopted a decision on some questions of the history of the CPC since the formation of the PRC, the basic part of which is devoted to the assessment of the role played by Mao and his "thought". In contravention to the objective need to overcome the heritage of Maoism in the ideological, political, social and economic life of the PRC as quickly as possible, the authors of the decision followed

³ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 2, 1981.

⁴ See *Ibid.*, Feb. 2, 4, 1981.

⁵ *Jiefangjun bao*, April 19, 1981.

the line of the apology of Maoism and used the "thought of Mao Zedong" on a rather broad scale to consolidate different factions within the CPC leadership in the struggle against Marxism-Leninism, and for the attainment of hegemonic foreign policy goals relying on the alliance with US imperialism. This decision was of a compromising and contradictory nature. On the one hand, it censured some "errors" of Mao Zedong, recognised his responsibility for the "cultural revolution" and criticised the "continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "leftist guiding ideas" of Hua Guofeng which are based on Maoism. The Third Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC at which the Deng Xiaoping line took the upper hand was declared the "great turning point" which ushered in a "new historical stage" in the development of the PRC. The Sixth Plenary Meeting characterised the pragmatic principle of the "realistic approach" which was proclaimed the "basic principle of Marxism" ensuring liberation from a "dogmatic attitude" toward Marxism and the "thought of Mao Zedong" by the Deng Xiaoping group as a major aspect of the "thought of Mao". The provisions concerning the absence of the exploiter classes in the PRC, and "market regulation", i. e., the theses introduced by Deng Xiaoping and his supporters, were preserved.

On the other hand, the decision claims that Mao Zedong's "merits" "to a considerable extent, prevail over his errors". The need to continue to uphold the "four basic principles"—"socialist road, democratic dictatorship of the people, i. e., the dictatorship of the proletariat, the guidance of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism—the thought of Mao Zedong" is stressed more than once. The provision on continuing the class struggle in the "absence of the exploiter classes" which, under certain circumstances, may exacerbate, and also the policy of creating a "high spiritual civilisation", in the "spirit of Yu Gong who moves mountains" and the "spirit of hard and persistent struggle" has actually been preserved.

Thus, the new variant of Maoism which is now proposed as the official ideological and theoretical platform of the CPC includes both the "thought of Mao Zedong" and the theses which have been upheld in recent years by the two Maoist groupings within the Chinese leadership.

Mao Zedong's hegemonic foreign policy strategy was fully approved by the Plenary Meeting, and the Maoist concept of the "three worlds" spearheaded against the socialist community was proclaimed as the "correct strategic platform".

The denial of Marxism-Leninism as the theoretical foundation of "concrete" socialism also unites the positions of the rival groups within the Chinese leadership, actually signifying the confirmation of the monopoly status of Maoism as the ideological platform of the CPC. The decision also attempts to single out the "scientific system" within Maoism, which, according to the authors of the Decision, will help separate the "thought of Mao" as a "scientific system" from his "individual" theoretical and practical errors and, moreover, place the "thought of Mao Zedong" on an equal footing with Marxism-Leninism, thus making it possible for them to dissociate themselves from the theory of scientific communism, pulling China out of the sphere of application of Marxist-Leninist theory.

As in the 1940s, under the pretext of overcoming a "dogmatic approach" to Marxism and the allegedly "theoretically unresolved" problems in the building of socialism, the Decision brings to the fore the idea of "Sinicised Marxism". At the same time, the experience of the interna-

tional communist movement is openly scorned, and the achievements of real socialism are ignored. The international experience gained by the revolutionary forces of our day and age is counterposed to the "originality" of the Chinese revolution, which demands the creation of a "national Sinicised" Marxism embodied in the "thought of Mao Zedong". That the development of the "thought of Mao Zedong" proceeded as part of the struggle against the application of Soviet experience and against the "dogmatism" of the Comintern is openly regarded as a merit of the CPC.

The provision concerning the leading role of Mao Zedong and his "thought" during the Chinese revolution and socialist construction is one of the crucial theses of the Decision. "The thought of Mao Zedong" is proclaimed to be the "product of the fusion of general propositions of Marxism-Leninism and concrete practice of the Chinese revolution", the "quintessence of collective wisdom" of the Communist Party of China. That was a convenient pretext to spread to the CPC as a whole the blame for the political and economic adventurism initiated by Mao Zedong himself which brought about grave political, economic, social and ideological consequences. At the same time, the proclamation of the "thought of Mao Zedong" as a result of the collective creativity of the CPC leaders is directed at separating the "thought of Mao Zedong" from his personal "errors" which thereby seem to be just the "errors" of a personality who was merely one of the creators of Maoism.

The content of the Decision adopted by the Sixth Plenary Meeting demonstrates that Maoism remains the official ideology of party and state alike. The Decision notes that the "thought of Mao Zedong" remains and will remain "the valuable core of the socialist modernisation of the country".

However, the Plenary Meeting did not elaborate a basically new version of Maoism and resorted to an eclectic combination of the two different platforms ((rightist-pragmatic and "leftist-orthodox") in the concept of the "thought of Mao Zedong", clearly based on a delicate temporary compromise.

Simultaneously, the Plenary Meeting showed the unity of the competing groups within the Chinese leadership in their striving toward the accelerated buildup of China's military-economic potential as the material basis for the hegemonic foreign policy strategy of Maoism. The two groups are still united by bellicose anti-Sovietism and the urge to whitewash Maoism by hook or by crook, preserving it as a common ideological banner for all the rival groupings.

* * *

Immediately after the Plenary Meeting proceedings, the Chinese press launched a large-scale campaign to propagate its materials, primarily the Decision. This campaign makes it possible to trace the emphasis the official mass media and ideologists put on the "version" of Maoism adopted at the plenary meeting and to see the new tendencies in dealing with the legacy of Maoism and its pragmatic applications in the ideological struggle against the theory and practice of scientific socialism.

In determining how to study the materials of the plenary meeting, *Renmin ribao* wrote in a policy-making article in July 1981 that the "achievement of a full understanding of the historical place of Comrade Mao Zedong and the thought of Mao Zedong in the Chinese revolution

is a most important thing in this study". Many articles in the Chinese press are devoted to the "merits" of Mao Zedong and his role in attaining victory in the Chinese revolution. The tune in campaign of extolling Mao Zedong is set by China's top leaders. *Renmin ribao* published an interview with the new Chairman of the CC CPC Hu Yaobang in which he asserted that "there would have been no tremendous victory, neither would there have been a new China without the guidance of Comrade Mao Zedong".

Each article devoted to the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC glorifies Mao Zedong. The attempt to whitewash Mao and belittle his errors and shortcomings is self-evident. In a bid to preserve the prestige of the "great leader and teacher Comrade Mao Zedong" (such epithets have again appeared in the Chinese press after a long silence), Chinese periodicals state point-blank that the "whole party is responsible for the mistakes of Mao Zedong". The decision of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC noted that "far from holding Mao Zedong responsible for all errors in the field of guiding concepts, the plenary meeting fully confirmed the important role played by Comrade Mao Zedong in history".⁶

Actually China witnesses a large-scale ideological campaign to restore Mao Zedong's prestige because it has suffered tangibly in recent years. Diggessions in history are being made to find and renovate the evidence of Mao's "historic merits", numerous reminiscences about him are being published.

The attempt to characterise Maoism as a historically inevitable phenomenon not only of Chinese, but also of world history, constitutes a major direction of that campaign. Such is the basic trend characterising the modification of Maoism after the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC.

Chinese theorists and propagandists are seeking to substantiate the "historical inevitability" of Maoism's emergence by references to the "multitude of specific and difficult problems" faced by the Chinese revolution which took place in a backward, semi-colonial, semi-feudal country. They claim that "reliance on the general principles of Marxism-Leninism and the imitation of foreign experience" "could bring no victory", inasmuch as the Comintern, even at the early stage of the Chinese revolution (in the 1920s), was allegedly infected by "dogmatism" and absolutisation of the Soviet experience which "almost brought the Chinese revolution into a deadlock". The credit for delivering the Communist Party of the influence of "dogmatism" is ascribed to Mao Zedong, while the thesis about the "threat of a deadlock" is not explained at all.

Contemporary Chinese propaganda pays special attention to the concept of "new democracy", worked out by Mao in the 1940s. This is an opportunist model of "national socialism", with "Sinicised Marxism" as its ideological basis. Mao Zedong actually counterposed the concept of "new democracy" to the Leninist theory of non-capitalist development of the backward countries of the East, and to the teaching of socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Praising the Maoist theory of "Chinese socialism" to the skies, Peking propaganda, under the pretext of fighting dogmatism and absolutisation of foreign experience, is trying to validate the notorious thesis of the inapplicability of the Marxist-Leninist teaching to the "specific" conditions of China, supposedly because they are "too general".

⁶ *Renmin ribao*, July 21, 1981.

Highly indicative in this respect is the article entitled "In Quest of the Ways of Building Socialism" in *Hongqi* magazine. It is but another attempt to portray the "thought of Mao Zedong" as the sole theoretical foundation for the implementation of radical social transformations in the PRC. Moreover, the magazine writes that prior to the Chinese revolution, there allegedly was no "suitable" experience in socialist revolution and socialist construction. The principal "theoretical" argument is as follows: "Revolution and construction in any country should be based on, and proceed from, the situation in that country rather than from copying the experience of other countries and ready-made textbook conclusions".⁷ This is why the "nationalisation" of Marxism is allegedly necessary, as is the creation of "its own", "national" Marxism in each country. In dealing with the "thought of Mao Zedong", *Hongqi* reproduces the Maoists' thesis of the end of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s almost word for word, stating that the "thought of Mao Zedong has enriched and developed Marxism-Leninism with creative universal theories which reflect the specific features of the Chinese revolution—the 'Sinicisation' of Marxism-Leninism".⁸

It is evident that this has nothing to do with the creative application of the Marxist-Leninist theory to the conditions in that country. On the contrary, it is a denial of the possibility of applying these propositions which are interpreted as "ready-made textbook conclusions". It would not be out of place to say again that such an approach toward Marxism-Leninism was used by Mao in the 1940s to implant his own "thought" in the party. The struggle against "dogmatism", "blind copying of foreign experience" and the "directives" of the Comintern are all well-known Maoist propaganda cliches which were directed at discrediting Marxism-Leninism as "overseas patterns" unsuitable for China's "specific" conditions, thereby justifying the replacement of Marxism-Leninism with "Sinicised Marxism—the Marxism of reality". The theorists of *Hongqi* magazine depict Maoism's replacement of Marxism as a historical inevitability, as an objective law of the successful implementation of democratic and socialist revolution in China. Moreover, since they take an even broader approach to the problem—the inapplicability of the general "abstract" tenets of Marxism-Leninism to the "specific" conditions in each country—it is possible to regard this "conclusion" on the part of Peking's theorists as a direct denial of the internationalist character of the theory of scientific communism and its applicability to the specific conditions of any country. All this is very close to the absurd contention that there can be no general sociological theories, but only "national theories" where the very notion of theory is deprived of any meaning. And this assertion is made in the very country where the catastrophic consequences of the "nationalisation" of communist ideas are so evident.

To substantiate this worn out opportunistic thesis which could never be realised in politics without tragic results, Peking's propaganda resorts to a distorted interpretation of the Marxist proposition of practice as a criterion of the truth. Attributing a relativistic-empirical meaning to this provision, the *Hongqi* magazine theorists allege that some "sheer" practice devoid of the wealth of the revolutionary-transforming experiences of mankind, including theoretical and cognising activity, mechanically gives rise to ever new theories which are endlessly "born" from

⁷ *Hongqi*, No. 15, 1981, p. 33.

⁸ See *Ibid.*, p. 46.

each new "practice",⁹ but without forming any historical or logical ties.

With the help of such creeping, flat and, at the same time, unfortunate empiricism, Peking's "theorists" seek to substantiate the actual denial of Marxism-Leninism as the international and universal teaching of the revolutionary transformation of the world. It is no accident therefore that now official propaganda regards the so-called principle of a "businesslike and realistic approach", as well as the principle of "self-reliance and independence"¹⁰ as the "living soul" of the "thought of Mao Zedong". This Maoist methodology, which is interpreted pragmatically and nationalistically, is supposed to justify the opportunist, actually anti-communist, unscientific concept of "national communisms" which is obviously professed by Peking leaders today.

Apparently aware of the shaky character of such a stand, official propaganda pays special attention to the interaction between the "thought of Mao Zedong" and Marxism-Leninism, seeking to prove that the "thought of Mao" has "enriched and developed" Marxism-Leninism.¹¹

As the "important contribution" Mao Zedong made to Marxism, the "teaching" of Mao about the "socialist revolution and socialist construction" is mentioned where such "discoveries" as the "theory of democratic dictatorship of the people", the teaching on the socialist transformation of private industry and trade, on cooperation in the countryside, the dictum of "going on two feet", the concept of the "two types of contradictions among the people" and even the "theory of foreign policy of a socialist state" are attributed to him. Mao Zedong is portrayed as the sole creator of the general theory embracing socialist revolution, socialist transformations and socialist construction, a creator who has allegedly opened up a new stage in the development of Marxism. Chinese propaganda about Mao's "contributions" to the development of Marxism is characterised by the urge artificially to create a theoretical "vacuum" in analysing the development of the Chinese revolution, either distorting or ignoring historical facts to make it more convenient to proclaim Mao Zedong as a "great" theorist of Marxism.

It is common knowledge, however, that Mao Zedong did not create any "teachings" on the socialist revolution and socialist construction except for his "theory on the continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", which is a theoretical and practical denial of socialism as the first phase of the communist formation, a "theory" which is presently criticised even by the Chinese leaders themselves.

The same can be said of the "theory of the democratic dictatorship of the people". The classics of Marxism-Leninism elaborated (and the communist parties of Eastern Europe implemented) provisions on the people's democratic stage of socialist revolution, the people's democratic stage of socialist transformations, and people's democracy as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The attempts to ascribe this theory and its practical implementation to Mao Zedong are nothing but a gross distortion of history. Mao Zedong's so-called "theories" on the socialist transformations of private industry and trade, and cooperation in the countryside are in no way his "contribution" to Marxism, inasmuch as these problems were theoretically substantiated in works by Marx, Engels and Lenin and were implemented for the first time in the Soviet Union. As for Mao's contribution to the creation of the "theory of foreign policy of a socialist state" this is nothing but blasphemy. All the

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁰ *Hongqi*, No. 19, p. 34.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 15, p. 43.

activities of the CPC and the PRC show that the late "helmsman" only invented the pro-imperialist geopolitical "theory of the three worlds", a "theory" of struggle against real socialism, against peace, democracy, and the national and social emancipation of the peoples. Maoist theoreticians do not even try to conceal the anti-socialist, anti-Soviet trend of this "contribution" of Mao's, citing as its concrete implementation the idea of a "united front of struggle against hegemonism",¹² i. e., the strategy of waging a joint struggle with world imperialism and reaction against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

Among Mao's "discoveries", only one of his "theories" can be mentioned: the concept of the two types of contradictions—"among the people" and "between us and our enemies". The "new" feature here is that Mao Zedong has constructed such a "picture" of social contradictions under socialism, according to which the bourgeoisie, under certain conditions, may act as a class "among the people" and not be antagonistic to the working people. What matters is whether the bourgeoisie accepts the policy of the ruling party and the way in which its contradictions with the working class are resolved. If this is a peaceful process, then the bourgeoisie is regarded as part of the "people", and if not, then it is an enemy and enters into a phase of antagonistic contradictions. This opportunistic "concept", as the history of the PRC has showed, was invented by Mao Zedong, first, to flirt with the national bourgeoisie and preserve its economic and political positions in society, and second, to hide "theoretically" the persecution of the opponents of Maoism in the party and the country under the guise of the "class struggle against our enemies". It is quite clear that such a "theory" has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.

Apart from extolling Mao Zedong's merits in the past, Chinese propaganda is going out of its way to prove that the "thought of Mao Zedong" allegedly remains valid today and will retain its significance in the future. Here the press makes a special point of the Maoist "teaching" on dialectical and historical materialism, which supposedly "developed" Marxism-Leninism, Mao's principles on a "realistic approach to reality", "self-reliance and independence" and also the notorious "line of the masses". According to Peking's propagandists, the following concepts of Mao Zedong retain their importance: the concept of the "democratic dictatorship of the people", "the teachings" on the social contradictions within a socialist society, on regulating relations between productive forces and production relations, economic construction, on the need to "consolidate all the forces which can be consolidated", "mobilisation of all active factors" and "conversion of passive factors into active ones".¹³ The task is set correctly to dovetail these concepts of Mao Zedong with current and future practical tasks. Propaganda stresses that the "thought of Mao Zedong" is linked with the specifics of the Chinese revolution and constitutes the "Sinicisation of Marxism-Leninism". This shows a clear-cut desire to link the "thought of Mao Zedong" with Marxism-Leninism to prop up the prestige of Mao's "thought" and then to allow for the creation of a "new theory" under this flag based on the "enrichment and development of the thought of Mao Zedong".¹⁴

This is actually a problem concerned with a new stage in the "development" of Maoism, the stage of an "even closer link between the basic

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 44, 45.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

provisions of Marxism and the concrete practice of the implementation of socialist modernisation in China".¹⁵ In other words, Chinese propaganda is striving to adapt the "thought of Mao Zedong" to future policy as well, thus opening up the opportunity for new modifications of Maoism in case there are new changes in policy. The "explanatory" work performed by Peking propaganda on the Decision of the 6th CC CPC plenary meeting is obviously of anti-socialist, anti-Soviet character. Apart from spreading the openly anti-Soviet foreign policy "concepts" of Mao Zedong, attempts were made by Mao and now by his successors, with the aid of anti-Sovietism, to justify an opportunistic interpretation of domestic policy problems, in particular the thesis on the existence of a "specific class struggle" in "socialist China". In his article "The Class Struggle and the Chief Contradiction in Socialist Society" Zuo Wen explains the need to strengthen the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in China to suppress the "class enemies" not only for "domestic reasons", but also due to the "situation of class struggle" in the international arena, which is hostile to China. The Soviet Union in the North and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the South are named among China's international "class enemies", and the SRV is also accused of "regional hegemonism". Beside these chief "class enemies", certain "reactionary elements among the ruling quarters of the states with which China has established friendly relations"¹⁶ are mentioned only in passing.

The class and political essence of the stance taken by the Chinese leaders has come to light: they regard real socialism as the main "class enemy". Here the direct anti-Soviet, anti-socialist trend of the latest modification of Maoism carried out by the present Chinese leaders stands out in bold relief.

Summing up the brief analysis of the new version of Maoism worked out by the 6th plenary meeting of the CC CPC, it should be pointed out that it is nothing but a set of social-chauvinistic "thought of Mao Zedong" substantiating the anti-socialist, pro-imperialist line of the Peking leaders in their domestic and foreign policies. The acknowledgement of certain "mistakes" made by Mao is aimed at "purging" Maoism of allegedly chance flaws which are not inherent in it as a "scientific system".

Although the 6th plenary meeting of the CC CPC did not formulate any basically new version of Maoism, only reshuffling the "thought of Mao Zedong", the following trends can be singled out in its Decision.

First, under the pretext of "taking account of Chinese specific features", the thesis on the need for the "Sinicisation" of Marxism was set forth which actually means replacing Marxism by the "thought of Mao Zedong". The emergence of Maoism (like any other "national" theories of communism) is portrayed as a historically inevitable phenomenon, thereby depriving communism of its status as a science.

Second, the thesis of Mao's "contribution" to the development of Marxism is being spread once again. The content of the "contribution" is interpreted on such a broad scale that the "thought of Mao Zedong" is actually depicted as a qualitatively new stage in the development of Marxism, which "sublated" the results of the previous stages of the development of Marxism.

Third, an attempt is made to carry out an artificial and pragmatic systematisation of the "thought of Mao Zedong" in which only "correct

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 13, 1981, p. 34.

¹⁶ *Hongqi*, No. 20, 1981, p. 30.

ideas" are included in the "scientific system", while the rest of his "ideas" may even contradict the latter. Moreover, this system is portrayed as an obvious result of the "collective wisdom" of a group of party leaders. Any "errors" by one of them do not deprive the system of its truthfulness.

Fourth, there are increasingly insistent calls to "develop" Maoism further, to apply the "thought of Mao Zedong" actively both in the current implementation of the "four modernisations" and in future CPC policies to the detriment of the Marxist-Leninist teaching.

Fifth, all this is supposed to substantiate the need for "national" socialism in China theoretically and, in the final count, to explain the renunciation of Marxism as the theoretical and ideological foundation of the CPC's activities and of Marxism as a science of international character.

None of the abovementioned trends runs counter to the basic views held by any group within the Peking leadership because the arsenal of the "scientific system of the thought of Mao Zedong" has now been expanded considerably and includes both the "orthodox" and rightist-pragmatic "versions" of Maoism. Still, the rightist-pragmatic variation reflecting the platform of the Deng Xiaoping group should be regarded as the leading trend in the current modification of Maoism. The aforementioned trends may serve as a basis for further compromises between the confronting groups in the Chinese leadership, but they also contain a source of the future aggravation of ideological infighting among the leaders.

These trends have emerged and continue to develop in connection with the policy of militarising the PRC, fanning anti-Sovietism and great-power chauvinism, and overt hegemonism in China's foreign policy. This warrants the conclusion that the current trends in the ideological line pursued by the Peking leaders are nothing but another modification of the same old social-chauvinistic Maoist doctrine.

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IDEOLOGY OF JAPANESE EXPANSIONISM BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC

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[Article by Ye. V. Shchetinina, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text]

The development of imperialist Japan was indissolubly linked with expansion in Asia. The crushing defeat suffered by Japanese militarism during World War II proved the untenability of the idea of setting up the Japanese empire by means of war and enslavement of neighbouring peoples. During the postwar years, however, as the Japanese monopolists have built up their economic potential, they became increasingly active in infiltrating Asian countries. Japan's becoming second in the capitalist world in the level of economic development has created the material prerequisites for the revival of the age-old plans of the converting of this region into a zone of unrivalled sway of Japan.

Of course, the new situation demanded the working out of new methods of penetrating into the Asian countries and of new forms of ideological substantiation of these moves. The prewar concept of setting up "Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was replaced by the concept of the so-called Pacific Community which has been actively advertised in Japan since the mid-1970s. All the differences between them notwithstanding, these two doctrines are aimed at attaining one and the same goal, i. e., ensuring Japan's domination in Asia.

Under present-day conditions, any attempts at aggression against neighbouring peoples are doomed to failure. In Japan, however, the forces which would like to turn the clock back are becoming ever more active. They are pushing the country onto the pernicious road of militarisation and are making more and more noise about the "vital necessity" of Japan's penetration into the Asian countries.

Ideologists of the contemporary Japanese expansionism are seeking to camouflage the ambitions of the monopolies by numerous assurances that Japan wants peace, friendship, and cooperation with all countries. As for their essence and ultimate goals, however, many present-day concepts of the development of Japan's ties with Asian countries are rooted in the doctrines of the 1930s and the 1940s, absorbing the old postulates of the leading ideologists of Japanese expansionism, but adapted to the new situation.

Japan embarked on a road of colonial seizures soon after the incomplete bourgeois revolution of 1867-1868, which was predetermined by the transition of the country to capitalism. Lenin wrote about Japan: "The latter is a bourgeois state, and for that reason has itself begun to oppress other nations and to enslave colonies."¹

Up to the end of World War II, Japan's expansionist policy was deter-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 399.

mined by the military-feudal character of Japanese imperialism and its special aggressiveness. For many decades the objective needs of the country's industrial development were closely intertwined with predatory wars and annexation of foreign territories. "Each expenditure on armaments is a form of investment"—this thesis of Ginjiro Fujiwara, a Director of Mitsui Company, served as the credo of Japanese monopolists.²

The Asian states were a permanent object of the Japanese monopolies' aggressive ambitions, beginning with the seizure of the Ryukyu Islands and the expedition to Taiwan. Japan was either waging permanent wars or preparing for them. There was not a single country among its neighbours which was not included in the aggressive plans of Japanese imperialism. Classics of Marxism pointed out that "the relations of different nations among themselves depend upon the extent to which each has developed its productive forces, the division of labour and internal intercourse."³ In the course of its historical development, Japan has outstripped other Asian countries considerably. Using the advantages of the capitalist mode of production, it strove, by hook or by crook, to enslave weak states which were at the stage of feudalism and secure domination in the Asian region. At the same time, despite the high rates of development, in the early 20th century Japan was still considerably behind the "old" capitalist countries in size and technical level of industry, extent of concentration of production and capital, and maturity and power of financial groupings. By the end of World War I Japan already turned into a colonial power discharging the role of "Asia's policeman". Nevertheless, as Lenin pointed out, "she cannot constitute an independent financial and military force without support from another country".⁴

The problems of the relative financial and economic weakness and dependence of the Japanese industry and armed forces on the external sources of raw materials and fuel were still acute also in the 1930s-1940s when Japan unleashed hostilities in Manchuria and China, and began the war in the Pacific. While working out its strategy for domination in Asia, Tokyo's ruling quarters could not ignore the above-mentioned factors in evaluating their own potentialities and prospects for military confrontation with the USSR, on the one hand, and with the USA and Britain, on the other. Japan sought to avoid a protracted war and a war on two fronts. Most far-sighted leaders did not believe that it was possible to seize China and all of eastern Asia exclusively by force of arms, and tried in every possible way to augment the force of arms by a political and ideological struggle designed to assist in the fulfilment of the aggressive schemes of Japanese imperialism. "One of the 'secrets' of the oppressors' rule has always consisted in reinforcing direct physical oppression of the masses with spiritual oppression."⁵ That is why the problems of ideological indoctrination of population in Japan itself and in Asian countries was of special importance in the strategy of Japanese hegemonism in Asia.

In each historic epoch, the official ideology is nothing but "the ideal expression of the dominant material relations".⁶ The ideology of Japanese expansionism in Asia in the 1930s-1940s fully reflected the process of development of the militarised system of state-monopoly capitalism in

² Quoted from Y. Pevzner, *Monopoly Capital of Japan During the Second World War and After the War*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1950, p. 31 (in Russian).

³ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Moscow, Vol. 5, p. 32.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 226.

⁵ L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Moscow, 1978, p. 172.

⁶ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 59.

Japan, and the fascist dictatorship was used as a political instrument of that system. This ideology constituted a logical continuation of the concept of Pan-Asiatism of the beginning of the 20th century and of the doctrine of "special interests". However, in the 1930s-1940s it assumed some new features which distinguished it from previous theories.

In accordance with the official interpretation of the "special interests" doctrine expounded in the memoirs of the Japanese diplomat Kukujiro Ishii, "the special interests of Japan in China implied primarily political and, among other things, economic interests".⁷ Putting the economic interests in the background, Ishii sought to camouflage the expansionist ambitions of the Japanese monopoly capitalism which then was entering the stage of imperialism. In later documents, for example, in the instructions issued by the Foreign Ministry to the Japanese diplomats, as well as in the protocols of diplomatic negotiations, including the talks between K. Ishii and US Secretary of State R. Lansing in 1917, the sphere of "special interests" was given a much broader interpretation which openly implied economic and political interests as well, although the priority was given to the latter.⁸

In the 1930s-1940s, economic considerations were put forward simultaneously with strategic problems, but were subordinated to the aims of national defence. In other words, in the opinion of some Japanese authors, Japan's economic interests in Eastern Asia were reduced, above all, to the need to provide the country with strategic raw materials and fuel.

Ideological doctrines by bourgeois Japanese political scientists, historians, statesmen, jurists and philosophers of that time were supposed to justify and substantiate the internal processes by which the country was becoming fascist and militarist, as well as seizures of foreign lands and territories. These ideas were permeated with Pan-Asiatism and ultra-nationalism. Depending upon whom the edge of the ideological propaganda was directed against the concepts of the apologists of Japanese expansionism were either expounded as postulates of oriental morality, or assumed the form of political doctrines similar to those worked out by the bourgeois-democratic states of Western Europe and the USA. In appealing to Asian peoples, Japanese authors referred to the teachings of ancient sages and thinkers of the new time from India and China. In addressing governments and public opinion in the USA and Europe, they sought to compare the American policy of isolationism and the struggle to set up the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The theory of an "East Asia Federation" put forward in the 1930s was one of the first doctrines which determined the structure of relationships between Japan and Continental Asia. Colonel Kanji Ishiwara and Masayoshi Miyazaki, a top official of South Manchurian Railway concern, were the originators of that theory. The book *The Theory of East Asia Federation* by Miyazaki was put out in 1936 when the aggressive strategy of the Japanese ruling quarters was still directed largely toward the Asian continent. Japan, China and Manchuria were regarded as a single whole, as a mainstay of the concentration of the Japanese interests in Asia.

While substantiating this orthodox military doctrine ideologically, Miyazaki claimed that Japan was becoming the centre of development in the East, and that it was necessary to set up an East-Asia federation which would initially include Japan, Manchuria and China. According to

⁷ K. Ishii, *Diplomatic Comments*, Moscow, 1942, p. 102 (in Russian).

⁸ See *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1974, No. 2.

Miyazaki, the aim of such association, in which a "new order" would be established, would be to secure the "solution of the Sino-Japanese incident", i. e., complete subordination of China, and "preparation for mobilisation for total war".⁹ The author primarily had in mind aggression against the USSR, on which Japanese militarists insisted, since they regarded the Soviet Union as one of the principal forces impeding Japan's expansion in Asia.

At the same time, Miyazaki maintained that the Federation would be an optimal means "to destroy the Western imperialist establishment governing East Asia".¹⁰ Evaluating Miyazaki's views, US Professor Joyce Lebra wrote: "The rationale for Federation was that Japan would ultimately have to deal with one or more of the Western imperialist powers, including the Soviet Union. Japan should therefore avoid protracted war with China but rather form a federation with China and Manchukuo. This was the only way Western imperialism could be expunged from East Asia".¹¹

Miyazaki's approach was typical of ultra-right ideologists of the Japanese bourgeoisie and was reflected in declarations made by many Japanese political leaders at that time. For example, the Society of East Asia Federation, set up by Miyazaki and Ishiwara in 1939 to implement their concept, obtained some support from Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye. However, Tojo and the military upper crust preferred to act quicker and more frankly, absolutising the military means for establishing domination. They saw no need to specify other forms and methods for the implementation of expansion and opposed the very question of the formation of a federation.¹²

In his work, Miyazaki gives much attention to the theoretical substantiation of the need to strengthen Japan's military might. In his opinion, Japan could fully cope with the tasks of leader and centre of the consolidation of the East only if it possessed sufficient military potential. Miyazaki explained the dependence of China on Western Europe and the USA and the intensification of anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese people exclusively by the fact that Japan did not have sufficient power "to expel Europe and America from Asia".¹³ Playing up the concept of the relative weakness of Japan as compared with its potential adversaries, the author regarded the establishment of fascist dictatorship as the only way to strengthen the economy and the army, and to stabilise Japan's political situation. He overtly expressed the mood of the military-fascist quarters in stating that in Japan, "pressure by the military was not sufficient to suppress liberal parties. Not only that, but the military has often been counter-attacked by the liberal parties, and time has passed with national opinion divided. With the outbreak of the Incident [here the aggression in Manchuria is meant.—E. Shch.], the death knell of outdated liberalism has tolled".¹⁴

Up to the beginning of the war in the Pacific, the Japanese ruling quarters had to reckon with the threat of aggravating relations and disrupting trade ties with West European countries and the USA as a result of launching the aggression in China. The spread of Japan's influence to

⁹ *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II. Selected Readings and Documents*, Ed. by J. C. Lebra, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹² *Ibidem.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁴ *Ibidem.*

the territory of South and Central China and the statement of Premier Konoye of November 3, 1938, about setting up a "new order" in East Asia, brought a sharp response from the USA which demanded explanations and the preservation of the Treaty of Nine Powers. Tokyo could not ignore the fact that more than fifty per cent of the country's military needs were being met at the expense of imports from other imperialist countries or regions under their control, the United States above all. "And therefore", Richard Sorge wrote, "there seems to be an intention to apply the new Japanese policy in China more elastically with respect to the United States than with respect to Britain and France."¹⁵

The attempts of the Japanese ruling circles to justify their East Asian policy by frequent references to the doctrine of American expansionism advanced by President James Monroe in his message to Congress of December 2, 1823 were one of the manifestations of such "elasticity".¹⁶ As to its spirit and tendencies, the political strategy of Japan with respect to East Asia was in full accord with the Monroe Doctrine, the main aim of which was to eliminate all obstacles to US territorial seizures on the American continent on the part of European powers.

Professor Hokomatsu Kamikawa of the Tokyo Imperial University, a theorist of the Japanese version of the Monroe Doctrine and a well-known expert in the history of diplomacy, while bringing to light the similar features in the foreign policy activities of the two countries, tried to use the analogy to convince the corresponding strata of American society of the legitimate nature of the actions taken by Japanese imperialism in East Asia. In particular, he wrote in his article "The American and Japanese Monroe Doctrines" that there was much in common in the contemporary policies pursued by Japan in East Asia and in American continental territorial claims. In actual fact, he went on, Japan's continental expansion policy, beginning with the incident in Manchuria, can be called the Japanese Monroe Doctrine or the East Asia Monroe Doctrine. However, the author states with exasperation, there were quite a few Western authors who condemned the Japanese doctrine, while at the same time justifying its American prototype.¹⁷

In a bid to substantiate and justify Japan's policy in East Asia theoretically, Kamikawa deliberately discussed only those provisions from the Monroe Doctrine which could, in his opinion, explain Japan's intentions positively, though he was trying to dissociate himself from the essence of that concept, i. e., expansionism. He arbitrarily singled out two factors in the US version of the doctrine: political and economic, implying by the political factor the struggle against the influence of West European countries on the American continent, and by the economic factor, the US expansionist policy in Latin America.¹⁸ Professor Kamikawa claimed that the Japanese Monroe Doctrine followed exclusively the political principle of its prototype and included the struggle against intervention and colonisation, having in mind Japan's counteraction against Western colonialism in Asia. Kamikawa wrote that if Western powers or the USA carried out intervention and extended their political influence to the entire region, such actions should be regarded as a violation of peace and order in East Asia, and Japan as the regional protector of peace in that area,

¹⁵ R. Sorge, *Articles, Reports, Reviews*, Moscow, 1971, p. 199 (in Russian).

¹⁶ For details see *Modern History*, Part I, Moscow, 1978, pp. 547-549 (in Russian).

¹⁷ See *Contemporary Japan*, August 1939, p. 10.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

should resolutely oppose such moves.¹⁹ As for the so-called economic principle of the American doctrine, i. e., its expansionism, Kamikawa asserted that the Japanese version of the Monroe Doctrine had never called for territorial expansion as was the case with its American prototype. Professor Kamikawa stated that Japan had no territorial ambitions. This position, he went on, was sufficiently explained in different public statements by the Japanese government since the outset of the Japanese-Chinese hostilities.²⁰ True, the author admits Manchukuo (Manchuria) was set up with Japanese assistance, but he insistently emphasised that this was allegedly an independent country that had nothing to do with the territory of Japan proper.²¹ Kamikawa sought to justify Japanese imperialism's decision to withdraw from the League of Nations (in protest against the resolution of February 24, 1933, which declared the seizure of Manchuria illegal) according to the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine. Noting that Japan adhered to the principle of political isolation which was bequeathed to the United States by President Washington, and included in the Monroe Doctrine, Kamikawa sought to use it to explain Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. He wrote that as far as the principle of isolation included in the Monroe Doctrine was concerned, Japan was also striving to adhere to a similar principle as strictly as possible. It not only withdrew from the League of Nations, Kamikawa went on, but also restricted its contacts with the European countries to those spheres which had no bearing on politics.²²

Of course, the practical activities of the Japanese military and Zaibatsu went far beyond the rather flexible framework of Kamikawa's theoretical concepts. The spread of fascism within the country, the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and armed provocations on the Mongolian and Soviet borders testified to the openly aggressive intentions of Japanese imperialism, Japan's striving for the military alliance with fascist regimes in Western Europe and its preparations for a major war.

Under these conditions, Kamikawa's theoretical concepts were designed to convince the imperialist powers, the USA above all, that Japan had no intention of interfering in the affairs of other continents. Kamikawa wrote that Japan limited its activity to the framework of East Asia making no active attempts to interfere in European or American affairs.²³ Kamikawa thought it possible to secure understanding and sympathy for Japan's policy in East Asia from the USA and other imperialist countries. While identifying Japan's actions in that region with the Monroe Doctrine, he thought he would succeed in persuading the thinking people in the USA who took the Doctrine for granted to see the just nature of the Japanese variant for East Asia.²⁴ It is possible that he, like Japan's ruling quarters, had reason to believe that the USA was not so much interested in strengthening its positions in China as it was in averting the threat of war with Japan. In any case, many US scholars assessed the American policy in the Far East at that period precisely in this way.²⁵ The objective process of the growth and exacerbation of imperialist contradictions inevitably lead to war between the two states, as Lenin wrote in his time, displaying the far-sightedness of a genius. He warned that it

¹⁹ *Ibidem.*

²⁰ See *Contemporary Japan*, August 1939, p. 12.

²¹ *Ibidem.*

²² *Ibidem.*

²³ *Ibidem.*

²⁴ *Ibidem.*

²⁵ See *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1981, No. 1.

"would be just as much an imperialist war as the one between the British and the German groups in 1914",²⁶ and that "this war has been brewing for decades. It is no accident. ...Japanese and US capitalism are equally predatory".²⁷

In the stormy years preceding the beginning of the War in the Pacific, Japanese ideologists concentrated on substantiating the need for the formation of a vast sphere of co-prosperity under the aegis of Japan. In a memorandum prepared in 1940 for the Ministry of the Navy, Teiji Yabe, an active member of Premier Konoye's "brain trust", insisted on the formation of "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", which he understood as a vast autonomous zone for ensuring Japan's security and providing it with the necessary material resources. Yabe wrote: "One of the essentials of Imperial defence and the national structure is to establish an autonomous defence sphere or economic sphere embracing Greater East Asia".²⁸ He tried to prove that this sphere should "include Northern Sakhalin and the Kuriles in the North, East Siberia, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, China, and Tibet in the West, the Dutch East Indies in the South, and the ocean as far as the Hawaiian Islands in the East".²⁹ In other words, Yabe stressed the pressing need for seizing the territories of other states to ensure Japan's security.

Yabe maintained that the priority in joining the above-mentioned regions to the "co-prosperity sphere" should be determined in conformity with the situation at hand, and left the resolving of the so-called problem of Northern Sakhalin and southern provinces (the countries of Southern Seas) to the distant future. However, he did not rule out the possibility of conducting the expansion in both directions—northwards and southwards—and the implementation of one variant did not exclude the other. Yabe stressed that it was necessary to perform "full study of whether the future aims of the Empire should be based on continental or maritime nations or on both".³⁰

In his memorandum, Yabe devotes much attention to strengthening Japan's military potential, building and reequipping bases in accordance with the tasks of multi-directional aggression. He wrote: "The Imperial Army should pursue its primary responsibilities. To do this it should secure the military bases necessary for land and sea operations over all of Greater East Asia. It should especially obtain control of the air and should prepare for the war of weapons appropriate to war in the various sectors".³¹ Specifying the tasks of Japanese diplomacy in preparing for a large-scale war, Yabe made a point of exploiting the advantages stemming from the pressure brought to bear on the Soviet Union by Germany. He thought that Japan's claims to Northern Sakhalin should not be voiced prematurely, but it was necessary to accelerate the building of military bases in China which would be "effective and appropriate" for confronting the Soviet Union.³²

While defining Japan's economic interests in the "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", Yabe proceeded primarily from military and strategic tasks. He believed that the deliveries to Japan of raw materials, fuel and strategic materials from areas controlled or influenced by Great Britain and

²⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 470.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, p. 36.

²⁸ Quoted from *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, p. 31.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

the USA, made Japan's defences dependent on these states and restricted its possibilities. He saw one of the main tasks of the "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in the so-called liberation of national defences from the pressures brought to bear by European countries and the USA, in meeting its requirements at the expense of the internal reserves of the Empire (including Manchukuo and China) and expanding trade and economic ties with the Southeast Asia countries included in that sphere, and also with Germany and Italy.³³

Thus, in Yabe's interpretation, the economic factors are subordinated to military and political ones. This concept clearly reflected the predominant influence of the military in the state machinery, their relative independence, and the urge to play a leading role in the complex relations with the monopoly capital.

Theoretical concepts were designed to lay down the ideological groundwork for creating a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", i. e., for Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia, a course officially adopted in 1940. The orthodox military doctrine which regarded Japan's gaining a foothold in Asia by seizing China as its basic principle was altered fundamentally as Japanese imperialism embarked on an impressive new adventure. However, any policy of aggression directed at enslaving peoples is sure to be a failure. The liberation struggle of the peoples and the rout of the Japanese military by the Soviet Army led this adventure by the Japanese military to a fiasco.

While assessing the stance of the Japanese military and industrialists which found theoretical substantiation in the writings of Yabe, US political scientist W. Magistretti noted that although Japan's movement southwards was undoubtedly caused by the need to compensate for the insignificant achievements in China and to capitalise on war in Europe, nevertheless it also stemmed from the old, firmly established tradition that Japan has two major directions of expansion: one of them is in Asia, in China and Siberia, whereas the other is in the south of the Pacific at the expense of the colonial empires and the interests of Great Britain, America, France and Holland. These two directions, Magistretti noted, were not necessarily mutually exclusive and could be implemented simultaneously.³⁴

It is hard to determine correctly how weighty were the reasons of the US publicist for declaring the existence of the tradition of southern expansion for Japan. The references to Japanese authors which he cites testify only to the exceptional importance attached to the countries of the South Seas in those years as a source of strategic materials necessary for waging war in China, as well as resources for providing the Japanese economy with the necessary materials in general. More important, probably, is the fact that the southern direction of Japanese expansion which established itself in the official policy early in the 1940s, preserved and multiplied its importance in the postwar years. In other conditions and on a qualitatively new level, Southeast Asia continues to remain one of the main directions of Japanese expansion, having become a traditional sphere of activities for Japanese imperialism.

As the war in China became increasingly protracted, the ideologists of Japanese expansionism gave more attention to the elaboration of different proposals aimed at an early resolution of the Chinese issue, i. e., the attainment of the aims of Japanese imperialism with a minimum expenditure of force and means.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

³⁴ See *Pacific Affairs*, July 1941, p. 67.

One of the eldest Japanese political scientists, Professor Masamichi Royama, supporter and advisor of Premier Konoye, sought to prove in his book *East Asia and World*, put out in 1941, that the road towards an early settlement of the Japanese-Chinese contradictions was the establishment of a "new order" in East Asia. By the "new order" Royama means the association of Japan, Manchukuo and China based on principles of "co-operation". Moreover, Royama emphasised, that the functions of "ensuring self-defence" would be an indispensable attribute of the planned community.³⁵ In a bid to substantiate his theory, Professor Royama contended that since Japan allegedly never planned to conquer China and never believed that it could cope with this task, while China was unable to oppose Japan independently, the sole means for ensuring stability in the Far East was the establishment of a "new order" meeting the interests of both parties.³⁶ In this contention, Royama openly admitted the impossibility of Japan's conquering China by force of arms and regarded the establishment of the community in East Asia as the only acceptable way out for Japanese imperialism.

With the outbreak of the war in the Pacific, the ideologues of Japanese expansionism began to highlight the "liberatory mission" of Japanese imperialism in Asia to camouflage the true goals of its aggression and give a theoretical justification for Japan's occupationalist policy. In his works published between 1942 and 1945, Kamekichi Takahashi, a well-known economist and publicist, concentrated on contrasting Japan's policy in East Asia to that of US and Western European colonialism. He asserted that in occupying Asian countries, Japan ridded itself of its economic dependence on the USA and Britain, simultaneously bringing liberation to the peoples of East Asia. He wrote that Japan had to put up with US and British pressure in the form of economic blockade right up to the outbreak of the war in the Pacific. Up to that moment, he added, either politically or economically, East Asia was not a fully independent community: it was effectively subordinated to Britain, the US and their allies. Now, that East Asia has regained its political and economic independence, he went on, it is evident that Japan must try to do everything possible to consolidate this independence through the establishment of an economic sphere of co-prosperity embracing the peoples of Greater East Asia.³⁷

Arguing that the peoples of East Asia would finally accede to "independence and freedom" under Japan's aegis, Takahashi hastens to emphasise, developing the concepts propounded in the works of Yabe Toiji, that in any case, priority should be given to the needs of "ensuring national defence". Consequently, the continuing independence of small nations, the natural resources of which were vital for the existence of great powers, was admissible only to the extent that there was no threat of outside interference which could be detrimental to "national defence" of the great power dependent on the deliveries of raw materials, i. e., Japan.

Takahashi was also one of the most vocal advocates of dividing the world into spheres of influence where a "new order" was to be established. He wrote that besides Greater East Asia, "the white world will also probably have spheres of co-prosperity" in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. What is important, he pointed out, is that every one of these spheres will have its own racial, geographic, cultural, economic and

³⁵ See M. Royama, *East Asia and World*, Tokyo, 1941, p. 14.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³⁷ See *The Japan Times and Advertiser*, November 2, 1942.

strategic peculiarities, and combination of these different spheres will lead to the establishment of a new international order.³⁸ Hairbrained schemes of establishing a "new world order" under the aegis of Germany, Italy and Japan set forth in the works of Takahashi and other ideologists of the fascist military regime were widely used by the ruling elite to justify its policies of aggression and the enslavement of the people in the occupied countries.

The theoreticians of Japanese expansionism attached great importance to the ideological brainwashing of the Asian peoples to win them over to Japan's side in its struggle against European colonialism. They did everything to dissociate Japan from imperialist policies which were represented as a purely West European and American phenomenon, to hide its expansionist essence, and to whitewash its acts of aggression, vesting them in the garb of struggle for the freedom and independence of the countries of the Orient.

Advocating the creation of an East Asia Federation under Japan's aegis, Masayoshi Miyazaki sharply criticised the imperialist policy of the USA and Western Europe, promising demagogically that the Federation would "completely abandon the colonialist policy of West European imperialism and liberate East Asia". He stressed the need for an extensive brainwashing operation against the population of the occupied lands in order to secure support for Japan's policy. "It is no exaggeration to say," wrote Miyazaki, "that the key to success of East Asian Federation depends on a peoples' cooperative movement".³⁹ The author had in mind the Japanese-inspired movement for secession from China in Manchuria and praised the activities of pro-Japanese "public" organisations to this effect.

This line of argument was picked up in the works of Professor Kamikawa who argued that what Japan sought was the creation of an economic bloc which would be free of any imperialist features and equally beneficial to Japan and other members. Kamikawa wrote that in the economic sphere, the Japanese Monroe Doctrine might be defined as East Asian continentalism, i. e., a movement based on the geographical, racial, cultural and economic solidarity of East Asian countries. While Japan has already entered the phase of industrial development, he added, other countries in the region are still at the agrarian stage. Therefore they mutually complement one another, and should establish relationships of mutual assistance.⁴⁰

Money-hungry and exploitative capitalism objectively rules out the possibility of equal relations between states with different levels of economic development. During the short period of Japanese occupation of Asia, Japanese Zaibatsu outdid their European counterparts by far in plundering and raping the occupied territories. Despite this, Kamikawa tries to prove that there is absolutely no reason to refer to the Japanese Monroe Doctrine as a doctrine of imperialism.⁴¹

Yabe Teiji, a prominent advocate of Japan's aggressive policy, also resolutely denied the imperialist essence of the idea of an East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. He contended that "the foundations of the Greater East Asia Autonomous Sphere particularly dictate an economic cooperative unit. This economic unit should not be an imperialist exploitative relationship but a cooperative relationship in coexistence and co-prosperity,

³⁸ See *Ibidem*.

³⁹ Quoted from *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, p. 5.

⁴⁰ See *Contemporary Japan*, August, 1939, p. 12.

⁴¹ See *Ibidem*.

bearing in mind the direction of the world's new order".⁴²

Miyazaki went even further: Korea, which, in the apt words of Lenin, "plunders Korea ... with unprecedented brutality, combining all the latest technical inventions with purely Asiatic tortures,"⁴³ is depicted in Miyazaki's book as prospering under the aegis of Japan. The so-called "harmonious union" between the Korean and Japanese peoples is cited by Miyazaki as another "success" story of Japan's continental policy.⁴⁴

Miyazaki also tried to convince the Asian public that Japan's war against China was in reality a war against West European oppression and, therefore, essentially noble. He argues, "We feel Western imperialism is trying in every way to take revenge. The Western Establishment in East Asia which is the adversary of our Federation movement is a policy for world domination by the white races built up through the past century. Formally we are fighting Chiang Kai-shek's army in China but substantially we are fighting against British and French imperialism... which are taking clever advantage of the peoples' unity movement in China".⁴⁵ Miyazaki's position is fully in keeping with the official stand in Tokyo. "Japan emphasises again and again," Richard Sorge wrote in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* "that it is fighting in China not for the sake of subjugating the Chinese people and conquering Chinese territory. The objective is the country's readiness to cooperate in the fulfilment of Japan's mission in Asia."¹⁶

Shumei Okawa, a lawyer by education, a fascist and a member of many ultra-nationalist organisations by choice, was another vocal advocate of the "new order" in Asia. A graduate of the Department of Philosophy of Tokyo Imperial University, member of the board and director of the South Manchuria Railway's research bureau, the founder of the ultra-nationalist Jimmukai organisation, Shumei Okawa took an active part in the young officers' movement and in plots against so-called "liberal" bureaucrats, politicians and financiers whose activities were not to the liking of the fascists. Okawa's ideas of pan-Asiaticism and nationalism were highly popular among the officers, known for their fascist leanings. In his book *The Formation of a New Order in Greater East Asia* published in 1943, he tried to provide ideological justification for the formation of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" under the aegis of Japan. In his work, Okawa highlighted the features which, in his view, made most Oriental peoples different from the peoples of Europe, glorifying Asia's history, its heroes of the antiquity, myths, ancient philosophy and culture, and contrasting the "Orient's thousands years of glory" to the achievements of the West, which, in his opinion, are much less impressive.

Okawa believed that Asia's unity was based on some special "Oriental spirit". He wrote that most of the Orient was enslaved by modern Europe, its culture had degraded, its spirit had been downtrodden, the spontaneity and originality of antiquity is lost, but this is no reason to deny the Oriental spirit altogether.⁴⁷ Continuing in this vein, he drew the conclusion that those who deny the existence of the "Oriental spirit" have no respect for themselves, they are incapable of understanding the most vital essence of Asia which they bear in themselves.⁴⁸

⁴² Quoted from *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, p. 43.

⁴³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 443.

⁴⁴ Quoted from *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, p. 6.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶ See R. Sorge, *Articles, Reports, Reviews*, p. 143.

⁴⁷ S. Okawa, *The Formation of a New Order in East Asia*, Tokyo, 1943, p. 39.

⁴⁸ See *Ibid.*, p. 40.

The author needed these speculations about the "Oriental spirit" to justify Japan's special mission in Asia. Praising the role of India and China in the development of culture, philosophy and science in the ancient East, he underlined the role of Japan as a successor to these two centres of Asia's grandeur. There is no need to repeat, Okawa stressed, that Japan took a lot from China and India, the thought and culture of the two nations which were the great centres of the Orient have merged and amalgamated in our spirit.⁴⁹ He concluded that, since Japan had absorbed the achievements of millennia-old civilisations which determined the essence of the Asian way of life and thinking in contrast to the European one, the Oriental spirit was really the Japanese spirit. He went on to say, that since Japan absorbed the accomplishments of China and India over the course of the thousand years of our existence, the Japanese spirit can be understood only as the spirit of the Orient.⁵⁰ It follows that along with the concept of the "Oriental spirit", Okawa introduced that of the Japanese spirit, putting an equation mark between the two. On the basis of this newly proclaimed unity of the Oriental and Japanese spirits, Okawa tried to justify Japan's military operations on the mainland, describing them as aimed at the rebirth of the Orient, and at proving the need for the Asian peoples to subordinate themselves to their "natural leader", i. e., Japan.

Propaganda of the "Japanese spirit" was highly popular in Japan during the years of its sliding to fascism. The progressive Japanese materialist philosopher Yoshishige Kozai stressed that the Japanese spirit of the Showa period was, in form and content, a slogan of the adventurist war waged by an aggressive imperialist country.⁵¹ This is an objective definition of Okawa's doctrines.

The ideologues of Japanese expansionism put forward an array of models and types of communities recommended for the Asian region from the East Asia Federation to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Although the authors tended to laud their own prescriptions for the planned organisation, they all pursued the same objective—the establishment of Japanese hegemony in Asia. For example, Professor Masamichi Royama proceeded from a theory of regionalism. He believed that the "new order" in East Asia was a form of international regional organisation in which the relationships between the member-states were to be based on principles of cooperation and coexistence. These relationships were to be closer than those among individual states in a federal-type country. Professor Royama stressed specifically that "under the new order, sovereignty, freedom and independence must be respected in the full meaning of the word".⁵² Such statements were, naturally, nothing but propaganda, pure and simple. They were not further developed and, what is more important, the author could not provide any guarantees the proclaimed principles would be implemented.

Similar pronouncements by Masayoshi Miyazaki are even less credible. He set out to prove the possibility of the Asian countries' voluntary entry into a federation led by Japan and promised them the right of free secession in case of disagreement with Japanese policy. But at the same time, he called for the extension of the experience of Japan's relations with Manchukuo to the whole of China, and thought it possible to negotiate

⁴⁹ See *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ See *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵¹ Y. Kozai, *Modern Philosophy. Notes on the Yamato spirit*, Moscow, 1970, p. 124 (in Russian).

⁵² *East Asia and World*, Tokyo, 1941, p. 14.

with a Chinese government only from a position of occupying power.⁵³ The "experience of Japan's relations with Manchukuo" meant, in effect, the establishment of a pro-Japanese puppet regime, a practice to be extended to the whole of China. Miyazaki's protestations about certain guaranteed freedoms within the framework of the federation contradicted sharply with his fascist ideology and categorical rejection of all tenets of bourgeois liberalism. Miyazaki wrote that such Western ideals as freedom, equality, democracy, etc., are based on the concept of racial and class differentiation; therefore, the "new structure" in East Asia will replace the Western concept of freedom underlying the Western Establishment with the Eastern concept of morality.⁵⁴

Takahashi was more specific and frank about the relationships among countries within the "co-prosperity sphere". In contrast to Royama and Miyazaki, he gave a much broader interpretation of the community's geographical framework, including the countries of the South Seas in it, in addition to China and Manchukuo. Takahashi stressed that these countries had various levels of economic development, cultures, different populations, etc., and, therefore, each of them required a different approach. He also stressed the need for strict control by the leader, i. e., Japan, and for a precise delimitation of control functions in the spheres of trade, diplomacy, economy, finances, etc., under the proviso that Japan handle the larger part of these functions. Takahashi freely admitted that the "co-prosperity sphere" was of vital importance for Japan, the very existence of which depended on goodneighbourly relations with the countries of East Asia. However, he believed that only Japan's hegemony and firm supremacy in the region could provide a real guarantee of such relations. On the basis of these considerations he, like Okawa, insisted on the complete elimination of all manifestations of Western influence in the East. Takahashi wrote that in what it concerns Greater East Asia, it is imperative that the Western way of thinking be expelled and the Asian spirit restored in its original form.⁵⁵ Teiji Yabe held a similar view: "The Autonomous Sphere of Greater East Asia will exclude non-Asiatic invading powers and will eschew dependence on Europe and America."⁵⁶

All this is past history now, but an understanding of the present is largely determined by knowledge of the past. "Any understanding of human history," wrote N. I. Konrad, "is of necessity based on what we deduce from mankind's past experience and what we can predict for the future on this basis."⁵⁷ Past experience shows that Japanese imperialism waged a protracted struggle to establish its sphere of influence in East Asia, that its expansionism was of a permanent nature, and that Japanese fascism and militarism were a source of tension and war in the Far East. Past experience reveals the imperialist essence of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" idea broadly advocated and pursued in the 1930s-1940s and brings to mind the idea of the notorious Pacific Community. Past experience points out the sources of aggressiveness of Japanese imperialism, which for a long time enjoyed a "monopoly of force" in the Far East and which is trying to use its present monopoly of economic power to attain similar objectives.

⁵³ Quoted from *Japan's East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, p. 5.

⁵⁴ See *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁵⁵ *The Japan Times and Advertiser*, November 2, 1942.

⁵⁶ Quoted from *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, p. 32.

⁵⁷ N. I. Konrad, *Selected works. History*, Moscow, 1974, p. 293.

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HAN SUYIN--APOLOGIST OF MAOISM AND CHINESE NATIONALISM

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[Article by M. V. Koval', candidate of economic sciences]

[Text]

Han Suyin (the pen name of Rosalie Zhou) is fairly well known both in the West and in China; between the 1950s and 1980s she has written a number of voluminous books and articles dealing with China.

Han Suyin was born in 1917 in China's Sichuan Province, of Zhou Yandong, a Chinese, and a Belgian mother, although she herself professes to be pure Chinese. She maintained contacts with her father in Peking until he died in 1958, and with his numerous relatives who were typical Chinese-style bourgeois (merchants and bankers). In 1938 she married Tang Baohuan, a Guomindang officer, who later became a General and was murdered by his subordinates in the Chiang Kaishek Army in 1945. Han Suyin studied medicine at the Yanjin University in Peking and in Belgium.

She spent long intervals in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and other countries of Southeast Asia where she was in constant touch with Chinese emigres; through her relatives and other huaqiao she established extensive ties with scientists, writers and political figures in the USA, Britain, France, India and Southeast Asia. In this way, using her acquaintance with Malcolm MacDonald, the British political emissary to India, she got to know Jawaharlal Nehru, and was presented to Tikki Kaul, a prominent Indian diplomat (the former Indian Ambassador to China, the USSR, and the USA), who helped her obtain a Chinese entrance visa in 1956.¹

Subsequently she often used another source of visas, her old acquaintance Gong Peng, the first wife of Qiao Guanhua, the then Foreign Minister of the PRC, a close associate of Zhou Enlai. It was Gong Peng that arranged her first interview with Zhou Enlai in 1956 and introduced her to the latter's family which she visited quite often ever after. Gong Peng sent her invitations to official receptions, National People's Congress sessions and other important political conferences and functions of the Peking government. She gave her access to Song Qingling, Mao Dun, Lao She, Guo Moruo, the Justice Minister Shi Liang, the Public Health Minister Li Dequan, He Xianying who headed the commission for expatriate Chinese, and Chen Yi, who even then tried to sound out the possibility of enlisting Han Suyin as a mediator between Peking and the Taiwan regime.

Among Han Suyin's acquaintances of 1956 were George Hatem, a physician of Lebanese origin residing in China since 1936 whose alias was Ma Haide and who gave medical advice and treatment to Mao Zedong in Yanan; American journalists Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and Rewi Alley, as well as other long-time foreign residents of China. Her pro-American sympathies were already much in evidence, although she

¹ Han Suyin met the Chinese revolution in Hong Kong, and did not risk going to the PRC immediately after its formation waiting, as she put it, for the dust to settle down in China.

insistently paraded her love of China. In the following years, she often met Edgar Snow, Harrison Salisbury of *The New York Times* and other US figures.

Han Suyin combines her medical practice (she owns clinics in Malaya and Singapore) with writing. She is always ready to treat any topic concerning China, judging the complicated political problems of the country, the Chinese revolution, the life and views of the political figures of China and Southeast Asia—all this with astounding ease. She garnishes them with dubious details of her own family life and amorous adventures.

On the whole, her books are devoid of scientific interest, being rather of the bestseller type with titles like *The Crippled Tree*, *The Mountain Is Young*, *A Mortal Flower*, *The Morning Deluge*, etc.

Her style is muddled and contradictory; her own emotions override the facts of history, while her judgements and conclusions are openly pro-Maoist and anti-Soviet, especially those in *Birdless Summer*, *The Morning Deluge*, *China in the Year 2001*, *Asia Today*, *The Wind in the Tower*.

The overall concept of her works is fallacious owing to the author's undisguised anti-communism and the strong nationalistic sentiments which permeate the entire fabric of her writing. In this connection, her latest production, the voluminous *My House Has Two Doors*,² is of understandable interest.

This work, written after the death of Mao Zedong and the overthrow and exposure of the "gang of four", i. e., in the period that saw the exacerbation of power struggle within the PRC leadership and the growing political prestige of Deng Xiaoping, is, on the face of it, a renunciation of all that the author wrote before. According to an insightful remark of Simon Leys whom Han Suyin has known since her Hong Kong days, "... her work resembles those clothes you can buy with two different patterns and colours so that depending on your mood or the weather you can wear them with the outside in or the inside out. I believe that in the trade they are called 'reversible models'"³

So, while comparing the political assessments and pronouncements contained in her latest book with what she stated in her numerous works published before Mao's death, one may safely assert that she has "flogged herself" like the Sergeant Major's widow in Gogol's play. In this sense, the very title of her book—*My House Has Two Doors*—is quite symbolic. The author seems to emphasise her lack of any principle in handling historical events and facts here, other than her own preferences and expediency. In other words, Han Suyin prefers to see which way the wind blows, as she herself has admitted, and believes that this must be a writer's credo.

It is not surprising, therefore, that whereas in her pre-1976 works Han Suyin looks with an approving eye on the "cultural revolution" and the activities of Jiang Qing, condones the endless quoting of Mao Zedong and the Mao worship and praises the hongweibings, in her latest book she gives quite opposite assessments of the same phenomena. This was vividly demonstrated by Simon Leys in the aforementioned article in which he contrasted a number of passages from her previous works and the latest book.⁴

However, this is not a matter of Han Suyin's astounding unscrupulousness alone, characterising her slippery position as it does, but of

² Han Suyin, *My House Has Two Doors. China. Autobiography. History*, London, 1980.

³ "Simon Leys on Han Suyin", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan. 1, 1981.

⁴ "Simon Leys on Han Suyin", p. 32.

that trait becoming her *alter ego* and going to justify her pro-Chinese nationalism. She is always loyal to those who are in power in China and shape its policies, pursuing their nationalistic goals. Thus, in the 1930s, she was quite loyal to Chiang Kaishek whom she sincerely admired and thought a "true patriot" and a fighter for the liberation of China; in the 1950s-1960s and early 1970s she extolled Mao Zedong and Maoism, and claimed that he personified the entire Chinese Revolution, "has embodied the aspirations, needs, and desires of his nation and of his people", that he "unhesitatingly gave all of himself" to the cause of revolution and the cause of the people, and "became their leader, the nation-man".⁵

As she does not trouble herself with an analysis of facts, a study of the developments, or with proving her assertions, Han Suyin demonstrates an extraordinary ease in distorting Mao's position at the early stage of the communist movement in China, calling him the leader of the proletariat, a true Leninist, a staunch adherent of the united front policy and, later, claiming that his work among peasants foreshadowed the decisions of the 6th Plenary Meeting of the Comintern CC and that the Meeting's resolutions were allegedly "echoed in Mao's ideas and writings".⁶

In passing, Han Suyin smears the Comintern's recommendations for China and the work of the representatives it sent to China, who, as she claims, did not understand the situation, could not follow the events.

Diligent as a trained parrot, Han Suyin repeats the Maoists' concepts of the Chinese revolution: the armed struggle by the peasants, the people's war, the encirclement of the town by the countryside, the creation of rural bases, etc. And, naturally, she praises the Maoist "big leap forward", the "people's communes" in the late 1950s, and later the "cultural revolution" which, she claimed, was China's way to provide the working class with leadership and the masses with greatest possible democracy, the way to prepare China "to go on building a socialist system".⁷

As to China's political figures, before 1966 she lauded Liu Shaoqi, before 1971—Lin Biao, and before 1976—Jiang Qing, her associates, and the hongweibings. Subsequently, she gave her due to Hua Guofeng, and, at last, in her latest work all her sympathies belong to Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, while she levels criticism at Jiang Qing, the "gang of four", Kang Sheng, Chen Boda and others.

However, this does not prevent Han Suyin from stubbornly publicising the most important Maoist dogmas and dicta retained by the new Peking leaders, and from libelling, in passing, the Soviet Union and the Soviet people who rendered China disinterested aid in the 1950s.⁸ This means that, although she now denies many facts and events or gives them a new interpretation, she has not renounced the nationalistic concept of Maoism—that of Chinese exclusiveness and the originality of the Chinese path of development. She says, recalling her 1956 visit to China, that even then she thought that it would have to invent a "new pattern, all its own, for socialism", that the "Hundred Flowers" meant China's departure from communism, and that Zhou Enlai attempted, as early as 1956, to "liberalise" China in the same way as was done later in the late 1970s. She qualified Zhou's speech at the 1956 NPC session as a "departure from the accepted theses of how to run a socialist state".⁹

⁵ Han Suyin, *The Morning Deluge. Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, 1893-1954*, Boston-Toronto, 1972, p. 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 92, 97, 108, 130.

⁷ Han Suyin, *Asia Today*, London, 1969, p. 71; Han Suyin, *China in the Year 2001*, London, 1967, p. 204.

⁸ See Han Suyin, *My House Has Two Doors*, p. 156.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

This speech of Zhou Enlai's which Han Suyin directly links with Mao Zedong's April 1956 speech (published in 1977 under the title of "The Ten Major Relationships") laid, as she believes, the foundation of "...a democratic, socialist China" which rejected the "Soviet yoke".¹⁰ According to the author, Zhou Enlai who received her in his home at Zhongnanhai and had a three-hour talk with her on the problems of the Chinese revolution was mainly distressed at the fact that the West did not understand the Chinese.¹¹ One can infer from this admission that, even then, Zhou was directing Han Suyin to work for the establishment of ties between China and the West.

However, initially Han Suyin's mediating mission ran up against several setbacks. Although she managed to visit India in the spring of 1957 and had a talk with Nehru, the latter did not accept her mediation and declined to discuss relations between India and China with her.

In September 1957, Han Suyin went to China again to witness the broad-based campaign for the exposure of the "right-wing elements". Yet now, in giving an account of this period, Han Suyin is clearly tacking, reluctant to condemn Mao for the campaign aimed at destroying the intellectuals and party cadres, and attempts to put all the blame on the Soviet Union. "...Pressure from the USSR", she claims, allegedly forced the Chinese leaders to start struggle against the "right-wingers". Right from the start, the USSR had been against that 'feeling of early spring', as she called the "Hundred Flowers."¹²

Such biased assessments of Chinese-Soviet relations are not accidental, nor are they particularly infrequent, permeating the whole of Han Suyin's work. At the same time she is extremely reticent in speaking about the sorry outcome of Mao's struggle against the "right-wingers", and cites only the example of Qiao Guanhua who was also qualified as a "right-winger" but was then saved by Zhou Enlai himself.¹³ She intentionally keeps silent about the other numerous victims of Mao's reprisals (e. g., Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, and others). It is known that Deng Xiaoping's grouping is still against the rehabilitation of these CPC functionaries, since none other than Deng was the inspiration behind the persecution of Gao Gang, owing to which he found his way to the Politburo and became CC CPC General Secretary.¹⁴

In March 1958, Han Suyin visited Peking in connection with her father's death¹⁵ and witnessed the beginning of the "big leap forward". Even today, in assessing it, she betrays vestiges of her old views: on the one hand, she admits some negative aspects of the "big leap forward", on the other, she tends to whitewash this policy by claiming that the "leap" attained its main objective and even helped China's industrial development. Like most Maoists, Han Suyin seeks to attribute the blame for setbacks and failures the Chinese economy suffered in the "leap" years to natural calamities.¹⁶

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 202.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

¹⁴ See O. Borisov, "The 26th CPSU Congress and Some Problems of Studying the History of China", *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 4, 1981, p. 8.

¹⁵ Her father, Han Suyin writes, was given a state funeral at the Babaoshan cemetery reserved for revolutionaries and prominent political figures of China, although he was not a CPC member. His death was reported by *Renmin ribao*. See Han Suyin, *My House Has Two Doors*, pp. 206-208.

¹⁶ Han Suyin, *My House Has Two Doors*, pp. 246, 342-343.

Han Suyin emphasises her closeness to the Chinese power centre and parades the assignment she received from Peking of helping to shape the public image of China abroad, especially in Asia. She is indeed well suited to the task, since, in addition to her being acquainted with many political figures, in particular in South and Southeast Asian countries,¹⁷ she plays a prominent role in public life and maintains ties with various sections of the intelligentsia. Thus, she was a member of the Malay Research Institute of Sociology, contributed to the setting up of the Chinese University in Singapore, which its US sponsors who had financed it conceived as a "bulwark" against communism.¹⁸ In 1959 she lectured on modern Asian literature at this University where she was previously a staff physician and therefore knew the ins and outs of student life.

Han Suyin was always very attentive to the situation of the Chinese emigres in Indonesia, and repeatedly criticised Sukarno's discriminatory measures against the huqqiao. She may be considered as a typical representative of Peking's "fifth column" in Southeast Asia, and, in fact, she makes no secret of this role.

Posing as a political analyst and a seasoned diplomat, Han Suyin impudently flaunts the bit she did in "settling" the Chinese-Indian border conflict. She does not conceal it that she took a manifestly pro-Peking stand when the Chinese-Indian relations worsened. Her attitude toward the conflict was already apparent at the August 1959 Conference of Sinologists in Toronto which she attended as unofficial observer and, therefore, could not, as she put it, stand up to those who charged China with belligerence, aggressiveness, cruelty, etc.¹⁹ She does not hesitate to vindicate China's constructing a highway across Aksai Chin, claiming that Indian maps always marked this area as a "no man's land", and that it was not part of India. She pretends to be unable to understand why "there was an uproar" in the Indian Parliament over the Chinese road being built in "Aksai Chin region now suddenly considered 'sacred soil of India'".²⁰

Han Suyin's efforts and her pro-Chinese stand did not remain unappreciated: four days after she published in Canada a number of articles in defence of the PRC, the Chinese leaders sent her an entrance visa, whereas she had previously been refused admittance.

This time, too, she had a lengthy talk with Zhou Enlai who commended her stand on the Chinese-Indian border conflict and suggested further steps she might take. He condemned the "strange conduct" of Nehru and his "unclear" position in the Chinese-Indian border issue, offered the idea that "India and China were ... the hope of the Third World", came out against peaceful coexistence, and claimed that "selling out the peoples of the Third World" for the so-called peace was impermissible.²¹

After an infusion of nationalistic Sinocentrism from such a highly placed source, Han Suyin equipped with maps, documents, and a letter from Zhou Enlai, went to India to see Nehru in November 1959. However, her mission was again a failure, although Madame Suyin was honestly working for her bread and went out of her way to praise the "peaceful disposition", "modesty" and "decency" of the Chinese with respect to India. To her surprise, Jawaharlal Nehru "for some unknown reason" did not

¹⁷ She was acquainted with Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Li Kaung Yu, Norodom Sihanouk, Aidthi, Sukarno, and others.

¹⁸ See Han Suyin, *My House Has Two Doors*, pp. 88-89.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 257-258.

want" to start negotiations with China and did not believe her emotional and "convincing" pleas. In addition, complains Han Suyin, her talks were again "hindered by the Russians" who allegedly took in their stride the Chinese-Indian border clashes "to obtain leverage with the Indian government".²² Despite all of her subsequent efforts, she failed to convince Nehru of China's peaceful intentions, although she tried to "move" him even after Zhou Enlai's April 1960 Indian visit, for which purpose she brought into play her connections in literary, scientific and intellectual circles. As a result, she accused, groundlessly as it were, Nehru and Krishna Menon, India's former Defence Minister, of having provoked the conflict themselves because of their "forward policy" at the Chinese-Indian border.

Han Suyin's interpretation of the armed border conflict of autumn 1962 is fully identical with that of Neville Maxwell, a British journalist whose book on the Chinese-Indian war she refers to.²³

Characteristically, that same period was marked by sharply increased journalistic goings-on centred around China. Peking was visited by Felix Green whom Han Suyin, with Gong Peng's assistance, helped obtain a visa in 1960 and by Edgar Snow who got the go-ahead from the State Department to come to China as a *Look* correspondent. These were the people who, along with Anna Louise Strong, Agnes Smedley and Han Suyin were entrusted with the task of helping to promote "better understanding between China and the Western world" in the 1960s, of seeing that China occupied "her rightful place in the sun" and making it "equal among all the nations of the world".²⁴

This is Han Suyin's own account of the events. She does not conceal that she had repeated meetings with Snow and Green in Peking, and that they discussed those problems. She intimates that in September 1960, Green conducted a televised interview with Zhou Enlai, and that on October 22, Edgar Snow interviewed Mao Zedong and also had a talk with Zhou Enlai. Han Suyin does not miss a chance to praise Zhou Enlai who allegedly "would shoulder the total burden", and "like Deng Xiaoping", calls for working against the boasting and for "sticking to facts".²⁵

A detail to note: in the autumn of 1960, i. e., when Chinese-Indian relations were at their lowest ebb, Han Suyin displayed a sudden interest in the problem of China's national minorities, in Islam, Buddhism, and Zheng He's expeditions, taking a closer look at the situation in the outlying areas of the PRC, including Tibet, all the while regularly discussing the issues involved in China's relations with the "Third World" with Chen Yi and Zhou Enlai. Han Suyin attended the Peking reception given for Prince Sihanouk in 1961 and went both to the conference on Laos in Geneva and the 2nd Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Cairo (February 1962) as an observer. In the exchanges of views in the lobby, she vigorously argued in favour of the main Maoist tenets of war and peace, peaceful coexistence, and sought to smear the USSR's policy regarding the national liberation movement. In general, at these and other Afro-Asian forums, Han Suyin acted as a Maoist agent, and as such, used the opportunity to establish close contacts with politicians of the independent countries of Asia and Africa.

An analysis of Han Suyin's pronouncements and actions will reveal that she always diligently followed Peking's line with respect to the *hua-qiao*, seeing her mission as establishing ties with the outer world, in par-

²² *Ibid.*, p. 262.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-270.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

ticular with the developing countries, and in doing her utmost to promote China's prestige abroad. With this aim in view, she exerted herself to create a more attractive image of Chinese life in the early 1960s. Thus, drawing on her own impressions (she asserts that she travelled all over China in 1962-1963, and walked around eight provinces on foot), she claimed that in towns and the countryside alike there were no longer any signs of hunger to be seen, although the facts she cites herself (e. g., that the population, including the city dwellers, raised chickens wherever they could, keeping them "on balconies, in bedrooms, and in coops suspended from windows") show a far less rosy picture of the food situation in China.

Now and then she comes up with new assessments of China's historical personalities. Thus, in describing her visit to Jinggangshan in the early 1960s, Han Suyin still called that place the first red base set up by Mao, an eagle's nest in the mountains, etc. However, she clearly gives prominence to Zhu De who had come there with his detachment and without whom, allegedly, there would have been no revolution.²⁶ She also reports an interesting detail: during the "cultural revolution", the monument to Zhu De in Jinggangshan was removed, and the picture of Mao meeting Zhu De in 1927 was repainted to represent Lin Biao instead of Zhu De.

But, even in deplored the "cultural revolution", Han Suyin seeks to mislead the reader and to lend a measure of soundness to the concept of "cultural revolution". She claims, for example, that the "cultural revolution grew out of the socialist education movement" which was launched in January 1965 on the basis of Mao's "23 Points on Socialist Education" and was aimed at the destruction of the old system of education set out "after the Soviet pattern".²⁷

At the same time Han Suyin started a broad propaganda campaign in favour of China abroad. She gave a number of lectures on China in the USA (in a Los Angeles synagogue, and some women's organisations) and met with several politicians (Senators Fulbright and Goldberg), as well as with her collaborators Felix Green and Edgar Snow.

She was no less active in Britain where she and Vanessa Redgrave set up a Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding (SACU), spoke before a seminar at Oxford, etc.²⁸

In July 1965, she went to Tanzania where she made contact with the Chinese and the US Ambassadors and discussed TANZAM with them, and was also presented to a person whom she called an Angolan resistance leader (i. e., Holden Roberto, leader of the reactionary anti-popular FNLA movement, who was subsequently actively backed by Peking and the USA), and to his American wife.

Han Suyin also visited Kenya and was going to attend the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference of the Heads of State in Algeria which failed to be convened, in fact, due to China's manoeuvrings.²⁹

In September 1965, she had a meeting (the 7th one!) with Zhou En-lai. Their talk was attended only by Gong Peng, and this time their topic

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 358-359.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 389, 392-393.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 408. Han Suyin writes that in the subsequent 14 years, she gave lectures on China all over the world—in Europe, America, Canada, Mexico, Australia, Japan, Africa, India, including in the Paris Military Academy, and a military college in India (p. 404).

²⁹ Naturally, Han Suyin alleges that the conference did not take place "because the Indian delegation had lobbied on behalf of the Soviet Union" (p. 410).

was the worsening domestic situation in China and the incipient open break between Mao and Liu Shaoqi, as well as possible changes in Sino-US relations.

According to Han Suyin, that time Zhou predicted a dramatic change in US China policies, and was insistently searching for the ways of rapprochement with America. Echoing the Chinese Premier, she holds that it was then that China was "turning to the West" and became hopeful of its assistance. In the mid-1960s China was visited by quite a few businessmen and journalists from Britain, Japan, Canada and other countries.³⁰

After that meeting, she came to consider Zhou Enlai as her guide in life, claimed that she would be his dedicated follower, and pledged to be true to him for the rest of her life.³¹ Acting on his advice, she went to Chicago to attend a symposium on China in February 1966, where she met Harrison Salisbury (with whom she was on terms of full mutual understanding) and other US scholars, such as M. Hein, Morton Galperin and others.³²

In May 1966, i. e., in the heyday of the "cultural revolution", she returned to China and followed the activities of Jiang Qing who, she says, was made famous by Lin Biao, for it was he who put her in charge of arts and literature in the Army at the February 1966 Shanghai conference on literature and arts (after Mao completely broke off with Liu Shaoqi).

As we have noted, Han Suyin condemns the hongweibing rampages in *My House Has Two Doors*, the persecution of the intelligentsia, and the violence and terrorism of the "cultural revolution". She sympathises with the sufferings of many Chinese revolutionaries, scientists, writers and actors, recounts the details of the martyrdom and death of Lao She, of the hongweibing humiliation of Zhao Shuli, of the persecution of Luo Ruiqing, Zhu De, He Long, of the torment of Liu Shikun, the famous piano-player and son-in-law of Ye Jianying. Ye Jianying himself was left unharmed, writes the author, only because "he had saved Mao's life during the Long March."³³ She testifies that the hongweibings sentenced Qiao Guanhua to selling papers in central Peking in late 1966, and that then they began edging closer to Zhou Enlai, who all the while had been busy saving politicians and scientists, "especially in the atomic and nuclear installations".³⁴

She emphasises Zhou's invariably positive role during the "cultural revolution", admires his formidable capacity for work, self-restraint and his pervasive intellect. Contrary to her previous assertions describing Mao as the father of the Chinese revolution, she now claims that it was Zhou Enlai that set up the CPC "long before Mao had emerged as leader in 1935", that none other than Zhou talked Chiang Kaishek into entering the united front with the Communists in 1937; she calls him the only architect of Peking's foreign policy before, during and after the "cultural revolution". She keeps stressing that "Zhou Enlai, since the Bandung conference in 1955, had been identified with the policy of an opening out to the world, including America".³⁵ Han Suyin intentionally

³⁰ Han Suyin, *My House Has Two Doors*, p. 388.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 414.

³² She is also known to have maintained close ties with some French politicians (André Malraux, and others) and with the Ceylonese Trotskyist Tedje Gunavardene.

³³ Han Suyin, *My House Has Two Doors*, p. 463.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 464.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 465, 534.

overlooks the difference between the PRC's foreign policies in the first decade of its existence and in the subsequent years, and seeks, along with present-day Maoists, to vindicate the policy pursued during the "cultural revolution", based as it was on sheer anti-Sovietism.

Han Suyin's praise of merits and activities of Zhou Enlai is now aimed at exposing Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing as his chief persecutors. She is painting Jiang Qing all black, alleging that she was impossibly vain, envious, suspicious and avid for power, that she suffered from persecution mania. On coming to power she destroyed all the films, photographs and newspapers featuring her as the actress Lan Ping; and that she had all of her old-time acquaintances and girlfriends arrested and sent to prison. Han Suyin intimated that at the time Rewi Alley, Ma Haide, and other "ultra-revolutionary foreigners," were arrested and imprisoned, and that at the end of 1967 she and Pearl Buck were also branded "agents of American imperialism", but luckily, she was not in Peking then. She always knew whether or not it was safe to go to China.³⁶

However, in January 1968, Han Suyin, together with Edgar Snow and other "prominent Sinologists," took part in a symposium on China held at North Carolina University (USA), where she came out in support of the "cultural revolution". In October 1968, she was in Montreal giving lectures on China and singing hallelujahs to the activities of the hon-gweibings and the "cultural revolution".

Today Han Suyin admits that her assertions and evaluations contained in those 1968 lectures were largely exaggerated and "ultra-left", that she displayed "petty-bourgeois radical" views, but that she could be excused, since she, "like many other prominent scholars", "suffered from euphoria" in connection with the "cultural revolution" and, besides, she allegedly had difficulties in obtaining "hard-core information on what had happened".³⁷

Indeed, Han Suyin changes her "leftist" colouring to "rightist" as naturally as a chameleon. But how could anyone believe that her alleged "delusions" regarding the "cultural revolution" were caused by the lack of "objective information" about China, for was it not Han Suyin who received the most authentic first-hand information from her close friend Gong Peng, a fact she herself repeatedly emphasised? Therefore, one can easily understand Simon Leys' sarcasm when he queried in his article how it was that "...this particularly gifted, particularly well informed woman, with her privilege of unrestricted entry and direct access to the Chinese leadership,"³⁸ found herself in such a disgraceful position.

From 1969 on, Han Suyin has consistently performed her Peking-assigned role of mediator between the Chinese leaders and the US politicians, trying with all her might to build the "bridges of friendship" between them. She helped Edgar Snow obtain a Chinese entrance visa in 1970, and again met in Paris with Harrison Salisbury who was then campaigning for the normalisation of the Sino-US relations. Incidentally, writes Han Suyin, Mao Zedong greeted Snow warmly in December 1970, and said that he had long wanted to see his "good friend Edgar Snow", but that "some ultra-leftists" had prevented him from meeting him.³⁹

In her turn, Han Suyin came to China in 1970 accompanied by her

³⁶ She received the relevant information from the selfsame Gong Peng who was a confidant of Zhou Enlai. See *Ibid.*, p. 479.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 482-483.

³⁸ "Simon Leys on Han Suyin", p. 35.

³⁹ See Han Suyin, *My House Has Two Doors*, p. 522.

prospective Indian husband Vincent whose visit, she claimed, had been organised with the help of T. Kaul. She insisted he was "the first Indian non-diplomat to go to China since 1959" and that he had a talk with Zhou Enlai on border issues.⁴⁰

Han Suyin has no compunctions about admitting that at that time she saw much of Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and other adherents of the future "gang of four". She translated Jiang Qing's operas into English, sat beside her in her box at the theatre, and even, as she says, was awarded the highest distinction: Jiang Qing presented her with a blouse she herself had worn, expecting that she would become her biographer (in the same manner as Edgar Snow was a biographer of Mao Zedong).⁴¹

Han Suyin also retells the official Maoist version concerning Mao's break with Lin Biao and the latter's death, although she did not resist the temptation to air the sensational rumours that filled Peking at the time. These said that Lin Biao's downfall was prepared by Zhou Enlai, who allegedly strangled him with his own hands (?) in a dark corridor of a villa.⁴²

Nevertheless, Han Suyin again praised Zhou Enlai's foreign policy moves in 1971-1972, and his statesmanship, and in so doing, linked Zhou's policy of establishing contacts with the USA (ping-pong diplomacy, Nixon's visit to China) with Mao Zedong's catchword "Let foreign things serve China", which would let "a wide opening to the West".⁴³

According to the author, it was then, as China's ties with the imperialist powers grew, that Zhou Enlai became especially popular with the Chinese who began to call him "our dear Premier Zhou".

As to Jiang Qing, writes Han Suyin, she was "put up with because of Mao, because of Zhou Enlai" and no one had an idea of the actual power she wielded in Shanghai and in the media, while all the violence perpetrated against the administrative personnel and diplomats were ascribed to Lin Biao and Liu Shaoqi.⁴⁴

It was in that period that Han Suyin, acting on Zhou Enlai's recommendation, started lobbying vigorously among those concerned with US foreign policy-making. She tried, as she said, to bring home to State Department officials that it was imperative speedily to normalise relations between the USA and China, for any delay would lead to pressures on the foreign policy of Zhou Enlai and Mao. In this task she was assisted by Huang Hua (formerly the PRC's permanent representative to the UN, presently—China's Foreign Minister) with whom she had studied at Yanjin University, and who had been Edgar Snow's interpreter at Yanan. However, her mission was again a failure, this time on account of Watergate.

In September 1973, the "Shanghai mafia", says Han Suyin, started an attack on Zhou Enlai, disguised as a "campaign against Confucius", and in April 1974, it was learned that he had cancer. He was taken to hospital, where he was not given proper treatment. He was harassed, disturbed and exposed to nervous strain. In keeping with Jiang Qing's

⁴⁰ It is indicative that from then on the role of intermediary between Zhou Enlai and Indira Gandhi was to be played by Vincent, See *Ibid.*, p. 529.

⁴¹ However, she was beat out by Roxane Witke (a US historian) who interviewed Jiang Qing in August 1972, and wrote a book about her. See Roxane Witke, *Comrade Chiang Ching*, Boston, 1977.

⁴² Han Suyin, *My House Has Two Doors*, p. 567.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 577.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 579.

orders, the American cancer specialists, J. Wu and Li Ping, whom Han Suyin invited to attend to Zhou Enlai,⁴⁵ were not allowed to see him. At that time, Deng Xiaoping began to edge closer to the fore of the Peking political scene. The author writes that Deng's small stature earned him the loving nickname of "Little Bottle"⁴⁶ among the people, and that immediately after Zhou Enlai's death she predicted who would replace him and that from that time on all her hopes "were with Deng". She interpreted the April 1975 Tiananmen events as an outburst of popular outrage directed against the "four" and in defence of Zhou Enlai, but refrained from mentioning that they reflected the power struggle between the grouping of Deng and the "four".⁴⁷ However, she betrays her knowledge when she qualifies these events as a "historical landmark" in China's life putting them on a par with the May 4th Movement and comparing them to the taking of Bastille during the French revolution, or the Boston Tea Party during the American revolution.⁴⁸

Han Suyin's condemnation of the "four" and their activities after the death of Mao is in full accord with the line of Deng Xiaoping and his adherents. She highlights the role Ye Jianyin played in the arrest of Jiang Qing and her associates, runs down Qiao Guanhua for his having become, as she puts it, an accomplice of the "four" and having betrayed Zhou Enlai, accuses Zhan Chunqiao of having had a mind to worm himself into Premiership in February 1976, and having later headed a group of "historians" who rewrote the history of China, smeared all those who took part in the Long March, and brought into bold relief the role of Jiang Qing in the Chinese revolution.⁴⁹

It would be futile to seek objective assessments or consistency in Han Suyin's book. Her very methods are tendentious, and she obviously intends her book for indiscriminating readers who will be easily misled by emotional exclamations and frequent lyrical digressions. Actually, she is constantly on the look-out for any changes in the views of those who wield the power in China so that her own opinions can be streamlined accordingly. Presently she is keeping pace with the grouping of Deng Xiaoping, whose assessment of the role of Mao and Maoism in the history of China she has adopted.

After dabbling for a while in criticism of Mao Zedong (Deng's 20 per cent of all errors), she concludes her book with renewed eulogies of Mao, referring to him as "China's great liberator" and claiming categorically that "there cannot be a de-Maoisation" in China, and that "Mao's place in China's history is unequalled".⁵⁰ Although she praises the plans for the modernisation of China, she still upholds the concept of China's specific way of development, claiming that China will go "its own way" which she describes as the way of socialist development. Yet this, she adds, "will be 'socialism' but adapted to China" where "some methods borrowed from capitalist expertise will surely be tried".⁵¹ So, in this case, too, Han Suyin puts in her own writings Deng's fallacious idea that it is possible to combine socialism and capitalism.

Presently, Han Suyin is pinning all her hopes on the pro-Western trend in the CPC, headed by Deng Xiaoping, and the conclusions of her

⁴⁵ Han Suyin, *My House Has Two Doors*, pp. 601, 621-622.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 608, 620.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 627-628.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 646.

⁴⁹ According to Zhan Chunqiao's version, Jiang Qing was the inspiration behind the revolution carried out by Mao Zedong, pp. 633, 639.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 649.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 648.

latest book are in full accord with the decisions of the 6th Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC and with Deng's concept of retaining the fundamentals of Maoism—Sinicised Marxism, hegemonism and anti-Sovietism.

However, like many bourgeois Sinologists, she does not notice that the new leadership's policy is untenable and fallacious.

The main deficiency of her method is that she lacks any firm position of her own for evaluating the developments in China and therefore has to adapt to the opinions of the pro-Maoist wing of Western Sinology and the propaganda catchwords of the Chinese leaders for her purposes. At the same time she keeps silent about those events which do not fit in with her concept, or resorts to spinning yarns, or outrightly slandering the USSR and other socialist countries which, she claims, are behind all the difficulties experienced by China. As was shown above, the author does not bother to prove her contentions, for she simply lacks the necessary facts.

In and of themselves, Han Suyin's books would probably not merit a special analysis if they were not a reflection of the Chinese leadership's nationalistic ambitions and of the pro-Maoist trends in the bourgeois Sinology.

But there is not a shade of doubt that the new assessments advanced by Han Suyin will be refuted by facts and events as quickly as the old ones.

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PRC 'DISTORTION' OF WW II BATTLE AGAINST JAPANESE CRITICIZED

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[Article by A. S. Titov and Professor M. F. Yur'yev: "Maoist Falsification of the '100-Regiment Battle'"]

[Text]

Virtually all major events in the history of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolutionary movement in modern times, including some initiated by Mao Zedong, have been subjected to gross falsification in China. One case in point is the "100-regiment battle" fought by the CPC forces against the Japanese army in 1940. This operation, the largest one mounted by the 8th Army, was a surprise attack to destroy enemy communication lines, disrupt logistic services, extricate some units of the 129th and 115th divisions of the 8th Army blockaded in North China, establish contact with other anti-Japanese bases, and forestall the planned Japanese offensive against Xian and Chongqing. At the same time the operation was primarily a political move designed to "galvanise" the anti-Japanese war, fortify the people's confidence in the ultimate victory over the Japanese invaders, and halt the "murky wave of opportunism and capitulation".¹

In order better to comprehend the significance of the battle and Mao's attitude toward it, it is necessary to take a look at the international situation and the domestic scene in China prior to the operation.

The "100-regiment battle" was launched at a time when the internal political situation and the international position of China took a sharp turn for the worse: military supplies to China across the Indochina border were cut off after June 20, 1940, and on July 18, Britain closed the road from Burma to China, which cost the Chinese government a year's supply of ammunition and arms, and denied China access to sea ports. This inevitably affected the course of the anti-Japanese war, increased defeatist sentiments in the Guomindang and the Chinese government, and spurred the activity of the pro-Japanese and most reactionary elements advocating peace with Japan, which in fact would have amounted to China's total capitulation.

For their part, to force China to surrender, the Japanese made preparations for an offensive on the cities of Luoyang, Tongguan and Xian in Northwestern China in an effort to overrun the Western section of the Lunghai railway, thereby cutting off China's central provinces from Lanzhou, the main base of Soviet-supplied arms.² The Guomindang general staff sent an urgent order to Yan Xishan, commander of the 2nd military region and governor of Shanxi, and to his deputy Wei Lihuang, as well as a special message to Zhu De urging them to reinforce defen-

¹ See *People's Liberation Army of China in the War Against the Japanese Invaders* (Russian translation from the Chinese), Moscow, 1957, p. 139.

² See A. Ya. Kalyagin, *The Unknown Roads. Notes of a Military Adviser in China*, Moscow, 1979, p. 431.

ces in the directions of Luoyang and Tongguan and take steps to thwart the planned Japanese offensive.³

Simultaneously, the Japanese built up forces for an offensive on China's provisional capital of Chongqing, stepping up the bombardment of the city. Therefore, the situation in China objectively necessitated a more active role on the part of the Chinese army, including the CPC forces, which up to that moment had carried out virtually no major operations against the Japanese.

On top of it, the internal political situation in China was further aggravated by a crisis in the united national anti-Japanese front, by growing strains in relations between the Guomindang and the CPC and the beginning of feuds, notably in North China, where armed clashes involving the Guomindang and 8th Army units occurred on a fairly large scale. Although pro-Japanese elements and Japanese agents working to break up the united national anti-Japanese front did play a role, the main blame for the clashes was shared by the two conflicting parties. From the very outbreak of the Japanese-Chinese war, Mao Zedong and his faction maintained that China was unable to stand up to Japan's onslaught and were hostile to the idea of a united national anti-Japanese front, the more so since it was based on cooperation between the CPC and the Guomindang, and to the strategy and tactics of an active involvement of the CPC armed forces in hostilities against the Japanese invaders.

As early as in August 1937, at a meeting of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau in Luochuan, Mao and his supporters put forward their special adventurous line of working for a simultaneous defeat of Japan and the Guomindang regime of Chiang Kaishek. The Mao group believed that sooner or later the Guomindang would surrender to Japan, whereafter a Japanese-Soviet war would break out leading to the defeat of both Japan and the Guomindang regime of Chiang Kaishek. Therefore, they argued against any concessions to the Guomindang and for the CPC to act independently both on the political and military plane and even to oppose the Guomindang at the first opportunity.⁴

However, the war against Japan took a different course. The hoped-for Japanese attack on the Soviet Union was delayed. Addressing the 6th plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee in October 1938, Mao Zedong had to admit this: "When the events at Lake Hasan took place, a section of our public rejoiced thinking that if a Japanese-Soviet war broke out, China could go over to counteroffensive and there would be no need for a long war."⁵ Accordingly, in 1939, Mao stepped up his provocative activities aimed at wrecking the cooperation between the CPC and the Guomindang. He widely exploited the fact that within the Guomindang there were also opponents of cooperation with the CPC, who were virtually working toward the same goal.

Describing Mao's strategic line during the war against Japan, P. Vladimirov, a Comintern liaison man, wrote: "Mao Zedong is seeking a civil war... The reasons behind this are complex: to gain territory at the expense of the Guomindang, to draw the Soviet Union deeper into the conflict between the CPC and the Guomindang and with any luck, to provoke the USSR to fight both Chiang Kaishek and the Japanese."

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ See O. Braun, *Chinese Notes of 1932-1939*, Moscow, 1974, pp. 284-285.

⁵ Mao Zedong, *On the New Stage*, Yanan, 1938 p. 24 (in Chinese).

se so the CPC could build up its strength. Behind all this is also the working out of his own political platform for the CPC.”⁶

In 1940, Mao Zedong believed that with the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty signed, the Soviet Union was in a good position to help the CPC defeat both the Guomindang and Japan.

When armed clashes began between the CPC and the Guomindang, Mao Zedong put all the blame on Chiang Kaishek and advanced the slogans of “responding to frictions with frictions”, and “we hurt no one so long as nobody hurts us, but if we are hurt then we will respond in kind”.⁷ Mao used this slogan chiefly to fight the Guomindang troops sent behind the Japanese lines to wage a guerrilla war. “In North China,” wrote P. Vladimirov, “the CPC armed forces are fiercely driving out (one cannot even call it ‘ousting’) or wiping out whole military units of the Central government. What struggle against the Japanese can one talk about here! The Japanese moreover are happy with this feud... In some places they have even improved their positions with practically no losses.”⁸

In October 1939, Mao Zedong made a patently provocative statement to US journalist Edgar Snow. He said that the regions controlled by the CPC troops were administratively independent from the Chiang Kaishek government. China, he added, could not be completely unified until the Guomindang dictatorship was destroyed and replaced by a democratic government of communists and others.⁹

While playing up the growing anti-communist tendencies in the Guomindang, Mao Zedong persistently argued that the Chiang Kaishek group would inevitably surrender to Japan and that some Guomindang leaders (such as Shanxi governor Yan Xishan who advocated resistance to Japan) had allegedly gone over to the enemy. Therefore, Mao agitated for the CPC to launch an attack on the Guomindang troops. Within a short time, this line was put into practice. In December 1939, the CPC-led New Shanxi Army clashed with other units of the Yan Xishan forces, of which it was part, and jointly with the units of the 8th Army, destroyed some of them.¹⁰

The armed conflict in Shanxi continued till early March 1940, with Mao Zedong seeking to wipe out the forces of Yan Xishan, his ally in the anti-Japanese front, and make Shanxi province his stronghold. However, following the intervention of Chiang Kaishek’s army, the conflict was settled. This removed the serious threat of a rupture between the Guomindang and the Communist party.

The Japanese closely followed the growing frictions between the two parties and the armed conflict in Shanxi province. *Asahi* wrote in February 1940: “The CPC is beginning to take advantage of the steadily weakening position of the national government. There have been repeated rumours of growing tensions between them, but every time some skilful tactics helped avoid the breakup. Now both parties are using every opportunity to build up their strength... The possibility of a serious change in relations between the Guomindang and the CPC cannot be excluded. One should therefore watch the situation very closely.

⁶ P. P. Vladimirov, *Special Region of China. 1942-1945*. Moscow, 1973, pp. 123, 201.

⁷ Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1953, p. 362.

⁸ P. P. Vladimirov, *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁹ See *Daily Herald*, Oct. 21, 1939; *Modern History of China (1917-1970)*, Moscow, 1972, p. 194 (in Russian).

¹⁰ See *Modern History of China*, pp. 194-195.

The Communist 8th Army in Shanxi recently clashed with the forces of the Guomindang and Yan Xishan. Recently there was a clash between the communists and the Chongqing troops in Shandong province. There are reports of clashes in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. When clashes occur, the national government makes every effort to restore peace one way or another.”¹¹

After the armed conflict in Shanxi was settled, Mao Zedong went in for another adventurous scheme. He resolved to move the focus of struggle against the Chongqing government from North China, where the CPC forces already predominated over the Guomindang, to Central China, which in the past had been a stronghold of Chiang Kaishek and his closest associates. Thereby, Mao Zedong planned to increase tensions between the CPC and the Guomindang, since he realised that Chiang Kaishek and his confederates would not tolerate a buildup of the CPC troops in Central China, let alone an expansion of CPC guerrilla bases there.

On the other hand, Mao sought to bring the New 4th Army under his control. It was operating in Central China under the command of Xiang Ying, member of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee. The commanders of the New 4th Army faithfully abided by the policy of the united national anti-Japanese front and of cooperation with the Guomindang in opposing their common enemy, the Japanese invaders, and rejected Mao's adventurous instructions.¹²

Mao told his associates that the Guomindang had virtually put up with the CPC domination in North China and it was imperative to make it recognise in the future CPC rights to a part of Central China as well.

To realise his plans, Mao Zedong began to transfer units of the 8th Army from North to Central China. As early as in July 1939, he ordered an 8th Army column under Peng Xuefeng to move from the eastern part of Henan province to the northwest of Anhui province and set up a guerrilla base there. This column was incorporated in the New 4th Army as its 6th detachment. Early in 1940, the 6th detachment entrenched in Guoyang, in the north of Anhui province, where it increased its strength to 6,400 men to become the strongest unit of the New 4th Army north of the Yangtze River. Simultaneously Mao Zedong, acting through his emissaries, tried to win over to his side Chen Yi and some other commanders of the New 4th Army. At the end of 1939, Mao Zedong set up a South-Jiangsu command headquarters under Chen Yi and another command headquarters under Zhang Yonggui for troops operating north of the Yangtze. Both headquarters were responsible directly to Mao Zedong and the Central Committee Bureau of the Central Plain established in 1939, but not to the Southeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee led by Xiang Ying. In this way the command of the New 4th Army actually lost control over the larger section of its troops.¹³

In January 1940, Mao Zedong moved 20,000 troops of the 8th Army from North China to the northern part of Jiangsu province in Central China.¹⁴

On May 4, 1940, Mao Zedong sent a secret directive to the Southeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee ordering it “not to abide by re-

¹¹ Asahi, Feb. 26, 1940.

¹² See more on this in A. Titov, “Valiant Son of the Chinese Working Class (80th anniversary of the birth of Xiang Ying), *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 3, 1978.

¹³ *People's Liberation Army of China in the War...*, p. 113; T. Kataoka, *Resistance and Revolution in China*, Berkeley, 1974, p. 195.

¹⁴ See Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 380.

strictions imposed by the Guomindang, to overstep the limits that the Guomindang may accept, not to await instructions from anyone else, to expect no supplies from the top; acting as an independent and self-sustained force, deploy military units more boldly, resolutely establish new bases..."¹⁵

These clearly adventurous and provocative instructions were supported by the argument that in conditions "when the anti-communist clique of diehard Guomindang men [i. e., Chiang Kaishek.—Authors] persists in its policy of 'preventing communist activities', 'restricting communists' and fighting communists, and is therefore setting the scene for a surrender to Japan, we must lay stress on struggle and by no means unity; to lay stress on unity would be a gross mistake."¹⁶ This amounted in fact to the renunciation of cooperation with the Guomindang in the struggle against a common enemy—the Japanese invaders. Mao Zedong believed that a civil war in China might lead to the total capitulation of the Guomindang to Japan and to an eventual attack of Japan against the USSR.

To disguise this adventurous strategy, Mao argued demagogically that "the more the 8th Army, the New 4th Army and guerrilla units in South China develop their [so-called independent and self-sustained.—Authors.] activity in the Northwest, in North, Central and South China", "the higher the chances of averting the threat of surrender and bringing about a change for the better in the current situation will be, and the easier it will be for our party to advance its cause throughout the country." At the same time he alleged that such actions by the CPC and its armed forces spearheaded primarily against the Guomindang would not frustrate cooperation between the CPC and the Guomindang on the national scale.¹⁷

Although Chiang Kaishek, given the situation at the time, was not particularly anxious to launch a civil war against the communists, he did not preclude this contingency. He maintained that the Guomindang was in a position to wage war simultaneously against the Japanese invaders and the Chinese communists. He bluntly stated this to Zhou Enlai during one of their meetings in 1940, recalling the experience of 1927-1928, when the Guomindang was simultaneously fighting the Chinese communists and the Northern militarists, and defeated them during the Northern Expedition. However, Chiang Kaishek realised that unless he maintained peace with the CPC, he could not expect material and military aid from the Soviet Union, which he badly needed, as neither the US nor Britain gave China such aid despite the latter's requests. Besides, Chiang Kaishek had the Soviet warning that the arms supplied by the Soviet Union should by no means be used for suppressing the CPC-led democratic movement. So Chiang Kaishek naturally preferred to look for peaceful solutions to the so-called communist problem in China and to reach some agreement with the CPC. In the spring of 1940, Chiang Kaishek told his Minister of Defense He Yingqin, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Bai Chongxi, and Chairman of the Legislative Yuan Sun Fo, who had a reputation of a liberal favouring friendly relations with the Soviet Union, to draft three separate programmes for dealing with the "communist problem" in China and preventing clashes between the Guomindang and the CPC troops.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 371.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 372-373.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 376.

Bai Chongxi and Sun Fo submitted their proposals, which essentially envisaged gathering all CPC troops (8th and New 4th Armies) northeast of the Huanghe River in North China and granting them the right to spread their influence in the Japanese rear northeast of the Huanghe, including Manchuria. In addition, Sun Fo suggested allowing the 8th Army to get its weapons directly from the USSR. He Yingqin submitted no proposals. In principle, Chiang Kaishek endorsed the proposals of Bai Chongxi and Sun Fo regarding the redeployment of the 8th and the New 4th Armies from Central to North China.

Early in June 1940, Zhou Enlai arrived in Chongqing at the invitation of Chiang Kaishek for talks with the Central government on ways of resolving outstanding issues between the CPC and the Guomindang. He handed over to the Chongqing government the so-called June proposals of 1940, put forward as a basis for talks between the CPC and the Guomindang. Some bourgeois historians believe that the "June proposals" were written by Mao Zedong himself, who sought to wrestle from the Guomindang an official recognition of the CPC's authority over North Jiangsu.¹⁸

The first half of the "June proposals" called for granting more democratic rights to the people and political parties, including the CPC. The more important second part was concerned with the 18th Army Group (8th Army), the New 4th Army and the Special Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia Region. Essentially the proposals called for the following steps: a) the Special Region will be established within 23 counties, with Lin Zuhuan appointed as chairman of its government; b) the 18th Army Group should be reorganised into three armies comprising 9 infantry divisions; the existing and newly organised guerrilla detachments are to be considered reinforcement units attached to each army group; c) the New 4th Army will be reorganised into seven detachments; d) to avoid further misunderstanding between troops, their territories should be delineated and areas of operation assigned to the 18th Army Group and the New 4th Army; e) supplies to the units of the 18th Army Group and the New 4th Army should be allocated on the basis of the norms and quotas established for the Central government troops.¹⁹

On July 2, 1940, the Guomindang leadership presented their proposals to Zhou Enlai, whereafter talks between the two sides began. The Guomindang was represented at the talks by He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, and the CPC by Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying. Chiang Kaishek later wrote: "On July 16, 1940, the Central Government, with a view to preventing more clashes in various parts of the country, worked out an arrangement with the communists represented by Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying. This arrangement was later handed to Zhou Enlai, who took it to Northern Shenxi on July 24, to be put into life."²⁰

The document handed to Zhou Enlai contained the following basic propositions: a) on the issue of democratic freedoms the guiding principle should be the 26th article of the Programme of war of resistance and upbuilding of the country;²¹ b) the border region Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia is established within an area of 18 counties (specifically listed in the

¹⁸ See T. Kataoka, *Op. cit.*, pp. 208-209.

¹⁹ See *A Collection of Materials on the Anti-Japan War*, pp. 6-7 (in Chinese).

²⁰ See Chiang Kaishek, *Soviet Russia in China*, New York, 1957, p. 94.

²¹ Article 26 read: "During the resistance war, the freedom of speech, the press, organisation and assembly shall enjoy legal protection provided it does not violate the supreme three basic popular principles and does not go beyond the Central government decrees."

document) and will be renamed the Administrative Region of Northern Shenxi; the administrative body of this region is to be called the Chancellery of the Administrative Region of Northern Shenxi and temporarily be subordinated to the Executive Yuan, but will be administered by the Shenxi provincial government. The Administrative Region takes orders solely from the Central government. The issue of banknotes is not allowed in the region. Garrison troops of the 18th Army Group stationed in Shenxi, Gansu and Ningxia provinces are fully transferred to the Administrative Region; c) concerning the area of operation of the 18th Army Group and the New 4th Army: the Hebei-Chahar military region is to be abolished. Hebei, Chahar and part of Shandong (36 counties) province situated north of the Huanghe River are to be incorporated into the second military area. General Yan Xishan remains the commander-in-chief of the second military area, with Wei Lihuang and Zhu De as his assistants.

"For the sake of convenience in conducting military operations", the document placed responsibility for the southeastern section of Shanxi province on General Wei Lihuang; for Hebei, Chahar, North Shandong and North Shanxi on Zhu De, for southwestern Shanxi on Yan Xishan. In this way almost all of North China was transferred to the authority of Zhu De for the purpose of "conducting military operations". The 18th Army Group and the New 4th Army were suggested to move in full strength into their assigned area, (i. e., under the command of Zhu De) within one month of receiving the orders. The troops of the 18th Army Group and the New 4th Army were not allowed to cross the frontiers of their area of operation or to set up military units outside this area. Whatever Guomindang troops were stationed in the area that passed on to Zhu De were to be withdrawn. These measures were to prevent armed clashes between the Guomindang and the CPC troops.

The document authorised the Central government to appoint a chairman of the Hebei-Chahar provincial government, whereas Zhu De was entitled to nominate 3 to 5 members of the government. The Daming-Weixian area was envisaged as the provisional seat of the Hebei-Chahar provincial government. The 18th Army Group on top of its three armies consisting of six divisions and three reserve regiments, was allowed to have another two reserve regiments. The New 4th Army was to have two full divisions consisting of two brigades and four regiments each. The rations for officers and men were to be established on the basis of the respective Central government's regulations, with the army as a basic unit for calculating expenditure rates; provisions were to be ordered directly from the department of supplies.

Zhou Enlai approved of this arrangement for the most part, but Mao Zedong voiced his opposition as it upset all his plans. On the pretext of wresting further concessions from the Guomindang, Mao Zedong virtually disavowed the agreement reached with it. He argued that the agreement signified only the beginning of concessions on the part of Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang, who as a result of the cutting of their foreign links via South and Southwest China following the closure of the border with Indochina and the Burma road, were compelled to seek closer relations with the Soviet Union to get the much-needed arms and supplies from it. Therefore, according to Mao Zedong, Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang should agree to more concessions to the CPC and recognise its authority not only over a part of North China, but also a part of Central China. Mao Zedong maintained that Chiang Kaishek, aware as he was of the direct connection between the Chinese-

Soviet relations and the Guomindang-CPC relations, would seek to resolve the problems of relations between the Guomindang and the CPC above all, thereby facilitating a further rapprochement with the USSR. In party documents, Mao Zedong even began to use such expressions as the "pro-Soviet group" of Chiang Kaishek. In keeping with this assessment, Mao decided not to fulfill the agreement with the Guomindang but continue talks to obtain further concessions. In August 1940, he again dispatched Zhou Enlai to Chongqing with counterproposals to the agreement reached earlier with the Guomindang. He put forward the following demands: a) the second military area should be extended to the whole of Shandong province and a part of Suiyuan province; b) provisions to the 18th Army Group, the New 4th Army and guerrilla units operating in various places should be supplied on a regimental basis [this was precisely the reason why the military operation launched within a short time by the 8th Army in North China was called the "100-regiment battle".—*Authors*]; c) guerrilla units in different areas should be assigned territories of operation within which they could fight the enemy independently. Besides, the counterproposals contained a demand for increasing the strength of the 18th Army Group to 9 divisions and the New 4th Army to 3 divisions and granting the 18th Army Group command the right to appoint the governors of Hebei and Chahar provinces. It was only on these conditions that Mao Zedong was prepared to withdraw the troops of the 18th Army Group and the New 4th Army from Central China.²²

Advancing these counterproposals, Mao Zedong realised full well that they would be turned down by the Guomindang and would only serve to exacerbate tensions between the two parties and to strengthen the position of the defeatist elements within the Guomindang. He hoped to use these developments to discredit the policy of the Comintern and CPC internationalists who sought to promote cooperation with the Guomindang in the fight against Japan.

It is in light of these plans that one should view Mao's attitude toward the "100-regiment battle". According to P. Vladimirov, Mao Zedong informed the Comintern of an operation undertaken to forestall a "second Munich" (i. e., the isolation of the defeatist elements in the right wing of the Guomindang) and an impending Japanese offensive.²³

The mounting of so major an operation seemingly contradicted the stand of Mao Zedong and his supporters who were against "wasting forces" on hostilities against Japan and saw their main task in building their strength for the future decisive fight with the Guomindang for power in China. For once, however, an exception was made to this policy. There were apparently several reasons behind this decision. First, the battle was conceived by Mao Zedong as a means of diverting attention from the fact that the focus of the struggle being waged by the CPC armed forces against the Guomindang was shifting from North to Central China, where, on Mao's orders, units of the 18th Army Group and the New 4th Army had already begun combat operations against the Guomindang troops of Han Deqin, Governor of Jiangsu province, and also from the establishment of guerrilla bases there, which could not fail to worsen relations between the CPC and the Guomindang. The army of Han Deqin had a strength of 60,000 to 70,000 men and besides he

²² See "A Collection of Materials on the Anti-Japan War", pp. 18-21; T. Kataoka, *Op. cit.*, pp. 212-213.

²³ See P. P. Vladimirov, *Op. cit.*, p. 551.

controlled several local forces. The first clash between the CPC and Han Deqin's forces took place at Huangqiao, 25 km north of the town of Taixing in Jiangsu province between the end of June and the beginning of July 1940. On August 1, 1940, the two sides fought another major battle. Fighting continued through September into October. Eventually the forces of Han Deqin were completely routed. Units of the 8th and the New 4th Armies captured over 8,000 prisoners and took lots of spoils. Both sides suffered heavy losses,²⁴ accusing each other of perfidy, but the incident did not receive much publicity. Chiang Kaishek and other Guomindang leaders withheld information from the press, convinced that such publicity would only play into the hands of the Japanese and the pro-Japanese elements in the Guomindang itself. Neither was Mao Zedong interested in publicising the events in Jiangsu. But his hopes of aggravating relations with the Guomindang and bringing most of the units of the New 4th Army under his control were fulfilled.

Second, the "100-regiment battle", according to Mao Zedong, was to raise the prestige and role of the CPC and its armed forces in the eyes of the public both inside and outside the country, and to refute or stifle the talk (which had serious causes) about the divisive activities of Mao Zedong and his entourage, as well as about the virtual wrecking of the agreement reached between the CPC and the Guomindang in Chongqing in July 1940.

Third, Mao Zedong undertook the battle to show the whole world, above all the Soviet Union, that the CPC, not the Guomindang, was emerging as the decisive force in the struggle against the Japanese invaders, and thereby induce the Soviet Union to drop its aid to the Guomindang in favour of the CPC. Simultaneously on Mao's instructions, claims were persistently made that as many as 17 Japanese divisions, i. e., over a half of the Japanese occupation army in China, were opposing the CPC forces but could not gain the upper hand.

The plan for the operation was drawn up one month in advance under the direct guidance of Zhu De and Peng Tehhuai who supervised preparations of all military districts for a general offensive in all the liberated regions of North China.

The "100-regiment battle" began unexpectedly for the Japanese command on August 20, 1940. On August 21, Zhu De sent the following cable to Chiang Kaishek: "I have received your communication that the enemy massed up to two infantry divisions at Taiyuan and intends to advance in the direction of Tongguan and Luoyang. Same information received from my units which confirm enemy's preparations for an offensive aimed at cutting our communication lines. In order to forestall this offensive, keep the Northwest in our hands and defeat the enemy, units of the 18th Army Group marshalled to the strength of up to one hundred regiments have gone over to a general offensive. The tasks before the offensive is: a) to disrupt all enemy communications along the North-South line conclusively; b) to secure your overall leadership along the entire front of struggle against Japan. The offensive was prepared over the course of a month, but I am afraid our secret service does not work well, therefore I submit the following information: a) we have called this offensive a '100-regiment offensive'. It involves the 115th, 120th and 129th infantry divisions and units stationed in Chahar, Hebei and Shanxi provinces; b) no similar offensive has been mounted at any point

²⁴ See Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power. The Emergence of Revolutionary China. 1937-1945*, Stanford, 1962, p. 57.

during China's war against Japan. The offensive began at 20.00 hours on August 20. Fighting is unfolding at every step as we advance. At this point I can already report that enemy communications along the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway have been completely cut. I will report details of the fighting after the completion of the offensive. Zhu De."²⁵

According to the information of the political department of the 8th Army, preparations for the offensive had begun a month earlier, i. e., in the third week of July, when Mao learned about the outcome of the talks with the Guomindang conducted by Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying. According to the same information, the offensive involved "115 regiments of the 8th Army of the total strength of 400,000 jointly with numerous people's voluntary units".²⁶ The figure was apparently exaggerated for the purpose of propaganda. A. Kalyagin estimates that all in all, over 300,000 Chinese troops including some Guomindang units were committed to the "100-regiment battle".²⁷

In Chinese sources, the operation is divided into three stages. The first stage, from August 20 to September 10, involved an attack against five enemy divisions and nine separate brigades with an aggregate strength of about 200,000 officers and men deployed along eleven railways in North China, as well as some major highways. The forces involved in the operation included 46 regiments of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei area led by Nie Rongzhen, deputy commander of the 115th division; 47 regiments of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan region under Liu Bocheng, commander of the 129th division; and 22 regiments of Shanxi-Suiyuan region led by He Lung, commander of the 120th division. The main thrust of the attacking forces was against the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway. The Japanese garrisons along this road, especially in Nianziguang, hampered communications between the troops in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei area in the north and the field headquarters of the 8th Army under Peng Tehhuai in the south of Shanxi (in the area of operation of the 129th division). The forces of Nie Rongzhen attacked in the Pingding-Shijiazhuang section, while the 129th division and the New Shanxi Army advanced west of Pingding. Simultaneously the 120th division struck towards the northern section of the Datong-Puzhou railway in order to prevent the enemy from rushing reinforcements to the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway. Along with attacks against Japanese garrisons and hundreds of outposts the strength of which ranged from platoon to battalion, the Chinese troops destroyed communication lines (rail and motor roads, bridges, telephone lines), to impede enemy efforts to regroup its forces and counterattack. Units of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei area captured a crucial enemy stronghold at Nianziguang, which had been well fortified by the enemy during the three years of the occupation, and killed its garrison. They also overran and ruined coal mines in Jingxin surrounded by 22 fortified fire emplacements and burned the coal, most of which used to be shipped to Japan.

The population enthusiastically supported the efforts of the 8th Army. Over 30,000 local people, for example, turned out to help in the destruction of the Shijiazhuang-Dezhou road.

By September 10, the objective of the first stage of the operation had been achieved and the battle entered its second stage, which lasted

²⁵ A. Ya. Kalyagin, *The Unknown Roads*, pp. 432-433.

²⁶ *People's Liberation Army of China in the War Against the Japanese Invaders*, pp. 128-129.

²⁷ A. Ya. Kalyagin, *Op. cit.*, p. 433.

till the second week in October. The second stage involved the destruction of enemy strongholds which had cut deep into the CPC anti-Japanese base areas. The Chinese troops destroyed a line of forts and fire emplacements along the Yushe-Liaoyue highway which ran through the central part of the Taihang region controlled by the CPC.

The soldiers and officers of the 8th Army, guerrillas, and volunteers displayed great heroism and self-sacrifice in carrying out their difficult combat missions. However, the CPC troops had few weapons, notably heavy weapons, and were short of explosives, which, moreover, were of poor quality. This could not but affect the further course of struggle. In the first ten days of October, the Japanese army launched a vigorous offensive. This marked the opening of the third stage of the "100-regiment battle", a defensive stage for the 8th Army, which continued till December 5.

In just over three months the Chinese forces had 1,824 engagements, killed or wounded over 20,000 Japanese officers and men, and more than 18,400 puppet troops, destroyed 2,993 strongholds, captured over 5,400 guns, over 200 heavy and light machineguns and large quantities of other arms and ammunition, destroyed 948 lis of railways and 3,000 lis of motor roads, over 260 bridges, tunnels and railway stations, liberated more than 10,000 coal-miners, liberated more than 2,000 railway workers and over 600 other compatriots who had been rounded up by the Japanese for road building and repair work. Overcoming enormous difficulties, the officers and men involved in the "100-regiment battle" displayed exceptional heroism and achieved their combat objectives.²⁸

"But the most important combat result," stressed the Chinese communists at the time of the anti-Japanese war, "was that our troops defeated the enemy blockade tactics immobilised large enemy forces deep in the rear and stopped the murky wave of conciliation and capitulation... These offensive operations, unprecedented in scale since the beginning of China's war against the Japanese invaders, were a source of inspiration to the entire people and the army; many newspapers in the deep rear areas devoted special editorials to this victory, while the population in the Japanese rear sent us numerous letters expressing their appreciation and gratitude to our soldiers."²⁹

The Political Department of the 8th Army put its losses at "over 22,000 in wounded, poisoned by gas and killed in action".³⁰

The Japanese admitted that the "100-regiment battle" "unexpectedly demonstrated how active the Chinese troops still were" at a time when the Japanese army was preparing for an offensive in the south, into Indochina and further on. The operation dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese occupation forces in North China, compelling them to take drastic action to halt the further guerrilla offensives and to waste much time and effort in restoring destroyed communication lines, railways and highways, coal mines and other projects.³¹

Since the "100-regiment battle" did not bring the results Mao Zedong had expected, he and his supporters later described it as a "strategic blunder". Addressing the 7th Congress of the CPC in 1945, Nie Rongzhen echoed Mao Zedong by saying: "The '100-regiment battle' was a strategic mistake! One cannot change the political situation with

²⁸ See *People's Liberation Army...*, pp. 129-136.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

³⁰ *Ibidem.*

³¹ C. A. Johnson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 57-59.

the aid of 100 regiments. The battle was undertaken to prevent Japan's possible aggression against someone else [i. e., the Soviet Union.—P. P. Vladimirov]. In this operation we sustained big losses and invited ... retaliation by the Japanese. A hundred regiments could not cause the enemy any tangible damage, whereas we suffered. Therefore the correct line on the military question is the line of Mao Zedong.”³²

Nie Rongzhen was backed up at the 7th CPC Congress by Lu Dingyi, Yang Shangkun and other supporters of Mao Zedong.

In contrast to these speeches, Zhu De, in his report on the military question at the congress, spoke against denying the success and significance of the “100-regiment battle”. He referred to it as a “powerful” operation crowning the first phase in the military activities of the CPC armed forces. At the same time, he acknowledged that the balance of forces obtaining on the eve of the operation had been misjudged and mistakes had been committed in the course of the operation.³³

In the Chinese communist writings of the 1940s and 1950s the “100-regiment battle” was commented as a strong blow to the aggressor’s plans and the defeatist sentiments in the Guomindang. However, after the Lushan Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee in 1959, at which Peng Tehhuai was branded a “right-wing opportunist” for his bold criticism of the adventurist Maoist “great leap forward”, the “100-regiment battle” was not mentioned in the People’s Republic of China.

It was only at the post-Mao 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation (December 1978) that the “100-regiment battle” was “exonerated” along with Peng Tehhuai. Yet today, in an effort to whitewash the role of their “helmsman” concerning this matter, Mao’s successors put the blame for distorting historical truth about the “100-regiment battle” on Lin Biao and the “gang of four”. Notably, this tendency has been manifested in the article “Restore the True Story of the ‘100-Regiment Battle’” which says in part that throughout the 1950s, the battle was assessed positively, but that this view was later revised and the operation was subject to falsification, particularly while Lin Biao and the “gang of four” were in power. The article goes on to say that the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong knew about the “100-regiment battle” and that Mao even sent a cable to Peng Tehhuai congratulating him on the victory”.³⁴

The above analysis shows that the “100-regiment battle” was not a “strategic mistake”, but a major event in the anti-Japanese war, which demonstrated that the armed forces of the CPC were capable of successfully conducting large-scale military operations against the Japanese invaders. However, since this conclusion did not fit in with Mao’s plans, he distorted the story of the battle to bear out his policy of renouncing active military operations against the Japanese imperialists.

³² P. P. Vladimirov, *Special Region of China*, p. 543.

³³ See Zhu De, *On the Strategic Bridgehead of the Liberated Areas*, Dalian, 1945, p. 12 (in Chinese).

³⁴ See Jin Chunming, “Restore the True Story of the ‘100-Regiment Battle’”, *Liaoning daxue xuebao*, No. 6, 1979, Shenyang.

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CHINESE WRITER'S ACTIVITIES DURING CULTURAL REVOLUTION CRITICIZED

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[Article by A. N. Zhelokhovtsev, candidate of philological sciences: "Guo Moruo--'Hero' or Victim of the 'Cultural Revolution'?"]

[Text]

The Maoist "cultural revolution" put the Chinese intelligentsia through a grim trial without precedent in Chinese history. The majority of honest artists refused to plead guilty to charges of having committed "errors" and fell victim to Maoist violence. Among them were Deng Tuo, Wu Han, Lao She, Tian Han, Zhao Shuli and others.

But Guo Moruo adopted a special attitude during the "cultural revolution". A world-famous historian and archeologist, eminent poet, dramatist and calligrapher, President of China's Academy of Sciences, Guo Moruo did everything in his power to survive the feudal-fascist dictatorship of Mao Zedong. There was some hope that he might succeed, given his long-standing acquaintance with Mao Zedong, who had praised him on many occasions for expressing Mao's "thought" in verse, and in consideration of his special position as the official commentator of Mao's poetry.

Guo Moruo did survive the storms of the "cultural revolution" and the hongweibing outrages. In the heyday of that "pogrom without parallel in history" he was given the opportunity to live and work in peace.

Guo Moruo continued to write verses extolling Mao Zedong and his "thought". The celebrated poet, who had written in the "new", i. e., modern style all his life, had to abandon it toward the end in favour of the classical forms, favoured by Mao Zedong. Moreover, to stay on the bandwagon he interspersed eulogies to Mao with attacks on the Soviet Union. His later poems were a mixture of flattery and abuse, which had nothing to do with real poetry.

In 1971, Guo Moruo published a book about China's great medieval poets Li Bo and Du Fu. Written in the spirit of the "thought of Mao Zedong" the book was remarkable for its distortion of truth and juggling with facts. It stands out as a monument to the personal humiliation and moral bankruptcy of Guo Moruo.

Out of appreciation for this "loyalty", Mao Zedong did not harm his commentator and correspondent (they used to exchange poetic messages). However, Mao's benevolence proved an inadequate guarantee against the pitfalls of the "cultural revolution".

When Jiang Qing sought to draw Guo Moruo into her campaign against Premier Zhou Enlai in 1971, the poet's refusal brought the disfavour of the all-powerful "four" upon him. The very life of the old poet hung in the balance, and the strain broke Guo Moruo's health. His literary friends are convinced that he died prematurely.

Guo Moruo's record during the last few years of his life shows that he was morally broken long before his death. The burden of unwavering loyalty to Mao Zedong proved too heavy. Writing adulations to the "architect" of the "cultural revolution" put too great a strain on the poet, as he watched his former associates—writers, poets, and intellectuals—go under before his very eyes. One of them was Lao She, the pride of Chinese literature. Those who have survived recall: "Lao She was subjected to isolation, abuse, humiliation and beatings... He was hit in the face till he bled."¹ Guo Moruo escaped this fate—he was not beaten or spat upon, and neither was he led through the streets wearing the cap of disgrace. He retained his high-ranking posts, attended receptions, made speeches on festive occasions and celebrated Mao Zedong. But Guo Moruo the poet and scholar was no more. His prestige survived only because of his past achievements and political patronage which placed him above all criticism.

In his writings Guo Moruo still laid claim to scholarship. In his book *Li Bo and Du Fu*, he conducted sharp polemics against the views of eminent scholars Feng Zhi, Xiao Difei and others, but his opponents kept silence, not for lack of arguments, but because they could not speak up.

In fact, Guo Moruo lived the last ten years of his life in agony as an artist. He was no longer the man who had written many volumes. After the downfall of the "four", he was too exhausted and weary to rise again. The road he had chosen had led him to an impasse and drained his strength. In a collection of documentary material brought out in Shanghai, Guo Moruo tops the list of the Chinese men of art who died at the hands of the Maoists. This is correct in the sense that Guo Moruo was a moral victim. Mao's "thought" destroyed even such a giant and a versatile talent with a tremendous capacity for work as Guo Moruo. The narrow confines of Mao's dogmatic "thought" suffocated Guo Moruo; his talent withered in the stifling atmosphere of Maoist China.

By the time he died at 85, on June 12, 1978, Guo Moruo was a member of the CPC Central Committee, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's National Assembly, Vice-Chairman of the All-China Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council of China, President of China's Academy of Sciences, and Chairman of the All-China Association of Workers in Literature and Art. A 20-volume collection of his works has now been reissued in Peking.

Guo Moruo was given a state funeral and in orations and articles he was called a "staunch revolutionary and outstanding champion of proletarian culture, an eminent author, poet and playwright, a Marxist historian and an expert on ancient epigraphy".² He was praised as the founder of new Chinese poetry, the author of historical plays, one of which, *The Enlightened Madame Cai*, has now been revived in Peking, and satirical pamphlets against Chiang Kaishek, and an erudite scholar. He was compared to Lu Xin and Goethe, was described as a colossus of culture and the pride of the nation. And Guo Moruo did in fact make an imprint on Chinese history, culture and literature.

At one time he was a friend of the Soviet Union and was warmly welcomed in this country. Some of his best fiction, historical and historico-philosophical writings are available in Russian translation. Guo Mo-

¹ *The Past and Sorrow*, Shanghai, 1979, p. 80.

² *Renmin ribao*, June 19, 1978.

ruo broke off friendly ties with the Soviet people of his own choice. He decided to follow Mao Zedong instead.

Guo Moruo's personal friendship with Mao Zedong had a long history.

They first met in Guangzhou in 1926 and Mao invited Guo Moruo to lecture at the peasant movement courses.³ Then their ways parted. Guo Moruo first went to Japan, then lived in China in the territory controlled by Guomindang, not travelling to Yanan where Mao Zedong had his residence. In Chongqing, Guo Moruo maintained close contacts with Zhou Enlai, who in the early 1940s was the CPC representative to the government of Chiang Kaishek. Author Liu Baiyu recalls that period in these words: "The Premier respected Guo's genius. In foggy Chongqing Guo wrote several historical plays: the Premier not only made a point of seeing each of them, but often made brilliant comments on them which Guo accepted with deep respect. The Premier showed great interest in the article 'The 300th Anniversary of the Year Jiashen'. He made a special trip to Yanan to have it published there."⁴ In fact, Zhou Enlai did not become Premier until after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, but Liu Baiyu calls him Premier in keeping with the Chinese tradition of referring to a man by the highest rank. Guo's article on the events of the year Jiashen, 1644, fostered closer relations between Guo Moruo and Mao Zedong. In November 1944 Mao wrote to Guo Moruo from Yanan: "Following our separation in Wuchang I've been continually struggling with a mass of work and had no opportunity for reading and research; therefore I'm envious of your successes. We regard your '300th Anniversary of the Year Jiashen' as a document of the Zhengfeng movement... Your articles on history and historical plays are of tremendous help to the people of China, and the more numerous they are the better. This is by no means a waste of spiritual forces and I hope you will continue your endeavours."⁵

Mao's assessment of the article calls for some explanation. Guo Moruo completed his historical article in Chongqing on March 10, 1944, and nine days later it was published in four installments in the newspaper *Xinhua ribao*. On March 24, the Guomindang newspaper *Zhongyang ribao* carried an editorial criticising Guo Moruo. After that, Guo's article was published in Yanan, first in a newspaper,⁶ later as a pamphlet.⁷ On Mao's insistence the article was included in the obligatory list of materials for study by party members within the framework of the notorious Zhengfeng campaign.

The events of 1644 in China led to a national tragedy which culminated in the inauguration of the foreign Qing Manchurian dynasty. This was the result of a civil war in China in the course of which the imperial capital of Peking was seized by peasant insurgents led by Li Zicheng who overthrew the Ming dynasty and proclaimed himself Chinese emperor Dashun. The Ming emperor Chongzhen committed suicide. But the Ming troops under Wu Sangui on the Manchurian border refused to recognise peasant leader Li Zicheng as emperor. Wu Sangui chose instead to submit to the Manchurians. The combined forces of the Manchurians and Ming warrior Wu Sangui who had committed an act of

³ *The Past and the Sorrow*, p. 31.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 1, 1970.

⁶ *Jiefang ribao*, Yanan, April 18, 19, 1944.

⁷ Su-Chuan, Ni Bo, "A Chronological List of Works and Translations of Guo Moruo", 1979, Addenda, p. 63.

national treason, defeated the army of Li Zicheng, captured Peking and installed a Manchurian emperor on the Chinese throne. Li Zicheng lost his life, and China fell under foreign rule.

These facts are well-known, but the article recalling them appeared at an extremely opportune moment. Moreover, it drew parallels with contemporary events. It was precisely the analogies and parallels, rather than facts as such, that Guo Moruo was concerned with. He compared the peasant leader Li Zicheng to Mao Zedong in Yanan, the Manchurian conquerors greedily eyeing China to the Japanese occupationist army, and Wu Sangui and other Ming dignitaries to the Guomindang government of Chiang Kaishek in Chongqing.

Guo Moruo was anxious to learn a lesson from history and prevent repetition of the same mistakes. Paradoxically, he did not blame the obvious traitor, Wu Sangui, but even glorified him. The article put the blame for China's defeat squarely on the Ming emperor who had failed to effect the necessary reforms, and on one of Li Zicheng's associates. Li Zicheng himself was not to blame for the national humiliation. His mistake was that he did not nationalise the war in time, continued executions of Ming nobility and failed to win Wu Sangui over to his side. Because this was not done, China fell prey to foreigners.

Guo's interpretation of the events that had taken place 300 years earlier met with enthusiastic response from Mao Zedong. For one thing, Mao liked the idea of the Ming emperor's being criticised for having rejected reforms, as he saw this criticism as being aimed at the intractable Chiang Kaishek. The comparison to Li Zicheng, the national hero of the peasant war, was also flattering to Mao. Besides, Mao was particularly pleased with the way Guo Moruo dealt with the problem of China's national independence. Guo's idea of rallying the Chinese people against foreigners ostensibly served the task of fighting the Japanese occupationists: the analogy here seemed obvious and unmistakable. However, in the context of Yanan in the 1940s, the article had a special role to play in the Zhengfeng campaign. This so-called movement of style rectification was launched to defeat the internationalist forces in the CPC and give Mao and his group full control of the party. In discussing Guo's article, the Maoists sought to give the historical analogy not only an anti-Japanese, but also an anti-Soviet colouring. According to Mao Zedong, the historical lesson to be learned from the events of 1644 was that national victory for China should be the supreme goal. In the name of this goal, one could and should renounce everything else, including the class struggle. For Li Zicheng, who had ruthlessly persecuted the dignitaries of the overthrown Ming dynasty, had lined up a powerful coalition of internal and external forces against himself, which led to the conquest of China by the Manchurians. The call to sacrifice class principles to nationalist goals coupled with the comparison of Mao to the historic figure of Li Zicheng were quite consonant with Mao's policy both within the CPC and in the struggle for power over the country.

Under the conditions of Mao's special line, one could not discuss the most burning issues, such as the nature of the political regime and the future of the country openly, operating with contemporary material. Therefore Guo Moruo once again resorted to the method of historical analogy of which he was a superb master. His historical plays *The Enlightened Madame Cai* (1959) and *Wu Zetian* (1960) have the common ideological purpose of providing historical parallels for the regime of Mao's personal power in the PRC.

The plays are set during the reign of two famous despots, Cao Cao (3rd century) and Wu Zetian (7th century). In contrast to historical

tradition, the dramatist extolled the two rulers whose activities were allegedly historically beneficial to the state and the people. Therefore Guo Moruo by implication praises the ruthless regime of Mao's personal power which was rightfully considered despotic in China. For any cruelty or crime committed by the autocratic ruler can be justified by his concern for the good of the state, the enlightenment of the people, and justice. The underlying idea of both plays is that the unlimited power of Mao Zedong should be welcomed by every Chinese.

Guo Moruo's judgement of any historical figure hinges on his "contribution to the political and cultural progress of the Chinese nation". Thus, Cao Cao, a despot free from the constraints of morality, who devastated the country and decimated its population with an internecine war, emerges as a progressive ruler who played a useful role for a future united nation.

The Hong Kong writer Lin Manshu believes that *The Enlightened Madame Cai* was a failure, since an attempt to "rehabilitate Cao Cao" could not be a sound basis for a play.⁸ However, Lin Manshu either overlooked or preferred not to comment on the analogies the play suggested to the Chinese readers and theatre-goers. The other play, *Wu Zetian*, was given a different interpretation by Lin Manshu. While admitting that Guo's portrayal of Wu Zetian, as an irreproachable empress was a clear case of idealisation, Lin Manshu argues that through Wu Zetian, the playwright appealed to Mao Zedong to pay heed to advice, use the services of gifted people, and conduct a policy consonant with the interests of the people.⁹ In other words, Lin Manshu interpreted the play as an attempt to persuade Mao to soften his regime. He may well be right. In any case, playwright Wu Han, author of the historical drama *Demotion of Hai Rui* and an opponent of Mao's regime, welcomed this play.¹⁰

In contrast to Wu Han, Guo Moruo never condemned despotism either openly or symbolically. He appealed to Mao Zedong by setting the positive historical example of the progressive policies conducted by Wu Zetian. According to Lin Manshu, Guo Moruo put his own thoughts, aspirations and ideals into the heroine of this play.¹¹

In the 1960s, Guo Moruo became the official commentator of Mao's poetry and lavishly sprinkled his commentaries with anti-Soviet insinuations. The acknowledged founder of the new Chinese poetry, Guo Moruo, to please Mao Zedong, wrote poems in the old style, the themes of which echoed Mao's verses. Guo Moruo appeared to enjoy an exceptional position and an immunity guaranteed by his personal friendship and close relations with the "great helmsman" himself. Yet this was not enough to save Guo Moruo from humiliation: he was forced to make a shameful repenting speech vowing his readiness to burn his previous works and smear himself with dirt in the name of "Mao's thought".¹²

Japanese scholar Minoru Takeuchi believes that faced with the choice between poetry and politics, Guo Moruo consciously opted in favour of politics like the ancient poet Cai Yuan of whom he had written earlier.¹³ However, Guo Moruo failed to rise to the top despite his extreme self-

⁸ Lin Manshu, "Critique of the Book *Li Bo and Du Fu* by Guo Moruo", *Xianggang*, 1974, p. 138.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 154-157.

¹⁰ Wu Han, *The Spring*, Peking, 1961.

¹¹ Lin Manshu, *Op. cit.*, p. 156.

¹² *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 5, 1966.

¹³ Minoru Takeuchi, "Poetry and Revolution. The China in Which Guo Moruo Lived", *Chuo koron*, Tokyo, 1978, No. 8, p. 66.

abasement. What purpose did his abasing speech and the offer to burn his poems serve? What was the point in burning his verses if young people could not read them anyway? At the end of his life, Guo Moruo became Mao's commentator and spared no effort in extolling him. Yet, according to Minoru Takeuchi, even Guo's early poems betrayed a tendency to glorify the personality, his own personality to be sure. The young Guo indulged in so much self-glorification in his poems that it amounted to a virtual "cult of his own personality", rather than to the somewhat hyperbolised idea that many poets have of themselves.¹⁴

Guo Moruo paid a high price to save his life and position in society, but in the process he lost his artistic powers; the last years of his life proved fruitless. The Chinese intellectuals refused to follow him, rejecting his surrender to the "thought of Mao Zedong". As vacuum formed around him, Guo Moruo never felt safe. In 1972, when his position seemed to be tottering, he made plans to leave the capital and go into self-imposed exile to "escape the worst". Playwright Xia Yan writes: "I must say with sorrow that Guo left us early, and one of the reasons for this was slander and persecution... In 1974, Jiang Qing tried to make him a counsellor to the 'Liang Xiao' group. According to Yu Liqun [Guo's wife.—A. Zh.], his health deteriorated after that."¹⁵ Writer Liu Baiyu confirms this assessment: "In February 1974, Jiang Qing came to see him at his house and demanded that he write an article criticising Lü Buwei [a minister in the Qin Kingdom, died in 235 B.C.—A. Zh.]. The target of this criticism would have been the Premier. Guo firmly refused. He was taken to the hospital. After that incident the persecution intensified."¹⁶ Guo Moruo's wife testifies: "The 'four' ruined his health. In 1973, Jiang Qing tried to line up a group at Peking University for open criticism of Guo. In the spring of 1974, she came to see Guo on three occasions and told him that his attitude toward Qin Shihuang and Confucius was similar to that of Lin Biao. She pressed him to admit that his writings and plays, created at the risk of his life during the anti-Japanese war and exposing the dictatorship of Chiang Kaishek, were the product of Wang Ming's line against Chairman Mao; she demanded that he write an article against 'Minister Qin Shihuang'... Deep sorrow and ruthless pressure broke his health."¹⁷ Thus, in a sense, Guo Moruo can be regarded as another victim of the "cultural revolution", which destroyed him morally, if not physically.

The works of Guo Moruo are striking proof that he embarked upon a dead-end road by committing himself to the service of Mao Zedong. His last noteworthy work, *Li Bo and Du Fu*, shows that even such a great talent as Guo Moruo could not create under the fetters of Maoist dogma. A critical analysis of this work has been made both by a Soviet Sinologist¹⁸ and the Chinese literary critic Xiao Difei.¹⁹ To comply with Mao's postulates, Guo Moruo arbitrarily isolated both great ancient poets from the people and pitted them against each other. This interpretation was not new in the history of Chinese literature, but it was a long way from the truth.

In 1980, when it became possible to discuss the merits and demerits

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁵ *The Past and Sorrow*, p. 6.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

¹⁸ See in I. S. Golubev, "Guo Moruo: 'Resurrection' from Ashes", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1972, No. 2, pp. 190-198 (in Russian).

¹⁹ See in *Xinhua yuebao wenzhai ban*, 1979, No. 5.

of Guo Moruo's works in the Chinese press, critics took exception above all to the simplified view of Chinese classical poetry expressed in *Li Bo and Du Fu* in line with Mao's dogma.

Critic Gao Jianzhong has bluntly said that the book is neither objective nor fair.²⁰ He thinks that first of all, in general the political assessment of the ancient poets' works is one-sided. Thus, in passing judgement on an ancient poet's commitment to his people, Guo Moruo was guided by the man's attitude toward the peasant uprising, rather than by an analysis of his actual attitude toward the people. The critic also points out a strong tendency in the book to judge ancient writers by standards so high they are anti-historical. Finding the stinging criticism contained in Du Fu's poems inadequate, Guo Moruo rebukes the ancient poet for having failed, in the 8th century, to indicate a "way out" of the hardships that befell the people and to "provide an answer" to the questions the poet had himself raised. Lastly, Guo's book is extremely biased. This partiality frankly serves the purpose of bearing out some apriori postulates. For example, in recounting the biography of Du Fu Guo Moruo emphasizes his landlord background but ignores the privations and hardships he endured in his life. Guo Moruo is at pains to point out the religious views of Du Fu which, according to him, proves that the poet was reactionary. He stresses the negative attitude of Li Bo to the ancient court poet Song Yue to show the difference between Li Bo and Du Fu, who was "permeated with feudal ideology". In actual fact, however, Li Bo's attitude to Song Yue was entirely different, as is evident from his positive comments, quite consonant with the spirit of that time, which are ignored by the author. Arbitrary interpretation, distortions, deliberate shifting of accent, lacunae in argumentation, and contradictions have all been listed by Gao Jianzhong as drawbacks of Guo Moruo's book. "It so much harms our practical work to be guided by subjective wishes, to garble objective facts, and to betray the principles of historical materialism in research! Exposed to such an influence even the pen of the eminent, renowned scholar inevitably gives one a feeling of disappointment and regret," the critic writes in conclusion.²¹

Naturally, the Chinese critic does not name the main cause of the subjectivism which led Guo Moruo to creative bankruptcy in his last work. But it is safe to assume that both Gao Jianzhong and Xiao Difei realise the cause of this failure: the theoretical basis of Mao's "thought" which was eclectic and anti-scientific compromised the "renowned" scholar. Guo Moruo staged an experiment on himself which strikingly demonstrated the sterility of the "thought of Mao Zedong" in philology as well as its hollow vulgar subjectivism and anti-scientific nature.

In Chinese critical commentary today, it is often said that Guo Moruo "praises Li Bo and denigrates Du Fu" in his book. This is not quite so, for the author does not regard even Li Bo as a people's poet; to him both masters of Tang poetry are merely products of the landlord class permeated in varying degrees—Li Bo less, Du Fu more—by feudal ideology. Guo Moruo has awarded the title of people's poet to the long forgotten Su Huan, though only four mediocre poems by him have survived. Guo Moruo needs this choice to provide a theoretical basis for the "rebel spirit of the thought of Mao Zedong". According to Guo Moruo, Su Huan is great for the sole reason that he was a correct philosopher and

²⁰ See in Gao Jianzhong, "Critique of *Li Bo and Du Fu*", *Wenxue pinglun*, 1980, No. 3; pp. 121-130.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

a rebel; accordingly, Li Bo and Du Fu cannot be great because "though they are poets, they are no good as rebels and Zaofangs", concludes I. S. Golubev in his article. Therefore, on top of its subjectivism, also noted by contemporary Chinese critics, Guo Moruo's book has the defect of seeking to "modernise historical material to fit "Mao's thought". Guo Moruo's work cannot be considered scholarly. However, today it may be useful to Chinese literary criticism as a sad example of an impasse to which "Mao's thought" leads scholars. It is a tragic and costly public experience that should warn Chinese scholarship against repeating it in the future.

So much for the results of Guo Moruo's research work. Neither did he do any better in poetry. In 1971, he published some verses written in the old classical style, an utter imitation of Mao Zedong: "Chairman Mao is a great commander-in-chief... He gives the order and mountain streams change their course, all obstacles disappear..."²² and so on. Guo's poetic talent had definitely degenerated.

After the fall of the "four", Guo Moruo continued in his position as the number one official poet of China. His poems were published on various festive and solemn occasions, but they were of a strictly formal nature and cannot be listed among his artistic achievements.

As the process of reappraisal of some of Guo Moruo's writings began in 1979, his views on scholarly research came under criticism, something that had previously been impossible. The critics of Guo Moruo recognise the significance of his work and do not attempt to dismiss his contribution to Chinese culture. But the special position he held which placed him above all criticism makes a discussion of his real achievements inevitable and necessary.

Guo's most positive contribution appears to have been made to Chinese historical drama. To date, many articles have been written on this subject; proposals were even made that a national conference on historical drama be convened in China. As critic Wang Jiancong has pointed out in an article, it was Guo Moruo who employed historical drama as a method of disguised depiction of contemporary reality.²³ To prove his point, Wang Jiancong quotes a revealing statement by Guo Moruo in his little-known article, "On Historical Drama", published in the Shanghai paper *Wenhuibao* on June 26, 1946: "After 30 years of the Republic [i. e., in 1941.—A. Zh.], historical drama has come to occupy a very important place in the theatre. This tendency is due to the fact that at the time, Shanghai was in the hands of the enemy and its puppets and the best way to depict the grim realities was through the historical drama. And deep in the rear? Here also historical drama was most often employed to avoid investigations, etc."²⁴ Guo Moruo strongly objected to the view that historical drama was an "escape from reality", pointing out that the key to the problem was not the subject of a play but its "correct treatment". In other words, Guo Moruo believed that the success of a play depended on the interpretation of a historical theme that should be current and give answers to most burning issues. In our day, critic Wang Jiancong has completely agreed with Guo Moruo: "During the long domination of feudal absolutism in China, writers did not dare openly express political views; they were ill advised to speak their mind, for this was punished by imprisonment or beheading; what was left to them was

²² *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 19, 1971.

²³ *Zhongshan daxue xuebao*, 1980, No. 2, pp. 89-97.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

to resort to allegories and allusions.”²⁵ Guo Moruo and the tradition he stood for in Chinese drama showed an interest in history since it could be related to the politics of the day. Guo Moruo wrote: “The general principle to be followed in historical drama is ‘to place the antiquity at the service of modern times’. A historical play is seldom written for its own sake. In fact, the writer of historical plays has a clear idea of his motives and goals even before he sits down to write. A work devoid of informative, educational and aesthetic content is meaningless.”²⁶

In his own works, Guo Moruo tried to avoid modernisation, although in the present writer’s view, he did not always succeed. But he did not deliberately seek to update history.

Guo Moruo’s best plays have acute political relevance which does not result in the modernisation of ancient events. In his play *Qu Yuan* written in Chongqing in 1942, the political situation that shaped up in the 4th century B.C. was related to the realities of the day. The topicality of the play stemmed from its context rather than modernisation, although it was the author’s supreme task to put across a modern political message. Later, Guo Moruo wrote in a preface to the Russian-language edition of *Qu Yuan*: “I used the description of the *Qu Yuan* epoch as a symbolic depiction of modern times.”

In pursuing this supreme task, Guo Moruo discounted many historical facts and folk legends about *Qu Yuan* that did not serve his purpose. For example, the play makes no mention of *Qu Yuan*’s suicide, although it is the most popular theme associated with his name.

Qu Yuan was staged in Chongqing, capital of the warring Guomindang China, at a time when the country was divided into three parts: one occupied by Japan which installed a puppet administration there, another under the Guomindang, and the Special Region in Yanan controlled by the CPC. Of these three hostile forces, Japan was the strongest, and while the Guomindang and the CPC formally pursued the policy of a united front, it barely disguised their extreme differences.

In Guo’s play, in an analogy to this situation, the strongest kingdom in ancient China, the Qin Kingdom seeks to break the alliances of another kingdom, Chu, by tempting it with an offer of 600 li of territory. This was precisely the tactics of the Japanese government in trying to win the Guomindang over to its side. In exchange for the Guomindang’s surrender and withdrawal from the united front with the CPC, Japan promised to hand the Special Region controlled by the CPC over to it, i.e., the territory of 600 li. The Guomindang reactionaries found Japan’s offer tempting, since it held promise of wiping out communist power in China. The play showed, based on historical material, that the acceptance of this cunning offer would lead to a loss of national sovereignty and to defeat: the Qin Kingdom succeeded in conquering Chu, which was tempted by the territorial concession and lost its allies.

Small wonder that at a time when the Guomindang was engaged in secret talks with Japan, the staging, in Chongqing, of a play reconstructing similar events from the 4th century B.C. had the political effect of an explosion. As a result, the Chiang Kaishek clique abandoned its plan of giving in to Japan. It must be noted that the writing of such an historical play was no small risk to one’s life at the time.

No doubt, the artistic legacy of Guo Moruo, notably his historical plays, posed many questions during the 50 years of his work which

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

must be discussed in earnest scholarly debate. Some progress has been made in this field. Slovak scholar Marian Galik has described the early evolution of Guo Moruo's views on literary criticism as progress from the aesthetic-impressionist to the proletarian criticism.²⁷

Three years ago, a paper dealing with the historical theme in Chinese literature was prepared at the Institute of the Far East.²⁸

It is quite obvious that the poems and articles Guo wrote during the "cultural revolution" period kow-towing to Mao and steeped in anti-Sovietism are unacceptable and must be rejected as shortlived propaganda. They only show the scale of the moral sacrifice Guo Moruo brought to Mao Zedong in the last years of the latter's life. A review of Guo Moruo's early works will reveal valuable material for the Chinese cultural heritage. It can be said even today that *Qu Yuan* and other historical plays of the 1940s, the stories and poems written before 1949, the 4-volume autobiography, and travel notes written during Guo's trip to the USSR in 1945—all of them have made a signal contribution to modern Chinese culture and warrant special study. Many of these works have been translated into Russian, staged in Soviet theatres and have preserved for the Soviet public the portrait of Guo Moruo as an artist at the height of his powers, when the destructive influence of Maoist ideology had not yet ruined his talent and sterilised his personality.

²⁷ M. Galik, *The Genesis of Modern Chinese Literary Criticism (1917-1930)*, London-Bratislava, 1980, pp. 28-62.

²⁸ A. N. Zhelokhovtsev, "The Function of the Historical Theme in Modern Chinese Literature", Third scientific conference on the problems of China's modern history at the IFE of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Synopsis of the Papers, Moscow, 1978, pp. 277-279.

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PRC RADIO ATTACKED AS INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL PROPAGANDA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 82 pp 139-146

[Article by G. S. Lonshchakov, candidate of historical sciences: "PRC Radio--Maoist Propaganda Mouthpiece"]

[Text]

To this day, in the PRC, radio broadcasting remains the principal means of exerting an ideological influence on the country's population of almost a billion, and the sole source of information for the 400 million illiterate or semi-literate citizens of the PRC. Despite the Chinese leadership's efforts, it will be a long time before television will be able to cater to such a huge audience. More than that, the role of the radio will grow further: "the number of illiterates and semi-literates among young people and people of medium age has grown, since elementary education has not become universal. A vigorous campaign to stamp out illiteracy was conducted in the 1950s. But because of what has happened in China during the past twenty years, illiteracy has not declined but has grown."¹

The Chinese leadership regards radio broadcasting as the most important weapon of the CPC on the ideological and political fronts and as the major form of mass communication.

The first wireless radio station with a capacity of 50 watts was built on the territory of China in Shanghai by American businessman P. Osborne in 1927. On the eve of the victory of the people's democratic revolution, there were 42 state and 90 private and foreign—mostly British and American—radio stations throughout the territory of China. Of these, 40 were in Shanghai. There were 1.5 million radio sets in the country. Considering that the population was 600 million at the time, this meant that there were approximately 2.5 sets per thousand of people.²

During the anti-Japanese war, the CPC leadership adopted a decision on the creation of a national broadcasting system.³ In 1940, the CPC CC formed a broadcasting committee headed by Zhou Enlai. A radio transmitter with a capacity of only 300 watts was installed in a cave in the Yanan mountains. The Xinhua (New China) radio station in Yanan began trial broadcasting in the winter of 1940, transmitting news and newspaper articles. Official broadcasts began on September 5, 1945, immediately after the rout of the Japanese militarists. In connection with the CPC CC's departure from Yanan, the radio station was moved to Wayaobao in March 1947 and installed in a local temple in a mountain gorge. It was renamed the Shenbei radio station of Xinhua. In May 1949, it was moved to Peking and in December of that year, became known as the Central People's Radio Station. Radio stations also appeared in Zhangjiaokou, Harbin and Handang. By the end of 1948, there were 16 radio stations in the liberated areas.

By proclamation of the PRC, all radio stations were nationalised and united under the Central People's Radio Station in Peking. The decision on the creation and expansion of a modern broadcasting network was adopted by the broadcasting department of China's Press Association in

¹ *Guangming ribao*, April 22, 1980.

² In F. T. C. Yu, *Mass Persuasion in Communist China*. New York-London, 1964, p. 124.

³ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 31, 1961.

April 1950.⁴ This was followed by the appearance of local people's radio stations in the provinces and towns. The first national conference devoted to the broadcasting network was held in January 1953 and a decision to confiscate the remaining 12 private radio stations and include them in the system of local people's radio stations was taken. From that time on, the entire network of radio stations in the PRC was united under the Department for Radio Broadcasting. The following figures give an idea of the pace at which the broadcasting network was developed during the first decade after the proclamation of the PRC:

Year	1951	1952	1953	1958	1959	1961	1962
Number of radio stations	54	71	73	97	122	138	141

The radio stations were distributed among the provinces as follows: Jiangsu—11, Hebei—11, Inner Mongolia—10, Liaoning—10, Heilongjiang—9, Jilin—8, Henan—7, Hunan—7, Anhui—5, Zhejiang—5, Xinjiang—2, Jiangxi—5, Shanxi—5, Guangxi—5, Hubei—4, Fujian—4, Shenxi—4, Shandong—4, Guangdong—4, Sichuan—4, Guizhou—3, Qinghai—3, Yunnan—2, Tibet—1.⁵

In the years that followed, the Chinese leaders continued to pay close attention to the development of the broadcasting network on a nationwide scale, emphasising the installation of radio facilities in the countryside. The task of developing the radio network in the countryside was set in Mao Zedong's article "The Discussion on the Cooperation of Agriculture and the Present Class Struggle". He returned to this question again in December of the same year in his work "Canvassing Views Concerning 17 Points in the Field of Agriculture". In 1956, when Mao Zedong and his group were preparing for the acceleration of agricultural production, a long-term plan for developing wired radio broadcasting in the countryside was drawn up. The broadcasting department was instructed to "face the countryside" and to build rural radio stations vigorously according to plan. In the period of the most intensive communalisation of agriculture (1957-1958) the capacity of radio stations was increased to 2,500 kilowatts. The following table shows the number of rural wired radio broadcasting stations and loudspeakers installed in villages in the period from 1949 to 1964.⁶

The Chinese leaders have never set radio broadcasting the task of systematically and persistently educating the working people on the basis of a truly Marxist-Leninist ideology. Instead, the Maoists have viewed radio only as an instrument for manipulating the minds of the masses in the interest of strengthening their power. Zhou Yang, then deputy head of the Department of Propaganda of the CPC CC, stated in 1958: "All the means of propaganda should be subordinated to the needs of the situation, because they are an instrument of class struggle and should serve politics all the time ... Radio broadcasting can have no mis-

⁴ *People's China*, No. 22, November 16, 1953, p. 53.

⁵ Chao Tsejen, *A Study of Chinese Communist Broadcasting*, Taipei, 1962.

⁶ See *The Great Decade*, Peking, 1960, p. 208 (in Chinese); *Communist China Digest*, No. 20, July 26, 1960, p. 56; *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 21, 1964. No statistics for 1960-1962 were published.

sion whatsoever not connected with the requirements of the current moment... We determine the political tasks in accordance with the situation and solve propaganda tasks proceeding from political tasks."⁷

Starting in 1955, the development of broadcasting in the PRC means developing wired radio for the most part. The development of wireless broadcasting is hampered by the language barrier that still exists in a number of provinces, the absence of electricity in many parts of the country, and first of all by the shortage of even the most basic radio equipment. In its efforts to develop wired radio broadcasting, the Peking leadership has also proceeded from political considerations. Wired radio broadcasting lends itself to strict control, depriving listeners of any choice of programmes compelling them to listen to programmes of the central propaganda bodies.

Xinhua agency reported in 1975 that all counties and towns had their wired radio broadcasting stations, every commune—a broadcasting centre, and that 90.2 per cent of all production teams could listen to the radio. It is estimated that at present there are 2,200 wired radio stations on a country level. The wired system of broadcasting is being further expanded, now encompassing two-thirds of the rural population. In some provinces there are wired radio terminals almost in every house.

Three levels of broadcasting have taken shape in the process of forming a radio broadcasting network in the country: the central, provincial and local levels.

At present the entire system of broadcasting in the PRC is in the hands of the Chief Department for Radio Broadcasting. Prior to 1978, it was under the supervision of the State Council of the PRC with the rights of a state committee, but starting with 1978 it was placed directly under the CPC CC.

The Central People's Station in Peking is the central link in the operation of the country's broadcasting network. It is connected with the local people's radio stations of the provinces, autonomous regions and towns subordinated to the centre, and also with the relaying and retransmitting stations in the most distant localities. Its transmitting equipment is in Liangxiangzhen, 20 kilometres southwest of Peking. The Central People's Station also broadcasts to foreign countries.

To this day, the Chinese leaders use the radio as the principal means of influencing the masses ideologically during their endless politico-ideological campaigns. To manipulate the enormous numbers of semi-literate or totally illiterate people more successfully, the Maoist propaganda men employed the method of collective listening to the radio. As they listened to the radio, people were watched by party officials, and the Peking leaders could be confident that the population got precisely the information that was intended for it.

In China the radio helps overcome the barrier of illiteracy to a certain extent, but its use is restricted by the insufficient number of loudspeakers.

Year	Number of radio stations	Number of loudspeakers
1949	8	500
1950	51	2,200
1951	183	6,100
1952	327	16,200
1953	541	31,800
1954	577	47,500
1955	835	90,500
1956	1,490	515,700
1957	1,700	993,200
1958	6,772	2,987,500
1959	11,124	4,570,000
1963	—	450,000
1964	1975	—

⁷ *Xinwen zhanxian*, No. 5. 1958, p. 18.

ers and the existence of different dialects. At a conference on the standardisation of the Chinese language in 1955, a spokesman of the radio broadcasting said that of the 55 provincial and city wireless radio stations, 15 have to broadcast not only in the official Peking dialect, but also in a total of 18 other dialects. According to statistics of the Wenzhou city radio station, only some 5 per cent of the listeners in Zhejiang province can understand the official Peking dialect. More than that, even the Wenzhou dialect is understood by listeners only within a radius of 65 kilometres from the city.⁸ The radio station of the Guangxi-Zhuang autonomous region has to broadcast each programme in the Peking, Guangdong, and local dialects. In big cities where workers come from many parts of the country, the local radio stations often find it very difficult to choose a dialect that will be understood by at least a majority of listeners.⁹

In the PRC, the radio remains not only the most important means of mass communication but also a means promoting the spread of a national language.

Two or more broadcasting stations exist in large areas or areas of special significance from the viewpoint of the Peking leadership. Jiangsu province has the largest number of radio stations—8. Provinces and towns with two or more radio stations include Liaoning (5), Guangdong (5), Zhejiang (5), Hebei (4), Fujian (3), Inner Mongolia (2), Heilongjiang (2), Shandong (2), Henan (2), Hunan (2), Guangxi (2), and Shanghai (2). By the end of 1979, the PRC had 99 central and local broadcasting and 320 wireless relaying radio stations.

The wired radio broadcasting network is also being developed. By the end of 1979, this network had 2,560 wired broadcasting stations, more than 2,300 of them being in the counties. About 88.4 per cent of the people's communes now have more than 49,000 radio amplifying stations, making it possible to bring wired radio broadcasting to 93 per cent of the big production teams and 88 per cent of all production teams. There were 10.7 million loudspeakers in the country by the end of 1979 and 65 per cent of the peasant families had wired radio terminals at home.

Along with the growth in the number of radio stations, the PRC now has a comparatively developed radio industry manufacturing radio equipment and radio receivers. While continuing the output of various types of radio receivers with tubes, this industry has also mastered the production of several types of transistor radios. Today the PRC annually produces 14 million radio sets in more than 200 models. Of the radio and television sets manufactured in 25 provinces, 74 models of radio sets were awarded certificates by the 4th Ministry of Engineering and the Chief Department for Radio Broadcasting and Television.¹⁰ No official statistics have ever been published on the number of privately owned radio sets in China, but it is estimated that their number exceeds 85 million.

The Chinese leadership is taking measures to improve its radio propaganda intended both for domestic and foreign consumption. In this

⁸ A. Liu, *Communications and National Integration in Communist China*, Berkeley, 1974, p. 127.

⁹ Ting Ifeng, *Some Suggestions on the Problem of Standardisation of the Chinese Language*, (A Collection of Materials Presented in the Modern Chinese Language), Peking, 1956, p. 149.

¹⁰ *Jingji daobao* (Xianggang), No. 49, 1979, pp. 25-26.

connection, lately much attention has been given to the training of radio and television personnel. New facilities have been built for the Peking Institute of Radio Broadcasting. Starting on November 6, 1978, the Chinese radio stations diversified their political programmes and improved news presentation. Reporting has become prompter, and demagogical cliches are used less frequently. The PRC joined the International Telecommunication Union in 1971 and the Asian Broadcasting Union in December 1973. The PRC has also recognised the 1975 decision of the International Telecommunication Union on altering the bands of broadcasting stations using medium waves. But the PRC selects radio frequencies for its radio stations in such a way as to obstruct reception of foreign radio stations. To overcome interference created by foreign radio broadcasting, waves of three or four frequencies are beamed in concentrated form at certain areas of China.

The Central People's Radio Station has a domestic service of five programmes and broadcasts a total of 90 hours a day. The first and second programmes are broadcast in the nationally understood *putonhua* language to the whole country. The third programme is intended for listeners in Taiwan. It is broadcast in *putonhua*, the South Fujian and Hakka dialects. Taiwan service totals 20 hours a day.

The 4th programme is intended for areas populated by national minorities and is broadcast a total of 12 hours a day in the Mongolian, Tibetan, Uigur, Kazakh and Korean languages.

The radio stations of provinces, cities subordinated to the centre and autonomous regions retransmit programmes of the Central Station in Peking according to a set schedule. The volume of this retransmission varies: Tianjin—1.5 hours, the radio station of Heilongjiang province—1 hour, while the radio station of the Big Hingan district in the same province broadcasts only 40 minutes of local news, devoting all the rest of the time to retransmissions of Radio Peking. It is compulsory for all radio stations in the country to retransmit two traditional programmes of the Central Radio Station—News and Press Review, and Transmission for Local Radio Stations.

Some 80 per cent of domestic air time in the PRC is devoted to political material. All political broadcasting in the PRC is marked by extensive speculation on the illiteracy and ignorance of the population and on the scantiness of the information it receives. The 20-minute "theoretical" programme of the Central Radio called "Education" is the main form of manipulating the social consciousness of the masses. It is retransmitted by most of the country's local radio stations. Similar programmes are also broadcast by radio stations at the provincial level. For instance, a programme broadcast by the radio station of Jilin province is called "Theory and Practice"; in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region it is called "Study of Theory", etc.

In recent years, mostly after the 3rd (December 1978), 4th (September 1979) and 5th (February 1980) plenary meetings of the CPC CC of the 11th convocation, the propaganda in the programmes "Education", "Study of Theory", etc., has concentrated on theses connected with the implementation of the programme of "four modernisations", that is on ensuring the accelerated development of the military-industrial complex. These programmes attempt to deal with "theoretical" aspects of such questions as the adjustment of the economy, family planning, "unfettering of the consciousness", struggle against the "ideological heritage" of Lin Biao and the "gang of four", etc. Sometimes a theme is presented in the form of a series of talks such as "working in accordance with ob-

jective economic laws, to accelerate the pace of socialist modernisation", "the interconnections between class struggle and material incentives", etc.

The domestic radio service devotes much time to broadcasting for the military and "people's volunteers". These programmes are called "Life of the People's Liberation Army". When broadcast by radio stations of provinces, autonomous regions and towns under central control, this programme is called "For the People's Liberation Army and the People's Volunteers". In addition to these programmes, news about the Army is constantly included in news bulletins, in the "Transmissions for Local Radio Stations" and "News and Press Review" programmes both of the Central Radio and all provincial radio stations.

The present Chinese leaders are striving to use the People's Liberation Army of China not only as a support for their military-bureaucratic regime, but also as a shock force in the fulfilment of their hegemonic plans. In present-day propaganda, there are no more endless calls to "study the ideas of Mao Zedong" or to follow the military doctrine of "people's war". The Chinese leaders are striving to encourage the army to engage in the fulfilment of the programme for its modernisation. There is a marked desire to mobilise Chinese servicemen not only to engage in political and ideological study, but also to toughen discipline and to improve combat and technical training. All Chinese radio propaganda for the People's Liberation Army of China is called upon to cultivate in servicemen not features of proletarian internationalism but militaristic, anti-Soviet sentiments, and hostility and hatred for the peaceloving policy of the countries of the socialist community headed by the Soviet Union.

The arsenal of the PRC's radio propaganda includes traditional programmes intended for workers and peasants. Some radio stations give such programmes special rubrics. Thus, the Peking city radio station has a programme called "For the Workers of the Capital". Many provincial and city stations have programmes called "For the Countryside". With the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the "gang of four", the content of these programmes has undergone changes. Now the Chinese working people are generally urged to work hard for the fulfilment of the Peking leadership's ambitious plans to "modernise" the country with the aim of turning it into a military power by the end of the present century. As a rule, all broadcasts of a political nature include anti-Soviet and anti-socialist diatribes.

Political information in China is presented in various forms and genres. The main programmes are the 30 minute "News and Press Review" and "Transmission for Local Radio Stations". These programmes must encompass the main socio-political events of the day and present them in a Maoist interpretation, always concluding with international news. More often than not, this information is anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban or anti-Vietnamese. These programmes are used for broadcasting major news and announcing important broadcasts. They deal with such materials as the most important directives of the CPC CC and the State Council of the PRC, statements, notes and memorandums of the Chinese government and the Foreign Ministry, speeches by Chinese representatives at the United Nations and other international organisations, telegrams sent by the Chinese leaders to the governments and leaders of other countries, meetings and talks of the Chinese leaders with foreign leaders, and activities of a national stature—congresses, meetings, conferences, etc.

"News" and "News in Brief" are the two most traditional programmes in terms of form in all of Chinese radio propaganda. They are broadcast seven times a day and deal with news items. Their purpose is to step up the political and labour activity of people and to draw them into political and ideological campaigns and movements. As regards content, these programmes contain the largest volume of information about what is happening in the country. Starting on September 1, 1979, the "News" programme was supplemented by "International News in Brief", often containing materials of an anti-Soviet nature. In addition, four of "International News" bulletins are broadcast daily. The daily 15-minutes "International Chronicle" has an overt anti-Soviet, anti-socialist cast. To back up its anti-Soviet inventions, the Chinese radio usually resorts to tendentious selections of quotes from statements by foreign leaders and the press of countries that are unfriendly to the Soviet Union, as well as from pro-Maoist and extremely reactionary press publications.

Only two years ago music and songs first of all, were regarded exclusively as a means of mass ideological influence in China. To this day, music continues to serve these aims to a certain extent. Only recently, songs glorifying the CPC and its leaders were broadcast nationwide. But substantial changes in the popularisation both of Chinese and foreign music have occurred in the course of the political campaigns of the past two years. The propaganda of "national-patriotic" ideas is a reflection of political changes connected with the intensive militarisation of the country. As a tribute to the PRC's ever closer political and economic ties with the FRG, Australia, the United States and a number of other countries, the Chinese radio has started to acquaint its listeners with the music of these countries.

At the same time military songs hold a special place on the musical programmes. Among the latest, mention should be made of twelve songs devoted to "the heroes of the battles in Vietnam" published in the November 1979 issue of the magazine *Songs of the People's Liberation Army of China*. Sounding more often on the radio than others were such songs as "Firm Bonds Between the Army and the People", "The Red Army Will Return to Us Yet", "The Red Army Does Not Fear a March". Music is broadcast a total of 3-4 hours a day.

In its coverage of domestic and international sports events the PRC radio does not yet have a consistent format. A fifteen-minute sports programme was first started by the Central Radio Station on May 16, 1972. Now it is broadcast once a day. But this programme, too, is quite biased. Usually, the broadcast consists of two parts: first comes news from countries with which the PRC maintains "friendly relations" and reports on the achievements of Chinese athletes. The second part includes one or two propaganda items popularising activities connected with military training. Instances of discrimination against "non-Chinese" winners are not a rarity. As a rule, when teams or individual athletes from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries win medals at competitions, they are usually either not listed at all or mentioned last.

The Chinese leaders began to attach importance to broadcasting to foreign countries from the very first months of the establishment of the PRC. In April 1950, measures were taken to secure additional equipment for the radio's overseas service. In 1953, Radio Peking was broadcasting in seven foreign languages: English, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Indonesian, Burmese and Thai. Besides, it also broadcast 11.5 hours a day for the overseas Chinese—huaqiao. By 1960, Peking was already broadcasting to foreign countries in 19 languages. One of the

results of the ambitious claims of the Chinese leaders to head the international communist and national liberation movement was the steady growth of air time and the number of foreign languages in which broadcasts are made. Lately, the total volume of the overseas service is 132.5 hours a day in 39 languages.¹¹

The volume of Russian-language broadcasts from the PRC is now 19 hours 15 minutes a day. Counting broadcasts in the languages of other peoples of the USSR (beamed at Soviet Central Asia) the total volume of Chinese broadcasts intended for our country is 56 hours a day. This means that about a third of the PRC's world service is directed at the Soviet Union. For the sake of comparison it should be noted that the total volume of the English-language service broadcast is considerably less: to North America (6 hours), Australia and New Zealand (2 hours), Southeast Asia (3 hours), Africa (4 hours) and Europe (2 hours).

An analysis of the Chinese broadcasts to foreign countries shows that in most cases, they include identical programmes: "China Builds", "In a People's Commune", "Culture in China", "Round and About", "Letter-Box for Radio Listeners". These are usually one-hour programmes repeated many times. As a rule, they begin with tendentiously selected news and include talks, interviews, reports and commentaries.

The Chinese radio propaganda for foreign listeners is characterised by the use of the most unseemly methods of falsification. These materials are marked by a rude didactic tone, slanderous attacks and impertinence that expresses itself in endless repetition of one and the same thesis.

This is especially evident in Russian-language broadcasts. These programmes abound in deliberate distortions and malicious attacks on the Soviet way of life "backed up" by arbitrarily selected quotes and references to the newspapers *Pravda*, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, *Trud*, and *Zarya Vostoka* on the problems existing in our country. The aim of the radio propaganda directed at the Soviet Union is to exert a negative influence on the political consciousness of Soviet people. All Russian-language broadcasts of Radio Peking without exception contain elements of misinformation, are of a subversive nature, distort the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, shamelessly jumble Marxist-Leninist terminology, and manipulate facts. Information, articles, and commentaries with overt and covert attacks on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries take up about a third of Radio Peking's foreign service.

The foreign political propaganda of the new Chinese leadership is a component part of its foreign policy and one of the most important means of attaining its hegemonic aims in the international arena. Its organisation and content depend on the domestic and international situation and serve the expansionist designs of the present Maoist leadership.

In the first years after the victory of the people's democratic revolution, the PRC's radio broadcasting played a role in forming the consciousness of the Chinese working people in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology and proletarian internationalism. But when the Peking leadership severed ties with Marxism-Leninism and embarked on the road of hegemonism and expansion, it turned this most important channel of mass communication into an instrument of cultivating hatred for the states of existing socialism headed by the Soviet Union and of splitting the international communist and national liberation movements.

¹¹ *Zhongguo bake nianjian*, Peking-Shanghai, 1980, p. 605.

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VIETNAMESE POLICY ON NATIONAL MINORITIES LANGUAGE RIGHTS EXAMINED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 160-165

[Article by I. I. Glebova, candidate of philological sciences: "The Vietnamese Language as a Medium of Interethnic Communication in the SRV"]

[Text] The Vietnamese language is the official language of the SRV--a multinational socialist state which is making extensive use of Soviet experience in its policy on nationalities.

The 54 languages of Vietnam, the majority of which are autochthonous, represent at least four language families and two independent language groups. The Austroasiatic family is represented in Vietnam by the Mon-Khmer and Viet-Muong languages. Ethnic groups in Vietnam speak 21 Mon-Khmer languages: 680,000 people speak Khmer, 81,000 speak Bahnar, 69,000 speak Die, 64,000 speak Koho, 57,000 speak Hre, 53,000 speak Sedang, 47,000 speak M'Nong, 35,000 speak Stieng, 29,000 speak Bru-Van-Kieu, 23,000 speak Katu and 22,000 speak Na Ma and Taoi-Po (the Mon-Khmer languages also include the Khmu, Ko, Brao, Khang, Ksinmul, Mang and some other languages spoken by a small number of people in Vietnam). The Viet-Muong languages, which can be classified as part of the Austroasiatic family with some reservations are represented by four languages: Vietnamese, which is spoken by 42-43.5 million people (excluding bilingual members of ethnic minority groups), Muong, which is spoken by 649,000 people, and the Tho and Tiut languages. The Austronesian or Malayo-Polynesian language family is represented in Vietnam by several Indonesian languages: 165,000 speak Jarai, 144,000 speak Ete (Rhade), 66,000 speak Cham and 38,000 speak Raglai. The Sino-Tibetan language family is represented in Vietnam by the Chinese language, spoken by refugees from China, who numbered 1.228 million in 1976 (around a million in the South and over 200,000 in the North), and six Tibeto-Burman languages (spoken by a small number of people in Vietnam). Many of the ethnic minority groups in Vietnam speak Thai languages, which represent an independent group: 825,000 people speak Tay, 686,000 speak Thai, 524,000 speak Nung, 53,000 speak Shan (one of its dialects) and 26,000 speak Dhai (Jai). (The Thai languages also include the Laotian, Lu and Boi languages spoken by a few ethnic groups in Vietnam.) In all, more than 2 million people in Vietnam speak Thai languages. Finally, there are the Miao-Yao languages, which also constitute a separate group and are represented by three languages in Vietnam: Meo, spoken by 373,000 people, Dao (Yao), spoken by 311,000, and Pathan.¹

The Vietnamese language, which is spoken by the Vietnamese (Kini or Viets), who constitute 84-87 percent of the population, is the dominant autochthonous language.² The language is the political and cultural medium of communication for the ethnic majority and it is also a language spoken with some degree of fluency by many minor ethnic groups in Vietnam.

During different stages of Vietnam's history, the Vietnamese language was an important consolidating factor in the struggle against foreign invaders. In addition to the Viets, ethnic groups speaking other languages participated in wars of resistance (Vietnamese historians list 13 such wars). There is a great deal of literature in Vietnamese on this topic, but the matter has been given little attention by Soviet scholars of Vietnamese affairs.

The integrating function of the Vietnamese language was given strong momentum in the 20th century in connection with an entire series of major events in Vietnam.

One of these events was the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in February 1930, which was guided by Marxist-Leninist principles in its policy on nationalities from the very beginning. These principles are proclaimed in many party documents.³ Even before the victory of the 1945 August Revolution, when Vietnam was under oppressive colonial rule, the party's basic policy on languages had been formulated precisely: the use of the Vietnamese language on a broader scale by means of its introduction into the secondary and higher educational system, scientific terminology, politics, administration and so forth; the democratization of the language by means of the elimination of all sinisms and gallicisms duplicating its "own" words; the popularization of the latinized Vietnamese script, Quoc-Ngu, among ethnic minorities; the use of the languages of Vietnamese minorities on a broader scale by means of the authorization of their use in political, economic and cultural life, including their use in the schools; the assistance of ethnic groups to develop a written language. Policy directives on the languages of minority groups were recorded as early as 1935 in the decisions of the First ICP Congress,⁴ in 1940 in the decisions of the Seventh ICP Central Committee Plenum⁵ and in 1941 in the decisions of the Eighth ICP Central Committee Plenum.⁶

The victory of the 1945 August Revolution was an event of major importance and established the necessary conditions for the convergence of the nationalities of the DRV--the first worker and peasant state in Southeast Asia.

After the victory of the revolution, the major principles of party policy on nationalities were reflected in the first Vietnamese democratic constitution, which was adopted in November 1946 and guaranteed the equality of the minorities living in Vietnam. The constitution envisaged compulsory free elementary education, and minorities were granted the right to conduct studies in their native language. It took a great effort to secure this right because almost all the members of these minorities were illiterate at that time and many groups did not even have a written language.

The nationwide war of resistance of 1946-1954 against the French colonialists helped to promote the Vietnamese language as a medium of interethnic communication. In other words, it promoted bilingualism among ethnic minorities: Fighting against the colonizers hand in hand with the Viets, the members of ethnic minorities mastered

the Vietnamese language, learned to read and write in Vietnamese and read political and other literature in Vietnamese. Conversely, party workers who were sent to the mountains were expected to learn the local languages. The popularity of the Vietnamese language grew as social-democratic and economic reforms were instituted in the mountain regions, as illiteracy was eradicated, and so forth.

The policy of nationwide unification and the encouragement of minorities to subscribe to the common cause during the years of the war of resistance of 1946-1954 and during subsequent years played a tremendous role in the development of a supra-ethnic form of patriotism in ethnic minorities.

By the beginning of 1958 the period of national economic reconstruction had ended and the period of the planned construction of socialist foundations had begun. The adoption of a new constitution in December 1959 was an important consolidating factor. It described the DRV as a multinational state striving for the inclusion of all nationalities in state, economic and cultural construction. The 1959 constitution stipulated expressly that the state would assist groups without a written language to develop one (related instructions specified that this would be deemed expedient if the minority were not too small, lived in a compact group and spoke a relatively unified language). After the Third VWP Congress (September 1960), the country began to fulfill the First Five-Year Plan (1961-1965), which enhanced the role of the Vietnamese language even more as a medium of interethnic communication. The peaceful construction was interrupted by the war of resistance of 1965-1976, which ended with the shining victory of the Vietnamese people and the reunification of the country.

After South Vietnam was liberated in May 1975 and the SRV was founded in June 1976, the integrating function of the Vietnamese language was thoroughly developed on the national scale. The SRV constitution adopted in 1980 guarantees the equal rights and obligations of citizens of all nationalities living in the SRV and secures their right to use their native spoken and written languages, to retain ethnic customs and to develop their own culture. At present, the basic aim of SRV policy on nationalities is the encouragement of Vietnamese minorities to participate to the maximum in the construction of socialism, the equalization of cultural levels and the convergence of the ethnic groups of Vietnam in all areas.

The experience of the Soviet Union and other multinational socialist countries, including the SRV, proves that the construction of socialism creates conditions for the maximum development of the integrating function of the official state (or national) language and broadens the range of the use of local languages spoken by a relatively large group of people, which tends to develop these languages and enrich their vocabulary and stylistic variety. On the other hand, the languages of small ethnic groups without a written language might not be used on a broader scale and might even be used less, sometimes to the point at which these languages are supplanted by the official language, the dominant local language or a related local language.

The reinforcement of the integrating role of the official state (or national) language is organically related to the development of its cultural and educational functions, including its function as a mediator in the dissemination of knowledge among other nationalities.

The Vietnamese language is the chief medium of interethnic communication because bilingualism is widespread among Vietnamese minorities. When we speak of bilingualism, we should note that many local languages also serve as media of interethnic communication in Vietnam, such as Tay and Nung in Viet-Bac and Thai in Tay-Bac, but the most widespread form of bilingualism among Vietnamese minorities involves the use of the Vietnamese language in public life and the native language with family and friends. Such languages as Tay, Khmer, Thai, Muong, Nung, Meo, Dao (Yao), Jarai, Ete and Bahmar play a more or less important role from the standpoint of the number of people speaking these languages, but their value as a medium of communication cannot be compared in any way to the communicative value of Vietnamese.

Vietnamese teachers, linguists and ethnographers have noted that the degree of fluency in the Vietnamese language is highest among those bilingual people with a high educational level. Special studies have shown that speakers of other languages acquire adequate fluency in Vietnamese only in schools of the third level,⁷ meaning that the deciding factor in the purposeful development of bilingualism is study in general educational schools of the second and third levels, in which most of the teaching is done in Vietnamese rather than in native languages. It has been deemed expedient in Vietnam to teach in the native language in the elementary grades and then replace the native language with Vietnamese. In schools of the second and third levels (that is, junior and high schools), teaching is conducted mainly in the Vietnamese language, but the native language and native literature (folklore and—if there is any—written literature) are required subjects. Incidentally, most of the teaching in the national schools of the RSFSR is conducted in Russian rather than in the native language beginning with the secondary grades. Schools in union and autonomous republics teach in native languages and in Russian (members of non-Russian nationalities can choose to attend any school).

Almost all of the children in the Vietnamese regions inhabited by ethnic minorities are now attending schools of the first level (up to the fourth grade). They have a good chance of continuing their studies in schools of the second and third levels. The report by Secretary General Le Duan of the CPSU [as published] Central Committee at the Fourth VCP Congress (December 1976) notes that every community in the socialist North has a second-level school and every district has a third-level school.⁸ The SRV has been tremendously successful in the area of public education. In the 1955/56 academic year there were only 710,000 students in general educational schools in the DRV, in the 1964/65 academic year the number had risen to 2,666,000 and in 1974/75 it reached 5,147,000.⁹ Before the revolution there was a special lycee in Langshon where the children of the privileged upper stratum of the largest ethnic groups (Tay, Nung, Muong and Thai) studied. This lycee did nothing to solve the problem of illiteracy among ethnic minorities. In the 1968/69 academic year there were 623 schools in just the mountain province of Langshon, and in 1978/79 there were 672.¹⁰ In the 1968/69 academic year, 81,022 school-age children were attending school in this province, but in 1978/79 the figure was 139,539.¹¹ For the sake of comparison, 15,000 people attended the lycee during its entire existence. Now every mountain province has an institute for the training of teachers for ethnic schools (they began to be opened in 1953), and all mountain districts have institutes for the training of elementary school teachers. The DRV Government was also concerned with the training of instructors for teachers' institutes: As early as 1951—that is, during the most difficult years of the war of resistance—150 members of minority groups were admitted to the Higher Pedagogical Institute. In

1964 there were 5,854 teachers who were members of minority groups, but there were 12,653 in 1974, including 143 with a higher education.¹² Specialists in teaching methods are doing much to enhance the effectiveness of the teaching of the Vietnamese language in ethnic schools with a view to the tendency of the native language to complicate this process and are improving Vietnamese-language curricula and textbooks for bilingual students, because the creation of the necessary conditions for the mastery of the official national language by ethnic minorities is part of the official policy on languages. Linguist Bui Khanh The speaks of the need to instill SRV citizens who do not speak Vietnamese with a desire to master this language.¹³ He is correct because the widespread development of bilingualism among ethnic minorities is in the interest of these groups and will give their younger members extensive opportunities to acquire a higher education, including post-graduate studies (in Vietnam or abroad). Whereas only 16 students from minority groups were studying in DRV VUZ's in 1956, the number was already 1,435 in the 1967/68 academic year,¹⁴ and by 1975 there were 3,200 members of ethnic minorities studying in VUZ's, including 200 studying abroad.¹⁵

The successful mastery of the Vietnamese language in ethnic schools is regarded in Vietnam as one of the significant achievements of the revolution (just as the widespread mastery of the Russian language in ethnic schools in the Soviet Union is one of the most important achievements of the Soviet regime).

The bilingual individual's degree of fluency in the Vietnamese language does not depend only on extralinguistic factors; there is also the important intralinguistic factor of linguistic similarity. For example, the Muong acquire fluency in Vietnamese quite easily (but the native language does interfere with this process to some degree, although it does have its own unique characteristics).

The widespread bilingualism and multilingualism in Vietnam stimulates the development of linguistic contacts, which leads to the mutual enrichment and convergence of languages. Sociopolitical, socioeconomic and even specialized terminology takes shape in minority languages primarily through the adoption of Vietnamese terms and partly through the speech of educated bilingual individuals. In old written languages like Tay, Nung, Cham and others, old terms are spontaneously replaced by new ones--or, rather, terms adopted from the modern Vietnamese language.¹⁶ This gives rise to Viet-Tay, Viet-Nung and Viet-Cham terminology (just as Han-Viet terminology, or terms of Chinese origin, once became part of the Vietnamese language). The adoption of numerous Chinese words by the Vietnamese language did not result in the assimilation of this language by Chinese, just as the adoption of many Vietnamese words by the minorities in Vietnam will not lead to the assimilation of their languages by the Vietnamese language. It is possible, however, that non-written languages could be assimilated by related local languages.

This occurs when the non-written language of a small ethnic group begins to be supplanted by a related language even in the home. For example, according to some Vietnamese authors, people who once spoke Tong, which is a language of the Thai group,¹⁷ now use the Dao language (of the Miao-Yao group) even when they converse with family and friends, which has led to the disappearance of Tong.¹⁸

When multisyllabic Vietnamese words (particular Han-Viet terms) enter minority languages, they cease to be divided into single syllables. In other words, most of

the minority languages in Vietnam are being inundated with multisyllabic words that do not consist of monosyllabic morphemes.

The reinforcement of the cultural and educational functions of the Vietnamese language is also connected with the greater insistence on the use of the latinized written language, Quoc-Ngu, when written languages are being developed for minority groups, and this helps minorities master the Vietnamese language.¹⁹ It is indicative that a society was founded to promote the spread of the Quoc-Ngu script soon after the founding of the ICP at the suggestion of the ICP Central Committee. It was quite active in 1936-1939. It organized a movement to eradicate illiteracy among the Viets and minorities. The tendency toward the replacement of traditional characters with Quoc-Ngu is being encouraged in Vietnam.

In 1961 a latinized script was officially approved for the Tay, Nung and Meo languages (the old system of writing with characters never became popular among the Tay and Nung groups because it was too complicated). Instruction in the Tay, Nung and Meo languages in elementary schools also has its traditions and its textbooks, teachers have been trained, dictionaries have been compiled, radio programs are transmitted in these languages and they are used in some of the clerical records of local administrative bodies.

In the same year of 1961 a plan was drawn up to improve the ancient written language of the Thai minority groups, which was to be retained but in a slightly improved form. Later, however, there was the prevailing opinion that the retention of a language of Pali origin would complicate the development of cultural contacts between the Thai group and the Vietnamese and other nationalities in Vietnam and would complicate teaching in the schools. For this reason, a plan was approved in 1969 for a latinized script for the Thai language, which later began to be used in the schools.

The Ete, Jarai, Bahnar and Koho groups are still using a latinized script dating back to prerevolutionary times.

The Khmers use a written language of Pali origin and the Chams also have their own Pali written language (the young generation of Chams is using the Quoc-Ngu script more).

Ethnic minorities without an official written language make extensive use of Quoc-Ngu (with certain necessary corrections). The Quoc-Ngu script is successfully used by the Muong and by numerous groups in Central and South Vietnam. It is interesting that in 1957-1958, or long before national reunification, massive efforts were being made in the liberated regions of South Vietnam under the exceedingly difficult conditions of struggle in the jungles, to create the first forms of writing, based on Quoc-Ngu, for such groups as the Hre, Sedang, M'Nong, Stieng, Bru-Van-Kieu, Katu, Raglai and others. Even then, 14 ethnic groups in South Vietnam began to use a latinized script.²⁰

The ethnic Chinese (huaqiao) use their own written language (characters). The willingness of some huaqiao to act on Beijing's orders against the interests of socialist construction in the SRV was one of the reasons for the abolition of the Tay-Bac and Viet-Bac autonomous regions, located close to the Chinese border, in

the beginning of 1976. It is no secret that when Deng Xiaoping visited Hanoi in 1965, he was irritated by the Vietnamese leadership's negative response to Beijing's suggestion that friendship with the Soviet Union and Soviet assistance be refused and he threatened to destabilize the situation in North Vietnam with the aid of the huaqiao. At the end of the 1960's, when the American aggression escalated in Vietnam, Beijing tried to act on this threat.²¹ At a meeting of the CCP Central Committee Politburo in August 1965, Mao Zedong said: "We must take Southeast Asia, including South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore."²²

After the unification of Vietnam, the 200,000-300,000 North Vietnamese huaqiao (160,000 of whom lived in Quang-Ninh, the province bordering on China, 33,000 of whom lived in Haiphong and 13,000 of whom lived in Hanoi)²³ were joined by almost a million South Vietnamese huaqiao, many of whom were members of the bourgeoisie, had concentrated much of the power in the South Vietnamese economy in their own hands and were under Beijing's control: By the time South Vietnam was liberated, the Chinese bourgeoisie controlled 80 percent of the processing industry, all wholesale trade, 50 percent of all retail trade and 90 percent of all export-import operations.²⁴ The existence of autonomous zones near the Chinese border could have been used by centrifugal forces supported by Beijing. It should be stressed that the autonomous zones were abolished only after there was no longer any doubt in Vietnam that Beijing would continue pursuing an extremely hostile policy in relations with Vietnam in the foreseeable future.²⁵ Later events proved that the Vietnamese leadership had valid grounds to take this step. As we know, Beijing organized a noisy campaign in 1978 to destabilize the situation in the SRV by encouraging the huaqiao to return to China. This injured the Vietnamese economy considerably. On 17 February 1979 Beijing launched a treacherous attack on Vietnam, demonstrating once again to the American imperialists that it was capable of an armed invasion of a socialist state.²⁶

It must be said that the anti-Vietnamese actions of the huaqiao, provoked by Beijing, did not disrupt the fraternal cooperation among Vietnamese citizens of the various ethnic groups making up the large family of socialist Vietnam's peoples.

Let us return to our investigation of the factors contributing to the broader use of the languages of Vietnamese minorities and the factors impeding this process.

The use of the native language as a medium of communication in elementary education promotes the broader use of minority languages (whether they are related to the Vietnamese language or not), but it certainly does not guarantee that these languages will be sufficient for all types of communication in the foreseeable future. According to F. P. Filin, a language can do this only if it is capable of expressing all of the knowledge accumulated by mankind in all spheres of activity.²⁷ A language serving as a medium of modern communication must have the necessary scientific and technical terminology, and this must be constantly supplemented (we agree with F. P. Filin that special standardized terminology is part of the literary language and is a major source of new terms). The development of special scientific and technical terminology is hardly possible in languages which are not used in modern scientific communication or in schools of the second and third levels, not to mention VUZ's. Some Vietnamese linguists even doubt that any kind of effort should be made to create special scientific terminology in a language if there is

real chance that the language will be used in the sphere of higher education.²⁸ This approach is probably correct because the use of a term in scientific communication is a condition for the permanence of the term. There is no doubt that the Vietnamese minorities will continue to learn about world culture (including Vietnamese culture), science and subjects of higher education primarily through the Vietnamese language and only in part through native languages. The educational function of the Vietnamese language is being developed even further, and this will mean the continued development of its integrating role.

There is no question that the existence of a written language will facilitate the development of the written literature of Vietnamese minorities. At this point it would be difficult to predict the future literary languages of the people of Vietnam if we agree with R. A. Bulagov that the literary language is a polished form of the national language, which has acquired certain established literary standards.²⁹ It would be even more difficult to predict the creation of ethnic literary languages of comparatively large minority groups in Vietnam if we proceed from the assumption that the literary language becomes the national language only during the era of the nation's establishment.

In contrast to the languages of the minorities of Vietnam, the Vietnamese language is now being used successfully in all spheres of modern communication, although the range of its use was much more limited just a few decades ago: During the period of colonial dependence the broader use of the Vietnamese language was forcibly restrained by colonial policy. In particular, the Vietnamese language was not used in the upper echelon of the colonial administration, it served as a medium of communication primarily in the elementary stage of education and it was rarely used in scholarly communication, particularly in science and technology. Although the restrictions on the use of the Vietnamese language slowed down its intra-structural development, when favorable extralinguistic factors appeared it quickly made use of its intrastructural reserves for the creation of words--that is, it was internally prepared for the rapid expansion of the range of its functioning. In particular, after it had become a medium of communication at all levels of the educational system, the Vietnamese language quite quickly became a language with a developed scientific and technical vocabulary. The SRV now has two-language terminological dictionaries in all fields of knowledge. The standardization of terminology is being considered. The contemporary Vietnamese language is highly effective as a means of communication and is successfully being used in all communication within the state, both intraethnic and interethnic.

FOOTNOTES

1. The information cited above on the languages of ethnic groups in Vietnam has been taken from a special decree of the SRV Central Statistical Administration of 2-3 January 1979 (see DENTOKHOC, 1979, No 1, pp 58-63) and from an almanac published in the SRV in 1977, citing official statistics for 1976. See "Vietnam Statistics," Hanoi, 1977, p 17.
2. The ancestors of the Vietnamese lived within the territory of present-day Vietnam at least as early as the middle of the first millennium B.C.

3. "Party Documents on the Issue of Nationality," Hanoi, 1965.
4. "Party Documents (27 October 1929-7 April 1935)," Hanoi, 1964, p 481.
5. "Party Documents (25 January 1939-2 September 1945)," Hanoi, 1963, p 154.
6. *Ibid.*, p 194.
7. DENTOKHOC, 1979, No 3, p 62.
8. Le Duan, "Political Report of the Party Central Committee. Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party. Principal Documents," Hanoi, 1977, p 36.
9. NHAN DAN, 1 September 1980. According to other data there were 716,000 students in the schools in the 1955/56 academic year, 2,673,900 in 1964/65 and 5,307,400 in 1975/76. See "Vietnam Statistics," p 33.
10. NHAN DAN, 16 December 1980.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. NGON NGU, 1979, No 1, p 18.
14. Nhat Hung, "Education at the Service of Ethnic Minorities," in the book: "The Ethnic Minorities of the DRV on the Road to Socialism," Hanoi, 1974, p 53.
15. NHAN DAN, 16 December 1980.
16. NGON NGU, 1979, No 1, p 15; DENTOKHOC, 1979, No 3, p 59.
17. DENTOKHOC, 1976, No 4, p 19.
18. *Ibid.*, p 31.
19. "Party Documents on the Issue of Nationality," Hanoi, 1965, p 54.
20. NGON NGU, 1970, No 1, pp 8-52.
21. As we know, the intensification of subversive activity by the North Vietnamese huaqiao for the purpose of destabilizing the situation in the DRV coincided with Beijing's armed provocation on the Soviet-Chinese border (March 1969).
22. Quoted in: "V'yetnam v bor'be" [Vietnam the Fighter], Moscow, 1981, p 156.
23. "Ob etnicheskikh kitaytsakh vo V'yetname" [The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam], Moscow, 1979, p 27.
24. *Ibid.*, p 88.

25. The status of the autonomous zones was publicly announced by the DRV Government in April 1955--that is, soon after the restoration of peace in Indochina. The Thai-Meo (Tay-Bac) Autonomous Region was created at that same time and the Viet-Bac Autonomous Region was created in April 1956. The right of ethnic minorities living in relatively large compact groups to form autonomous regions was stipulated in the 1959 constitution. At the beginning of 1976 a new administrative reapportionment of all unified Vietnam was announced, envisaging the abolition of the autonomous zones.
26. We should recall that the bloody pro-Beijing Pol Pot regime fell on 7 January 1979, enraging the Beijing leadership. Besides this, by that time Beijing had lost all hope of keeping its base of support--the Chinese bourgeoisie in South Vietnam--in Vietnam.
27. "Russkiy yazyk. Entsiklopediya" [Encyclopaedia of the Russian Language], Moscow, 1979, p 267.
28. NGON NGU, 1970, No 1, p 31.
29. R. A. Budagov, "The Place Occupied by the Soviet Study of Languages in Modern-Day Linguistics," VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA, 1981, No 3, p 15.

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JANUARY 1982 CONFERENCE OF SOVIET SINOLOGISTS REPORTED

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[Text]

The All-Union Conference of Sinologists was held in Moscow on January 25-27. Sponsored by the Scientific Board of the USSR Academy of Sciences on Problems of Far Eastern Countries, it was attended by nearly 300 scholars from universities and research centres in Moscow, Leningrad, Vladivostok, Novosibirsk, Ulan Ude, Alma Ata, Tashkent, Frunze and other cities.

Scientific and organisational aspects of Soviet Sinology were discussed at length, in particular, problems of training and effectively employing research workers, coordination of research, the state of and prospects for publishing in the field.

Different sections heard reports on the most important and urgent issues of history, economics, domestic and foreign policies, ideology, literature and art, and the spoken and written languages of China.

The conference adopted a document which will determine the main trends of research in the near future. It also contained recommendations for the further development of Soviet studies of China.

Academician P. Fedoseyev, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, made the opening speech. He said that many important events had taken place in the world since the First All-Union Scientific Conference of Sinologists (November 1971). The CPSU and progressive forces of the world have been waging a resolute struggle for peace, detente and security in the tense international situation. The forces of imperialism have sought to frustrate detente and push the humankind towards a new war. The Chinese leadership has joined hands with imperialist circles in a bid to make China part of the anti-Soviet, anti-socialist alliance. This policy is welcomed by the imperialists as it aids reactionaries throughout the world and does serious damage to the cause of world peace, national liberation and social progress.

Under these circumstances, the CPSU has given priority to the study of Chinese affairs. In this, it proceed from the interests of world peace and the vital interests of the Chinese people in the hope of bringing China back to the path of socialist construction.

The Soviet centres of Sinology, among which the Institute of the Far East under the USSR Academy of Sciences plays the leading role, have accomplished a useful amount of work for the Party and the state. Scientific papers written over the past decade contain important rational political and scientific assessments of the situation in China today. They also determine trends in China's domestic and foreign policy course for the 1980s. The guiding factor behind these works is the Resolutions of the CPSU Congresses and Plenary Meetings of the CPSU Central Committee, instructions by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme

Soviet, on the Soviet Union's foreign policy, on Soviet-Chinese relations, and on the struggle against Peking's anti-Soviet, anti-socialist line. Experience has confirmed the correctness of the CPSU's course as regards China.

A report on "The Tasks of Soviet Sinology and the Present-Day Situation in the PRC" was delivered by First Deputy Head of the CC CPSU Department O. Rakhmanin (Dr. Sc. Hist.). He said that the Central Committee of the CPSU showed constant concern for the advance of Soviet Chinese studies, as was demonstrated by the creation of the Institute of the Far East, the expansion of the Far Eastern Academic Centre and the Institute of Asia and Africa which trains specialists on China. This is also shown by the growing scope of Chinese studies in the USSR. Over the past decade, more than 550 books and pamphlets on China have been put out here, not including the thousands of scholarly papers; some 200 Candidates and Doctors of Sciences have defended their theses in the area; and the publication of a journal devoted to the area, *Far Eastern Affairs*, has been launched.

Today, many other research centres in Moscow, Leningrad, Vladivostok, Novosibirsk, Kiev, Alma Ata, Frunze, Chita, Khabarovsk, Irkutsk and other cities conduct research on Chinese problems and train specialists in addition to the Institute of the Far East, the main centre of Soviet Chinese studies, and the Institute of Oriental Studies which also has a staff of highly-qualified Sinologists.

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government show constant concern for strengthening the material base of Soviet Chinese studies and improving the working conditions of Soviet Sinologists.

Soviet scholars answer the Party's concern with industrious work. They have made a worthy contribution to the study of the history of China and the CPC, the Chinese revolution and Soviet-Chinese relations, the PRC's foreign policy, as well as of the economic potential, and the cultural and ideological heritage of the Chinese people.

This research is closely linked with political developments, which makes it highly significant. O. Rakhmanin emphasised such achievements of Marxist-Leninist Sinology as the correct assessment of the events in China in the 1960s, the 1970s and the early 1980s, the discovery of the main trends of development and the proper means of predicting the evolution of China's foreign and domestic policies.

O. Rakhmanin pointed out the international aspects of Soviet-Chinese studies. He said that the importance of the struggle waged by the CPSU against Maoism, the political doctrine and the activities of the present-day Peking leadership exceed by far the boundaries of Soviet-Chinese relations. These studies make a point of the ideological orientation of the international revolutionary movement, the fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist teaching, the creative implementation of general laws governing socialist revolution, and socialist construction.

The general laws of building socialism, accumulated in the world experience of existing socialism, are the achievements of the world communist movement and all of progressive mankind. The creative approach to this experience in each socialist country guarantees the success to the Communists. And vice-versa, the departure from these regularities and neglect of the historic experience of socialist construction inevitably have grave consequences. The crisis situation in China is a graphic example.

The CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties strongly oppose any deviation from the fundamental principles of socialism and wage an un-

compromising struggle against opportunistic and reactionary-nationalistic concepts.

The struggle against the political and ideological doctrine of Peking, against its distortion of scientific socialism (now and in the past) paves the way for effectively counteracting other manifestations of opportunism.

In conclusion O. Rakhmanin voiced his conviction that Soviet scholars who, proceeding from party principles, thoroughly analysed the achievements and shortcomings in the development of Chinese studies would find new reserves and justify the party's confidence in them with fruitful efforts.

Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute of the Far East M. Sladkovsky devoted his report to the present state and tasks of Soviet Sinology. He made an allround analysis of the main trends of Soviet Chinese studies. He said that Soviet Sinology must help the Party, determine the reasons for the unstable situation in China, acquaint Soviet public with these problems, energetically oppose the ideology of Maoism which is hostile to socialism, and expose Mao Zedong's great-Han policy fraught with danger both to peaceloving nations and to Chinese people themselves.

The scope of research has expanded considerably over the past ten years. New trends have appeared which, until now, were reflected only in individual pieces of research inadequately connected to other problems, if they were considered at all. The comprehensive and systematic character of research has become an imperative condition for the further advance of Soviet Chinese studies. Experience has shown that no problem can be tackled and no social phenomenon in present-day China can be understood apart from its history.

M. Sladkovsky stressed that presently the spread of Soviet Sinology which had noticeably gained momentum in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Soviet Far East, Siberia and Kirghizia during the past decade was of great importance. All Sinologists must promote this positive tendency in every way.

Recent years have seen a considerable growth of contacts between Soviet and foreign centres of Chinese studies. With the socialist countries, these contacts are carried out on a planned basis through an International Commission. The Soviet Union is represented at the Commission by the Institute of the Far East, the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Institute of the World Socialist System and the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences. Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, the MPR, Poland and Vietnam are represented by their respective research centres.

Over the past decade, a number of conferences and symposia in which Soviet scholars took part were sponsored in the socialist countries by the International Commission: two in Bulgaria, two in Hungary, five in the GDR, two in the MPR, two in Poland and three in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union played host to fifteen such conferences and meetings.

Soviet Sinologists participate regularly in international Oriental studies congresses where they deliver reports on the problems of present-day and ancient China. There have been six such congresses in the past ten years: one in Britain, one in Italy, two in France, one in Switzerland and one in Holland. Soviet scholars also took part in similar conferences in the United States, Japan, Belgium, Australia, Mexico, and other countries.

In conclusion, M. Sladkovsky said that in the past decade, Soviet Sinologists have discharged with honour their duty to the Party, to their

country, and their internationalist obligation before the Chinese people. The Chinese people are convinced that our conclusions are correct, and that Maoism must be opposed as an anti-socialist ideology and anti-popular practice. They are convinced that the Soviet Union is working for China's return to goodneighbourly relations with the USSR and to socialism.

In his report "Problems of Soviet-Chinese Relations", Prof. M. Kapitsa (Dr. Sc. Hist.) stated that it was not the Soviet Union's fault that relations between the two states remain complicated. The Soviet side, he continued, has set forth one initiative after another, taking steps "great" and "small" to eliminate the crisis in Soviet-Chinese relations, to put them in the form of dialogues and contacts, and has tried to influence their development positively. M. Kapitsa dwelt on the proposals made by the Soviet Union in the 1970s, in particular, on the four draft agreements for the preservation of the status quo on the border as well as draft treaties of the non-aggression and non-use of force. At the September-November 1979 Soviet-Chinese talks in Moscow, at the first plenary meeting, the Soviet delegation suggested for consideration a draft Declaration on the Principles of Mutual Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, a document of great political significance which is in line with the Soviet side's basic position on the question of relations with China.

The early 1980s have seen fresh Soviet initiatives.

It was stated from the rostrum of the 26th Congress of the CPSU: "The Soviet Union has never sought, nor does it now seek any confrontation with the People's Republic of China. We follow the course set by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU, and would like to build our ties with that country on a goodneighbour basis. Our proposals for normalising relations with China remain open, and our feelings of friendship and respect for the Chinese people have not changed."

On March 7, 1981, the Soviet Embassy tabled a proposal to the PRC Foreign Ministry to discuss jointly measures of confidence building in the Far East which could lead to detente and stronger peace in that important region. The government of the PRC rejected the proposal.

On September 25, 1981, the USSR Foreign Ministry forwarded a note to the Embassy of the PRC pointing out that the last round of the border-issue talks took place in 1978 and suggested that the talks be resumed in Moscow in the late quarter of 1981 or at any other time which was acceptable to the Chinese side. In its reply note of December 26, 1981, the PRC Foreign Ministry admitted that the talks should be continued but, nevertheless, suggested that they be postponed indefinitely under the pretext that both sides should make "proper preparations". Any comment is needless.

It is obvious that neither side benefits from the present state of Soviet-Chinese relations and that it runs counter to the interests of all peoples. Experience has shown the correctness of the line approved by the 24th, 25th, and 26th Congresses of the CPSU aimed at exposing the Chinese leadership's policy which is hostile to the cause of socialism and peace, and at finding ways of making Soviet-Chinese relations goodneighbourly.

The report made by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences N. Fedorenko was devoted to Chinese literature studies. He said that the study of Chinese literature and language was an important problem facing Soviet scholars. During the notorious "cultural revolution" when universities and research centres were closed down throughout

China and works of literature were forbidden and burned, the study and popularising of China's literary heritage were conducted on an even larger scale in the Soviet Union. It is common knowledge that the hongweibings instigated by the Maoists vehemently extirpated the legacy of the past, the classics created by the Chinese people throughout the centuries, and masterpieces by Chinese and foreign authors.

In view of that, N. Fedorenko added, the importance of the research conducted by the Institute of the Far East could not be overestimated. Chinese studies are not simply limited national area studies, for in dealing with these problems Soviet Sinologists are fulfilling their internationalist duty. N. Fedorenko expressed the conviction that the time would come when their work would be given the credit due them in China as well. We believe, he went on, that genuine scholars in China duly appreciate the contribution made by Soviet scholars to Sinology.

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PRC ROLE IN SUPPORT OF U.S. AT CANCUN CONFERENCE HIT

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 82 pp 152-159

[Article by A. S. Krasil'nikov, candidate of historical sciences: "Beijing: Deepening Alliance with Imperialism"]

[Text]

In October 1981 a Chinese delegation headed by Premier of the PRC's State Council Zhao Ziyang took part in an international meeting on cooperation and development within the framework of the "North-South Dialogue" that was held in Cancun, a resort in Mexico. Along with the Chinese delegation it was attended by delegations of some developing countries: India, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, Algeria, Nigeria, Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Guyana, as well as Yugoslavia, and of developed capitalist countries—the United States, Japan, Britain, the FRG, France, Canada, Austria and Sweden. Most delegations were led by heads of state or government.

The attitude of the industrially developed capitalist states toward the demand of developing countries on the establishment of a new international economic order and the transformation of international economic relations on a just basis was the main theme of the meeting in Cancun. The theme itself "came into being" in 1980 as a result of the obstructionist stand taken by the United States and several other capitalist countries and Peking at the 11th Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Economic Questions, which failed to approve the international development strategy for the 1980s and adopt a decision to commence talks in 1981 within the framework of the UN on problems of raw materials, trade, energy, development and monetary-financial relations, which became known as "global talks". This question was also discussed by the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly.

The demand for the establishment of a new international economic order has acquired such force in the world that the imperialist powers can no longer ignore it. Now they have been compelled to consent to talks on the transformation of international economic relations, but they are trying to procrastinate and to obstruct the adoption of concrete decisions. The United States and its allies are manoeuvring and making vigorous attempts to transfer the discussion of the main problems of economic relations with developing countries from the UN to international organisations, to forums with a limited number of participants where the positions of the developing countries are not as strong as in the United Nations and where they are deprived of the support of states of the socialist community. This tendency found its reflection in the convocation of the meeting in Cancun within the framework of the

so-called "North-South Dialogue". The Soviet Union's attitude to such forums was expressed by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Andrei Gromyko in his speech at the 36th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: "...No forum will yield positive results if the developed capitalist states do not change cardinally their approach to developing countries, do not stop discrimination in economic ties with them and do not give up the economic plunder of these countries."¹

In consenting to the holding of the Cancun conference, the West intended first of all to take the sting out of the struggle for the new economic order, to prevent the adoption of undesirable decisions at the current session of the UN General Assembly and to sow illusions among the developing countries about the possibility of solving their economic problems "within a narrow circle". On the eve of the meeting in Cancun, the Western mass media and the Chinese press tried to create the impression that the United States had supposedly succumbed to the requests of West European countries and consented to discuss the so-called "North-South" problem on a multilateral basis.

The Chinese delegation came to Cancun with the obvious intention of representing the developing countries at the meeting—the states of the so-called "South". In an attempt to draw closer to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and to impose its leadership on them, Peking's representatives stated that China supposedly "breathes the same air and lives the same life as the other developing countries". At his meeting with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Zhao Ziyang tried to convince the Tanzanian representatives that China "sides with Tanzania and other developing countries" and will make every effort for the attainment of success in Cancun.² But these and other such statements were refuted by all the activities of the Chinese delegation at the Cancun meeting, demonstrating that, as before, Peking is staking on closer relations with the imperialist powers, first of all the United States and Japan, to the detriment of the fundamental interests of the young countries and all progressive forces of the world.

China participated actively in the Cancun meeting. It accepted without reservations the bourgeois "North-South" concept. This notion substitutes geographical location for political and class criteria. An analysis of the PRC delegation's activity, the statements by Zhao Ziyang, and articles in the Chinese press about the meeting in Cancun prove that, on the whole, Peking's position was in accord with the interests of the developed capitalist states. The purpose of the Chinese delegation's activity, like that of the US delegation, was to emasculate the anti-imperialist content of the demands of the developing countries concerning the restructuring of international economic relations and to ward off the charges that the developed capitalist states are responsible for the economic backwardness of the emergent countries and for the continuing plunder of their natural wealth.

In Cancun, the Chinese delegation sided openly with those who are trying to separate states artificially into "rich and poor" ones, into the "North and South" to induce the developing countries to accept the thesis of the "common responsibility" of all developed countries, including socialist ones, for the existing economic plight of the former colonies and semi-colonies. Peking thereby demonstrated to the West its readiness to act jointly with it in undermining cooperation between the developing

¹ *Pravda*, Sept. 23, 1981.

² See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 23, 1981.

and socialist countries in the pursuance of one of the main directions of neocolonialist strategy.

The USSR rejects, as a matter of principle, the demand that, along with the imperialist countries, it should earmark a fixed part of its gross national product for aid to developing countries. Neither in the past, in the epoch of colonialism, nor at present has the Soviet Union ever taken part in the imperialist exploitation of developing countries which has caused their economic backwardness. Neither have the socialist countries anything to do with the negative phenomena caused by the functioning of the capitalist economy: crises, inflation, and other upheavals of the capitalist world economic system.³

Exploiting the USSR's non-participation in the Cancun meeting, the Chinese side tried to slander the Soviet position on the transformation of international economic relations and granting of aid to the newly-free countries. Along with Washington, Peking tried to use the meeting in Cancun to impose its anti-Soviet concepts on the developing countries. The tune of this attempt was set by Zhao Ziyang, who made anti-Soviet statements even before the meeting opened. At the Cancun forum itself, Zhao Ziyang called on the emergent countries to struggle, not against imperialism, but against "hegemonism"⁴ which in Peking's language means the Soviet Union. But China's anti-Sovietism did not gain any support from the representatives of the emergent countries attending the meeting. The Chinese press was unable to come up with a single statement by representatives of developing countries in support of anti-Soviet position of Peking and Washington.

The absence of the Soviet Union at the conference denied the Chinese side the possibility of blaming the USSR for the fact that no significant positive results were achieved in Cancun and that the struggle for the new economic order remained as complex as ever. The Chinese thesis about the so-called struggle of "two superpowers" that supposedly obstructs the solution of this problem and undermines the struggle of the peoples for the restructuring of international economic relations also burst like a soap bubble. Cancun clearly showed that it is Washington that is ignoring the lawful demands of the emergent countries and which has no intention of permitting the establishment of the new economic order. A considerable influence on the preservation of this negative US position was exerted by Peking, which supported Reagan on most issues and adopted a stand of reconciliation with the West.

There was obvious disappointment with the results of the meeting in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. As was noted by the Vice-President Malik of Indonesia, the conference failed to work out even the minimum practical measures for asserting a more just world economic order.⁵ The Zimbabwean newspaper *Herald* wrote on October 27, 1981 that the meeting in Cancun had confirmed the interest of monopoly circles only in the unimpeded export of profits from developing countries.

But Zhao Ziyang and Ronald Reagan, and in their wake the Chinese and American press, tried to present the Cancun meeting as a step toward the establishment of a new economic order. Zhao Ziyang, for instance, contended that the meeting in Cancun had "achieved certain successes".⁶ The *Christian Science Monitor* stated on October 26 that the

³ See R. Ulyanovsky, "Equal Partners", *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1981.

⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 20, 24, 1981.

⁵ See *Merdeka*, Oct. 27, 1981.

⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 27, 1981.

Cancun summit conference had become a triumph of pragmatism over ideology. This conclusion is mainly based on the provision of the concluding declaration that the heads of state and government had confirmed the expediency of supporting the common view on the commencement of global talks on a mutually agreed basis within the United Nations.

While feigning support for the global talks, Washington and Peking at the same time demonstrated their negative attitude toward them. In fact, the very holding of the Cancun meeting was a postponement of the global talks and legitimised the "North-South" dialogue. Officially, Washington agreed to take part in the talks in the United Nations but at the same time set a number of tough conditions which eliminate any possible positive results of such talks for the developing countries. In its turn, Peking stated the need for global talks but ruled out any possibility of holding them in its "Five Principles of Assistance to World Cooperation in the Name of Development" set forth in Cancun. The fifth principle, for instance, contains the demand to assist the speediest holding of the "North-South" talks, which supposedly have the improvement of the economic position of developing countries as their purpose.⁷ By supporting the continuation of the "North-South Dialogue", Peking undermines the emergent countries' drive to hold global talks within the framework of the United Nations and helps the West in its efforts to split the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and to exclude most of them from the number of full-fledged participants in the talks on the new economic order. And this is exactly the aim of the forces of imperialism which are persistently reducing the number of developing countries even at the "North-South" talks. Thus, whereas in 1975 similar talks were attended by 19 emergent countries, the number in 1981 was 14, including China and Yugoslavia. The group of countries representing the "South" was chosen arbitrarily. Thus, under pressure from the forces of imperialism, no invitation was sent to Cuba, which now heads the coordinating bureau of the nonaligned movement and has made a major contribution to the struggle of the emergent countries to restructure international economic relations.

The conference in Cancun brought to light the mutual interest of the United States and China in nullifying the successes of emergent countries in the struggle for the new economic order that have been achieved with the support of states of the socialist community. Thus, both Peking and Washington ignored not only the existing just and equal economic ties within the CMEA, the democratic and mutually advantageous relations of countries of the socialist community with the emergent states, but also the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Order adopted by the United Nations, and the Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of Group 77 (1981) and the relevant documents of the nonaligned movement. Of course, this move was intentional, because despite the certain inconsistency of these documents they contain the demand to do away with all manifestations of discrimination, *diktat* and exploitation, and to restrict the activity of transnational monopolies, and assert the right of countries to dispose of their own resources.

Instead of these and other fundamental principles, Peking and Washington proposed in Cancun their own principles of "world cooperation" (five American and five Chinese) which have no place for pro-

⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 24, 1981.

visions on full sovereignty, the right of countries to nationalisation, restriction of the activity of foreign monopolies, etc. The Chinese "principles", though they do not contain provisions on the freedom of private enterprise, the basis of the American "principles", are nevertheless designed to assist the West. They contain provisions on equality, justice, and mutual advantage but they link the improvement of the economic position of developing countries with the interests of the "development of the world economy" which, in the Western world, is controlled by monopoly capital.

Actually, in Cancun Peking offered the developing countries the notorious bourgeois concept of "interdependence" of the developed capitalist and the emergent countries, the essence of which is ultimately reduced by the West's ideologists to the inevitable dependence of developing countries on capitalist ones. Hence the conclusion that the economic problems of the emergent states can allegedly be solved by cooperation with the West. At the same time, this thesis "expresses striving to remove the Soviet Union and the world socialist system from participation in solving the problems of the present-day world economy and in the long run is called upon to resist vigorous actions by the emergent countries themselves against the transnational monopolies".⁸

By their essence, the Chinese "principles" are an unprincipled renunciation of struggle for restructuring international economic relations which the Peking leaders, to please imperialism, have euphemistically started calling a "reform of the international economic structure". It is possible to achieve this reform, contends the Chinese press, if "the developing countries rally closer with the developed [capitalist.—A. K.] states".⁹ It is not difficult to see that this is mere propaganda for the present course of China itself, which seeks to fulfil its program of "four modernisations" by way of alliance with imperialism.

The Chinese "Five Principles of Promoting World Cooperation in the Name of Development" were also set forth as a sort of counterproposal to the five fundamental principles of relations with emergent countries, formulated by Leonid Brezhnev in April 1981, a "code of behaviour" that the Soviet Union always observes and calls on China, the United States, the other permanent members of the Security Council and all states of the world to observe as well. The "code of behaviour" implies recognition of the right of every people to deal with its internal affairs itself without any outside interference; strict respect for the territorial integrity of these countries and the inviolability of their borders; unconditional recognition of the right of every state of Africa, Asia and Latin America to equal participation in international life, to the development of relations with any country of the world; full and unconditional recognition of the sovereignty of these states over their natural resources and also the actualisation of their full equality in international economic relations; respect for the status of nonalignment chosen by most states of Africa, Asia and Latin America and renunciation of all attempts to draw them into military political blocs.¹⁰ But this "code of behaviour", supported by the emergent countries, immediately met with objections from Peking, which tried without success to denounce it.¹¹

The Chinese "five principles" are directed at glossing over the main

⁸ R. Ulyanovsky, "Plunder Under the Guise of 'Interdependence'", *Kommunist*, 1981, No. 16, p. 79.

⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 26, 1981.

¹⁰ See *Pravda*, April 28, 1981; May 5, 1981.

¹¹ See *Renmin ribao*, April 29, 1981.

obstacles blocking the road to economic emancipation and the restructuring of international economic relations: imperialism's aggressive actions, the arms race, the vestiges of colonialism and neocolonialism, racial discrimination, hegemonism, and imperialist exploitation. The main direction in which countries of the socialist community concentrate their economic and technical cooperation with the emergent states is the strengthening of the positions of state and cooperative sectors in their economies with the aim of mobilising internal and external resources. To this, the Chinese delegation in Cancun opposed the vague principle of giving support to developing countries "in all their efforts directed at developing the national economy and the attainment of economic independence". This principle has an outward appeal to developing countries, but it is totally devoid of social content and is already being used extensively by imperialism and Peking to assist the Chilean junta, the regimes in Pakistan, Egypt, and Somalia and the like. Naturally, Zhao Ziyang spoke highly of the policy of Egypt's former President Sadat, who had supposedly "worked tirelessly to defend state sovereignty and develop the national economy" and even "to defend peace in the whole world".¹²

Zhao Ziyang's speech in Cancun, like the speeches by representatives of capitalist countries, side-stepped the question of the close connection between the restructuring of international economic relations and progress in restricting the arms race and strengthening peace. It should be remembered that the development of international economic cooperation as such, including the accelerated economic growth of the emergent countries, depends directly on strengthening universal peace, curbing the forces of aggression and war, and stopping the arms race. Additional resources for developmental purposes, on which the developing countries pin so many hopes, should be procured primarily by adopting effective measures in the field of real disarmament. But the developing countries in Cancun heard nothing on this score either from Washington or Peking.

Along with the West, Peking left unheeded the open letter signed by 76 prominent figures and politicians of African countries urging the participants in the Cancun meeting to study the problems of the new economic order in close interconnection with measures to strengthen international peace and security. The Western countries, stated the letter, should give up their hegemonic policy with respect to the developing countries and renounce the use of arms for repression.¹³ Contrary to this call, the documents of the nonaligned movement, and of Group 77, demanding that international economic cooperation not be made dependent upon political considerations related to East-West relations, Peking played up to Washington by trying to prove in Cancun that an improvement of relations between developing and developed capitalist countries is purportedly closely connected with struggle against the Soviet Union.¹⁴ Thereby Peking supported the positions of those Western countries which make development of economic relations with emergent countries dependent upon the severance of ties with socialist states.

Considering the importance of the problem of restructuring international economic relations, the Chinese delegation tried to use the conference to its own ends. By classifying itself as belonging to the "South", to the "Third World", Peking hopes to get the advantages that the deve-

¹² See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 20, 1981.

¹³ See *El Mujahid*, Oct. 22, 1981.

¹⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 24, 1981.

loping countries are seeking from the West in trade, international development programs, and in gaining access to the achievements of modern science and technology. At the Cancun conference, it tried to get access to the loans and credits of international funds on which developing countries are pinning their hopes. In 1971, China got \$15 million from the United Nations Development Programme for the first time. In 1980, the PRC got 450 million (special drawing rights) units of credit from the International Monetary Fund, a sum amounting to \$552.8 million and simultaneously from the IMF, a trust-fund loan of 309.5 million special drawing rights units. In 1981, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development granted the PRC a loan of \$200 million.¹⁵ Objectively, China is increasingly becoming a competitor of the developing countries, not only in obtaining easy-term credits from international organisations but also in attracting capital investments and loans from developed capitalist states.

This factor evidently played a role in China's moving closer to the position of the United States on many issues at Cancun. The Chinese delegation did not support the emergent countries on the Namibia question, or come out for granting it independence. Nor did it condemn Pretoria's aggression against Angola or the activities of the transnational monopolies which are inflicting tremendous damage upon Africa's economic independence. Along with the United States, Peking stubbornly pressed for an easing of contradictions between the West and the developing countries and tried to give the impression that the Western states were prepared to make serious concessions.

Posing as a developing country and paying lip service to individual demands of the "Third World", the Chinese delegation in Cancun concentrated its efforts on drawing closer with Washington and tried to persuade the developing countries to cooperate more actively with the West. In Peking's opinion, the developing countries will be able to achieve success if they "rally closer to the developed states".¹⁶ The purpose of this call for "close cohesion" was to back the policy of the United States with respect to the developing countries and to compel the latter to allow transnational corporations and foreign capital more leeway on their territories.

At the conference in Cancun, the Chinese delegation used a differentiated approach to representatives of the developing countries. The Chinese delegation showed no interest whatsoever in meeting delegations of Brazil, Guyana, Venezuela, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, and Saudi Arabia and held only brief talks with Algeria, Tanzania, the Philippines and Bangladesh. It was only to India and Mexico, the host country of the meeting, that Zhao Ziyang paid any attention.

China's approach to the representatives of Western countries was different. Zhao Ziyang met with every one of them. The Chinese side held a special reception for the heads of delegations of West European countries and Canada. Zhao Ziyang had his first meetings with President Reagan and Premier Suzuki and reached an agreement with them on an exchange of visits in 1982, while with the Japanese side, an agreement to hold a second Japanese-Chinese meeting at the ministerial level in Tokyo on December 15-18, 1981 was also reached. During these meetings, the Chinese delegation stubbornly and persistently stressed the "closeness" of Peking's "strategic interests" with those of Washington and its

¹⁵ See *Pravda*, June 25, 1981.

¹⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 26, 1981.

allies. Zhao Ziyang made a very determined effort to qualify as an "old friend" of Ronald Reagan. At a luncheon held by the US President in honour of the Premier of the PRC's State Council on October 22, 1981, the latter said that although this was their first meeting, he hoped they would feel like "old friends". As reported by the Chinese press, at the Sino-American meeting, the sides had "a friendly, sincere and free discussion of questions of the strategic situation in the modern world".¹⁷ By drawing closer to imperialism on an anti-socialist basis, Peking, as was noted by the Chinese magazine *Banyuetan* in September 1981, believes that the "strategic relations" between China and the United States are "an objective demand" of Washington's foreign policy directed at intensifying cooperation with all who oppose the Soviet Union. Openly showing its interest in the creation of an anti-socialist alliance with the United States, Peking tried to persuade Washington to make concessions on the Taiwan issue in appreciation of its pro-imperialist policy and pressed for the cancellation of arms deliveries to the Taiwan regime. But the American side, as it was stated on October 23, 1981 by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, replied that China should show understanding of the US commitments "to the people of Taiwan". Thereby Washington demonstrated its interest in further developing ties with the Taiwan regime.

The late October visit to the United States of PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua after the Cancun meeting showed that Ronald Reagan's talks with Zhao Ziyang would have far-reaching consequences. Huang Hua said in Washington that the "friendly relations" between China and the United States are like a ship at sea: if the sides adhere to the jointly adopted principles, the ship will weather the storm and successfully sail further. The "common strategic interests" were again discussed during Huang Hua's talks with Alexander Haig. Zhao Ziyang and Huang Hua's meetings with the leaders of the American administration show that a new step, very dangerous to world peace, has been made along the road to the overt creation of a strategic alliance between US imperialism and Peking hegemonism.

The Cancun meeting demonstrated the intensification of pro-imperialist tendencies in China's policy, its reluctance to assist the struggle of emergent countries for restructuring international economic relations, and Peking's obvious desire to exploit this struggle in its own hegemonic interests, for the sake of getting loans and credits from the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other Western financial organisations, as well as from the Western countries themselves. It also revealed the growing contradictions between Peking and most emergent states, and between the Chinese course and all the forces of peace and social progress.

¹⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 23, 1981.

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U.S.-PRC COMMON STANCE ON ASIAN ISSUES 'THREAT TO PEACE'

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[Article by Yu. I. Ognev, candidate of historical sciences: "Imperialist Reaction's Interaction with Beijing Hegemonism Poses a Threat to Peace"]

[Text]

The present international situation, including that in Asia, is characterised by a growth of tension generated by the aggressive intrigues of the forces of imperialism, militarism and hegemonism. A real and serious danger to the independence and sovereignty of states, to peace and security, first of all of the peoples of Asia, is posed by the policy of imperialist expansion with respect to the developing states, the escalation of the arms race, and the adventurous, hegemonic foreign policy course of Peking based on rabid anti-Sovietism. The development of this dangerous tendency is opposed firmly by socialist countries. Measures for preserving and strengthening peace and security of peoples, including those on the Asian continent, hold an important place in extensive constructive proposals made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

WASHINGTON'S AND PEKING'S PROVOCATIONS AGAINST COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA

Recent events provide new evidence of the unceasing interference by imperialist and hegemonic forces in the internal affairs of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The interaction of the United States and China in this region has lately expressed itself in the intent to force the ASEAN countries to step up the arms race, to engage in confrontation with countries of Indochina, to knock together a so-called coalition government, anti-Kampuchean in nature, and to organise China's armed provocations against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and against the People's Republic of Kampuchea from the territory of Thailand.

The Chinese authorities continue to increase tension along the border with socialist Vietnam. The border areas of Vietnam's northern provinces are subjected to massive shelling by Chinese artillery. Armed bands of Chinese soldiers make raids on border posts and peaceful settlements, terrorising the civilian population. The Vietnamese news agency, VIA, reported more frequent violations of the republic's territorial waters by armed Chinese vessels which harass Vietnamese fishermen. A tense situation also remains along the borders of the PRK. Egged on by Peking and Washington, the Thai military use their armed forces to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the PRK. As reported by the SPK Kampuchea Information Agency, Thai artillery shells Kampuchea's border areas whenever Pol Pot bands try to slip into its territory. There are instances of violations of the PRK's air and sea space by Thailand.

At the same time, in collusion with the Peking leaders, the ruling circles of the United States are continuing their attempts to form a so-called coalition government for the non-existent "democratic" Kampuchea

to include representatives of Kampuchean emigre groups, which were thrown out of the country by the Kampuchean people: monarchists, right-wing generals, and followers of Pol Pot.

According to reports from Bangkok, a meeting of representatives of the reactionary Khmer emigres held there in November was the ninth since September 1981. These puppets, supported by Peking and Washington, are still wrangling about who should have the leading role in the so-called coalition government in exile. Peking continues to hope that it will succeed in restoring its dominant position in Kampuchea and is seeking the leading roles for its stooges—the clique of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. Some ASEAN countries, the United States and Japan are campaigning hard for Son Sann, a reactionary who was once a prime minister of Kampuchea. They intend to form a “coalition” in which the Pol Pot people would be pushed to the background, so public opinion would not be reminded of their crimes against the Kampuchean people. The former head of state, a former prisoner of the Pol-Potists, and now their political associate Prince Sihanouk, is also becoming more active.

All these groupings are hostile to Kampuchea and are eager for action, counting on lavish handouts from Washington and Peking and on American and Chinese arms. “It may well be that for the time being I have no choice other than war”, stated the former prince in Brussels. He is planning to start a war against his homeland in the interest of the imperialists and Chinese hegemonists.

The ringleaders of the Pol Pot forces and their Peking masters resorted to a new tactic when they published a statement on the dissolution of the pro-Maoist “Communist Party of Kampuchea”. It is not by chance that this farce was staged after Pol Pot’s visit to Peking.

This is how the newspaper *Nhan Dan* of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam characterised the latest manoeuvre of the Pol Pot clique: “The ringleaders of the surviving Pol Pot thugs (who have not yet abandoned hope of returning to power) and their Peking masters are resorting to new tricks in an attempt to exonerate themselves and escape responsibility for their crimes. The aims they pursued in announcing the dissolution of the “Angka”¹ are totally clear: to deceive public opinion, first of all in the ASEAN countries, to draw these countries to their side and, upon securing their support, to form a so-called coalition government to continue activities directed at undermining the gains of the Kampuchean revolution... Pol Pot and his henchmen remain on the payroll of Chinese expansionism and hegemonism”.²

It is regrettable that the imperialist and hegemonic forces are succeeding in drawing individual ASEAN countries into the fulfilment of their expansionist plans with respect to the countries of Indochina. Thus, an extraordinary meeting of the foreign ministers of ASEAN countries was held recently in Thailand, and its agenda included questions on ASEAN’s participation in the formation of the anti-Kampuchean “coalition government” and also of “studying the possibility of military cooperation” of ASEAN countries with this counterrevolutionary scum. Such overt interference by ASEAN in the internal affairs of a sovereign state plays into the hand of those who would like to rekindle the war in Indochina and draw other countries of Southeast Asia into the orbit of their imperialist, hegemonic policy. It is not surprising that serious differences cropped up between the participants of this conference in

¹ “Angka”—the name of the former pro-Maoist “Communist Party of Kampuchea”.

² *Nhan Dan*, Dec. 9, 1981.

Thailand. Judging by reports in the press, Indonesia and Malaysia took a restrained position on these issues. Although the foreign ministers of these countries did come to Bangkok, they refused to make any statements concerning the granting of military aid to the Khmer reactionaries. Both these countries favoured settlement of Indochina's problems by peaceful means, by way of talks and negotiations.

Peking and Washington are putting crude pressure on the ASEAN countries in hopes of pushing them to the road of confrontation, hostility and mistrust in relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. This dangerous course contradicts the real interests of the countries of Southeast Asia: the common goal of strengthening security in the region. The latest initiatives of the three countries of Indochina serve these interests. The memorandum of the Laotian foreign ministry "The Main Principles of Peaceful Coexistence between the Groups of Countries—Indochina and ASEAN—in the Interests of Peace, Stability, Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia", circulated at the latest session of the UN General Assembly, is new evidence of the constructive nature of their positions. The initiative of the LPDR Foreign Ministry elaborated as a result of consultations with the SRV and the PRK, was a logical continuation of the earlier constructive proposals made by the three countries of Indochina. These countries proposed that constructive talks between the interested parties be started up again without any outside interference whatsoever on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states of Indochina and ASEAN, the settlement of disputes and differences between the states of the region by peaceful means—negotiations. "Countries outside of Southeast Asia should respect the territorial integrity of the region's countries", stated the memorandum of the LPDR's Foreign Ministry. "An end should be put to all forms of pressure and outside threats. These countries will undertake not to allow any other countries to use their territory as a base for direct or indirect aggression and intervention."

There was also a proposal to set up a permanent body for conducting a dialogue and consultations between the three countries of Indochina and ASEAN which would promote the development of relations between them on principles of peaceful coexistence.

AFGHANISTAN—A TARGET OF PROVOCATIONS BY FORCES OF IMPERIALISM AND PEKING HEGEMONISM

The continuing aggressive actions against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are an important component of the extensive plan to destabilise the situation in the vast region of South and Southwest Asia being carried out by the forces of international imperialism in conjunction with the Chinese hegemonists. The decision of the White House to openly finance the bandit anti-Afghan formations that are being trained at special camps located mostly on the territory of Pakistan further inspired the forces of the Afghan counterrevolution. In 1981, Washington allocated almost \$100 mln to wage undeclared war against Afghanistan using Afghan mercenaries and reached agreement with Peking on supplying the Afghan counterrevolutionaries with modern American firearms via the territory of China.

Democratic Afghanistan is firmly and resolutely repulsing the aggression from outside, the subversive activities of the imperialist powers and China. According to the latest reports by the Afghan Bakhtar News Agen-

cy, large underground centres of the counterrevolution were liquidated in a number of areas as a result of successful operations carried out by the people's armed forces. A large quantity of firearms, anti-tank rockets and mortars of American and Chinese make and hundreds of anti-tank mines were seized in Nangarhar province. It was also reported that the DRA's security forces had conducted a successful operation to liquidate the counterrevolutionary bands in Jawzjan province where large quantities of arms and ammunition were also seized, dozens of secret counterrevolutionary hideouts were destroyed, and hundreds of peaceful civilians freed—women, old people and children who were being held in these hideouts as hostages. Bakhtar News Agency reported that documents testifying to the ties of the counterrevolutionaries with imperialist intelligence services and the Peking regime were confiscated during this operation.

As in the past, Washington's and Peking's provocations against Afghanistan are accompanied by a slanderous anti-Afghan campaign by the mass media of the United States, several other Western countries, and China. This was reflected at the latest Session of the UN General Assembly where the imperialist and hegemonistic forces imposed the discussion of the so-called "Afghan question".

"The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is the target of an extensive international plot instigated by the United States and China", the DRA's permanent representative at the United Nations Farid Zarif said in his speech at the session. "We emphatically reject the discussion of the so-called "Afghan question" in the United Nations because this is a rude violation of the Organisation's Charter. We hold that the General Assembly will have fulfilled its duty if it sharply condemns the ever intensifying outside aggression directed by forces of imperialism and hegemonism. As for the DRA, it is striving for the speediest political settlement of the situation in the region".

PAKISTAN—A BRIDGEHEAD FOR US AND CHINESE AGGRESSION

The regime of General Zia-ul-Haq continues to act as an accomplice of American imperialism and Peking hegemonism in whipping up tension in South and Southwest Asia. Washington wants it to become the region's Israel. The territory of Pakistan was turned into a bridgehead for waging undeclared war against sovereign Afghanistan long ago.

The present US Administration has promised Pakistan \$3.2 billion worth of military aid. In so doing, it was motivated by the desire to increase Pakistan's role in the fulfilment of its plans to put political and military pressure on the states of the region that are independent of imperialism, first of all on Afghanistan and India. This aid will finance deliveries of the latest F-16 fighter-bombers, M-60 tanks, armoured personnel carriers and other military hardware.

Early in December 1981, an agreement was signed in Washington on the delivery of 40 F-16s to Pakistan. Moreover, as reported by *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, the deliveries of these combat planes are being made over and above the huge Pakistani-American deal concluded earlier. As reported by a France Presse correspondent, Saudi Arabia is said to be among those who have promised to provide the money to pay for the delivery of the most advanced American combat planes to Pakistan. In addition to aircraft, the Pentagon intends to supply Pakistan with self-propelled 155mm howitzers. Speaking recently to journalists in Wazirabad, Zia-ul-Haq said that the US government had expressed its readiness

to meet Islamabad's other requests in the field of modern American armaments and to supply any military hardware for the modernisation of Pakistan's armed forces. In response to this, the "grateful" military regime in Islamabad has already agreed to make Pakistani territory available to the Pentagon for the stationing of American "rapid deployment force" military units.

Peking is also acting in full accord with imperialism's plans with respect to the Pakistani regime. It coordinates its policy in the region with Washington, including provocative activities to aid the Afghan counterrevolution and to wage an undeclared war against Democratic Afghanistan.

The chief of general staff of the Chinese Army Yang Dezhi visited Pakistan in November 1981. Peking's envoy conducted talks with the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee of Pakistan and other heads of Pakistan's military establishment on questions of "mutual interest". His visit, like many former visits of high-placed Chinese military and political leaders to Islamabad, pursued the aim of drawing Pakistan deeper into the pursuance of Peking's hegemonic policy in Asia.

Observers noted the fact that the present visit of Peking's envoy to Pakistan was covered by the bourgeois press more than modestly, because the trip pursued "business" rather than propaganda aims. As reported by France Presse Agency, Yang Dezhi visited areas bordering on Afghanistan in order to give "competent advice" to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries who are undergoing military training there.

Peking, just like Washington, continues to give military assistance to Islamabad. Pakistan is the biggest purchaser of Chinese arms, including planes and missiles. A large complex for the repair of combat planes in Pakistan's Camra area was opened recently. This is only one of the projects of Sino-Pakistani cooperation.

Buildup of the latest armaments in Pakistan and the strengthening of its military ties with the United States and China create a threat to the security of the independent countries in South Asia. "Considering the growing threat of outside aggression, the government is taking the proper measure to sustain a high state of defence capability", the Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi said at a meeting with activists of the ruling INC (I) party in Maharashtra state. She called on her country's armed forces to be ready to repulse any intrigues by hostile forces along India's borders. This call was repeated by the chief of staff of the Indian armed forces Army General Krishna Rao. He told journalists that the perfection of China's and Pakistan's combat capability was compelling India to take the necessary measures in response.

IMPERIALISM'S AND HEGEMONISM'S DIPLOMATIC MANOEUVRES AROUND INDIA

There is no doubt that the rapid arming of Pakistan and the strengthening of the Sino-Pakistani military alliance constitute one of the key levers in Washington's and Peking's plans to put military and political pressure on the independent non-aligned countries of the region. Lately, however, Washington and Peking have been combining overt military-political pressure on India with vigorous diplomatic manoeuvres. This is evidenced by some political acts of the American administration, including Ronald Reagan's meeting with Indira Gandhi in Cancun, and his promises of the "great benefits" that India will derive from cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and other financial and econo-

nic bodies controlled by the imperialist powers. The initiatives of China, which is trying to capitalise on India's interest in settling the question of the Sino-Indian border, should also be viewed in light of this question. No one knows who was the real initiator of Pakistan's recent proposal to India to conclude a "non-aggression pact". But it is not difficult to guess that all such simultaneous steps on the part of Washington, Peking and their Pakistani accomplices, pursue a single aim in addition to putting military pressure on India: to create the false impression among its leadership that Washington and Peking wish India well. The Indian leadership was very wary in its approach to this proposal by Islamabad. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said in this connection, "one cannot carry out preparations for war and at the same time speak of a non-aggression pact". Although the rearmament of Pakistan is taking place to the accompaniment of a propaganda outcry about the "Soviet threat", it is clear that in reality, it is not the Soviet Union that Pakistan is preparing to fight, and that its military preparations, all geopolitical factors and the previous history of Indian-Pakistani relations considered, as noted by Western commentators, are directed first of all against India. "The massive deliveries of American arms to Pakistan lead not only to a growth of tension in the region," noted the Indian newspaper *National Herald*, "but also bring with them the direct threat of the outbreak of a military conflict."

In such conditions, Indian commentators believe, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Pakistan could serve Islamabad only as a convenient screen for further arms buildup, for the fulfilment of its nuclear programme, and for turning the territory of Pakistan into a military springboard for imperialist and hegemonic forces.

It seems that diplomatic activities with respect to India by the Chinese leaders can be regarded in the same way. Lately they have been making numerous claims about their "sure interest" in normalising relations with their southern neighbour.

It should be noted that for its part, India is definitely striving for a normalisation of relations with China. It is interested in a peaceful solution of questions related to the 36,000 square kilometres of Indian territory occupied by China.

An Indian delegation headed by Secretary for East Asian Affairs of the Indian Foreign Ministry E. Gonçalves arrived in Peking on December 8, 1981 for talks with the Chinese side. The Chinese delegation to the talks was headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Nianglong. But the Sino-Indian talks did not lead to any substantial results—and this is only natural, for as Indian commentators noted, India and China have different ideas about acceptable terms for the normalisation of their relations. India is striving first of all for the settlement of the border issue, while the people in Peking would like to pigeon-hole this issue or impose their own settlement on India, hoping, as reported by the Indian weekly *New Wave*, to keep about 36,000 square kilometres of the Indian territory it occupied, while claiming more than 90,000 square kilometres of additional Indian lands. "The liberation of all Indian lands seized by China and its renunciation of groundless territorial claims is a necessary condition for conducting a serious dialogue to achieve a mutually acceptable settlement of the border problem", wrote *New Wave*.³

Events show that the Chinese leaders do not intend to give up their hegemonic policy with respect to India. Lately, the Indian press notes,

³ *New Wave*, Nov. 4, 1981.

China has stepped up military preparations in areas bordering on India. There are reports that China has deployed medium-range missiles launchers in Tibet aimed at Indian towns and has increased the fire power of Chinese military units in that area. The Indian parliament was told this by the country's State Minister for Defence Shivraj Patil.

Groups of subversives and bandit detachments are sent from China into India's northeastern states to engineer anti-government provocations. China has set itself the aim of destabilising the political situation in India's northeastern states to the utmost and regards these activities as a lever of pressure on India.

When deciding on talks with India, the Peking leaders, would like first of all to force India to depart from its anti-imperialist position and to drive a wedge into Soviet-Indian relations. But Peking's efforts are in vain. At a recent dinner in New Delhi in honour of a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, headed by Alternate Member of the Political Buro of the CPSU CC, First Vice-President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR V. V. Kuznetsov, the Vice-President of India Mohammed Hidayatullah said: "Indian-Soviet cooperation has withstood the test of time".

"Signed in August 1971, the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation has opened a new chapter in the history of our relations. Confirming the friendship between the peoples of the two countries and their resolve to continue the struggle for peace and international cooperation, this document has laid a firm foundation for the further deepening of relations between our states. It has taken on special importance under conditions of the aggravation of the international situation, when peace is gravely endangered and the threat of war looms over mankind."

The steadily strengthening friendly relations between the USSR and the Republic of India are an important factor in the preservation and strengthening of peace in Asia and in the whole world.

THE "COMMON STRATEGIC INTERESTS" OF THE USA AND CHINA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THEM

In developing its relations with imperialist powers China gives priority to the United States, with the help of which it hopes to ensure its hegemonic positions in the international arena and to solve its domestic—especially economic—problems. In its turn, the United States wants to use China in the pursuit of its aggressive policy with respect to the socialist world, the national liberation movements, and the independent developing states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is from these interests that Peking and Washington proceed in developing bilateral relations in the military, political, and economic spheres. This was confirmed once again by the latest high level Sino-American contacts, in particular the meeting of Premier of the State Council of the PRC Zhao Ziyang with President Reagan in Cancun. This was the first direct contact between the top Chinese leadership and the current US President. The Xinhua Agency reported that in Cancun, the two leaders discussed the strategic situation in the world today and bilateral relations. President Reagan invited Zhao Ziyang to visit the United States at his convenience. Zhao accepted this invitation with gratitude and invited Reagan to visit China. President Reagan was very pleased with the meeting.

Soon after the meeting in Cancun, an official visit to Washington was made late in October by Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua. He had meetings and "frank and friendly" conversations with President Reagan,

Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Secretary of Defence Weinberger and a number of other officials of the Washington administration. A White House spokesman said that an agreement was reached at Reagan's meeting with Huang Hua and that a common view was expressed on most key problems of the international situation. He added that both sides expressed the opinion that the maintenance of close Sino-American relations was important for both countries and that the most important thing was the statement of similar points of view concerning the "Soviet threat". Questions of expanding trade and exchanging technology were also discussed.

At a reception held by Secretary of State Alexander Haig in honour of Huang Hua, the latter said that "in the present even more troubled international situation it is important to regard and develop bilateral relations between China and United States from a strategic point of view". Haig spoke in the same vein and stressed that the "strength and viability" of the American-Chinese alliance "is embodied in common strategic interests".⁴

It has become a vogue in the United States to speak about the similarity of American-Chinese strategic interests. Former US Defence Secretary Harold Brown addressed journalists in Peking, where he arrived in October 1981 as a guest of the Peking Institute of International Strategic Studies, and expressed this idea as follows: China and the United States have parallel interests with respect to the vast majority of problems and an unusual coincidence of viewpoints on strategic problems.

What do the American and Chinese leaders mean by "strategic" interests or problems? It is absolutely clear that they have in mind first of all the shared hostility of the ruling circles of the United States and China to the Soviet Union and its friends and allies.

This is how the "philosophy" of American-Chinese "cooperation" was characterised by Richard Pipes, an expert on the Soviet Union in the US National Security Council, in an interview with *US News and World Report*. A militarily strong China, he said, was very much in US interest. Besides, the moment the Russians start threatening, the USA will be able to draw still closer with the Chinese. This is a wonderful lever for the attainment of common interests, according to Pipes. The stamp of this "philosophy" can be found on the statements of many other American politicians. Thus, speaking in Tokyo on November 14, 1981 at a discussion of US foreign policy, former assistant to the US President for national security affairs in the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, said that China would play an exceptionally important role in US policy now and in the future and that for all practical purposes already now relations of alliance are coming into being between the United States, Western Europe, Japan and China.

But in American scientific circles, one can encounter sufficiently realistic estimates of Washington's policy with respect to China, pointing out that this policy is dangerous to the United States itself. It was noted, for instance, that the arms deliveries to China, while they are not capable of substantially altering the difference between the military potentials of the PRC and the USSR, are capable at the same time of giving China the possibility of staging an armed attack, for example, on Taiwan. Also noted in this connection was the divergence of Washington's and Peking's interests in Southeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula.⁵

⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 31, 1981.

⁵ A. Nagorsky, "East Asia in 1980", *Foreign Affairs*, 1981, Vol. 59, No. 3.

Very convincing criticism of Washington's course of further rapprochement with China in the military field was voiced by some participants in a seminar held recently at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University.

Serious doubts about the wisdom of expanding the so-called "strategic cooperation" between Washington and Peking were expressed also by well-known specialist on Asian affairs, staff member of the Congressional Research Service, R. Sutter. He opposed US assistance in the rearmament of the Chinese army and also noted that the Washington administration was concealing the possible consequences of American-Chinese rapprochement in the military field from the American people.

THE TAIWAN PROBLEM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The nature of the so-called common strategic interests of the United States and China manifests itself at the present stage very clearly in the stands taken by these countries on a number of pressing problems in the Far East, including the Taiwan problem.

Lately, much attention has been given in the Western, and especially the American press to the Taiwan problem in connection with the Reagan administration study of the question of supplying modern American weapons to Taiwan, including FX fighter-bombers and with the propaganda campaign launched by China's mass media concerning the question of the island's unification with the mainland.

There is no doubt that Washington's announcement of plans to sell modern FX fighter-bombers to Taiwan put the Peking leaders in a very difficult position, first of all in the eyes of their own people. Recognition of government of the PRC as the sole government representing the interests of the people of China and the severance of official relations with Taiwan was one of the main principles of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. At the same time the Taiwan-Relations Act adopted by the US Congress in April 1979 officially provides for the preservation of the entire complex of ties with Taiwan at the former level and the inviolability of US political and economic interests there. Events show that despite the rapid growth of allround ties between the PRC and the USA, the political and economic ties of the United States with Taiwan have not only not declined but have grown considerably. According to the *New York Times*, almost \$2,5 billion were invested by over 200 American companies in Taiwan's economy in recent years. As a trade partner of the United States in Asia, Taiwan remains second only to Japan. It was announced by Taiwan's minister of economy that the volume of trade with the United States had grown from \$900 million in 1971 to \$14 billion in 1981. In accordance with the five-year programme of military deliveries for 1979-1983, the United States continues to provide Taiwan with modern weapons. American-Taiwanese ties also include other forms of military cooperation: the holding of joint military exercises, visits by American ships to Taiwan's ports, and the training of Taiwanese military personnel in the United States and at American military bases in third countries.

Thus, the United States and China have not reached an accord in their approach to Taiwan. When establishing official relations with China, observers note, the US stated that it would continue to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan, while Peking objected to this practice. So far the

United States is not attaching serious importance to these differences. It realises that the Peking leaders are prepared to make any compromises for the sake of a "strategic partnership" with the United States and an alignment against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The PRC's new proposals concerning reunification with Taiwan can be regarded only as an expression of Peking's desire to reach a compromise with the United States. This is the so-called nine-point programme providing for the preservation of Taiwan's extensive autonomy, the inviolability of its socio-economic system, local self-government, and also Taiwan's maintenance of its own armed forces, and the participation of Taiwanese leaders in the supreme bodies of state power. It is clear that Peking addressed these proposals not only to Taipei. This initiative of the Chinese leaders was praised in Washington. Secretary of State Haig described Peking's nine-point programme as "very important" and expressed satisfaction that they recognise federalism in Taipei and its ability to preserve its own political, economic and military-strategic structure.

For its part, to dampen Peking's protests about the sale of modern arms to Taiwan, the United States simultaneously gave China extensive access to the latest military hardware. The Japanese press reported that Washington had officially informed the Japanese government of the revision of the law on controlling the export of arms to supply China with American weaponry. In accordance with the new regulation which has already gone into effect, the United States can not only supply lethal arms and military equipment to the Chinese army but also provide it with information of a military-industrial nature and grant it military assistance. These steps by the Reagan administration are regarded as a qualitatively new stage in American-Chinese military cooperation. "In effect," wrote the newspaper *Nihon Keizai*, "in matters of supplying China with American arms and military equipment, the United States has placed Peking on the same level as its Western allies."

It should be borne in mind, however, that the compromises reached by Peking and Washington in the name of "common strategic interests" can only dampen the lengthy dispute between the PRC and the United States over Taiwan temporarily, leaving its solution for the future.

MANOEUVRES OF THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The regular 36th Session of the UN General Assembly concluded its work recently. At the session, the overwhelming majority of countries voiced serious concern at the dangerous aggravation of international tension and the intensification of the nuclear arms race. The Session approved a major proposal for the present international situation tabled by the Soviet Union—"To Prevent Nuclear Catastrophe. A Declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation". The UN General Assembly also adopted a number of other important political decisions including a resolution, proposed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, calling for the conclusion of a treaty banning the placement of any types of weapons in outer space, a recommendation to conclude a convention banning the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons, and several other important decisions. The United Nations member states voted for the speediest commencement of talks on ending the production of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of their stockpiles, up to and including total liquidation. A resolution was adopted prohibiting the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.

ons. The representatives of the majority of United Nations member states voted for these and many other resolutions aimed at curbing the arms race. But they were actively opposed by the United States, its closest military allies, and Maoist China. Here, too, the Chinese representatives frequently interacted with the delegates of imperialist powers, first of all, representatives of the United States, trying to distort the true aims of the proposals made by socialist states, to present the intentions of the Soviet Union in a false light, and to divert the attention of the participants in the discussion from the essence of the problems under discussion.

When the most important resolutions were put to vote at the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly, the United States and its allies invariably found themselves in the absolute minority. As a rule, the Chinese delegation did not take part in voting at all, leaving the assembly hall in advance. Peking is using this tactic more frequently to avoid ranging itself against the majority of non-aligned countries with which it claims "friendship".

However, Peking had to take into consideration the fact that all socialist countries, the entire "Third World" and all peaceloving countries are rallying behind the Soviet Union's proposals to ensure the security of peoples and disarmament, this being evidenced by the numerous resolutions unanimously adopted at sessions of the UN General Assembly. That is why the Chinese representatives at the United Nations had to resort to all manners of manoeuvres and demagogical tricks to achieve their ends. The Chinese leaders try to portray their international policy as almost the most peaceloving and constructive one in the world when they speak. But in fact, they are trying to weaken the positions of the peaceloving forces in every way, to encourage the activisation of aggressive military blocs and exclusive economic groupings of the capitalist states, to block all real measures to curb the arms race and, in defiance of world public opinion, continue nuclear weapons tests. Peking is trying to undermine the efforts of the European states to strengthen security and expand cooperation on the European continent and is striving to split the ranks of the peaceloving, anti-imperialist forces. This provocative policy of the Peking leaders, who under the cover of "peaceloving" assurances, are trying to prevent the lessening of tension and practical solutions to the problem of disarmament, poses a serious threat to the cause of peace and international security.

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CHINESE CITED ON BAD EFFECTS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION ON SCIENCE, ECONOMY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 188-191

[Article: "Consequences of Political Campaigns in the PRC"]

[Text] Some statements in the Chinese press provide a better understanding of the damage inflicted on the economy in general and on scientific and technical development in particular during the course of various political campaigns in the PRC, such as the "Great Leap Forward," the "Cultural Revolution" and others. The sole exception was the military sphere, which was carefully guarded against all types of "rioters."

The very fact that no sessions of the Academic Council of the Chinese Academy of Sciences were convened for 21 years is indicative. After this long interval, the Fourth Session of the Academic Council was finally held from 11 through 20 May 1981. A report on the work of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was presented at a plenary meeting of the session by Vice Premier Fang Yi of the PRC State Council, president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. He described the fairly pitiful state of research in the natural and technical sciences.* Whereas "in 1965, on the eve of the 'Cultural Revolution,'" he said, "there were 106 research organizations, employing 60,000 people, within the academy system," the "10 years of unrest (1966-1976) seriously injured the academy. By 1973 there were only 41 research organizations left in the system." Only within the last 4 years, or since the time of Mao Zedong's death, has the activity of organizations within the system of the Chinese Academy of Sciences been revived and reorganized (at present, according to data cited by Fang Yi, there are 117 research organizations in the system, employing over 75,000 researchers and technical personnel, 2,000 of whom are highly qualified scientists).

Fang Yi admitted that there are still many unsolved problems in the sphere of research (he blamed them, as is now the custom in China, on the "subversive activity of the 'gang of four'"). "Besides this, there are shortcomings and errors in our own work," he said, "and we still have a long way to go before we can satisfy the demands made on us by the state."

* See GUANGMING RIBAO, 27 May 1981.

Fang Yi then presented his views on the matter in greater detail:

"Above all, as a result of 'leftist' ideological influence, our demands on the development of science were too high and premature, we were working on too many large priority projects and the scales of construction were too great. This is inconsistent with the capabilities of our country and our own strength, and we must therefore put these matters in the proper perspective. Although there were objective reasons for this, even I entertained some 'ultra-leftist' ideas. At one time I underestimated the seriousness of the consequences of the 'gang of four's' acts of sabotage and overestimated the economic capabilities of the state. I must assume most of the blame for this."

"In the second place, the system of administration and scientific supervision was not organized correctly. The centralization of authority in research organizations is too great, the style of work is superficial and the effectiveness of work is low. This is why no noticeable advances have been made as yet in the elimination of the disparities which existed for so long. Questions connected with the management of scientific projects, the supervision of scientific groups and the conditions of work are still being dealt with negligently and inefficiently on the local level."

"In the third place, we are still not paying enough attention to the important scientific and technical problems which arise during the process of state construction."

"Projects are fragmented, old approaches are still being used and known facts are being reiterated. We are still unable to concentrate efforts effectively and take joint action to solve major problems. All of this is mainly due to our lack of initiative and enthusiasm, and to the fact that our contacts and cooperation with various ministries and local research organizations, particularly higher academic institutions, are still not strong enough."

The severe injuries inflicted by political campaigns on the development of science and technology in the PRC, as a result of which the national economy did not receive the proper technical equipment and could not develop quickly, are eloquently described in a RENMIN RIBAO editorial of 17 October 1981 entitled "The Development of the Machine-Building Industry Must Be Preceded by the Development of Science and Technology." The article says that "the current development of the machine-building industry is far from capable of satisfying the needs of the four modernizations program. The stumbling block is its low level. The poor quality of machine-building products reflects the technological backwardness of the industry." The editorial stresses that the production efficiency of some machine tools is low, that energy requirements are high and that extremely necessary new goods cannot be produced with some machines. All of this is happening because science and technology are not being given the necessary attention. "Our past experience and our current problems," the author of the articles writes, "testify that the development of the machine-building industry should be accomplished by raising its technical level." Its development will necessitate "keeping an eye on the market, placing emphasis on science and technology and maintaining economic effectiveness. Scientific and technical work must be reinforced according to plan, with a view to the present and future needs of the market, and the advanced technical equipment which is needed for the manufacture of necessary goods must be delivered."

As the article points out, not everyone realizes that "only the priority development of science and technology can make the development of the machine-building industry possible. Some people are not convinced...and there are even some establishments where they believe that this is not the time for scientific and technical work." All of them feel that "a distant stream cannot slake thirst, and they believe that the intensification of scientific and technical work is something that will have to be done in the distant future." "It is not only at enterprises that people regard scientific and technical work as unimportant, but also in governing bodies," the newspaper stresses. "This is not simply a matter of a few people openly discussing the unimportance of science and technology. The problem is that scientific and technical work is not being assigned the place it warrants in practical activity."

When Premier Zhao Ziyang addressed a session of the National People's Congress in December 1981, however, he emphasized the following: "We must not underestimate our strength. When we refer to the backwardness of domestic science and technology, we mean their lack of correspondence to the objective needs of national economic development, and not their absolute backwardness. In some areas China has considerable research strength and experimental facilities and has made definite advances." The premier was referring primarily to the military-industrial complex, to which the Chinese leadership, guided by its hegemonic policy, has assigned primary significance for more than 20 years, sentencing many other branches of the national economy, which are important from the standpoint of public well-being, to vegetation. Questions connected with improving the life of the Chinese people, about which so much has been said in China recently, particularly at the session in question, were rarely the topic of discussion prior to this time.

Consumer Goods Production Was Not Given Sufficient Attention

A RENMIN RIBAO editorial of 18 October 1981 notes that "the development of the food industry has not been given enough attention, there has been no unified plan and equipment in the food industry is outdated." It stresses the need for "the gradual technical remodeling of enterprises in this branch, which must be accompanied by the mechanization of production processes." The content of the article indicates that the Chinese authorities are still not eager to invest state funds in this area and are still promoting "self-reliance." "The development of the food industry," the article says, "will necessitate more energetic activity on the local level, a search for resources and the refusal to rely only on state subsidies."

The information of the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY about the fulfillment of the state plan by Chinese industry and transportation as of the end of August 1981, particularly the report in the 16 September 1981 issue of RENMIN RIBAO, directs attention to the fact that "the quality of some products has deteriorated, the coal output has not reached the planned level, transportation does not meet requirements and industrial accidents have become more common at some enterprises."

In a report on the development of small-scale commodity production, the RENMIN RIBAO reporter writes: "The population is now suffering from an acute shortage of several items of daily use. The corresponding branches must give this matter the necessary attention." The reporter notes that commonly used goods are now produced mainly at enterprises of the collective sector, which have been repeatedly

reorganized, while their managers have been repeatedly attacked, since the time of the PRC's founding. In connection with this, the author advises that "the lessons of history must be heeded. The manufacturing specialty of small-scale production enterprises must not be changed without good reason, nor should collective enterprises suffer restrictions on their finances, equipment, raw materials, manpower and so forth. With the aid of small-scale production enterprises, particularly those in cities, we can serve the public better."

Declining Discipline of Administrative Personnel

A Central Committee directive on the verification of discipline by the CCP Central Committee was published in the 6 October 1981 issue of RENMIN RIBAO. It said, in particular, that "serious measures must be taken against those who violate the rules each day.... Surveys conducted in a number of regions indicated that some cadres, mainly on the district level and in production brigades, took advantage of their official status to set an example in the confiscation of land, the embezzlement of treasury funds and construction materials, the free use of state- and collectively-owned vehicles and the use of the manpower of production brigades for the construction of homes for themselves and their children." To put an end to these practices, the committee set forth a number of demands by which all party organizations are to be guided in the struggle against violators of the rules.

In a RENMIN RIBAO article of 16 November 1981, Central Discipline Inspection Commission Deputy Secretary Zhang Yun advises people to "strike a blow against smuggling and observe party discipline and state laws." In particular, she writes: "Smugglers can do their work because, in the first place, communist cadres and even administrators in some regions buy contraband goods while others authorize the purchase of these goods by individuals and organizations.... In the second place, some party members are collaborating with smugglers and have become their agents."

Zigzags in Economic Policy

The development of heavy and light industry in recent years illustrates the effect of thoughtless actions in the management of the PRC economy.

China's leaders are now encountering severe problems because, for a long time, they did not concern themselves with the development of light industry, which plays an important role in securing public well-being. Now they are willing to correct the situation, even if only by means of palliatives. In the last 2 years this sphere has been given more attention. It is no secret, however, that the PRC is spending huge sums on the military-industrial complex and is re-equipping its army and therefore does not have enough resources for the rapid and simultaneous development of all sectors of the economy. After priority was assigned to the development of light industry and consumer goods production, which improved supply in the domestic market to some degree, the Chinese Government discovered that economic growth was slowing down and it has now been announced that the normal functioning of the economy will also necessitate the development of heavy industry.

According to a report in the 30 September 1981 issue of the American WALL STREET JOURNAL, Vice Premier Bo Yibo of the PRC State Council said in an interview that in 1982 China "must stress the development of heavy industry once again."

According to this American newspaper, in view of the sizeable budget deficit and shortage of capital for investments in 1981, the new economic policy will unavoidably reduce the output of consumer goods.

At an NPC session in December 1981, Premier Zhao Ziyang of the State Council said that heavy industry "should move in the direction of production growth."

He stated in his report that the regulation of the economic structure will be of paramount significance in the future. In his words, economic regulation will take another 5 years, or perhaps even longer.

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NEW MONGOLIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES JOURNAL REVIEWED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 192-194

[Article by V. A. Arkhipov: "Scanning the Pages of the New Journal of the MPR Academy of Sciences"]

[Text] The Institute of Oriental Studies of the MPR Academy of Sciences has started publishing a new sociopolitical magazine, VOPROSY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, containing discussions of the history, economics, government and law, culture and international relations of the countries of the Far East.

The journal begins with an article entitled "The Mongolian People's Revolution and Its Principal Results." The article says, in particular, that the ideals of the Great October Socialist Revolution illuminated the path of the Mongolian revolution with a brilliant light and inspired the people to wage a resolute struggle against their oppressors and to perform great feats. Mongolia was the first country in the world to follow the heroic example set by Soviet Russia.

The victory of the people's revolution in Mongolia, the article notes, and the country's transition from feudalism to socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage, corroborated the great accuracy of Lenin's teachings about the possibility of a non-capitalist course of development for backward countries and peoples. The Mongolian people's revolution was part of the world revolutionary process which was begun by Great October and is developing rapidly at the present time.

Now the MPRP is directing its people, in line with the new program adopted by its 16th congress, to establish a material and technical base for socialism through the constant augmentation of labor productivity and the effective use of world scientific and technical achievements.

The results of 60 years of fraternal cooperation, the article stresses, are clearly and fully reflected in the achievements of the genuine socialism of people's Mongolia, which has become a dynamically developing state with a modern multi-sectorial economy and a flourishing culture where the well-being of the laboring public is constantly being enhanced.

The article ends with the emphatic statement that the MPR Government and the Mongolian people support the consistent peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union

and other countries of the socialist community and are invariably in favor of the elimination of the threat of war, the consolidation of peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world, the development of commercial cooperation with all countries and the reinforcement of international solidarity with the international working class and the laboring people of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The author of the article "In the Name of Peace and International Security," D. Chulundayeva, notes that the 26th CPSU Congress was an event of worldwide historic significance and the most important stage in the history of the struggle for peace and social progress because it clearly reflected the colossal successes of the Soviet people.

The assessment of the main current tendencies in the CPSU Central Committee accountability report was permeated with historic optimism and made those who are fighting for peace and disarmament, protecting the interests of the international workers movement and defending the independence and freedom of their homeland confident of their own strength.

The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress have been highly commended and unanimously approved by the fraternal parties, states and peoples of the socialist community. The policy of peace pursued by the USSR and its allies and their joint struggle for detente, the alleviation of the threat of nuclear war and the free and independent development of peoples have become the most significant factor in international life.

While the Soviet Union has been tirelessly seeking ways and means of eradicating seats of tension and settling conflicts in various parts of the world, the author remarks, U.S. ruling circles, conspiring with Beijing hegemonists, are escalating tension in relations with developing countries and are dealing more and more openly from a position of strength. History has proved that this policy is destined to fail.

The world public and all people of goodwill are asking their governments to carefully consider and quickly implement the new major Soviet initiatives in the area of foreign policy, aimed at strengthening peace and detente, curbing the arms race and eliminating the danger of a new world war.

In an article entitled "The Historic Roots of Great-Han Hegemonism--Imperialism's Ally" published in the new Mongolian journal, M. I. Sladkovskiy, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, presents a detailed analysis of the reasons for the rapprochement of imperialist circles, especially the United States, with the Chinese leaders and the "benefits" the PRC is deriving from rapprochement with imperialist circles.

The Chinese leadership is making every attempt to convince bourgeois Sinologists that the "Great China" concept provides valid ideological and historical "grounds" for great-Han aspirations. The roots of great-Han hegemonism are centuries deep. The flourishing socioeconomic and cultural development of China in past centuries and its military strength gave the Hans delusions of grandeur and false ideas about the role of other peoples. In addition to this, China was surrounded by more backward nomadic peoples, it was separated from other centers of world civilization and other peoples did not venture out onto the seas until much later.

The aggressive policy of the feudal Chinese rulers, based on great-Han hegemonism, the author concludes, had the most negative effects on China itself--expansionism resulted in economic stagnation and weakened China's international position.

Each time the Chinese rulers have severed their relations with progressive forces in the world and have entered into an alliance with reaction, the country has been put in a state of crisis. The present Chinese leaders are continuing the reactionary aggressive policy they inherited from great-Han hegemonism and are not taking all of China's past experience into account. They acknowledge that part of its history which is connected with "successful" conquests and territorial expansion, but they do not want to see the catastrophic effects of expansionism on the Chinese people. Citing Mao Zedong's words about his positive attitude toward the despotism of the ancient Chinese emperors, the author confirms the fact that the present Chinese leadership is deliberately carrying on the traditions of great-Han hegemonism. The Beijing leadership is also copying many of the other habits of the great-Han expansionists of the past in its foreign policy.

In their agreement to ally themselves with the United States and other imperialist states and reactionary regimes for a struggle against the countries of the socialist community, Mao and his successors resemble the ancient emperors with their desire to consolidate the strength of the "Middle Kingdom" (Zhongguo).

In the article "The April Revolution in Afghanistan," E. Puntsag discusses the process by which the Afghan revolution developed as a direct continuation and integral part of the worldwide revolutionary process begun by the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. The April revolution, which took place in line with the wishes of the laboring public under the leadership of the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan], began a new page in Afghanistan's history.

The author directs special attention to the anti-imperialist aims of the revolution in Afghanistan and to its social aspect: the construction of a new society with no exploitation--a principle inherent in the socialist society. Afghanistan, the author stresses, was one of the first countries in Asia to break the chains of imperialism on the threshold of the 1920's, under the shining rays of Great October. This country has much in common with the MPR in its revolutionary development and the historical process of the national liberation movement.

Describing the two stages of the April revolution, the author cites specific data to confirm the tremendous success the DRA had during the general democratic stage of the revolution in overcoming the objective difficulties posed by the country's underdevelopment and the resistance of those who exploited and betrayed the revolution. The author underscores the significance of the second stage, which began when the Amin regime was ousted on 27 December 1979. He correctly criticizes the undeclared aggressive war launched against the Afghan revolution by the reactionary forces of American imperialism and the Chinese hegemonists, with Pakistan serving as their main bridgehead, and commends the role of the Soviet military aid which guaranteed Afghanistan's safety. The limited contingent of Soviet troops in the country is defending the revolutionary conquests, independence and sovereignty of the state against external dangers.

The author concludes by stressing that the government headed by Babrak Karmal is resolutely striving to implement the ideals of the April revolution by forming a

national patriotic front and is displaying tireless initiative in the area of foreign policy with regard to the peaceful settlement of issues arising around Afghanistan. This is clearly attested to by the DRA Government proposal of 14 May 1980, which seeks the establishment of peace and friendly relations in countries in the region.

In the article "The Case Against Lin Biao and 'Jiang Qing's Gang'" T. Handsuren analyzes the trial of the "gang of four" and shows that this "performance" was carefully staged from the very beginning, with several rehearsals. It began in two chambers which were designed expressly for this event: one for the trial of Jiang Qing's group and the other for the rest of the accused. Among the four main charges brought against the "gang of four," which were set forth in 48 points, the charge of the assassination attempt on Mao was emphasized. The Chinese press focused its attention on "the case of Lin Biao," who, according to accusations made at the trial, was implicated in the assassination attempt.

The testimony of Mao's widow implied that she "was only carrying out Mao Zedong's instructions." This statement, the author notes, compromises not only Mao, but also some of today's leaders who were among his closest associates, including Hua Guofeng, which compelled them to bring the proceedings to a speedy close.

The trial of the "gang of four" is essentially another sign of the continuous struggle for power among various segments of the Chinese leadership, which became more intense on the eve of the 12th CCP Congress. On this basis, the author concludes that China is on the threshold of another sweeping campaign of party purges, and the Chinese press is openly discussing this matter.

The authors of the article "The Aggressive Essence of Beijing Foreign Policy"-- Candidate of Historical Sciences D. Sodnomgombo and D. Bayarhuu--underscore Maoism's reactionary essence as a variety of anticomunism and anti-Sovietism, which is particularly apparent in the foreign policy activity of the Beijing rulers, and expose the aggressive aims of Beijing foreign policy.

The foreign policy of the present PRC leadership is distinguished by the following features:

Spiteful anti-Sovietism and ideological and political hostility toward the USSR;

Attempts to undermine the unity of the socialist community with the aid of the "differentiated approach" tactic;

An alliance with imperialism, based on a common platform of struggle against positive tendencies in international life, including detente, and on hostility toward the USSR and the socialist world;

A desire to draw the developing countries into its own sphere of influence, set them against the world socialist system and divest the nonaligned movement of its anti-imperialist aims;

The use of conflicts to escalate tension;

The intensification of divisive and subversive activity against the international communist movement.

The anticommunist and anti-Soviet ideas of the Maoists, which stem from the Chinese rulers' eternal dream of world hegemony, are not simply a tactic, the authors point out, but a combination of reactionary theory and strategy. Although the present Beijing leadership acknowledges the need to "modernize" Maoism, it has no intention of revising its antisocialist aims and is more likely to strive for their attainment more vigorously, but with the aid of more insidious methods.

After examining the aggressive essence of PRC foreign policy in various parts of the world, the authors conclude that Beijing foreign policy is still hostile toward the cause of peace and socialism and is becoming even more adventuristic--relying on war for purposes of expansion and hegemony. Under these conditions, the principled struggle to expose the pernicious effects of Maoism, a struggle which is now being waged successfully through the concerted efforts of communist and workers parties, represents, the authors say in conclusion, one form of international aid to the Chinese people, with the aim of putting China back on the road to socialism.

The publication of the new journal in the MPR was motivated by the hope of strengthening and expanding friendship and all-round cooperation between the MPR and the Asian countries and maintaining lasting peace and security in this region, and is also connected with the increasing interest of the Mongolian and world public in the problems of the Asian countries and peoples.

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MEMOIRS OF TASS CORRESPONDENT IN BEIJING REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 82 pp 171-173

[Review by B. A. Soborov of book "17 let v Kitaye" [17 Years in China] by M. Yakovlev, Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, 320 pages: "A Timely and Useful Book"]

[Text] Soviet journalists specialising in world affairs have been witnesses to, and often participants in, many important events on our planet. Therefore, their reminiscences, accounts, stories—rich in eyewitness accounts of details unavailable from other sources—are all of great interest to those concerned with the history of international relations. This book by well-travelled journalist, Sinologist M. Yakovlev, is one such publication.

The author lived and worked in China in the 1950s-1970s, mostly as a TASS correspondent. Those were hard years in the history of the country, which, after a fruitful beginning, entered a period laden with tragic events, the period of the "great leap forward", the notorious "cultural revolution", the sharp turn in Soviet-Chinese relations engineered by the top Maoist leadership, which eventually led to China's failure in the socio-economic sphere and is now threatening to turn China into a junior partner of imperialism.

Yakovlev is not just presenting us with his memoirs, he is a thorough researcher. In addition to his reporter's notes, he uses a wealth of related material, and makes frequent references to the works of Soviet Sinologists. All of this makes his book even more convincing, profound and interesting. Although the book covers only the 17 years the author spent in China, in fact, it is a wide review of life in the PRC over the last three decades.

Yakovlev's memoirs were released on the eve of the 26th Congress of the CPSU. The wealth of facts contained in the book became a vivid illustration of the statement made at the Congress by Leonid Brezhnev: "The

experience of the social and economic development of the PRC over the past twenty years is a painful lesson showing what any distortion of the principles and essence of socialism in home and foreign policy leads to".¹

Of special interest in this connection are the pages dealing with the notorious "great leap forward" and the "cultural revolution", the pernicious effects of which has now been recognised inside China.

The "great leap forward" is an example of overt subjectivism and eyewash, a crude violation of the principles of socialism, an attempt to bring about a sharp growth of production in agriculture and industry, a few dozen-fold or even a few hundred-fold, ignoring the objective laws of development and the actual situation in China. All those Maoist experiments, intended to mask the hegemonic aspirations, led to the overstraining and ruining China's underdeveloped productive forces. This had a catastrophic effect on the economy, pushing the backward country even further back for many years.

The "great proletarian cultural revolution" that followed a few years after the "great leap forward" was really a reactionary political coup d'état, which set up a military-bureaucratic dictatorship in China. The "cultural revolution" destroyed the socialist superstructure of Chinese society, led to serious, uncalled-for antagonisms among different strata of the population in China, and provoked, according to the Chinese leaders themselves, elements of civil war in the country. The Chinese economy was severely damaged in that period.

¹ *The 26th CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.*

The Chinese leaders now in power, while admitting the negative effect of the "great leap forward" and the "cultural revolution", are trying to underestimate the harm done by them. This is an expression of both the compromise among the various factions in the current Chinese leadership, and of their attempts to shield Mao Zedong and preserve Maoism as the ideological foundation of present-day China. That is why the decisions of the 6th Plenum of the CPC CC (June, 1981) qualify the "great leap forward" and the "cultural revolution" as mere "errors" either linked to "haste and running ahead" or "exploited by the counterrevolutionary factions".

But this camouflage is not enough to erase the widely known facts, including those mentioned quite recently by Chinese leaders. According to an interview given by former big capitalist from Shanghai, Rong Yiren, to the French newspaper *Matin* (3 September 1980), Deng Xiaoping said at a session of the All-China Committee of the CPPCC that, according to incomplete data, the number of killed during the "cultural revolution" was estimated at 8 to 10 million people, and the number of persecuted, at 200 million. In other words, casualties amounted to one per cent of China's population, while another 25 per cent were treated as criminals. If we add the 20 million people who starved to death as a result of the "great leap forward"² the cost of these two "errors" by Mao Zedong amounts to "at least" 30 million human lives.

The present Chinese leaders, the direct executors of Mao Zedong's will and plans, and the very men who shared most of his views, are simply unwilling to give a fair appraisal of Mao Zedong's devastating policies. At the same time, they are trying to clear themselves. The decisions of the 6th Plenum of the CPC CC show evidence of efforts to cover for Zhou Enlai, too, who is alleged "to have spared no effort and worked untiringly, in spite of reproach and hardships, to minimise the damage resulting from the 'cultural revolution'"³.

Yakovlev's book contains abundant factual material bringing those falsifications into the open and testifying that Zhou Enlai "was aware of much and therefore fell in line and actively promoted the measures initiated by Mao Zedong" (p. 99). With the "great leap forward" in progress, he praised it as a "good direction given and a good line followed by the Centre", putting the blame for the failures on the local authorities (p. 101). During the "cultural revolution", he worked for turn-

ing the hongweibings into a "highly organised army organisation" (p. 187); along with the "gang of four" he took part in the rallies of hongweibings and zaofans, including those that took place under anti-Soviet slogans (pp. 211, 216, 229). He disseminated accusations of "treason" and "betrayals" with respect to other Chinese leaders. He called Peng Dehuai and Qu Qiubo "traitors" (p. 269).

Zhou Enlai played an unseemly role in connection with the anti-Soviet hysteria erupting in China during that period. In that affair, Yakovlev notes, "his was the most infamous role; he revealed himself as the most vehement anti-Soviet of all the Chinese leaders" (p. 227).

Zhou Enlai's conduct of foreign policy during the "cultural revolution" is highly praised in China today as well; he is alleged to have demonstrated "a resolute and businesslike approach when faced with violations of China's foreign policy principles". The case of the hongweibings' burning down a British Mission building is mentioned by way of an example. As Ma Lie and Wang Ning wrote in *Renmin ribao*, Zhou Enlai "voiced sharp criticism on that subject many times", and after the building had been repaired, he "received the British chargé d'affaires especially to congratulate (!) the British on their newly redecorated building".⁴ It is remarkable that in relating this story, the writers of the article were by no means trying to create the impression that Zhou was apologising in any way for the arson, although it constituted a flagrant violation of international law and certainly called for apology.

Zhou Enlai took quite a different line of behaviour during the anti-Soviet row in Peking in February 1967, of which Yakovlev presents an eyewitness account. In light of the rampaging campaign of violence against Soviet personnel, the families of the personnel employed in Soviet offices were asked to return to the USSR. Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Alexei Kosygin, sent a personal message to Zhou Enlai bringing up the issue of ensuring the orderly evacuation of the Soviet families. However, Zhou Enlai turned a deaf ear to this appeal of the Soviet Government. Yakovlev writes that on the day the Soviet families departed from the Peking airport, Zhou Enlai was also there meeting a foreign delegation. He was certainly aware of what was happening, yet he did not interfere. There is a frightening

² See *Daily Telegraph*, April 27, 1981.

³ *Renmin ribao*, July 1, 1981.

⁴ *Renmin ribao*, July 14, 1981.

passage describing how the Soviet women and children passed through a corridor formed by the embassy personnel of socialist and capitalist countries alike, who had come to see them off, while cries of "Dogs", "Scoundrels, go home!", "Down with the Soviet revisionists!" were heard from all sides. (p. 226).

Today's Chinese leaders, in referring to the "cultural revolution" as an "error", are sure to leave out the anti-Soviet political acts of that period. Moreover, the rampant political and ideological campaign against the Soviet Union in that period is now being put to Mao Zedong's credit—yet another proof of the set course of Peking's foreign policy.

In his memoirs, Yakovlev has drawn a truthful and horrifying picture of Maoist China. However, the horrible scenes of Maoism in action he witnessed have not shaken his confidence in the Chinese people. The author ends his book with words of profound optimism, saying that the ideals of the best sons of the Chinese people shall triumph, that new communist patriots will rise in China, new communist internationalists, who will become leaders of the Chinese people and will guide them toward socialism. The author remarks that in writing this book, he was motivated by his belief in such a prospect. And we would like to add on our own part: it is a good piece of writing, truthful and undoubtedly useful.

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BOOK ON ARMY ROLE IN PRC POLITICS REVIEWED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 82 (signed to press 17 Feb 82) pp 202-204

[Review by B. N. Gorbachev, candidate of historical sciences, of book "Armiya Kitaya--orudiye avanturisticheskoy politiki maoistov" [The Chinese Army--An Instrument of Maoist Adventurist Policy" by G. N. Mos'ko, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1980, 144 pages: "The Army at the Service of the Maoists"]

[Text] The continuation of the struggle against the policy and ideology of Maoism and against the aggressive intrigues of the Beijing leaders is one of today's crucial tasks. At a time when China is allying itself more and more closely with imperialism on the basis of anti-Sovietism and struggle against progressive forces, the need arises for the continued exposure of the Beijing leadership's great-power policy and the disclosure of the workings of the Maoists' anti-people regime.

This is what G. N. Mos'ko hoped to do when he wrote "Armiya Kitaya--orudiye avanturisticheskoy politiki maoistov," a book published by the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The book is a study of the place and role of the armed forces in the policy of the Beijing leaders, and of the means and methods used to turn the army into a weapon of the military-bureaucratic Maoist regime and to militarize the country.

The Maoists have good reason to rely on the army. They have always regarded it as the principal instrument of domestic political struggle, and the militarization of politics and economics as the most suitable means of organizing the Chinese society. Mao Zedong's motto of the 1930's, "Authority springs from the rifle," testifies eloquently to his belief in the use of the armed forces as the deciding factor in the pursuit of policy.

After encountering mounting opposition to his adventuristic line when the "Great Leap Forward" failed, Mao Zedong decided to use the armed forces in the struggle against his opponents. For this purpose, Mao fought for total control over the army, which had always been a source of opposition to the Maoist line.

The author validly begins his discussion with an examination of the means and methods by which Mao Zedong was able to consolidate his position in the army by the middle of the 1960's. He concentrates here on a thorough analysis of the main

ideological campaigns in the PLA (1959-1964). These ideological and political movements, which were first tried out on the "army range," were then modified for the entire Chinese society.

The campaigns of ideological, moral and psychological pressure, conducted in an atmosphere of strong petty bourgeois, nationalist tendencies in the CCP, helped the Maoists gain stronger control over the army and put their opponents in a weaker position. One of the reasons for this, G. N. Mos'ko stresses, was the weakness of proletarian, internationalist forces in the army, and in the CCP as well, due to the general underdevelopment of the country, the weaker contacts with the armies of the socialist countries and the withdrawal from the international communist movement in general (p 18).

The ideological campaigns were supplemented with a sweeping wave of purges, repression and executions of commanders and political cadres who had displeased Mao Zedong.

The beginning of the 1960's was marked by the active inclusion of the army in the resolution of sociopolitical problems in the Chinese society. The Chinese leadership began to employ the army on a broad scale as a police force for the suppression of demonstrations by the laboring public against the policy of the "Great Leap Forward" and its after-effects. In February 1964 a movement was launched in China, "The Entire Nation Must Learn from the PLA," with the aim of militarizing the party and state bureaucracy and the entire system of ideological indoctrination. Mao Zedong called the army a matchless example and a model which should be emulated by the entire Chinese society.

When Mao Zedong's group had failed to attain its goals solely through the use of political campaigns, it resorted to terrorist actions and launched the so-called "Cultural Revolution."

The author presents a fairly detailed analysis of the place and role of the armed forces in the "Cultural Revolution." He logically divides the army's participation in the events of the "Cultural Revolution" into stages, consistently describing the military's actions to back up the Red Guards (November 1965-January 1967), the army's support of the seizure of power by the "left" (January-August 1967) and the army's action to strengthen the military-bureaucratic regime after September 1967. Mos'ko departs from the traditional approach, according to which the "Cultural Revolution" ended at the time of the Ninth CCP Congress, and suggests that this congress should be regarded as a new stage in the struggle of Mao Zedong's group against his political and ideological opponents (p 62).

The detailed descriptions in the book cogently testify that the main result of army participation in the domestic political struggle in these years was the establishment of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship in the country. They illustrate the futility of the present Chinese leaders' attempts to conceal the truth about the tragic consequences of the "Cultural Revolution" from the Chinese laborers and the international public and to whitewash the army, which was the main instrument of the Maoists' terrorist military coup. For example, the "Decisions on Some Questions of CCP History Since the Time of the PRC's Founding," adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, ignore the facts and imply that the army's actions to implement the campaign of the "Three Supports and Two Military Measures" (for the

establishment of military control) "were necessary in the chaos of that time" and "played a positive role in stabilizing the situation." The acknowledgement of the unspecified "negative effects" of this campaign does not change the overall apologetic assessment of the military's role in the "Cultural Revolution." At the conclusion of his analysis of the complex and contradictory events of the "Cultural Revolution," G. N. Mos'ko draws the sound conclusion that its chief victim was the Chinese population and the socialist conquests won during the years of popular democracy. The army, which secured the overthrow of this government for Mao Zedong and his group and ensured them victory over their political opponents, ceased to be the defender of the gains of the people's revolution and became the Maoist regime's main base of support and weapon and a political force standing above the people (p 61).

The book contains an interesting analysis of the ways in which the Chinese leaders used the army to attain their political goals after the "Cultural Revolution." The examination of documents and papers pertaining to the struggle between various groups within the army and the fight for control over the army is of particular interest.

For example, in his discussion of the causes and consequences of the "Lin Biao affair," the author correctly associates them with the Chinese leaders' vacillating course in the nation's economic life and with fundamental changes in PRC foreign policy aims (p 74). There is no question that the "September crisis" (1971) involved more than the "Lin Biao affair." This complex event demonstrated the impossibility of solving the country's socioeconomic problems with Maoist methods, the instability of the Maoist regime and the PRC's increasingly pronounced departure from the world communist movement and the socialist community. These and other factors gave rise to another split in the Chinese leadership, which resulted in the expulsion of a group of prominent military leaders from the political arena, including Defense Minister Lin Biao.

The expulsion of Lin Biao was not, however, a strike against the armed forces in general and the militarization process in the PRC political mechanism. The army remained the chief organizing force on whose support the Maoists could rely (p 77). Subsequent events showed that the role and influence of the army grew stronger and broader under the conditions of continuous struggle for power, political instability and the retention of the fundamental bases of the Maoist socioeconomic course.

This was reflected above all in the continued efforts to militarize the country and preparations for war. On the basis of abundant factual material, G. N. Mos'ko describes the Chinese army's role in the Maoists' aggressive plans and actions and the peculiarities of China's military organization and the combat training and ideological indoctrination of PLA personnel.

After resolving to provoke military incidents and aggressive actions against many states, the Chinese leaders made certain changes in the Maoist theory of "people's war" for the better adaptation of Chinese military doctrine to their great-power goals. Pointing out some of these changes in military doctrine, the author stresses that Beijing doctrinal concepts, which were once of a primarily defensive nature, are now aggressive and are supposed to secure the hegemonic plans of the Chinese leadership, for which the Maoists have created the largest forces in the world (p 107).

The Beijing leaders have now moved from ideological struggle against the socialist community and progressive and peaceful forces to political, economic and even military struggle. This was reflected in the use of military force and armed provocations against the USSR, MPR, India, Laos, Kampuchea and several other countries. China's treacherous invasion of the SRV in 1979 completely exposed the aggressive, militaristic and chauvinistic essence of Maoism.

The author not only discusses the failure of the armed venture against the SRV but also debunks the false theories propounded by imperialist ideologists that wars are engendered by socialism as well as by capitalism. In fact, neither the doctrine nor the political system of socialism does or can bear any of the responsibility for the Chinese army's invasion of Vietnam. This piratical invasion was motivated and dictated not by socialist ideals, but by Maoism--an ideology and policy openly hostile to Marxism-Leninism, an ideology and policy of chauvinism, great-power aims and hegemonism (p 113).

The Maoists' growing military-political cooperation with imperialism is discussed in the final chapter of the book. Analyzing the important aspects of the Beijing-Washington rapprochement and China's closer military contacts with the NATO countries and Japan, the author concludes that Beijing's move toward military-political alliance with American imperialism, Japanese revanchism and the aggressive NATO bloc provides conclusive proof of the Beijing ruling clique's rejection of the fundamental principles of socialist foreign policy. When the Beijing hegemonists acquire weapons from the imperialists and build up their nuclear missile potential, they are not preparing to ward off the mythical "threat from the North." China's broader military-political cooperation with imperialism and the intense effort to coordinate their actions are intended to weaken real socialism's position and sabotage the positive resolution of urgent international problems. There is an obvious conspiracy to "put the squeeze" on the Soviet Union from the West and the East. The Chinese leaders' present policy is hostile to the interests of other peoples and has nothing in common with the Chinese people's own desire to return to the socialist road of national development (p 143).

In conclusion, it must be said that the author's research required the study of numerous sources and books about the army's role in Chinese domestic and foreign policy and in the Chinese leadership's factional struggle. However, even though the book is intended for the general public, it would have benefited from a broader scientific reference base.

G. N. Mos'ko has made an important contribution to the study of the complex process by which the Chinese army turned into an instrument of the Maoists' adventuristic policy. His book not only exposes the militaristic aims of the Beijing leaders but also provides convincing evidence of the need to continue the thorough investigation of the military aspects of Chinese policy, which are posing a mounting threat to world peace.

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JAPANESE BOOK ON INVESTMENT IN S.E. ASIA CRITICIZED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 82 pp 173-176

[Review by Yu. Ye. Bugayev of book "Japanese Industrial Enterprises in Southeast Asia" by Yoshio Matsui, Tokyo, Jiji Mondai Kaisetsu, 1979, 184 pages: "Japanese Capital in Southeast Asia"]

[Text]

Yoshio Matsui who is on the staff of the economic department of *Yomiuri*, the largest Japanese daily newspaper, has written a book that has been published in the Urgent Problems Series, which examines such major problems as "The United Vietnam and Indochina", "Japanese-Soviet Relations", "East-West Trade", etc. The pub-

shers describe the series as a "useful aid for a correct understanding of current problems" (p. 182). Getting somewhat ahead of the story, one might say that this particular book completely fulfils the publishers' task of giving the reader a broad enough picture of the Japanese monopolies' economic expansion in Southeast Asia (SEA), as the author has cleverly selected and systematised separate facts. In this respect the book is a genuine manual on economic expansion based on the Japanese companies' penetration into Southeast Asian countries.

There is no secret that Japan deems relations with the Southeast Asian countries as especially important, considering them a traditional zone of influence, first of all a vast market for Japanese-made goods. On the other hand, these countries are Japan's major suppliers of raw materials and fuel.

Japan also considers Southeast Asia and the Pacific of crucial political importance, as the situation in the region defines, to a considerable extent, its possibilities for attaining its global goals. The region is important for Japan from a military and strategic angle, too, its seas and oceans being the main routes along which Japan receives its raw materials and fuel. This book by Matsui is of interest to the reader because its contents go beyond the limits of a mere narrative on the endeavours of the Japanese industrial enterprises in the SEA countries. The author presents a broad picture of the establishment of ties between Japan and SEA, its rivalry with the US in the region, and Japan's relations with China and Vietnam.

The book begins with a more precise definition of "the region of Southeast Asia" because the notion differs somewhat in various countries. Paying attention mainly to the activity of the Japanese firms in the ASEAN countries (Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia) and Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea, he discusses in the last chapter Japan's links with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and China.

When Japanese imperialism was defeated in the Second World War, Japan lost all its colonies, all foreign assets and investments. It took Japan about ten years to

rehabilitate the economy, during which time the countries of Southeast Asia were "next-door neighbours with whom one has little in common, as Japan strove to reach the world development level as soon as possible, using West European and US technology to restore its economy," the author explains (p. 9).

In the latter part of the 1950s, the Japanese monopolies which had regained their strength again joined in the fight over sources of raw material, markets, and spheres of capital investment. After restoring diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries, Japan began step-by-step economic expansion in the SEA countries, first paying them reparations and giving "aid" to push Japanese goods onto their markets. Matsui refers to the 1960s as the time when the Japanese companies began a consistent infiltration into the SEA countries, strengthening relations with them. Today "Japan has such large investments in SEA that heads the list in many of these countries. The establishment of factories with modern equipment has improved the employment situation and greatly contributed to the development of Southeast Asian economy," the author states (p. 10). One should note that this is only one side of the coin. We shall deal with the negative aspects of Japan's "great contribution" to the Southeast Asian economy later.

Considering Japanese economic expansion into SEA, the author points out the flexibility and diversity of methods used: foreign trade, export of capital, "aid", and reparations. Payments are among them, with foreign trade undoubtedly remaining the major form of penetration. "Since the latter half of the 1960s", Matsui writes, "trade relations have been expanding. In 1976, for instance, Japan accounted for 26 per cent of all ASEAN exports, with the US being pressed back to the second place (21 per cent). As for imports of the five countries, Japan was also in the lead, accounting for 23 per cent, while the US share was only 15 per cent" (p. 10). The author also mentions the envirorization of "personal contacts", ties between trade firms and services, banks, etc., in Japan and the ASEAN countries. "Years ago the saying went," the author writes, "'when America sneezes, Japan catches cold'. Now they say,

'When Japan coughs, Southeast Asia gets pneumonia'." Thus, the author shows dependence of the SEA countries on Japan. He adds: "It goes without saying that these relations are of great importance for Japan, too, the SEA region being second after the US in this respect" (p. 10).

Matsui concludes: "Economic prosperity and political stability in the region have doubtlessly become the major factor of the Japanese economy" (p. 11). Regrettably, the author does not define "political stability" precisely. Japan's practical steps vis-à-vis Vietnam and Kampuchea show, however, that regardless of the "Fukuda Doctrine" and other statements on Japan's desire to make a constructive contribution "to peace in Asia", its policy in the region hinges on creating a vast sphere of influence there and forming a kind of "cordon sanitaire" around the countries of Indochina. It is just this "political stability" that Japanese monopolies want, the reader concludes, no matter what the author means by it.

Let us examine some of the key aspects of Matsui's book, those most important for understanding the subject under review.

Private investment was and remains a basic means by which the Japanese companies penetrate into the SEA countries. "When one gets off the airplane and rides for half an hour in a car in any country of Southeast Asia," the author writes, "one notices ads of Japanese firms incessantly flashing by: Noshonary, Toshiba, Toyota, and others. One gets the impression of Japanese energy brimming over" (p. 13).

Matsui confirms this impression with figures of Japan's investment policy. In 1977, a third of all Japan's foreign investments (\$ 6,328 mln) was made in Asian countries. The author gives the investment figures for each country separately, thus demonstrating the Japanese companies' interest in particular countries.

"In 1977 Japan made the following direct investments: \$ 3,128 million in Indonesia, \$ 785 million in South Korea, \$ 556 million in Hong Kong, \$ 425 million in Malaysia, \$ 381 million in the Philippines, \$ 370 million in Singapore, \$ 277 million in Thailand, \$ 244 million in Taiwan, and \$ 162 million in other countries" (p. 40).

Analysing in what branches investments were made in 1951-1976, Matsui stresses that

40 per cent of the capital went to the extracting industries in the SEA states. "It was absolutely necessary to increase investments in the mining of major raw materials, including oil, natural gas, bauxites, metal ores, etc. The growth of the 'high rates' economy unquestionably demanded raw materials resources. Naturally, penetration into Asia, a region of vast resources and cheap labour, began" (pp. 20, 60-61).

The author shows an understanding of the nature of the Japanese companies' acts—in fact, their shameless plunder of the raw materials belonging to their neighbours in Southeast Asia—that has been enhanced systematically since the early 1970s.

Japan imports oil from Indonesia and Singapore, bauxites from Indonesia and Malaysia; metal ores from Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia; natural rubber from Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, making investments and entrenching itself primarily in these industries (pp. 22, 26-42).

Depending on local conditions, the Japanese monopolies choose ways and means that will be most effective in the given country. "However, no matter what country we discuss," Matsui writes, "the manner of penetration is common for all Japanese investments: it consists in setting up companies run jointly with local capitalists. Huaqiao are accepted as partners in most cases (South Korea being an exception) for which local governments frequently criticise the Japanese companies. More often than not, several companies—industrial, trade and others—are set up simultaneously, based on Japanese capital. This is a distinctly Japanese 'new model' of penetration" (p. 25).

It is hardly possible to name an industry in the SEA countries which Japanese capital has ignored. In all fairness it should be said, however, that the "new model" carries out the old expansionist functions. Scanning the list of items of trade between Japan and SEA is enough to see its typically neocolonial nature: Japan mainly exports manufactured goods and imports raw materials. With the exception of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, its main suppliers of raw materials, the balances of payment of the rest of the countries are chronically passive, since they import the means of production from Japan, in line

with loans and credits granted earlier, and equipment for the joint companies set up after the "new model".

Beginning in the early 1970s, economic expansion of the Japanese monopolies came to contradict the national interests of the developing SEA countries. While previously hostility toward Japanese businessmen did not manifest itself outwardly, in 1972 overt actions against the sway of the Japanese capital began. They reached a peak during the then Prime Minister K. Tanaka's tour of the SEA countries (from 7 to 17 January, 1974). Says Matsui: "The anti-Japanese sentiment of 1972-1973 overflowed in Thailand, Indonesia and other countries. These were hard times for the Japanese companies. Having lived through the trials, however, relations between Japan and the Asian countries have become much closer of late. One cannot assert that the anti-Japanese sentiment has entirely evaporated; it is as deep-rooted as before, and Japan should never forget about it" (p. 67).

The author's analysis of the charges against the Japanese companies in the SEA countries is also of interest. Matsui divides them into three groups: 1) charges against the company boards; 2) general problems of relations between Japanese companies and local authorities; 3) charges against the Japanese themselves. Within the first group, the author singles out the following accusations: "the Japanese companies are interested in gaining profit alone", they "exploit people for low wages", and "choose only the huaqiao as partners". Accusations in the second group include "seizure of raw materials", "small-scale purchases of local goods"; those in the third, "haughty and indecent manners", the "isolation of Japanese society", etc. "To tell the truth, some of these accusations and charges are just", writes Matsui (p. 68). But the author has cited far from all the charges against the Japanese; and all these accusations are just. This is the seamy side of the "great contribution" made by Japanese companies to the local economy mentioned at the beginning of this review.

According to Matsui, Japan and the SEA countries should have equitable, mutually-beneficial relations. As to the anti-Japanese sentiment, the author recommends that every conflict be settled by means of

"patient talks" (p. 68). To be sure, negotiations are helpful in any conflict, but in this particular case, much more is needed—namely, a radical restructuring of the entire system of economic relations between Japan and the SEA countries, genuinely equitable cooperation and mutual assistance. One could hardly expect the Japanese monopolies to follow that path.

The last chapter of the book, "A New Development", deals with the prospects of relations between Japan and the SEA states. The industrialisation of the latter, which accelerated in the 1970s, led to a sharper competition between Japan and these countries, especially in the textile industry. The author writes that a "state-level regulation, by the Ministries of Industry and Foreign Trade, regarding the production of certain goods, became necessary". "In this respect, a division of labour between the ASEAN states is needed. Japan should actively promote the process" (p. 137).

By way of example, in terms of cooperation between the ASEAN states, the author describes the project of the so-called ASEAN automobile conceived in 1971. Because of disagreements between the participants on who should produce what, the first results emerged only in May 1978. The car bodies were to be made in Thailand, engines in the Philippines, transmissions and Foreign Trade regarding the production but specific prospects for the project remaining vague. Matsui is concerned that the division of labour between the ASEAN countries has turned a complex affair. However, "cooperation is moving forward little by little. Negotiations on the expansion of the variety of goods enjoying preferential taxes within ASEAN are successful. Projects of uniting the five ASEAN states into some sort of a huge trade company have been suggested. Japan should encourage these moves, the author asserts. While harmonious relations between Japan and the SEA countries are being adjusted, it should pay close attention to the division of labour, avoiding excessive rivalry" (p. 141).

In fact, Matsui states, a number of objective difficulties prevent economic rapprochement between Japan and ASEAN countries, primarily the grave discrepancy between the

economic levels of Japan and some of the ASEAN states, which is sure to make them dependent on it.

Matsui devotes only a few pages to China and Vietnam in his book. China is regarded only in the context of its leadership's attitude to the huaqiao whose capital is prevalent in the joint SEA companies. After the dismissal of the "gang of four". Peking proclaimed a policy of "using big capital possessed by the huaqiao and the information they can provide, for modernising China" (p. 152). The author is of the opinion that the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China in 1978 has brought about a new aspect in the activity of Japan in SEA: now the Japanese entrepreneurs must manoeuvre ever more cautiously between the local governments and huaqiao capital "over whose heads mainland China is looming ever closer" (p. 154).

As far as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is concerned, the author reminds us that "Vietnam is closely connected with the USSR while its confrontation with China is being aggravated". Matsui probably considers close contacts between the USSR and any country dangerous for the Japanese companies. The reader probably wonders whether Matsui knew that the Japanese government itself had inflicted losses on its own business circles by freezing the supplies from Japan to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on a false pretext in 1980. These supplies, to the tune of 14 billion yen, were to be made on account of the loans and credits granted to the SRV earlier.

Having scrupulously examined the activity of the Japanese industrial enterprises in Southeast Asia, Matsui has confined himself to the factual aspect, showing a traditional bourgeois fear of positive changes in the world, which have resulted in the emergence of a new political situation in the region. The book demonstrates that Japan is pursuing an economic policy of preferential relations with the ASEAN countries ensuring, according to the author, "economic prosperity and political stability in the region". In reality, this goal can be attained only by means of equitable cooperation between Japan and all the SEA countries.

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OBITUARY OF SINOLOGIST, DIPLOMAT V. I. LAZAREV

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 82 (signed to press
17 Feb 82) p 208

[Text] Soviet Sinology has suffered a great loss. Vladimir Ivanovich Lazarev, a prominent expert on current Chinese affairs and CPSU Central Committee official, has met an untimely end.

V. I. Lazarev was born in 1923. Like the rest of his generation, he grew up in the flames of the Great Patriotic War. V. I. Lazarev defended his own homeland and helped to liberate the fraternal Czechs from the fascist yoke. The war also gave him a great deal of political maturity. It was no coincidence that he enrolled in the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs after demobilization.

In 1952 V. I. Lazarev began to study China and acquired a wealth of knowledge about the history, economics, culture and language of this country. He continued, however, to concentrate on international relations, especially Soviet-Chinese relations, and took a special interest in the class struggle in the PRC and the social policy of the CCP.

When he was on the staff of the Soviet Embassy in the PRC, V. I. Lazarev devoted all of his knowledge and energy to the reinforcement of relations between the USSR and people's China. When the Maoist group in the CCP leadership began its schismatic activity in the international communist and workers movement and started to openly propose its own "special" platform on the main issues of that day, primarily issues of war and peace, our party transferred V. I. Lazarev to a position requiring analytical skills. He was a member of the CPSU Central Committee staff for a long time, until the end of his life.

V. I. Lazarev displayed the best features of a party Sinologist-publicist: firm ideological conviction, intolerance for any sign of opportunism, a fighting spirit in polemics and a profound knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory. Many of his articles were published in KOMMUNIST, VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS and other publications. In them, he described the social roots of Maoist policy and the nature and roots of Maoist anti-Sovietism and analyzed the sociopolitical implications of events in China from a Marxist-Leninist vantage point.

In 1974 V. I. Lazarev published a book entitled "Voprosy sovremennoy diplomaticeskoy taktiki v rabotakh V. I. Lenina" [Questions Connected with Contemporary Diplomatic

Tactics in the Works of V. I. Lenin], in which he used Lenin's invaluable legacy to prove that the struggle for peace and international detente is an organic feature of socialist diplomacy. At the end of 1981 a new book by V. I. Lazarev was published--"Klassovaya bor'ba v Kitaye" [The Class Struggle in China]. In this book, the author traced the evolution of Maoism as a petty bourgeois nationalist current and revealed the danger Maoism poses to the fate of the Chinese revolution, the socialist world and the national liberation movement.

V. I. Lazarev was an exceptionally modest and principled man who demanded much of himself and others. It was his vocation and his party duty to struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism and for a peaceful future for the Soviet people and a socialist future for China. As a fighter, he completed his mission. If his life had not been cut short so suddenly, he could have done even more as a Sinologist. But the articles and books he was able to write will serve as a weapon for many years in the struggle against revisionist distortions of Marxism and will serve as an example of adherence to party principles in Sinology. Soviet Sinologists will retain good memories of V. I. Lazarev as a man and as a Sinologist.

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